Great Military Disasters

[privatehudson]

A very good point. It was disasterous in terms of lives lost, the financial cost, etc. I understand your point there, and now I agree with it.But history books won't call it a disaster, because it didn't have any immediate losses for the North. Granted, again, I agree with what you said, but that can go for Gettysburg, Chickamauga, etc. Had the one side done more, it would have been disasterous for the other. But I think it would have been called a disaster had Lee lost, because I cannot see the war continueing for more than a few months if Lee's army was captured/destroyed.

Well many history books shy away from openly addressing the issue of counter factual history, and many that do prefer to think of the "what ifs" for the South winning (much the same as WW2 what ifs tend to talk about the Nazis turning the tables on the allies). Lincoln certainly thought it was enough of a sucess to issue the Emancipation proclomation and Lee's invasion was turned back, so in the immediate strategic sense it was a victory. In a tactical sense he failed, and that lead to a missed opportunity for an even greater strategic success.

I suppose a better term than disaster would be a glorious missed opportunity but never mind.

Honestly, I think even Sumner, Hooker, and even Burnside could have done better.

I agree, especially in the case of Hooker. Unfortunately had any of them taken command after the battle began it would have taken them time to get up to speed with what was happening. McCellan had taken full control over each corps but his orders for the battle didn't think to inform each commander of what role the other corps would be assigned that day. This coupled with McCellan spending all day on the eastern bank of the Antietam Creek meant that there was little or no co-ordination between the attacks.

 

[privatehudson]

Like said, I kind agree there (then again how much McCellan was scared of ANV trio which caused him to hesitate?) but my point was to raise the question in general how much disasters could be counted towards the other side succeeding compared to the mistakes that are made. Sometimes there is fine line between genius move by the winning side and disaster move by the other side but rather often it's much more hazy.

Usually there's some element of both, and certainly the ANV fought very hard to maintain its position, with Lee making superb use of reserves. I also agree that McCellan was worried about his opponent and believe this probably played a part in not committing his two reserve corps at the end of the battle. Having said that however the AoP nearly won the battle despite his inefficiency, so for this battle the problem still remains more one of McCellan beating himself than Lee beating McCellan.

 

[Dachs]

I agree, especially in the case of Hooker.

So long as he doesn't get 'shell-shock' again, his planning would actually be pretty brilliant.

 

[C~G]

What I am saying is that a what-if scenario can be applied to several battles, much the same way it happens at antietam. For example, Chickamauga. Had Bragg followed Rosecran's rout, than the battle would have been disasterous for the Union. But he did not, and as such it wasn't a disaster.

Cleared up for you now?

Yeah I understand.

Like I made also my point towards the subject considering the other side of things but I think it has lot to do how we define "disaster".

If we are only looking militarily IMO it always leads to the question of expectations for at least "average performance" based into the troops in leader's disposal and things like supply and circustances in the battle field.

Example we can ask/answers in many different ways was Gettysburg military disaster for South? Surely parts were but then again we can see what they were up against so we could maybe say it makes it less of disaster. Then some detailed parts like Pickett's Charge as standalone act could be seen as completely disaster or just one last act of desperation.

This whole thing considered in this thread depends so much of how we define the disaster and also how much we put weight into different elements of the battle and how much we consider it being more of win for one than a loss for the another.

Usually there's some element of both, and certainly the ANV fought very hard to maintain its position, with Lee making superb use of reserves. I also agree that McCellan was worried about his opponent and believe this probably played a part in not committing his two reserve corps at the end of the battle. Having said that however the AoP nearly won the battle despite his inefficiency, so for this battle the problem still remains more one of McCellan beating himself than Lee beating McCellan.

I think Lee and co. had psychological edge over most northern leaders especially McClellan. I think one of the defining aspects of Lee's success was his boldness which in many times is the quality that general can express his intentions through his troops and make a difference during the course of the battle. McClellan in the other hand seemed to lack the very quality of it.

I think Antietam for ANV was very much mediocre battle and just used it's opportunities of exploiting the weakness of McClellan and northern army like so many other times.

And I agree. It's more of the question of kind of stalemate battle which was namely won by Lee but actually who made the mess out of it and for the North was McClellan himself.

