Diplomacy and the mysterious case of the poisoned russians

Russia has poisoned former agents before. Vengence is a valid reason for them.
I don't think it's for vengeance. There is actually quite a lot to gain from these political "microaggressions". One of the biggest problems for Russia is that many talented and smart people are leaving. They realize that life can and is often better in the West or even in Asia and move to countries like Spain, Germany, Israel, Thailand, etc. They can leave the country because there are diplomatic relations, and people can get entry to these countries. Now imagine Russia did not have travel relations with these countries. Then people would not be able to emigrate. That's a very easy way to force people to stay in a country without doing being North Korea.

Anyway, copying my post from another thread. Here is a list of attempted and successful assassinations by Putin and his office to silence his critics. This is really applicable to this thread.

November 1998


Less than four months after Putin takes over at the KGB, opposition Duma Deputy Galina Starovoitova, the most prominent pro-democracy Kremlin critic in the nation, is murdered at her apartment building in St. Petersburg. Four months after that, Putin will play a key role in silencing the Russian Attorney General, Yury Skuratov, who was investigating high-level corruption in the Kremlin, by airing an illicit sex video involving Skuratov on national TV. Four months after the dust settles in the Skuratov affair, Putin will be named Prime Minister.

August 1999

Completing a hat trick of bizarre spontaneous promotions, proud KGB spy Putin is named by Yeltsin Prime Minister of Russia. Almost immediately, Putin orders a massive bombing campaign against the tiny, defenseless breakaway republic of Chechnya, apparently seeing the reassertion of Russian power there as key to overall resurgence of Russia’s military and state security apparatus, his primary political objective. On August 26th, he’s forced to acknowledge the horrific consequences of the bombing. Hundreds of civilians are killed and tens of thousands are left homeless as civilian targets are attacked. World opinion begins to turn starkly against Russia, especially in Europe, very similarly to the manner in which it has polarized against U.S. President George Bush over Iraq. Putin’s poll numbers in Russia begin to slide.

September 1999

An apartment building in the Pechatniki neighborhood of Moscow is blown up by a bomb. 94 are killed. Less than a week later a second bomb destroys a building in Moscow’s Kashirskoye neighborhood, killing 118. Days after that, a massive contingent of Russian soldiers is surrounding Chechnya as public opposition to the war evaporates. On October 1st, Putin declares Chechen president AslanMaskhadov and his parliament illegitimate. Russian forces invade.

New Year’s Eve, 1999

Boris Yeltsin resigns the presidency of Russia, handing the office to Putin in order to allow him to run as an incumbent three months later. Given the pattern of bizarre promotions Putin has previously received, the move is hardly even surprising. So-called “experts” on Russia scoff at the possibility that Putin could be elected, proclaiming that, having tasted freedom, Russia can “never go back” to the dark days of the USSR.

March 2000

Despite being the nominee of a man, Yeltsin, who enjoyed single-digit public approval ratings in polls, Vladimir Putin is elected “president” of Russia in a massive landslide (he wins nearly twice as many votes as his nearest competitor). Shortly thereafter, all hell breaks loose in Chechnya. Russia will ultimately be convicted of human rights violations before the European Court for Human Rights and condemned for its abuses of the civilian population by every human rights organization under the sun.

[Between April 2000 and March 2002, Russia plunges into a nightmarish conflict in Chechnya eerily similar to what America now faces in Iraq. Opposition journalists, especially those who dare to report on what it going on in Chechnya, suddenly start dying. In 2000 alone, reporters Igor Domnikov, Sergey Novikov, Iskandar Khatloni, Sergey Ivanov and Adam Tepsurgayev are murdered — not by hostile fire in Chechnya but in blatant assassinations at home in Russia. On June 16, 2001, at a press conference in Brdo Pri Kranju, Slovenia, President Bush is asked about Putin: “Is this a man that Americans can trust?” Bush replies: “I will answer the question. I looked the man in the eye. I found him to be very straightforward and trustworthy. We had a very good dialogue. I was able to get a sense of his soul; a man deeply committed to his country and the best interests of his country. And I appreciated so very much the frank dialogue.”]

