The question of Winston Churchill as one of the great leaders of history came up on another thread, and I'd like to start a discussion about his role in the Galipoli campaign in WW I. Churchill has traditionally taken much of the blame for the Dardanelles debacle among historians - the failed operation and the massive casualties. There was even a popular antiwar movie, Galipoli, with Mell Gibson.
But in his (autobiographical) history of the First World War, The World Crisis, Mr. Churchill defends himself from these charges. And while Max Hastings and others warn us about Churchill's (Nobel Prize winner, Literature, 1953) "persuasive eloquence", the former First Lord of the Admiralty presents a convincing argument to the American military mind.
In the last decade or so, a new term began to surface in defense literature such as Armed Forces Journal and Proceedings. This concept is called "mission creep". Mission creep refers to a military operation or campaign that is begun by one (Presidential) administration, but is completed, often in failure, by another. Operations such as Bay of Pigs (Eisenhower/Kennedy) and Somalia (Bush41/Clinton), are examples of mission creep. The campaign is planned or initiated by one administration - but then there's an election - and a new administration, often of the opposite political party, comes to power. This new leadership, with different principles, judgement, agendas, personel - and often burdened with contrary political campaign promises (i.e., Obama - withdrawal from Iraq) - cannot help but to alter the planning, change the rules of engagement, shift the dates and times, and water-down the military power expended. In Bay of Pigs, the Kennedy administration withdrew the planned USAF and USN support to the Free Cuban Brigade. Whether that strategy could have worked or not, eliminating air and naval support absolutely doomed the plan. In Somalia, the Clinton administration recalled the Marine and Mountain Divisions - which had heretofore intimidated the warlords into inaction - and replaced them with second-string UN troops. This led of course to the "Black Hawk Down" incident, and ultimately to American forces pulling-out (These Colors Do Run) altogether. A diagnostic of mission creep is the later administration's need to find scapegoats among the former. The "Irish Mafia" for years defended JFK's shortcomings, and blamed Eisenhower's administration for saddling them with an "unworkable albatross" of a plan (which they carried out anyway, since they needed Florida's Cuban voters).
In Mr. Churchill's contention, he employs a mission creep style argument. He doesn't call it that, it's modern American jargon, but the pattern of changing personel and loss of focus is there.
He recognized (along with Lord Kitchener and others) the need to aid Britain's ally in the war, Russia, which possessed great manpower but few modern weapons; and the best supply route was through the Dardanelles to Sevastopol on the Black Sea. Army forces would be needed to assault the Galipoli penninsula, seize the seaforts dominating the straits, and threaten Istanbul. This latter follow-up operation typically Churchillian precursor planning. However, as naval chief, he didn't have the cooperation of the Army (or the French), which understandably were busy at the time in NE France. So it didn't immediately take place. Then there was regime change. Due to the pressures of the war itself, the casualty lists, early defeats, the Easter Rebellion in Ireland, and the loss of crucial labour support over the Compulsory Military Service Bill, the Asquith ministry at first forms a coalition with the conservatives (25May15), and then ultimately resigns (4Dec15). Churchill is removed from the Admiralty (25May15) and is replaced by Balfour. Meanwhile Kitchener (Churchill's opposite number in the War Minitsry), then a supporter of the plan, dies at sea when his ship sinks during a mission to Russia, and is replaced by Lloyd George.
Eventually, the Galipoli plan is approved, but the punch was telegraphed by Admiral Carden's naval raids up the Dardanelles from February 19th. The Turks, now alerted, increased their minefields in the straits and sent troops, under their finest commander, Mustapha Kemal (later Ataturk) - with German advisors, to defend Galipoli. British General Sir Ian Hamilton improvised an amphibious force and carried out a series of uncoordinated and unconnected landings on the penninsula. At one location, an old collier, the River Clyde, was employed as a kind of landing craft, but when its ramp dropped to disgorge its troops, a Turkish machine gun company openned-up and annihilated the entire force. On another beach, British troops landed without opposition, but remained there, not penetrating inland or linking up with other beacheads, until the Turks finnally arrived to surround them. A number of pointless battles and fruitless additional landings took place in following months until what's left of the force withdrew in January, 1916. Ironically, the retreat was the only successful operation of the entire campaign.
Churchill briefly held a minor post in the coalition ministry, but soon quit and served with the army in France, while also maintaining his MP status as a backbencher. He later rejoins the government. But for most of the Battle of Galipoli - April 1915 to January 1916 - Churchill is out of the loop - and the campaign, known for its incompetence, casualties, and foolishly stubborn persistance - is carried out beyond his reach to influence events. And who does the new government blame for its failure? Kitchener, the hero of Khartoum, is dead. Lloyd George, who actually carried out the plan, is now the PM. That leaves....
I don't suppose anyone out there might disagree?
Sources:
The World Crisis, 1991-1918, Winston S. Churchill, 1931, Charles Scribner's Sons.
