onejayhawk
Afflicted with reason
This was going on in an almost completely unrelated thread. It seems a good time to start a new one.
That being said, the point of a fighter plane is to kill other aircraft, and not be killed by them. It is useless to say that the Zero was faster, had better climb, etc. When push came to shove, squadron level engagements, several planes tore the Zero up, The Flying Tigers and F4F carrier planes are the relevant ones to this discussion.
Up front, I will acknowledge that 1 on 1, an F4F is dog meat. The Zero will get behind and stay there til the Wildcat is toast. The USN quickly figured this out, and trained crews to fly wing on wing, still the current doctrine.
One plane can tail one plane. Two planes find it much harder to tail two cooperating planes. This negated a lot of the Zero's maneuverability advantage, and brought the F4F's firepower advantage to bear. In any dogfight of passing shots and angled attacks, the F4F has all the face cards, and soon, most of the Aces.
Though one Wildcat was no match for one Zero, two Wildcats, in good formation, were an evern fight for three, or even four, Zeros. See also the Marines, flying Corsairs, using the same doctrine.
It should mentioned, again, that early in the war, the Japanese had a huge experience advantage. They squandered it by not rotating veterans out of combat for rearm and retrain, or whatever you apply to the letters R&R. Within a couple of years of fighting, almost all the Pearl Harbor veterans were unavailable to train newbees.
J
Even the Wildcat was better than the Zero. The American problems early in the war had more to do with training and experience than with hardware. Once the USN developed a decent doctrine, and the cream of the Japanese fighter corps had died in combat, even numbers of F4F's and Zeroes was a mismatch--against the Japanese. Between Coral Sea and Midway the Japanese lost their entire edge in pilot experince, never to be recovered.
J
I grant the combat range was very important, and should be considered.I would certainly say the Zero was technically superior to the Wildcat. First of all, in the Zeros greatest strength, its combat range, it completely outpaces the F4F. while the Zero could travel 2,000 miles, the F4F could only go 770. This was critical in the pacific theatre. During early operations, the Japanese were genuinely confused at why fighters disapeared over the East Indies once they were captured. They didn't realize that American fighters couldn't fly cover over the East Indies flying from Australia. Zeros had no trouble doing the inverse.
Now lets compare the two, even when based on the Zeros traditional weak points: Firepower, Maximum Speed, and rate of climb.
The Zeros rate of climb was 3,100 ft/min, compared to 1,950 ft/min for the F4F, The Zero is slightly faster being able to reach 331 MPH versus 320 for the F4F. Even in firepower, they Zero can match the F4F, if not best it.
I think its fair to say that when it entered service, the Zero was the best carrier based fighter in the world, if not the best fighter in the world.
That being said, the point of a fighter plane is to kill other aircraft, and not be killed by them. It is useless to say that the Zero was faster, had better climb, etc. When push came to shove, squadron level engagements, several planes tore the Zero up, The Flying Tigers and F4F carrier planes are the relevant ones to this discussion.
Up front, I will acknowledge that 1 on 1, an F4F is dog meat. The Zero will get behind and stay there til the Wildcat is toast. The USN quickly figured this out, and trained crews to fly wing on wing, still the current doctrine.
One plane can tail one plane. Two planes find it much harder to tail two cooperating planes. This negated a lot of the Zero's maneuverability advantage, and brought the F4F's firepower advantage to bear. In any dogfight of passing shots and angled attacks, the F4F has all the face cards, and soon, most of the Aces.
Though one Wildcat was no match for one Zero, two Wildcats, in good formation, were an evern fight for three, or even four, Zeros. See also the Marines, flying Corsairs, using the same doctrine.
It should mentioned, again, that early in the war, the Japanese had a huge experience advantage. They squandered it by not rotating veterans out of combat for rearm and retrain, or whatever you apply to the letters R&R. Within a couple of years of fighting, almost all the Pearl Harbor veterans were unavailable to train newbees.
J