April 2003



Sergei Yushenkov, co-chairman of the Liberal Russia political party, is gunned down at the entrance of his Moscow apartment block. Yushenkov had been serving as the vice chair of the group known as the “Kovalev Commission” which was formed to informally investigate charges that Putin’s KGB had planted the Pechatniki and Kashirskoye apartment bombs to whip up support for the Putin’s war in Chechnya after the formal legislative investigation turned out to be impossible. Another member of the Commission, Yuri Shchekochikhin (see below) will perish of poisoning, a third will be severely beaten by thugs, and two other members will lose their seats in the Duma. The Commission’s lawyer, Mikhail Trepashkin (see below) will be jailed after a secret trial on espionage charges. Today, virtually none of the members of the Commission are left whole and it is silent.

May 2003

Putin’s popularity in opinion polls slips below 50% after sliding precipitously while the conflict in Chechnya became increasingly bloody. Suddenly, he begins to appear vulnerable, and oil billionaire Mikhail Khodorkovsky begins to be discussed as one who could unseat him. All hell breaks loose in Russian politics.

July 2003



Yuri Shchekochikhin, a vocal opposition journalist and member of the Russian Duma and the Kovalev Commission, suddenly contracts a mysterious illness. Witnesses reported: “He complained about fatigue, and red blotches began to appear on his skin. His internal organs began collapsing one by one. Then he lost almost all his hair.” One of Shchekochikhin’s last newspaper articles before his death was entitled “Are we Russia or KGB of Soviet Union?” In it, he described such issues as the refusal of the FSB to explain to the Russian Parliament what poison gas was applied during the Moscow theater hostage crisis, and work of secret services from the former Soviet republic of Turkmenistan, which operated with impunity in Moscow against Russian citizens of Turkoman origin. According to Wikipedia: “He also tried to investigate the Three Whales Corruption Scandal and criminal activities of FSB officers related to money laundering through the Bank of New York and illegal actions of Yevgeny Adamov, a former Russian Minister of Nuclear Energy. This case was under the personal control of Putin. In June of 2003, Shchekochikhin contacted the FBI and got an American visa to discuss the case with US authorities. However, he never made it to the USA because of his sudden death on July 3rd. The Russian authorities refused to allow an autopsy, but according to Wikipedia his relatives “managed to send a specimen of his skin to London, where a tentative diagnosis was made of poisoning with thallium” (a poison commonly used by the KGB, at first suspected in the Litvinenko killing).

October 2003

Assaults on the enemies of the Kremlin reach fever pitch as the election cycle begins. Within one week at the end of the month, two major opposition figures are in prison.

October 22, 2003



Mikhail Trepashkin, a former KGB spy and the attorney for the Kovalev Commission, is arrested for illegal possession of a firearm (which he claims was planted in his vehicle). Also retain to represent some of the victims of the apartment bombings theselves, Trepashkin allegedly uncovered a trail of a mysterious suspect whose description had disappeared from the files and learned that the man was one of his former FSB colleagues. He also found a witness who testified that evidence was doctored to lead the investigation away from incriminating the FSB. The weapons charge against Trepashkin mysteriously morphs into a spying charge handled by a closed military proceeding that is condemned by the U.S. government as being a blatant sham, and Trepashkin is sent to prison for four years. Publius Pundit reported on Trepashkin’s plight back in early December of last year.

October 25, 2003



Just as the presidential election cycle is beginning, Khodorkovsky is arrested at the airport in Novosibirsk. He will be tried and convicted for tax fraud and sent to Siberia, just like in the bad old days of the USSR, in a show trial all international observers condemn as rigged (his lawyer has documented the legal violations in a 75-page treatise). He is there today, now facing a second prosecution for the same offense. His company, YUKOS, is being slowly gobbled up by the Kremlin.

March 2004

With Khodorkovsky conveniently in prison and the Kovalev Commission conveniently muzzled, Vladimir Putin is re-elected “president” of Russia, again in a landslide despite his poll numbers. He faces no serious competition from any opposition candidate. He does not participate in any debates. He wins a ghastly, Soviet-like 70% of the vote. Immediately, talk begins of a neo-Soviet state, with Putin assuming the powers of a dictator. The most public and powerful enemies of the regime start dropping like flies.