An Encyclopedia of World History, ed. William L. Langer, 1968, Houghton Mifflin Company.
A Short History of World War I, James L. Stokesbury, 1981, William Morrow and Company.
But in his (autobiographical) history of the First World War, The World Crisis, Mr. Churchill defends himself from these charges. And while Max Hastings and others warn us about Churchill's (Nobel Prize winner, Literature, 1953) "persuasive eloquence", the former First Lord of the Admiralty presents a convincing argument to the American military mind.
In the last decade or so, a new term began to surface in defense literature such as Armed Forces Journal and Proceedings. This concept is called "mission creep". Mission creep refers to a military operation or campaign that is begun by one (Presidential) administration, but is completed, often in failure, by another. Operations such as Bay of Pigs (Eisenhower/Kennedy) and Somalia (Bush41/Clinton), are examples of mission creep. The campaign is planned or initiated by one administration - but then there's an election - and a new administration, often of the opposite political party, comes to power. This new leadership, with different principles, judgement, agendas, personel - and often burdened with contrary political campaign promises (i.e., Obama - withdrawal from Iraq) - cannot help but to alter the planning, change the rules of engagement, shift the dates and times, and water-down the military power expended. In Bay of Pigs, the Kennedy administration withdrew the planned USAF and USN support to the Free Cuban Brigade. Whether that strategy could have worked or not, eliminating air and naval support absolutely doomed the plan. In Somalia, the Clinton administration recalled the Marine and Mountain Divisions - which had heretofore intimidated the warlords into inaction - and replaced them with second-string UN troops. This led of course to the "Black Hawk Down" incident, and ultimately to American forces pulling-out (These Colors Do Run) altogether. A diagnostic of mission creep is the later administration's need to find scapegoats among the former. The "Irish Mafia" for years defended JFK's shortcomings, and blamed Eisenhower's administration for saddling them with an "unworkable albatross" of a plan (which they carried out anyway, since they needed Florida's Cuban voters).
In Mr. Churchill's contention, he employs a mission creep style argument. He doesn't call it that, it's modern American jargon, but the pattern of changing personel and loss of focus is there.
He recognized (along with Lord Kitchener and others) the need to aid Britain's ally in the war, Russia, which possessed great manpower but few modern weapons; and the best supply route was through the Dardanelles to Sevastopol on the Black Sea. Army forces would be needed to assault the Galipoli penninsula, seize the seaforts dominating the straits, and threaten Istanbul. This latter follow-up operation typically Churchillian precursor planning. However, as naval chief, he didn't have the cooperation of the Army (or the French), which understandably were busy at the time in NE France. So it didn't immediately take place. Then there was regime change. Due to the pressures of the war itself, the casualty lists, early defeats, the Easter Rebellion in Ireland, and the loss of crucial labour support over the Compulsory Military Service Bill, the Asquith ministry at first forms a coalition with the conservatives (25May15), and then ultimately resigns (4Dec15). Churchill is removed from the Admiralty (25May15) and is replaced by Balfour. Meanwhile Kitchener (Churchill's opposite number in the War Minitsry), then a supporter of the plan, dies at sea when his ship sinks during a mission to Russia, and is replaced by Lloyd George.
Eventually, the Galipoli plan is approved, but the punch was telegraphed by Admiral Carden's naval raids up the Dardanelles from February 19th. The Turks, now alerted, increased their minefields in the straits and sent troops, under their finest commander, Mustapha Kemal (later Ataturk) - with German advisors, to defend Galipoli. British General Sir Ian Hamilton improvised an amphibious force and carried out a series of uncoordinated and unconnected landings on the penninsula. At one location, an old collier, the River Clyde, was employed as a kind of landing craft, but when its ramp dropped to disgorge its troops, a Turkish machine gun company openned-up and annihilated the entire force. On another beach, British troops landed without opposition, but remained there, not penetrating inland or linking up with other beacheads, until the Turks finnally arrived to surround them. A number of pointless battles and fruitless additional landings took place in following months until what's left of the force withdrew in January, 1916. Ironically, the retreat was the only successful operation of the entire campaign.
Churchill briefly held a minor post in the coalition ministry, but soon quit and served with the army in France, while also maintaining his MP status as a backbencher. He later rejoins the government. But for most of the Battle of Galipoli - April 1915 to January 1916 - Churchill is out of the loop - and the campaign, known for its incompetence, casualties, and foolishly stubborn persistance - is carried out beyond his reach to influence events. And who does the new government blame for its failure? Kitchener, the hero of Khartoum, is dead. Lloyd George, who actually carried out the plan, is now the PM. That leaves....
I don't suppose anyone out there might disagree?
Sources:
The World Crisis, 1991-1918, Winston S. Churchill, 1931, Charles Scribner's Sons.
An Encyclopedia of World History, ed. William L. Langer, 1968, Houghton Mifflin Company.
A Short History of World War I, James L. Stokesbury, 1981, William Morrow and Company.
