Could *Japan* have won?

[Omega124]

Simply saying, no. Emperor Hititoro himself knew he couldn't win even before Pearl Harbour. In fact, the only reason he did it is because his generals and the people thought they could win. I'd say that, if Pearl Harbour never happened, Japan would win the Second Sino-Japanese War, so as long they don't have a full alliance with Germany in case if America helps out the British.

 

[Tee Kay]

Simply saying, no. Emperor Hititoro himself knew he couldn't win even before Pearl Harbour. In fact, the only reason he did it is because his generals and the people thought they could win. I'd say that, if Pearl Harbour never happened, Japan would win the Second Sino-Japanese War, so as long they don't have a full alliance with Germany in case if America helps out the British.

No, not probable. That country is like a weaker version of the Soviet Union - a lot of manpower, territorial depth, difficult terrain, partisans everywhere. Japan spent four full years on China and concentrated on the China Front even after the Pacific War began. Unless Japan uses an atomic bomb, or mass fire bombings, I don't see them successfully conquering China.

 

[frekk]

Are you sure about that? Eastern forces only arrived in force around December 41, when the German offensive was well out of steam.

They had been arriving all through that fall. They weren't teleporting from Vladivostok to Moscow; it took a considerable amount of time to transfer the units from the Far East, to reorganize them and assign equipment in advance of deployment etc. And as I've mentioning, the defensive lines around Moscow were, in fact, manned by considerable numbers of Siberians throughout the fall.

December simply marks a surge, as a fresh wave of reinforcements (but not the first) was ready to be deployed. But even they had left the Far East some time before that.

Even with no reinforcements, actually taking Moscow would require surrounding and reducing it, and the Germans were never going to be able to do that before Spring rains shut down operations.

Without the Siberians, there's not much left of Moscow's defenses. Almost the whole of the 16th Army, for instance, was comprised of units transferred from the Far East in September/October. Many of the regular units (eg 32nd Rifle Division etc) fighting rearguard actions on the approach and then holding around Moscow were Siberian.

 

[frekk]

No, not probable. That country is like a weaker version of the Soviet Union - a lot of manpower, territorial depth, difficult terrain, partisans everywhere. Japan spent four full years on China and concentrated on the China Front even after the Pacific War began. Unless Japan uses an atomic bomb, or mass fire bombings, I don't see them successfully conquering China.

They were using biological and chemical WMDs, and that didn't help. Firebombings weren't enough to bring down England or Germany which had much smaller manpower pools, and atomic bombs actually did less damage than firebombing at the time (their advantage being that only a single bomber rather than an airfleet needed to get through, not their actual level of destruction). If any country in WW2 could shrug off a few atomic bombs, it was China. So even if the A-Bomb fairy gave Japan as many bombs as the US had (3 or 4 I think?) they still couldn't do it. If they had those, they'd have been better employed against American fleets anyway.

What exactly were they trying to accomplish in China anyway? I can't see that after Manchukuo was established and the Tanggu Truce signed that they had anything in particular to gain. Even if they did need a bit more down towards Beijing etc - what exactly was the point in crossing the Yellow River? Seems to me it would have made more sense to just stop and consolidate at the Yellow (or even before).

 

[Masada]

.... why is it that Chinese never have agency?

 

[frekk]

.... why is it that Chinese never have agency?

Are you suggesting they did something to invite attack from Japan?

 

[Tee Kay]

I can understand Japan viewing China with hostility. You had a nationalist, notionally revolutionary government in power, well on the way to unifying the country. Japan had no chance to expand against a strong, unified China - better to attack early.

 

[Masada]

... no, I'm suggesting they had agency much as the Japanese did.

 

[xchen08]

Without the Siberians, there's not much left of Moscow's defenses. Almost the whole of the 16th Army, for instance, was comprised of units transferred from the Far East in September/October. Many of the regular units (eg 32nd Rifle Division etc) fighting rearguard actions on the approach and then holding around Moscow were Siberian.

16th Army was transfered before Barbarossa, nearly destroyed, and reformed from mostly European personel. I suspect a lot of the other Siberian units are similar, ie raised East of the Urals, but not a part of the contingent transfered from the East. Not to mention that Moscow alone raised over 30 divisions. I'm sure Siberian units did play a part before December, but its unlikely to be that critical, not with the German logistics situation the way it was, and its troops attacking without winter clothing in 40 below temperatures.

 

[frekk]

16th Army was transfered before Barbarossa, nearly destroyed, and reformed from mostly European personel.

The core of the 16th, at the time of the Battle of Moscow, was the 316th Rifle Division and the 79th Rifle Division. The 316th was transferred from Kazakhstan in September. In October it was joined by the 79th Rifle Division from Vladivostok.

The rest consisted of some Cossack units, a regiment of cadets, remnants of a Volunteer Division from Leningrad, some penal battalions, etc etc.

Not to mention that Moscow alone raised over 30 divisions.

Meh. You can't compare the Volunteer Divisions to regular units.

In quantity, the number of European-raised troops was certainly larger, but most of the regulars - especially when it came to holding the Mozhaisk line - were transferred from the east.

 

[frekk]

... no, I'm suggesting they had agency much as the Japanese did.

Sure they had agency, but what were they going to do . . . retake Manchukuo in '41? I don't think so!!