June 2004



Nikolai Girenko, a prominent human rights defender, Professor of Ethnology and expert on racism and discrimination in the Russian Federation is shot dead in his home in St Petersburg. Girenko’s work has been crucial in ensuring that racially motivated assaults are classified as hate crimes, rather than mere hooliganism, and therefore warrant harsher sentences — as well as appearing as black marks on Russia’s public record.

July 2004



Paul Klebnikov, editor of the Russian edition Forbes magazine, is shot and killed in Moscow. Forbes has reported that at the time of his death, Paul was believed to have been investigating a complex web of money laundering involving a Chechen reconstruction fund, reaching into the centers of power in the Kremlin and involving elements of organized crime and the FSB (the former KGB).

September 2004



Viktor Yushchenko, anti-Russian candidate for the presidency of the Ukraine, is poisoned by Dioxin. Yushchenko’s chief of staff OlegRibachuk suggests that the poison used was a mycotoxin called T-2, also known as “Yellow Rain,” a Soviet-era substance which was reputedly used in Afghanistan as a chemical weapon. Miraculously, he survives the attack.

[Throughout the next year, a full frontal assault on the media is launched by the Kremlin. Reporters Without Borders states: “Working conditions for journalists continued to worsen alarmingly in 2005, with violence the most serious threat to press freedom. The independent press is shrinking because of crippling fines and politically-inspired distribution of government advertising. The authorities’ refusal to accredit foreign journalists showed the government’s intent to gain total control of news, especially about the war in Chechnya.”]

September 2006



Andrei Kozlov, First Deputy Chairman of Russia’s Central Bank, who strove to stamp out money laundering (basically acting on analyses like that of reporter Klebnikov), the highest-ranking reformer in Russia, is shot and killed in Moscow. Many media reports classify Kozlov’s killing as “an impudent challenge to all Russian authorities” and warn that “failure to apprehend the killers would send a signal to others that intimidation of government officials is once again an option.” Less considered is the possibility that Kozlov, like Klebnikov, was on the trail of corruption that would have led into the Kremlin itself, which then lashed out at him preemptively assuming he could not be bought.

October 2006




Anna Politkovskaya, author of countless books and articles exposing Russian human rights violations in Chechnya and attacking Vladimir Putin as a dictator, is shot and killed at her home in Moscow. In her book Putin’s Russia, Politkovskaya had written: “I have wondered a great deal why I have so got it in for Putin. What is it that makes me dislike him so much as to feel moved to write a book about him? I am not one of his political opponents or rivals, just a woman living in Russia. Quite simply, I am a 45-year-old Muscovite who observed the Soviet Union at its most disgraceful in the 1970s and ’80s. I really don’t want to find myself back there again.” Analysts begin to talk openly of Kremlin complicity in the ongoing string of attacks. Washington Post columnist Anne Applebaum writes: “Local businessmen had no motivation to kill her — but officials of the army, the police and even the Kremlin did. Whereas local thieves might have tried to cover their tracks, Politkovskaya’s assassin, like so many Russian assassins, did not seem to fear the law. There are jitters already: A few hours after news of Politkovskaya’s death became public, a worried friend sent me a link to an eerie Russian Web site that displays photographs of ‘enemies of the people’ — all Russian journalists and human rights activists, some quite well known. Above the pictures is each person’s birth date and a blank space where, it is implied, the dates of their deaths will soon be marked. That sort of thing will make many, and probably most, Russians think twice before criticizing the Kremlin about anything.”

November 2006




Alexander Litvinenko, KGB defector and author of the book Blowing up Russia, which accuses the Kremlin of masterminding the and Pechatniki and Kashirskoye bombings in order to blame Chechen terrorists and whip up support for an invasion of Chechnya (which shortly followed), is fatally poisoned by radioactive Polonium obtained from Russian sources. Litivinenko had given sensational testimony to the Kovalev Commission and warned Sergei Yushenkov that was a KGB target). In his last days Litvinenko himself, as well as other KGB defectors, including Oleg Kalugin, Yuri Shvets and Mikhail Trepashkin (who allegedly actually warned Litvinenko that he had been targeted before the hit took place) directly blamed the Kremlin for ordering the poisoning. Recent press reports indicate that British investigators have come to the same conclusion. With Litvinenko out of the picture, the only member of the Kovalev Commission left unscathed is its 77-year-old namesake chairman, dissident Sergei Kovalev — who has grown notably silent.

