Free Will

[warpus]

Ayatollah So

You argue that free will exists already having assumed that it does. Your arguments are flawed.

Assume that it does not and show that it does, if that is your position.

 

[Ayatollah So]

You argue that free will exists already having assumed that it does.

Not exactly: I argue that there is no inconsistency between free will and deterministic theories. That free will and determinism are compatible. I argue that the answer to Souron's thread-opening question, "what are the necessary conditions for free will?" should make no mention of the determinism/indeterminism issue.

To address questions of consistency, it's perfectly legitimate to assume that both of the theses (whose compatibility is disputed) are true, and look for contradictions. If no contradiction is present, the theses are compatible.

 

[Mise]

Actually the scenario you give is exactly the kind of case I had in mind. Let's say Dr. Sigmund is a famous psychologist, and has demonstrated an amazing ability to understand and predict human actions. And he's made a prediction about what you'll do today and why. Still, there's no threat to your free will there. His predictions (to the extent they're accurate, which let's assume is 100%) are a copy of your actions (in a different medium - prose, rather than performance). Your actions are the original (or maybe we should say, master) for that copy. You are still in charge.

Hmm, that's quite an interesting way of thinking about it. If this is free will, then I agree that free will and determinism are compatible. I'm guessing that this entire debate therefore boils down to that big "if"... Sorry if I only just got that

 

[warpus]

Not exactly: I argue that there is no inconsistency between free will and deterministic theories. That free will and determinism are compatible. I argue that the answer to Souron's thread-opening question, "what are the necessary conditions for free will?" should make no mention of the determinism/indeterminism issue.

Sure, but your argument that they are compatible goes something like this:

Somebody makes a decision.. therefore there is no inconsistency.

Ya but you need to show how somebody could make a decision in a deterministic universe

 

[Souron]

But we wouldn't "see" this, unless we are illogical. We would see that there is only one actual course of action, not (the illogical conclusion) that there is only one possible course of action.

If something will happen, then it will happen, no if or buts about it. If it is possible that it will not happen, then that would violate the premise that is will happen.

This comes back to the point about the copy and the original. In both the case of the historian looking back, and that of the hypothetical super-knowledgeable psychologist forseeing an action, those describers are simply finding reliable, faithful ways to make copies, so to speak. The historian is finding reliable causal links from your action to your future (the historian's present). The super-psychologist is finding reliable links from your action to your past (his present). These guys are just finding the traces of you, spread out over history. Why on earth would that disempower you?

Copy analogy is a good one. If you are deterministic, it is principally possible to make a perfect copy of you. Put in the same environment, this copy would act exactly as you do. Lets say we do that. But we let you live your life first, and then your copy will live the same life.

It will not be constrained by anything external to behave exactly like you do. The fact that you behave one way does not cause the copy to behave the same way. The only reason the copy behaves the same way is because it has the same initial state.

Yet, The copy has no possibility of behaving any differently than the way you behave. It has no options; there is only one possible sequence of actions: those that you yourself take. So the copy does not have free will.

Now, there really is no difference between you and the copy. Everything that can be said about the copy can be said about you, excepting that it lived later. But there is nothing significant about the fact that the copy happened to live it's life after you. If the copy is shy, you are shy. If the copy hates goths, you hate goths. If the copy has no free will, you have no free will

So if such a perfect copy could exist -- which it could in a deterministic world -- then you cannot have free will.

 

[Gogf]

Copy analogy is a good one. If you are deterministic, it is principally possible to make a perfect copy of you. Put in the same environment, this copy would act exactly as you do. Lets say we do that. But we let you live your life first, and then your copy will live the same life.

It will not be constrained by anything external to behave exactly like you do. The fact that you behave one way does not cause the copy to behave the same way. The only reason the copy behaves the same way is because it has the same initial state.

Yet, The copy has no possibility of behaving any differently than the way you behave. It has no options; there is only one possible sequence of actions: those that you yourself take. So the copy does not have free will.

