First Indochina War

[Lord Baal]

Meh, Stalin wouldn't last for long.

But Stalinist regimes in Eastern Europe would. No reason to think they wouldn't survive in the West either.

Indonesia and Vietnam declared their independence and went to war at about the same time. It's just that the Netherlands, being smaller, poorer with less political clout than France, found it harder to hold on to its colony.

You're right that the creation of Indonesia was very much a diplomatic victory. It wasn't easy though. Western public opinion was often very much on the side of the Dutch (justified by the usual "natives aren't ready to rule themselves" line). The Indonesian Republic was cast as an illegitimate Japanese-collaborationist government (which was true). At least the Viet Minh were fighting on the Allied side.

The Dutch actually did a better job of re-conquering Indonesia than the French did Viet Nam. If they'd had US support, they could probably have re-established control. Masada would know amore about this. Australia was instrumental in convincing the US to accept Indonesian independence, probably because we saw it as a fait accompli and wanted good terms with the new nation. Indochina had no such value to non-involved Western powers, and therefore no-one was willing to go to bat for it.

 

[innonimatu]

Australia was instrumental in convincing the US to accept Indonesian independence, probably because we saw it as a fait accompli and wanted good terms with the new nation. Indochina had no such value to non-involved Western powers, and therefore no-one was willing to go to bat for it.

I believe it was more like the australian government saw an independent indonesia as more easily exploitable than a dutch indonesia! I mean, they were hardly anticolonialist at the time, in no hurry to cast of New Guinea and indeed a bit too eager to have London recognize them as new holders of East Timor...

 

[Lord Baal]

I believe it was more like the australian government saw an independent indonesia as more easily exploitable than a dutch indonesia! I mean, they were hardly anticolonialist at the time, in no hurry to cast of New Guinea and indeed a bit too eager to have London recognize them as new holders of East Timor...

I'd forgotten about our attempt to hold East Timor. It didn't last long.

I think Australia's primary foreign policy goal at that point was to position ourselves to be capable of defending against any renewed naval threat from the north. Japan was our biggest bug-bear, but we also had concerns about the USSR and a resurgent China. Even the French and the Dutch could possibly be problematic in the event of a war between the European colonial powers. But the Dutch were friendly and we'd prefer them in charge of Indonesia than an unpredictable Asian power.

Since, however, that Asian country had already declared independence and looked capable of defending it from a renewed Dutch attack, we might as well accept the reality of the situation and attempt to build Indonesia as a buffer-state between ourselves and the north Asian states. Since we were still supporting Dutch control of West Papua and wanted East Timor for ourselves, this new Asian state would not be in a position to establish a power-base outside of ourselves, and we'd still have our very own forward defence-line in case they proved belligerent. Not a bad policy, if I say so myself.

Of course, in the long-run, Indonesia ended up in control of both West Papua and East Timor, but by that point we'd established strong contacts with their military and the PKI was eliminated. They were no longer even a potential threat.

 

[innonimatu]

Why did the dutch kept West Papua when the gave up on Indonesia anyway? I never heard the story behind that one.

 

[Lord Baal]

Why did the dutch kept West Papua when the gave up on Indonesia anyway? I never heard the story behind that one.

West Papua was inhabited by Melanesian New Guineans, who differed from the rest of Indonesia in culture, language and racially. Giving the territory to Indonesia would not be an exercise in self-determination, but simply exchanging one imperialist master for another. At least, that was the reasoning given by Australia at the time.

In reality, it was simply a case of the pro-independence Indonesians not actually having a force in the territory, whereas the Dutch did. The Dutch, who were already being forced to give up the jewel of their empire, didn't want to lose everything and endeavoured to hold onto the poorest, least integrated part of NEI on the grounds that it had never really been part of the NEI administration anyway.

The Australians thought that an expansionist Indonesia might have designs on Papua New Guinea or Malaysia. By denying them West Papua, it ensured that their expansionist desires were directed against somebody else, rather than us or our British masters/ allies. Simple divide and rule, there. Also, we might have the possibility of appearing as heroes later by supporting Indonesian claims to the territory - which is exactly what happened in the 1960s - in exchange for some sort of quid pro quo regarding Malaysia (which happened) or East Timor (which didn't).

There's also the simle fact that the Indonesians themselves hadn't decided how much territory they wanted for their new state. Sukarno, who wanted the entirety of the NEI (and more) was actually in the minority in the immediate post-independence period. Many pro-independence activists wanted a smaller Java-dominated state. Some only wanted Javanese independence, while some wanted a loose confederation of all the former NEI. Only a few hard-liners even cared about West Papua. So there wasn't any concerted effort to get rid of the Dutch there until Sukarno embarked on his foreign adventures over a decade later.

 

[Masada]

Huh? An independent Indonesian state using the borders of the NEI was the majority opinion. How that state was to be structured was the real issue.