March 2007

On Sunday February 25th, the American TV news magazine Dateline NBC aired a report on the killing of Litvinenko. MSNBC also carried a report. The reports confirmed that British authorities believe Litvinenko perished in a “state-sponsored” assasination. In the opening of the broadcast, Dateline highlighted the analysis of a senior British reporter and a senior American expert on Russia who knew Litvinennko well. Here’s an excerpt from the MSNBC report:

Daniel McGrory, a senior correspondent for The Times of London, has reported many of the developments in the Litvinenko investigation. He said the police were stuck between a rock and a hard place. “While they claim, and the prime minister, Tony Blair, has claimed nothing will be allowed to get in the way of the police investigation, the reality is the police are perfectly aware of the diplomatic fallout of this story,” McGrory said. “Let’s be frank about this: The United States needs a good relationship with Russia, and so does Europe,” said Paul M. Joyal, a friend of Litvinenko’s with deep ties as a consultant in Russia and the former Soviet states. Noting that Russia controls a significant segment of the world gas market, Joyal said: “This is a very important country. But how can you have an important relationship with a country that could be involved in activities such as this? It’s a great dilemma.”


Five days before the broadcast aired, shortly after he was interviewed for it, McGrory was dead. His obituary reads “found dead at his home on February 20, 2007, aged 54.” Five days after the broadcast aired, Joyal was lying in a hospital bed after having been shot for no apparent reason, ostensibly the victim of a crazed random street crime. He was returning home after having dinner with KGB defector Oleg Kalugin, and had been an aggressive advocate for Georgian independence from Russian influence. The attack remains unsolved.

CONCLUSION: Did the Kremlin have anything to do with either Joyal’s or McGrory’s fates, or is it just coincidence that both were struck down within days of giving statements directly blaming the Kremlin for Litvinenko’s killing to the American press? Would the Kremlin really be so brazen as to attack an American for speaking in America? Whether it did not not is almost beside the point: the thing you can’t see is always scarier than the thing you can. The Kremlin is now positioned to turn random accidents into weapons. Appelbaum sums it up: “As Russian (and Eastern European) history well demonstrates, it isn’t always necessary to kill millions of people to frighten all the others: A few choice assassinations, in the right time and place, usually suffice. Since the arrest of oil magnate Mikhail Khodorkovsky in 2003, no other Russian oligarchs have attempted even to sound politically independent. After the assassination of Politkovskaya on Saturday, it’s hard to imagine many Russian journalists following in her footsteps to Grozny either.”

NOTE: For more on the Putin murders from a panel of Russia experts, click here.

January 2009

markelovpasko.jpg


On January 19, 2009, Russian human rights attorney Stanslav Markelov was shot in the back of the head with a silenced pistol as he left a press conference at which he announced his intention to sue the Russian government for its early release of the Col. Yuri Budanov, who murdered his 18-year-old client in Chechnya five years earlier. Also shot and killed was Anastasia Barburova, a young journalism student who was working for Novaya Gazeta and who had studied under Anna Politkovskaya, reporting on the Budanov proceedings.

July 2009

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On July 14, 2009, leading Russian human rights journalist and activist Natalia Estemirova, a single mother of a teenaged daughter, was abducted in front of her home in Grozny, Chechnya, spirited across the border into Ingushetia, shot and dumped in a roadside gutter. Viewed as the successor to Anna Politkovskaya and by far the most prominent living critic of Chechen strongman Ramzan Kadyrov, who had repeatedly threatened her life, Estemirova was a member of the “Memorial” human rights NGO and a steadfast defender of human rights in Chechnya. Most recently, she had been reporting on the barbaric practice of the government in burning down the homes of rebel activists, often with women and children locked inside.

February 2015

Boris Nemtsov, a leading opposition figure and outspoken critic of Putin. Gunned down on a bridge near Red Square. Suspects still at large.
 
Anyway, copying my post from another thread.
Copying my question to you from the other thread - why your lists starts from 1998?
There were dozens of cases when opposition journalists, activists and businessmen were murdered in Russia before that year.
Why it doesn't include journalists Vladislav Listyev and Dmitry Kholodov, murdered in 1993 and 1994?

