Could China have defeated Japan on its own? Could Japan have won at all?

[amadeus]

Conditions:

• Japan neither attacks nor is attacked by any Allied power
• The U.S./Allies do not restrict trade to Japan
• China receives no foreign aid

Doing only the most elementary reading of the Second Sino-Japanese war, it seemed as though as it dragged on it would still have been impossible for Japan to conquer China, much less (effectively) administrate it after conquest. However, I have no idea if this is actually the case and want to defer to those with more detailed knowledge.

Thanks / 謝謝 / ありがとう

 

[Ajidica]

Conquer China? Not likely. It is too big.
Get all of the useful bits of China? Yes.

 

[Lord Baal]

Conquer China? Not likely. It is too big.
Get all of the useful bits of China? Yes.

Hold all of the useful bits of China? That's another question entirely. The Japanese never really had the capacity to occupy the regions they already controlled without the assistance of puppet-regimes. It's not certain that those regimes would stay loyal, especially with the internal problems insurgents were causing in ever-increasing levels.

Also, it's not really realistic to say that China wouldn't receive any aid. The USSR and Britain, just to name two nations, had vested interests in protecting their own territory by subsidising China's war with Japan.

 

[Dachs]

I assume that this isn't meant to be an attempt at creating a realistic scenario, because Condition 2 is nonsensical. That said, as has been noted above, the Japanese were uninterested in basically anything outside their extant control as of, oh, 1941 or so. Thereafter their basic posture was defensive and their goals limited (as if the conquest of nearly all coastal China, Heilongjiang, and much of the Huanghe and Yangzi basins can be called "limited"). Any further offensives - such as the failed attack on Chongqing and Ichi-Go in 1944-5 - were fundamentally designed to get the Guomindang to the negotiation table to formalize these conquests. I realize that American aid significantly helped Jiang and his troops at that point, but aid was never a precondition for defense, only offense.

So could they have held what they had, as asked above? Doubtful. The cornerstone to such a policy would have been the creation of a national Chinese government in the occupied territories with enough power to present a credible alternative to Jiang Jieshi and Mao. Because presumably the Japanese military figured such an alternative would compromise Japanese control over the relevant territories, the one created at Nanjing was never given any real power. With the IJA hamstringing itself like that, could the Japanese control over the coast ever be all that permanent? I'd lean towards "no" for the same reasons the Hitlerites had problems in the occupied East.

 

[amadeus]

I assume that this isn't meant to be an attempt at creating a realistic scenario, because Condition 2 is nonsensical.

It's a hypothetical. That condition is necessary, otherwise I suppose you could just have the Allies starve Japan of the resources needed to fuel their industrial base, throwing the victory to China.

 

[NedimNapoleon]

Population? Its hard to control a large country with a large population.

 

[ParkCungHee]

I'm more open to the possibility of Japanese Victory. The real problem would be the Japanese agreeing amongst themselves what constitutes victory. Until they could figure that out, China was a useless venture.

 

[Lord Baal]

I'm more open to the possibility of Japanese Victory. The real problem would be the Japanese agreeing amongst themselves what constitutes victory. Until they could figure that out, China was a useless venture.

That's a very good point. Most of the Japanese politicians were already quite happy with their gains in China - which they never wanted to begin with - but the military had a tendency to act aggressively on its own. They could certainly have pushed further into China without the government's knowledge, or even against orders.

 

[ParkCungHee]

While at the same time having absolutely no clue what they were after. The goal of the initial military push into China, as far as I can tell, was Beijing. The constant problem with the Japanese was that they saw any victory as a sign that more victories could be won, and therefor became perpetually dissatisfied with what they had. It's a part of the same line of thinking that lead them to believe that they were actually shortchanged by the Russo-Japanese war.

 

[Theige]

It seems to me that the Japanese had effectively won the war against China.

Barring a significant improvement in the Chinese position, and no help from the Allies, I think they would have come to terms before 1945.

 

[Lord Baal]

It seems to me that the Japanese had effectively won the war against China.

