Could *Japan* have won?

Forgot about that. :(
 
As long as they felt the need to attack the US, probably not.

But would US have escalated support for China regardless of direct Japanese attack against the USA? And would the Japanese army develop good tanks for a two front war against the USSR?

I think the US in a land war in China, with Chinese popular assistance and US tanks and US air cover would pretty much be a loss for Japan. I take the Japanese military to basically be a strong marine, airforce and navy, but not a true army in the sense of the European theatre.
(I may be wrong. I know they had similar tech as the Europeans, minus the armor vehicles, but did they have comparable numbers of units?).

Possibly they could achieve a cease-fire and control of Pacific islands though, if diplomacy and European theater events made that possible.
Basically what if Germany waged war more carefully, longer, with less attrition on their end, would they have diverted pressure that the US applied on Japan?
 
Possibly they could achieve a cease-fire and control of Pacific islands though, if diplomacy and European theater events made that possible.
Basically what if Germany waged war more carefully, longer, with less attrition on their end, would they have diverted pressure that the US applied on Japan?

The answer to this is no. Germany was already sucking up 85% of the U.S. war effort, and what was allocated to the Pacific were generally those things that would be useless in Europe, like the battlefleet, submarines, aircraft like the P-40 and P-38, etc. What little sent to the Pacific that would be useful in Europe, like the handful of U.S. marine divisions and their landing assets, would be nothing but a drop in the bucket.
 
I take the Japanese military to basically be a strong marine, airforce and navy, but not a true army in the sense of the European theatre.
(I may be wrong. I know they had similar tech as the Europeans, minus the armor vehicles, but did they have comparable numbers of units?).

The Imperial Japanese Army was reorganized and established along Western lines in the 1870's with the assistance of European advisors. It was certainly a conventional Army as the Russians unfortunately found out in 1905.

During World War II, total Japanese divisional strength topped out at 3 guards divisions, 4 armored divisions, 1 parachute division, and 220 infantry divisions. Additionally, there were some 20 or 30 division equivalents. Roughly one fourth of the army was assigned to homeland defense and a little more than half of the army was engaged in China and Manchuria.

The U.S. Army at the end of World War II consisted of 94 army divisions of all types, of which 17 were armored and 5 were airborne. Plus there were 6 Marine divisions.
 
I wasn't aware Japan put so much effort into the China campaign (post-1941.)

It's kind of a Catch-22, I think, insofar as a Sino-Japanese alliance. I don't think Japan could have been successful unless they had the Manchurian resource base, but if they take that then they presumably eliminate all chances of gaining an alliance with the Chinese.

WOPR was right; the only winning move is not to play.

They had all of Manchuria under a puppet government, so they actually did.
 
The point should probably be made clear that, if Japan felt a little paranoid about all the Europeans being out to gyp them out of their fair chunk of China, it's probably because all the Europeans were out to gyp them out of their fair chunk of China.

After Japan won the Sino-Japanese War in the 1890s, the whole of Europe pretty much contrived to deprive Japan of its spoils at the negotiation table. This sense of being punked by Europe led directly to the Russo-Japanese War (Russia after the first war ended up grabbing just about everything Japan had by 19th Century standards won fair and square in its war on China).

After the Russian War, Japan got gypped by the US of getting the concessions it thought was its due... a real backstab from their former friend & sponsor Teddy Roosevelt.
 
Without a major historical divergence prior to World War II, Japan could never have defeated the United States. And I will link my favorite website that shows why (I know most people already understand this reasoning but it doesn't hurt to have the industrial statistics illustrated directly).

http://www.combinedfleet.com/economic.htm

Also, apologies if somebody has already linked this site.
 
http://www.combinedfleet.com/economic.htm

Also, apologies if somebody has already linked this site.

Don't apologize. When a thread gets this long, you shouldn't expect newcomers to the discussion to have read everything beyond the last couple of pages, given the usual signal-to-noise ratio. This link is a really useful resource. Thanks for posting it.
 
Don't apologize. When a thread gets this long, you shouldn't expect newcomers to the discussion to have read everything beyond the last couple of pages, given the usual signal-to-noise ratio. This link is a really useful resource. Thanks for posting it.
Indeed. It's a really excellent source. I don't think I've come across it before, though to be fair I have books with that info.
 
That link was an interesting read. Thanks, too.
 