Businessman Ivan Kivelidi was poisoned in 1995 with the similar nerve agent as Scripal was, but he's not on the list.
Perhaps because Putin wasn't in power at that time and it's hard to put the blame on him?
 
I see a lot of innuendo on that list, possible Putin critics, possible links to the kremlin... the problem is that there is no evidence in it.

If a journalist gets murdered in the USA tomorrow, odds are he could be described as "a vociferous critic of president Trump". It does mot mean Trump had him murdered.

:shake: Well, if that's the best you can do, I'm just going to leave y'all to yourselves.

It fell out of the news cycle here very quickly, and I don't keep up with everything going on around the world. That is why I am asking you what happened since then, I remember there were dutch citizens aboard and the investigation was probably published and discussed there.
 
Doesn't mean they were, either.

It was the logic that any change against it must be true when the regime is "authoritarian" that led to all the ongoing disastrous wars gaining enough consent inside the "non-autoritarian regimes" to be carried out. Wars, that, we came to know were based on enormous distortion of the facts, when not absolute lies.
 
The remarkable ability of Russians abroad to just bumble into extraordinary deaths is pure coincidence. Nothing to see here.
 
If a journalist gets murdered in the USA tomorrow, odds are he could be described as "a vociferous critic of president Trump". It does mot mean Trump had him murdered.
The USA does not have a tradition of assassinating dissidents, while Russia has been doing it for centuries. In 1937 alone, Stalin executed millions of his own people, for example.

You shouldn't see Putin as some independent agent and a novelty in Russian leadership. You have to place him in the socio-historical context of Russian politics, where he simply continues the legacy of previous rulers. He hasn't done anything that others before him have not done. He is yet another Russian dictator, starting from the bloodthirsty Ivan III (1440-1505) who destroyed the Republic of Novgorod because its democratic structure could potentially become popular in Muscovy, and thus he laid the foundations of the repressive Russian traditions (his grandson Ivan the Terrible established the Tsardom of Russia, of course, since it did not exist at the time of Ivan III).
 
It fell out of the news cycle here very quickly, and I don't keep up with everything going on around the world. That is why I am asking you what happened since then, I remember there were dutch citizens aboard and the investigation was probably published and discussed there.
For someone who is pretending to be a serious analyst of international relations, with details about US PR from more than a decade ago at his fingertips, it is a bit disappointing to respond here that "at least the idea that a plane was shot down by a missile is plausible." In the best case, it is like starting a serious thread on WWI and then saying "at least the idea that Franz Ferdinand was shot down is plausible.", at the worst you are like the people who claim to want an open discussion about the historic facts of WWII just to go down the holocaust denial path.

Anyway: https://www.om.nl/onderwerpen/mh17-crash/@96068/jit-flight-mh17-shot/
The Joint Investigation Team (JIT) is convinced of having obtained irrefutable evidence to establish that on 17 July 2014, flight MH-17 was shot down by a BUK missile from the 9M38-series. According to the JIT there is also evidence identifying the launch location that involves an agricultural field near Pervomaiskyi which, at the time, was controlled by pro-Russian fighters.
...
The JIT has been able to identify a large part of the route concerning the arrival and the departure of the BUK-TELAR. This was the result of intercepted telephone conversations, witness statements, photographs and videos that had been posted on social media, and a video never shown before which was obtained from a witness. The system was transported from Russian territory into eastern Ukraine and was later transported on a white Volvo truck with a low-boy trailer. The truck was escorted by several other vehicles and by armed men in uniform.

Now, for arguments sake I'm going to assume that you (or at least the casual observers in this thread) accept this line and discuss how it affects the current discussion.

You previously raised several points that "make no sense" according to you:
* The extremely potent chemical weapon that took hours to produce any effect?
Frankly, this seems a question of biochemistry. I don't have the impression that you are a biochemistry expert. Yet you immediately conclude that the stated scenario makes no sense. Complaining about credibility in this thread, how credible are you? Anyway, as even school boys and house mothers know, medicine and drugs often take some time to work, 40 minutes is rather typical and two hours is not uncommon. Mustard gas, for that matter, takes like 24 hours to become effective and an experiment with VX showed an incubation time of more than 3 hours.