 

[Louis XXIV]

Yes, more or less. Manchuria was a good steal. Unfortunately, nobody accounted for Chinese obstinacy despite there serious domestic problems. Not the least, the Japanese who didn't even really think how they would deal with it. That it pulled them into a war with China which they couldn't win and which didn't offer them much in real terms -- they probably lost more than they gained -- wasn't intentional. There wasn't a master plan to dominate China it just kind of came about as a specific reaction to a series of events that both parties took part in. Certainly, the Japanese invasion of Manchuria was the catalyst for everything but it wasn't intended to be so... and really, it shouldn't have happened at all. There were some interesting circumstances surrounding the Japanese acquisition of Manchuria, not the least, the reluctance of the Japanese government to actually take it over.

I'm curious about this, since I hadn't heard anything about it before. My assumption had always been that Manchuria was simply the Japanese prelude to the colonization of China. What were the factors that led to a greater war and why was the Japanese government so reluctant to take over?

 

[Karalysia]

Manchuria was in itself quite a prize, being one of the most industrialized parts of China at the time, and having factories, railroads and such along with resources like coal and certain metal ores if I'm not mistaken.

 

[Masada]

Sure they had agency, but what were they going to do . . . retake Manchukuo in '41? I don't think so!!

They certainly wanted to, and didn't keep it a secret. Subsequent, Japanese actions should be seen in light of that.

I'm curious about this, since I hadn't heard anything about it before. My assumption had always been that Manchuria was simply the Japanese prelude to the colonization of China. What were the factors that led to a greater war and why was the Japanese government so reluctant to take over?

Manchuria's take over was a long term work in progress. Initially, the Japanese were content with winning sole control over the railway concessions and slowing expanding its economic control over the region. Broadly speaking that was successful policy. It didn't antagonise the Chinese to much and it allowed Japan to acquire for its own use strategic resources -- primarily, iron and coal -- as well as some measure of local industry. One of the concessions squeezed out of the Chinese was a concession that allowed them to station troops to defend Japanese assets. Unfortunately, the Kwantung army which was semi-autonomous was full of militarists. Their modus operandi was that they would engineer incidents with the Chinese, use it as an excuse to squeeze more concessions out of them, usually violently, and then deliver it as a fait acompli to the oblivious (literally) civilian governments. It wasn't part of a Japanese plot to take over China quite so much as it was a nebulous plan on the part of a small number of Japanese military personnel operating in a very unusual situation often against the wishes of there government. The end result of this was the Mukden Incident which saw the army effectively invade China after it conspired to bomb its own railway -- and even then, it was apparently junior officers acting in isolation who made it happen. In the long run, these and other acts -- the Marco Polo bridge incident -- drew Japan into a war that wasn't necessarily favoured or wanted by its government.

 

[luiz]

I didn't read the whole thread, but my answer is the one below:
Japan could and in fact did win the war against the European imperial powers in East Asia. I doubt Japan could fully control China, but they could hold part its territory indefinetly and come to a settlement with a chinese regime. They could never win the war against the US.

 

[frekk]

the Kwantung army which was semi-autonomous was full of militarists. Their modus operandi was that they would engineer incidents with the Chinese . . . it was a nebulous plan on the part of a small number of Japanese military personnel operating in a very unusual situation often against the wishes of there government. The end result of this was the Mukden Incident which saw the army effectively invade China after it conspired to bomb its own railway -- and even then, it was apparently junior officers acting in isolation who made it happen.

Ah ... so they removed the ability of Japan to limit its ambitions and hold to a line? Runaway militarism that got beyond their control?

 

[Masada]

Ah ... so they removed the ability of Japan to limit its ambitions and hold to a line? Runaway militarism that got beyond their control?

Yes, Japan already control over the region in every way that mattered. It wasn't under any real pressure by the Chinese to leave. And it was getting everything it wanted out of the deal. It made no sense to push for anything else. Unfortunately, the boots on the ground didn't see it that way and were eager to take more territory something which would cumulate in incidents like Mukden.

 

[BuckyRea]

What exactly were they trying to accomplish in China anyway?

That's the $64,000 question right there. A lot of it was left over business from the 1880s when all the cool kids were trying to grab a chunk of China for the export market. Japan was like that last kid your high school who was still wearing that "Ramones" tee-shirt years after the last of the band members had died of kidney failure and the midnight cinema wasn't showing "Rock & Roll High School" anymore.

Japanese policy makers were still talking about having an Asian "Monroe Doctrine" in the 1930s and bragging about how Teddy Roosevelt had personally given them the a-okay to go for it. It was just a happy coincidence that their form of nationalistic ambition so neatly dovetailed with the totalitarianism on the rise among the previous world war's losers (plus Italy).

What they were doing in China was exactly what they saw the US doing in Latin America with great profit, and to a lesser profit what France was doing in Africa and Britain was doing in India & the Middle East.

For the record, I was that kid in the The Ramones t-shirt. Gabba gabba hey.

.

 

[Lord Baal]

Japan basically had a massive inferiority complex compared to the imperial powers. In an attempt to prove that they were just as good as the Europeans - as well as for the more practical reason of improving their chances of survival in a potential war against said Europeans, though that reason was more of an excuse for the irrational actions of many in the military - some Japanese militarists decided to carve out a Japanese empire in the Far East.

Since most of the rest of the region was already dominated by European empires and the US, the only real potential target for Japan was China. The militarists seized the day, so to speak, only to realise that they'd bitten off far more than they could chew, as China was more than capable of fighting them off. The only reason they even got as far as they did was that the Chinese had their own internal problems.

 

[GamezRule]

So, if the Japanese had gone after China before the empire fell do you think the outcome would have been?