This is a nice link on the Japanese decision to go to war with the United States and lay claim to European holdings in the far east. It also does a good job of outlining the overall grand strategy (and others which were not chosen) for the war.

In summary, the decision for war is boiled down the Japanese necessity to secure resources, particularly oil and various metals, to continue their rapid rate of industrialization and military growth. The only alternative would be withdrawal from China and what is essentially acquiescing to be a secondary world player.

They strategy chosen when it became clear that diplomatic avenues would not bring the Japanese the resources they required was to quickly seize the rich Dutch holdings in the East Indies and to deliver a stunning blow to the United States at Pearl Harbor. The idea being that the Japanese could quickly grab and hold a ring of defensive islands around their new naval empire, gambling that the American military would not be willing to make the commitment to uprooting the Japanese and that Germany would be successful in Russia. There was never any plan for total defeat of the US militarily, or any sort of invasion of North America.

So then Japan could not have won because it was evidently not in the character of the United States to agree to a peace that would include Japan expanding their territory beyond pre-war holdings. That being the case, and the discussion already held on the overwhelming resource and industrial advantage of the United States, Japan was doomed from the start, in what many consider to be one of the most foolish military decisions in history.

Perhaps a more interesting hypothetical is what if Japan had undergone one of their other war strategies, those which specifically chose to avoid war with the US?
 
That was a very nice link Fetus!
 
Instead of the usual "could Germany have won WWII?" thread, I thought maybe I'd give it a little twist and ask if Japan, under any circumstances, could have won.

Let's say, for example, Japan focuses entirely on the China campaign and after winning (presuming victory is possible), goes on to fight a two-front war with Germany against the Soviet Union. Would that have bought Japan more time or enough resources? Would the campaigns be so draining that it would be impossible? What if Japan bypasses the Philippines and goes straight for the Dutch East Indies? Just a few sample questions. :D

Without having read the rest of the thread, just offering my perhaps not so profound $0.02...

No, they could not have won. It was always a false dream with no potential for success. Consider that 'victory' would be the fulfilment of the expulsion of European powers from South East Asia, replaced by Japan. That was never going to happen, assuming sanity on the part of those European powers (including the US, for the sake of argument). They could not just focus on the Chinese campaign and consolidate there before moving on, because the whole point of moving on when they did was to gain the resource wealth of the rest of South East Asia in order to maintain the fight, which they were not at the time able to sustain. Fighting China was simply unsustainable, given the support given to China by other nations. The oil embargo placed by FDR was crippling, crippling enough that I would think it fair to say that from that point on, there was no possibility of victory. There was no option from that point onwards for Japan that would've resulted in victory. A continuance of the war with China without an invasion of South East Asia would not have led to further gains that could be sustained, and an invasion of South East Asia in the circumstances could not have resulted in victory, despite the apparent supremacy of Japan in the early stages of the conflict.
 
After I heard that Japan already committed 80% of their efforts to the China campaign, I was pretty much convinced that Japan couldn't win unless they were allied with the KMT, but then blew that chance in '31 with the Manchuria invasion.
 
After I heard that Japan already committed 80% of their efforts to the China campaign, I was pretty much convinced that Japan couldn't win unless they were allied with the KMT, but then blew that chance in '31 with the Manchuria invasion.
Even allied with the KMT, with that 80% of their manpower availablefor use on other fronts, Japan really wasn't capable of taking on America. If they fought only the British and Dutch, there's some potential for territorial gains, but it's doubtful. Despite the friendly relations between Indian nationalists and Japan, a Japan that was a legitimate threat to the British in India would simply have led to more Indian volunteers in the British Army, negating the newfound manpower advantage. The Japanese would also still have been unable to launch a successful invasion of Australia, the other thorn in their side. Japan's primary problem was resources, not manpower.
 
I think it depends on how we define the win conditions. Japan won a great deal with the acquisition of the Netherlands Indies and the oil that bought to it. Pearl Harbour was just a means to an end of achieving that. The Japanese would have been happy to acquire the former without need for the latter. If that's an acceptable win condition then sure it could have won the War in the Pacific without the need to fire a shot.
 
If Japan won at midway they probably (I would say 50-50) won the war. That fact that they lost half there Battleships in a single month, and still put up such a big fight against the Americans is impressive. i don't have the time to read this thread tonight so I will respond to current arguments later
 
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