* That failed to kill the targets?
Here, the MH17 example is useful. What it shows is the Uber-ification of the Russian [to some extent this also holds for other nations, but we are talking about Russia here] military/intelligence apparatus. For several reasons, including maintaining plausible deniability, nation-state level weaponry came in the hands of 'independent contractors'. They receive support from Russia and work largely for Russia's goals, but they are not directly managed by Russia. Downside is that these dudes are not always up to professional standards. Might shoot down a civilian plane. Might botch a murder-for hire.
Furthermore, the chosen method [regardless if you think this was done by Russians, the CIA or aliens] shows that the PR piece of this entire thing was just as important as the actual attack. If you just wanted to kill someone you would use a gun. If you wanted to kill someone and not be found, you would make it look like a robbery or an accident. This was meant as a signal. Now, this is where the theories diverge. Is it a signal to Russians that they should not move abroad, is it to scare Russians who already moved abroad, is it a stunt for the elections, is it a show of Russian strength and a test of UK strength? Some combination? I don't have a strong feeling about this, you would need to know more about Kremlinology. Some of these theories are at least somewhat plausible. Dismissing them out of hand, as you do, as not very convincing. I'm also starting to slide into the next point.

* The idea of a state killing a former double spy it released years ago?
Makes more sense than downing an unrelated civilian air plane.
That still happened.

Anyway, the concept of Putin as an omnipotent master chess player, every move a miracle, is a bit of a straw man. I don't think Bush personally ordered Abu Ghraib. I don't think the shooting of unarmed black men is personally ordered by the US President or the local police chief. But the buck stops there. I don't think these things were/are actually very beneficial to the US, or that they make particular sense from a chess player vision. Poorly led chains of command that enable low level abuse tend to end up blundering away human lives. "making sense" is something for couch generals and TV script writers.

Finally, coming back to the MH17, what happened there was that the Kremlin, it's media arms and their loyal stooges immediately started putting out every possible conspiracy theory under the sun (maybe it was the Ukrainians, maybe it was the CIA, remember Iraq?) and started to cast doubt on every aspect of the investigation ("X makes no sense, Y makes no sense") in ways that were easy to refute but then the waters had already been muddied. This distasteful and disgraceful process started before the bodies were even buried. This is exactly what we see here and now.
 
when the story breaks out here , it's about a Turkish-Cypriot shop owner that sold stuff to the spy guy . Polite and kind to children ... So that we should be like ...

russians kill a lot of people . The West regularly fails to stop Russian advances here and there . Cold War is needed back . Putin was winning the elections already but the economics of Russia are not particularly strong . Especially for a real showdown in trade . See , nothing particularly troublesome .
 
But this also makes no sense. There was an election this year and no one, really no one, doubted Putin would win it. He had absolutely no need whatsoever for getting local sympathy through such a convoluted means.

Worse, the idea of sanction on Russia has been justified as a means of "weakening Putin". We can't have a narrative where Putin masterminds an attack in order to get popular at home because of sanction put upon Russia, and at the same time put those sanction with the justification that they will weaken Putin's government. Both could not be true at the same time.
The effect doesn't need to be so straight forward as: kill ex-agent -> get sanctioned -> rally the people -> win election. If you want to create an image of a nation under siege, you need to orchestrate these kinds of conflicts from time to time so that people remember the story you are telling them. The gain doesn't need to be immediate.

On the second point, weakening Putin is the west's goal. Putin can have his own goals, and so far Putin has outplayed the west on his own chessboard, using the west's predictable moves to further his own gameplan. I'm not sure Putin is even playing the same game as the west. The west is playing the game of international politics and trade, while Putin is playing the game of sultan of Russia. It's pretty clear that Putin doesn't care about international law and agreements (not saying that the US is much better), as long as the nation is in alert rallies around the strongman, he can perpetuate the existence of his gang of thugs and the theft from the russian people.
 