Barring a significant improvement in the Chinese position, and no help from the Allies, I think they would have come to terms before 1945.

This wouldn't happen, for the simple reason that there was too much support for continuing the war among the warlords and generals underneath Chiang. Chiang was even held hostage by his own people once for NOT prosecuting the war against the Japanese, so it seems highly unlikely that any peace would be agreed to, or kept if it was. This is assuming that the Japanese even cared to make peace.

 

[Dachs]

This wouldn't happen, for the simple reason that there was too much support for continuing the war among the warlords and generals underneath Chiang. Chiang was even held hostage by his own people once for NOT prosecuting the war against the Japanese, so it seems highly unlikely that any peace would be agreed to, or kept if it was. This is assuming that the Japanese even cared to make peace.

Well, the Xi'an incident happened before the war even started; I don't think it's a reasonable barometer of the opinions of those warlords in the forties.

 

[Lord Baal]

Well, the Xi'an incident happened before the war even started; I don't think it's a reasonable barometer of the opinions of those warlords in the forties.

That is a good point, but considering the fact that it was inspired by a lack of resistance to Japanese encroachment by Chiang, I would imagine the warlords would be even more pissed by the forties, when the Japanese had taken significantly more territory in China. Then again, maybe I'm wrong, since I've never come across any indication of what warlord opinion was like in China at the time.

You know what this thread needs? Tailless_kangaru.

 

[ParkCungHee]

There was certainly larger expectations in the thirties that Chiang could resist the Japanese. The January 28th incident went okay for Chiang's forces, and there wasn't a realization about how well the Japanese were prepared for war with China.

 

[Tee Kay]

That is a good point, but considering the fact that it was inspired by a lack of resistance to Japanese encroachment by Chiang, I would imagine the warlords would be even more pissed by the forties, when the Japanese had taken significantly more territory in China. Then again, maybe I'm wrong, since I've never come across any indication of what warlord opinion was like in China at the time.

You know what this thread needs? Tailless_kangaru.

Assume I read all threads in World History. If I don't post, it means I feel I don't know enough about the subject, or I feel I don't need to add anything to the discussion.

Anyway... the thing about the warlords is that they were a rather nebulous group. There were a few who collaborated with the Japanese, openly or otherwise. But the vast majority of the KMT-aligned warlords remained loyal, even if they don't always agree with Chiang Kai-shek's leadership.

Negotiation or defection to the Japanese would be extremely dishonourable and a truly desparate move, and the situation in China wasn't bad enough in 1940 or thereabouts to trigger it. There was stalemate on the frontlines. The Japanese had control of the major eastern cities, but they didn't control the countryside. Even so, their resources were already spread thin and they had to rely on Chinese collaborationist armies to keep the peace. The Chinese were willing to wait for the Japanese to weaken from exhaustion.

The Japanese could have certainly try to buy the warlords off, but then the question becomes whether the Japanese would be willing to do so, and how much Japanese control would the warlords themselves have tolerated (if the details of Yan Xishan's secret negotiations with the local Japanese commanders on Wikipedia is to be believed, it seems that major warlords like him would not have easily consented to being a mere puppet of the Japanese).

A major Japanese victory would change this picture significantly. Ichigo in 1944 was quite disastrous for the KMT and if China had been fighting Japan alone it's likely that they would seriously consider suing for peace, especially if the Japanese capitalise on their victory and threaten Sichuan. Though as others have been saying, whether the Japanese succeeds in holding on to its conquests depend on their ability to suppress the inevitable insurgencies and then either craft a credible national Chinese government, negotiate with individual warlords, or using brute force to impose a colonial regime. The first two would from the Japanese perspective compromise their authority, and the latter would seem impractical in the long term.

 

[Cutlass]

If Japan had beaten the nationalist forces, would the communist forces have still been able to hold them from a complete victory?

 

[Tee Kay]

If Japan had beaten the nationalist forces, would the communist forces have still been able to hold them from a complete victory?

Define complete victory

 

[Masada]

I'm not even sure what a Japanese victory looks like because the one they entered into China with was almost certainly unattainable the moment after Marco Polo.