Otherwise, what Lord_Baal said. The Dutch also thought it had value as a "launching pad" for their eventual return.

The Dutch actually did a better job of re-conquering Indonesia than the French did Viet Nam.

Not, really. The Dutch conquered as much as they did, in large part, because the Indonesian Government was convinced that negotiating was a better means to independence than fighting. On the rare occasions where Republican forces were allowed to fight on a large scale, especially at the tail end of the conflict, they showed they were more than capable of winning through violent means.

The best example, was A. H. Nasustion's Siliwangi division marching from starting positions in Central Java across Java and into Sunda. The division did so without facing any major Dutch resistance. Basically, the lines that the Dutch had spent like 12 months building were shown to be porous as hell with similar division level breakouts occurring elsewhere.

Given the above, it seems unlikely that the relatively small number of Dutch forces could have held in the face of actual resistance, as opposed to the conditioned resistance than Indonesian forces had been forced to offer up until that point.

 

[Lord Baal]

Huh? An independent Indonesian state using the borders of the NEI was the majority opinion. How that state was to be structured was the real issue.

Otherwise, what Lord_Baal said. The Dutch also thought it had value as a "launching pad" for their eventual return.

I worded that poorly. I meant the idea of a decentralised confederacy was more popular than that of a unitary state, which is what Indonesia became.

 

[Tahuti]

You're right that the creation of Indonesia was very much a diplomatic victory. It wasn't easy though. Western public opinion was often very much on the side of the Dutch (justified by the usual "natives aren't ready to rule themselves" line). The Indonesian Republic was cast as an illegitimate Japanese-collaborationist government (which was true). At least the Viet Minh were fighting on the Allied side.

Actually, the Indonesion nationalists were associated with the Axis Power in the Netherlands, the slogan "Wat tijd verbindt zal de Jap niet scheiden" (what time bonds will not be divorced by the Jap) being particuarly emblematic of this.

 

[Masada]

The amusing thing is that nobody outside of the Dutch bought that view.

 

[Tahuti]

The amusing thing is that nobody outside of the Dutch bought that view.

Fascist!

But it's true though. Even despite Britain helping out on several occasions.

 

[Masada]

Eh, the Brits probably did more harm to the Dutch cause than good. Defacto recognition, a lack of willingness to do much more than secure POWs, and some serious pressure on the Dutch (mostly successful) to keep their landings to the Outer Islands made retrieving the situation even more difficult than it already was. I can't blame them either: the Brits weren't going to waste their lives saving a colonial project they'd written off after Surabaya.

 

[Tee Kay]

A murky, unaccounted past as an Axis-aligned puppet/strongman/collaborator is no obstacle to post-War political power with the blessings of the West. See Thailand-Pibunsongkram, Vietnam-Bao Dai, Japan-basically the entirety of the post-war elite

 

[ParkCungHee]

Add South Korea to that list.

 

[JohannaK]

This sounds interesting. Gotta read something about it. Recommendations?

 

[dutchfire]

But Stalinist regimes in Eastern Europe would. No reason to think they wouldn't survive in the West either.


The Dutch actually did a better job of re-conquering Indonesia than the French did Viet Nam. If they'd had US support, they could probably have re-established control. Masada would know amore about this. Australia was instrumental in convincing the US to accept Indonesian independence, probably because we saw it as a fait accompli and wanted good terms with the new nation. Indochina had no such value to non-involved Western powers, and therefore no-one was willing to go to bat for it.

What I seem to remember from Dutch history (which probably suffers from LOADS of bias) that the American threat to cut off Marshall help to the Netherlands was a major reason to stop the Dutch attempt to reconquer the Dutch Indies.

 

[Masada]

Eh, that's overemphasized.

 

[Lord Baal]

Eh, that's overemphasized.

Yeah. So far as I know, it was a pretty empty threat, which the Dutch realised.

 

[Masada]

Not quite.

The real issue was that the military approach which the Dutch had gambled big on wasn't delivering. For example. While Operation Kraai had succeeded in its goals of capturing the Republics civilian leadership and all the major Republican held cities on Java, it had failed to deliver a decisive victory. To make matters worse the conflict intensified, contrary to Dutch expectations, and in ways that the Dutch had not planned on. This stretched Dutch forces and resources to breaking point, even in the short gap between Operation Kraai and the UN enforced truce, so much so that the Dutch government came to the realization that there were no circumstances under which it could win. The US threat to withdraw Marshall Aid funding really just tipped the scales in favor of a hastier departure than would otherwise have occurred.

tl;dr The Dutch started a war believing that it would be decisive. It wasn't and with no clear means of winning, the Dutch were forced to bail.

P.S. Dutch war goals during Operation Kraai were basically the same as those of Indonesian Nationalists way back in 1945. The problem of course was that both sides had changed their goals in the intervening 4 years.