I feel like the Law and Order episodes are getting to your head. The diplomats were sent to prison in a criminal case, they were simply expelled. There's no "beyond reasonable doubt" standard. The Vienna convention says "The host nation at any time and for any reason can declare a particular member of the diplomatic staff to be persona non grata. The sending state must recall this person within a reasonable period of time, or otherwise this person may lose their diplomatic immunity."
In your example, regardless of how likely it is, if this act was committed with using black market nerve agent that originated in Russia, that is still plenty of reason to be angry with them and expel their diplomats.
Of course it's a diplomatic case - the British other Western governments are allowed to expel diplomats from whomever they want, or even shut the embassy down altogether. The question is whether they should. I'd rather they have investigated this incident more fully before taking action, but I don't dispute that they are legally entitled to do it.
I feel like I owe you a better formulation of my point.

A different standard of proof does not simply shift a line on the likelihood scale (like going from p=5% to p=1%), it can fundamentally change an argument.

Let me illustrate this for mathematics, the clearest field of logical reasoning and standards of proof. To disprove a theorem, a single counterexamples suffices. But to proof a theorem, no amount of examples is sufficient, you need to prove it for all cases. If you want to prove Pythagoras' theorem, drawing a couple of triangles where a^2+b^2=c^2 does not suffice. In fact, drawing more and more triangles where the theorem holds is pointless and does not bring you any closer to a proof.

However, theorems are not the only object in mathematics. There are conjectures and hypotheses, there are research proposals. If you want to convince people that a certain aspect is interesting and should be investigated (read: funded!), finding more and more examples is useful and valid.

The frame of 'rigid proof', which is being deployed effectively by the Russians, and which is brought up by comparing this incident to other examples like the Iraq and Libya wars [for which the standard of proof is more rigid], is actually the wrong standard for diplomatic expulsion, and mostly serves as a red herring to derail this discussion.

Coming back to the mathematical example, the repeated occurrence of attacks with Russian links can be linked together to form a sufficiently strong proof in a diplomatic expulsion case, but not in a 'beyond reasonable doubt' standard.
 
allright , not the same game . Let's consider that as the exact truth and not one of where the West is throwing fits at how Russia is rebounding instead of becoming boots on the ground against China ...

then let's add the plane twist . Predictable in that Russians open fire on stuff because they have discovered that they are good at this "Hybrid Warfare" they long feared from the West and have completely trounced the Ukranians and try to make them give up trying . So , some passenger airliner gets shot down . Let's see , it grossly deviates from the flight plan , carries so many doctors that can save the world from AIDS or anything that can mutate out of it or something . As a further twist it carries a couple of relatives of those Malaysia lost over the Indian Ocean a year before . Damned Russians ? Why they didn't mistake that one as a military flight and not something else . Yes , Russians have shot down civilian airliners before , but they have standarts ; so only those they assumed were on espionage stuff , much as Aeroflot regularly spied on America on its Washington flights ...

yes , Russians are abominable , but their "comeback" is the sole reason that there is still a country named Turkey -not in Civil War . Out of the instability that creates , the West readily sells the Kurds . And that's across the board . The whole world .
 
Anyway, the concept of Putin as an omnipotent master chess player, every move a miracle, is a bit of a straw man. I don't think Bush personally ordered Abu Ghraib. I don't think the shooting of unarmed black men is personally ordered by the US President or the local police chief. But the buck stops there. I don't think these things were/are actually very beneficial to the US, or that they make particular sense from a chess player vision. Poorly led chains of command that enable low level abuse tend to end up blundering away human lives. "making sense" is something for couch generals and TV script writers.
Putin is being blamed by Britain for orchestrating this poisoning personally. So, "making sense" comments are valid.
 
I made a small research based on data from https://cpj.org

Number of journalists killed in Russia in 1992-2018
Type of death: Murder
Location: Russia
Origin: Local

Results split by 5 year periods, leaving out 1 journalist killed in 1993

1994-1998: 11
1999-2003: 7
2004-2008: 8
2009-2013: 7
2014-2018: 2

dead-journalists-russia.jpg


Putin became a prime minister in 1999 and a president in 2000.
I'll leave you to make your own conclusion, whether it is correctly to make full list of all journalists murdered in Russia for whatever reason and call it a "list of successful and attempted assassinations made by Putin"
 
Carrying on (and developing) what Dutchfire said about the lower standard of evidence here, and setting aside that there really is *no* standard of evidence on expelling diplomats...