Now, there really is no difference between you and the copy. Everything that can be said about the copy can be said about you, excepting that it lived later. But there is nothing significant about the fact that the copy happened to live it's life after you. If the copy is shy, you are shy. If the copy hates goths, you hate goths. If the copy has no free will, you have no free will

So if such a perfect copy could exist -- which it could in a deterministic world -- then you cannot have free will.

Hm? No offense, Souron, but this is rather convoluted.

The fact that something would react the same way as you does not make you deterministic. For all intents and purposes, the copy is you. The copy will always act in exactly the same way as you would, because that defines how you would act.

There is no reason that an exact copy of you with free will cannot exist. An exact copy of you would go through the same thought process a yourself and come to the same conclusion—through free will.

 

[Souron]

It just boils down to if there is only one possible outcome then there can be no free will. The copy is just a way to emphasize that there can only be one possible outcome in a deterministic world.

 

[Gogf]

It just boils down to if there is only one possible outcome then there can be no free will. The copy is just a way to emphasize that there can only be one possible outcome in a deterministic world.

Why do you need to involve a copy in that? There is only one possible outcome in a purely deterministic world. This comes from the definition of "deterministic."

 

[Souron]

Why do you need to involve a copy in that? There is only one possible outcome in a purely deterministic world. This comes from the definition of "deterministic."

If there is only one possible outcome then there can be no options. If there are no options, then there can be no choice. If there is no choice, then there cannot be free will. That is what I am trying to communicate to Ayatollah So.

 

[warpus]

It is a convoluted example, but a brilliant thought experiment, IMO

Even so, I do not think it will convince Ayatollah So

 

[Mise]

It just boils down to if there is only one possible outcome then there can be no free will.

Ayatollah So has said this many times: The "one possible outcome" is a result of your free will. Free will is not dependent on the outcome, but rather, the outcome is determined by your free will (or lack thereof). Free Will is an independent statement of fact, true or false, and the outcome is contingent on that will. I'm glad that I have come to appreciate the subtlety of that distinction

 

[warpus]

Ayatollah So has said this many times: The "one possible outcome" is a result of your free will. Free will is not dependent on the outcome, but rather, the outcome is determined by your free will (or lack thereof). Free Will is an independent statement of fact, true or false, and the outcome is contingent on that will. I'm glad that I have come to appreciate the subtlety of that distinction

Surely if you had free will there would be more than one possible outcome? ie. you would have the choice to go one way or another.

 

[Bozo Erectus]

Could you have not written it?

Atlas14, this question was buried pages ago, but I think its fundamental: You say that you chose to write what you wrote. Could you go back and change what you wrote, at that particular moment? No, because its in your 'past'. So therefore, if from moment to moment you do what you do automatically in an unalterable fashion, how could you possibly say that you possess free will?

 

[Ayatollah So]

Sure, but your argument that they are compatible goes something like this:

Somebody makes a decision.. therefore there is no inconsistency.

Ya but you need to show how somebody could make a decision in a deterministic universe

Simple: they imagine various actions, consider the consequences, and conclude their deliberations in favor of "I will do A". And this conclusion is a crucial causal determinant of the fact that action A is the one that actually happens. I've said all this before.

If something will happen, then it will happen, no if or buts about it. If it is possible that it will not happen, then that would violate the premise that is will happen.

That's not correct. I think that you're misapplying a third-person perspective to a first-person context. When you describe someone else, you may be able to rule out certain future actions on scientific grounds. When a person describes himself, and in particular his own actions, the only way he can rationally rule an action out is if he's already decided against it. Even if he has in hand a complete description of the early universe and the (suppose for the sake of argument) deterministic laws of nature, he's still not rationally compelled to conclude on scientific grounds, "I will do A". He's not, because he knows darn well that if he concludes on practical grounds "I will do B", he will do B. Because either conclusion would be self-fulfilling, neither one is rationally forced. More details of this subtle point here, along with a reference to David Velleman's original paper on the subject.

Yet, The copy has no possibility of behaving any differently than the way you behave. It has no options; there is only one possible sequence of actions: those that you yourself take. So the copy does not have free will.