But my point was that even when McClellan was weak in what-if scenario facing someone else than that deadly trio the result could have been very different.

 

[privatehudson]

I think Lee and co. had psychological edge over most northern leaders especially McClellan. I think one of the defining aspects of Lee's success was his boldness which in many times is the quality that general can express his intentions through his troops and make a difference during the course of the battle. McClellan in the other hand seemed to lack the very quality of it.

Well McCellan's main forte was organisation and training of soldiers. As much as I deride his qualities as a battlefield commander the fact remains that he helped to forge the disparate elements of the Northern forces around Washington into a coherent army and helped train it to a competent level. He was undoubtedly very popular with the men also. As you say though he lacked any ability to impose his will on campaign and during battles.

But my point was that even when McClellan was weak in what-if scenario facing someone else than that deadly trio the result could have been very different.

To be honest no-one but Lee was likely to have fought at Antietam in the first place, most probably would have withdrawn beforehand. Lee took a serious gamble putting his army in that position and to be frank gained very little from the battle other than the plaudits that came from holding the position in the face of such a numerically superior foe. It did little to change the strategic situation other than reduce his army by a sizeable figure of men that he could ill afford to loose.

Having said that had another general been in charge of the ANV for the battle the chances are that McCellan would have employed the same level of caution anyway. He didn't show much more initative against McGruder or Johnston in the Peninsula for example, and Johnston wasn't exactly the most agressive of generals that the south had. I would say therefore that whilst its possible that McCellan might have beaten an ANV without its best commanders its not particularly likely.

 

[C~G]

Well McCellan's main forte was organisation and training of soldiers. As much as I deride his qualities as a battlefield commander the fact remains that he helped to forge the disparate elements of the Northern forces around Washington into a coherent army and helped train it to a competent level. He was undoubtedly very popular with the men also. As you say though he lacked any ability to impose his will on campaign and during battles.

I think we're on the same page with that one, McClellan was an orgaziner but not really a battle commander which would need him to control not only his troops but basically the battle itself and opponent as well.

Then again we can always ask were his subordinates up for the task either?
But it's clear what we know about McClellan's orders that he made the position for his commanders very difficult especially when being against foe like ANV.

To be honest no-one but Lee was likely to have fought at Antietam in the first place, most probably would have withdrawn beforehand. Lee took a serious gamble putting his army in that position and to be frank gained very little from the battle other than the plaudits that came from holding the position in the face of such a numerically superior foe. It did little to change the strategic situation other than reduce his army by a sizeable figure of men that he could ill afford to loose.

I think he wanted to bloody the nose of the Union and it's very possible he saw that there was such chance with McClellan. It was simply a ballsy move and I believe Lee somehow believed that battle like that could turn the fate for the South. It's very possible it's the same he believed would happen in Gettysburg as well.

Having said that had another general been in charge of the ANV for the battle the chances are that McCellan would have employed the same level of caution anyway. He didn't show much more initative against McGruder or Johnston in the Peninsula for example, and Johnston wasn't exactly the most agressive of generals that the south had. I would say therefore that whilst its possible that McCellan might have beaten an ANV without its best commanders its not particularly likely.

Yeah, we can ponder that but then again like you said, hardly anyone other than Lee would have chosen Antietam as battling ground. Also I think Antietam wouldn't have been such high loss for the union if those three wouldn't have been supervising the resistance.

Like said I believe McClellan had problems with his leadership and didn't understand the importance of aggression. Maybe he counted too much towards the numbers he had against Lee and co. Funnily enough add more than touch of aggression and determination to go forward with larger campaign plan to McClellan and you almost get Grant.

But in general like I said I consider Antietam being stalemate battle were the other side has numbers but not the will to fight and the other side has the tactical advantage and also the desire to impose his will to the opponent. Results are usually like that. Considering again that for South the reason it could be considered a loss is because it has always had weakers numbers than North, so it simply couldn't afford such losses or battles. I think in general this is the defining aspect of the US civil war. North could always lose and then come back but South could never afford to lose.

OF course the disastreous element of the whole ordeal is that McClellan had Lee''s plans, which makes it very good reason to add to the disasters list on almost it's own. Add to that the superior numbers and only you can really ask is what happened George?