The discussion here is not whether Russia/Putin is guilty of a crime. It's whether they're responsible for the poisoning. And even in legal terms, that shift the standard of evidence: guilt for a crime is determined on proof beyond reasonable doubt, but responsibility for a wrongful act is determined on the basis of the balance of probabilities (ie, whether it appears more likely than not). So the question (since nobody is charging Russia/Putin with anything) is whether it appears more likely than not that Russia did it. OJ Simpson is a famous example of the distinction (not guilty of murder, liable/responsible for wrongful death).

In that case, the fact that someone else could be producing the nerve agent or who could have acquired it from Russia and similar speculation is not a very useful fact. Sure, some of it might induce a reasonable doubt (even that is a stretch), but reasonable doubt is meaningless on balance of probability. And on the balance of probability, the one state known to produce and stock the agent in question being responsible for an attack carried out with that agent..does indeed appear more likely than not. Especially given that the said state is also the only known entity with an apparent reason to wish ill to the victim (traitor to the state/former spy against it, etc).

All the more so when people who upset the said state (political opposition to the leadership, etc) do appear to have an unfortunate tendency to meet with untimely and unexplained demises.
 
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I made a small research based on data from https://cpj.org
That's a great source, tx. However, take a closer look at the filters.
Somewhat unintuitively, "Murder" only applies if there has been a confirmed motive.
E.g. this guy:
Spoiler :

Firefighters responding to an emergency call found Shurpayev, 32, dead in his rented Moscow apartment; he had been stabbed and strangled. The perpetrators had apparently set the residence on fire to cover their tracks, Channel One reported.

The prosecutor general's office opened a murder investigation. According to initial press reports, authorities ruled out robbery as a motive because Shurpayev's valuables, including his laptop, had not been taken. Investigators initially said they were looking at Shurpayev's journalism as a possible motive, along with unspecified private matters, Channel One reported on March 21. Channel One representatives declined to comment when contacted by CPJ.

According to local press reports, Shurpayev had moved to Moscow in February from his native Dagestan in Russia's volatile North Caucasus region, where he worked as a local correspondent for Channel One. Prior to joining Channel One, Shurpayev worked for the state-controlled NTV channel.

Hours before his death, Shurpayev wrote in his personal blog that the owners of a newspaper in Dagestan--later identified in the local press as Nastoyashcheye Vremya (The Real Time)--had refused to publish a column Shurpayev had written and had instructed staff to not mention his name in publications. "Now I am a dissident!" was the blog entry's title.

has type of death "Unknown" (not "Murder") and won't show up in the above statistics.
Including cases like the one above brings us to 74 people between 1994-2018.
World total: 1764.
UK: 3
US: 7
Germany: 0
Ukraine: 19
Iraq: 278.

EDIT: Also, 7 more are missing in Russia (out of world total of 58).
 
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That's a great source, tx. However, take a closer look at the filters.
Somewhat unintuitively, "Murder" only applies if there has been a confirmed motive.
That's a valid point, but if you include other types of death, the tendency is becoming even more clear:
https://cpj.org/data/killed/?status...S&start_year=1992&end_year=2018&group_by=year
I didn't include it originally so that statistics about journalists killed in Chechen wars won't interfere with the whole picture.

Apparently, during Putin's rule journalists work in Russia has become safer.
 
Putin is being blamed by Britain for orchestrating this poisoning personally. So, "making sense" comments are valid.

Are you suggesting that Russian foreign policy actions are taken that aren't orchestrated by Putin?
 
Are you suggesting that Russian foreign policy actions are taken that aren't orchestrated by Putin?
I'm suggesting precisely the opposite.
The foreign policy action which doesn't make sense from Putin's personal perspective, won't be taken by Russia.
 
I'm suggesting precisely the opposite.
The foreign policy action which doesn't make sense from Putin's personal perspective, won't be taken by Russia.

I was confused because if you come from "Putin's personal perspective" you open the door to motives that don't really make sense for the nation. From the national perspective killing some long out of action spy has very little upside, so any amount of downside risk makes no motive. From the personal perspective something as simple as vindictiveness could be the motive. Old KGB agents who regret the loss of the USSR have a strong antipathy towards enemy spies from that era.
 
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