The wording (and, I suspect, the intended meaning) is wrong. You are entitled to say:
There is no possibility that there is a difference in behavior between you and the copy

But your first sentence above doesn't follow from that. "The copy has no possibility ..." illegitimately distributes the impossibility, moving it from the relationship between us onto one (or each) of us considered individually. It's the modal scope fallacy deja vu all over again.

Why do you need to involve a copy in that? There is only one possible outcome in a purely deterministic world. This comes from the definition of "deterministic."

It doesn't come from the definition which I quoted. Reproduced below:

For anyone who's interested, I got my definition from the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (link). My summary in post #213 was based on this summary on that website:

We can now put our -- still vague -- pieces together. Determinism requires a world that (a) has a well-defined state or description, at any given time, and (b) laws of nature that are true at all places and times. If we have all these, then if (a) and (b) together logically entail the state of the world at all other times (or, at least, all times later than that given in (b)[rather, (a)]), the world is deterministic.

 

[warpus]

Simple: they imagine various actions, consider the consequences, and conclude their deliberations in favor of "I will do A". And this conclusion is a crucial causal determinant of the fact that action A is the one that actually happens. I've said all this before.

Yeah, except that in a deterministic universe you will only have 1 choice. So it isn't really a "choice".

 

[Ayatollah So]

Yeah, except that in a deterministic universe you will only have 1 choice.

This clause in my explanation of decision-making:

[Your intention to do A] is a crucial causal determinant of the fact that action A is the one that actually happens.

captures the fact that there are multiple options. If you only had 1 option, the way a jailed person only has 1 option of where to be, then your intentions would have no causal role, the way the prisoner's intentions fail to causally determine his location.

And there is nothing in that clause which is inconsistent with determinism.

 

[Mise]

Surely if you had free will there would be more than one "possible" outcome? ie. you would have the choice to go one way or another.

The problem is with the word "possible". You can have as many possible options or choices as you want, but there will always be one outcome, and this is true regardless of whether or not you have free will.

Bozo resurrected a post of his, which asked Atlas14 whether he could make a different choice. Regardless of whether free will exists objectively or not, given that Atlas made that choice, he could not have made any other choice. Determinism says the exact same thing, except it projects the scenario onto the future: given that Atlas will make <this> choice, Atlas will not make any other choice. And, similarly, this is regardless of whether or not free will exists objectively. Hence, determinism is compatible with free will. Thus far, you have not said anything that applies only to determinism.

 

[CartesianFart]

I think this thread (and the people who inhabit in it)needs to be quarantined because everyone else is only contaminating each other of their own sickening diseases with stale opinions from already established position of indeterminism and determinism.

No originality but many misuses and misleading comments that is confused by the people presenting their case.

This is the reason why the argument of the discussion of free-will looks like it is merely a case of preferences of people tastes.-whether you favor free-will or not.

 

[warpus]

This clause in my explanation of decision-making:

captures the fact that there are multiple options. If you only had 1 option, the way a jailed person only has 1 option of where to be, then your intentions would have no causal role, the way the prisoner's intentions fail to causally determine his location.

And there is nothing in that clause which is inconsistent with determinism.

Well, we're back to the same disagreement then.

I dont' think it'd be possible to have a choice in a deterministic universe. That's just the definitino of determinisim... there is only one path.. *shrug*

The problem is with the word "possible". You can have as many possible options or choices as you want, but there will always be one outcome, and this is true regardless of whether or not you have free will.

Right, but in a deterministic Universe you'd only have one possible outcome, not many.

In a nondeterministic Universe there could be many outcomes - opening the door for the possibility of free will.

 

[Mise]

Right, but in a deterministic Universe you'd only have one possible outcome, not many.

In a nondeterministic Universe there could be many outcomes - opening the door for the possibility of free will.

In both universes there are many possible outcomes, and the actual outcome is determined by free will. The difference is, in a deterministic universe, one can, with infinite knowledge, determine what that outcome is. The determination of the outcome does not mean that there is no free will. In a non-deterministic universe, it is impossible to determine the outcome. But there is free will in both, since free will is not dependent on the outcome, but rather the other way around.