 

[Dreadnought]

IIRC, Lee had only 25,000 men when the battle began, while McClellan had 80,000. Really, Lee's invasion wasn't daring or dashing, I think it was suicidal. He hopes to aggressively beat McClellan, but that is not possible simply because, even with McClellan in command, 50,000 men cannot hope to attack a 90,000-110,000 strong army and hope to win. Sure, it was a gutsy move, but I don't see how Lee thought he was going to win.

Wouldn't a retreat into Virginia have been better? I mean, Davis always wanted a campaign of defense, so would it have been so devastating to retreat and wait for a better opprotunity to fight?

 

[privatehudson]

Then again we can always ask were his subordinates up for the task either?

I'd back Hooker to give Lee a harder time than McCellan did. His performance to that point was reasonable and showed enough agression to pull it off. Porter was about as cautious as McCellan (part of why McCellan refused to commit to an attack late at Antietam was because Porter disagreed with it) so was unlikely to do any better. Franklin and Sumner were competent enough and Mansfield was old but eager. Burnside was rather an enigma whose performances peaked and troughed a little too much to say either way.

I think of all of them Sumner was probably senior corps commander, or at least he was during the Seven Days battles. Hooker's probably the only one you could rely on to definately do better (always assuming as has been said that he didn't have a loss of nerve or get injured) than McCellan I would say.

Like said I believe McClellan had problems with his leadership and didn't understand the importance of aggression. Maybe he counted too much towards the numbers he had against Lee and co. Funnily enough add more than touch of aggression and determination to go forward with larger campaign plan to McClellan and you almost get Grant.

Possibly although its hard to imagine McCellan ever coming up with the Vicksburg campaign.

But in general like I said I consider Antietam being stalemate battle were the other side has numbers but not the will to fight and the other side has the tactical advantage and also the desire to impose his will to the opponent. Results are usually like that. Considering again that for South the reason it could be considered a loss is because it has always had weakers numbers than North, so it simply couldn't afford such losses or battles. I think in general this is the defining aspect of the US civil war. North could always lose and then come back but South could never afford to lose.

Antietam and the Maryland campaign could also be considered a defeat because most of the aims of the campaign failed. Although the war moved out of Virginia briefly there was no massive influx of Marylanders to Lee's army. The lack of a major victory meant that the tentative thoughts Britain had towards intervention were put on hold. The withdrawl ended any hope that Maryland might be swayed to join the Confederacy. The first of and third of these weren't a major blow since by and large anyone who was likely to throw their lot in with the Confederacy probably would have done so by then. Since Britain did seriously to consider recognition/intervention during that period however the failure to secure a victory in the Maryland campaign coupled with a similar failure in Kentucky had much more impact.

OF course the disastreous element of the whole ordeal is that McClellan had Lee''s plans, which makes it very good reason to add to the disasters list on almost it's own. Add to that the superior numbers and only you can really ask is what happened George?

Indeed.

IIRC, Lee had only 25,000 men when the battle began, while McClellan had 80,000.

That's probably closer to the figure the day before since Lee had about 40-45,000 effectives on the field of Antietam and I doubt that AP Hill's troops (Lee's only significant body of men not present at the opening of the battle) constituted 15-20,000 men on their own.

Really, Lee's invasion wasn't daring or dashing, I think it was suicidal. He hopes to aggressively beat McClellan, but that is not possible simply because, even with McClellan in command, 50,000 men cannot hope to attack a 90,000-110,000 strong army and hope to win. Sure, it was a gutsy move, but I don't see how Lee thought he was going to win.

Its quite possible that he wanted to attack isolated elements of McCellan's army, defeating each in turn whilst McCellan blundered around trying to protect Washington. Little Mc barely held the city when he knew what Lee was up to, god only knows what would have happened if he'd been in the dark.

Wouldn't a retreat into Virginia have been better? I mean, Davis always wanted a campaign of defense, so would it have been so devastating to retreat and wait for a better opprotunity to fight?

Lee was concious of the effect on the Virginia farms and communities the war passed through and eager to take the war into the North to allow those communities time to recover. He also argued that the presence of a Southern army might inspire Southern sympathisers in Northern states, especially if it could win a sizeable victory. Unknown to either Lee or Davis, but hoped for by the latter it may also have brought Britain to at least offer mediation if not intervention. Simply defending Richmond wasn't likely to do any more than give the North the freedom to come back again harder.

 

[Dreadnought]

But Sharpsburg is right across the Potomac. It isn't a "grand invasion" of the Union. Its trespassing a couple miles over the border.

 

[Cheezy the Wiz]

Lee was concious of the effect on the Virginia farms and communities the war passed through and eager to take the war into the North to allow those communities time to recover. He also argued that the presence of a Southern army might inspire Southern sympathisers in Northern states, especially if it could win a sizeable victory. Unknown to either Lee or Davis, but hoped for by the latter it may also have brought Britain to at least offer mediation if not intervention. Simply defending Richmond wasn't likely to do any more than give the North the freedom to come back again harder.

As far as this effect goes, whether it was for this reason or that Maryland was a slave-owning state, 22% of our men who fought in the war did so for the Confederacy. I know that my county had a very pro-Southern stance, and it was precisely for that reason that a POW Camp was built at Pt. Lookout: it put Union soldiers in the county, who could do more than just guard duty.

 

[privatehudson]

But Sharpsburg is right across the Potomac. It isn't a "grand invasion" of the Union. Its trespassing a couple miles over the border.

I don't think it mattered whether it was a raid or an invasion, what mattered was to take for theatre of war away from Virginia and retain the initative gained by the victory at 2nd Bull Run rather than sitting back on the defensive and allowing the North to dictate where the next campaign would take place. Davis wanted the threat to Richmond removed and Lee argued convincingly that that the best way to do that was to carry the war onto Northern soil.

The British in the form of Palmerston and Russell didn't much care whether it was an invasion or raid either since in their rather narrow view the North were getting nowhere fast and one last defeat would be enough to warrant taking a hand in events.

 

[C~G]

I'd back Hooker to give Lee a harder time than McCellan did. His performance to that point was reasonable and showed enough agression to pull it off. Porter was about as cautious as McCellan (part of why McCellan refused to commit to an attack late at Antietam was because Porter disagreed with it) so was unlikely to do any better. Franklin and Sumner were competent enough and Mansfield was old but eager. Burnside was rather an enigma whose performances peaked and troughed a little too much to say either way.

I think of all of them Sumner was probably senior corps commander, or at least he was during the Seven Days battles. Hooker's probably the only one you could rely on to definately do better (always assuming as has been said that he didn't have a loss of nerve or get injured) than McCellan I would say.

You're probably right. Then again none of them made anything spectacular in Antietam IIRC but probably at least most of them pulled their weight and where more of victim of the circumstances which was partly (great part, must be added) the fault of McClellan and his inability to move forward and also communicate in proper way with his fellow officers.

Possibly although its hard to imagine McCellan ever coming up with the Vicksburg campaign.

I see McClellan as organizer for military operations but not certainly a planner or firebrand instigator. Maybe he could have get some sort of role as staff sergeant to fit his talents better. Ok, now I'm being almost too obnoxious.

McClellan IMO saw whole his task as some kind of police operation towards the southern forces. I think this is clearly displayed especially how he managed always be so overly cautious and especially how he handled the Lee's army's withdrawal from Antietam. It seems like he considered it was enough to take that amount of forces and move them to specific place with his own rhythm and then everything would work ok. But without that tip of aggression the whole spear is useless. McClellan seemed not to know this.

It's one of those attributes of humans, that killer instinct that allows making decisive moves and act accordingly. Some people have it, some people don't. Lee and Grant definately had it and I think it kind of rises them above most leaders of that war. It's possible McClellan could have achieved it over time but I think the Seven days battle series really hurt him. And I think he lost his faith to himself. It might have even effect towards his corps commanders.

Antietam and the Maryland campaign could also be considered a defeat because most of the aims of the campaign failed. Although the war moved out of Virginia briefly there was no massive influx of Marylanders to Lee's army. The lack of a major victory meant that the tentative thoughts Britain had towards intervention were put on hold. The withdrawl ended any hope that Maryland might be swayed to join the Confederacy. The first of and third of these weren't a major blow since by and large anyone who was likely to throw their lot in with the Confederacy probably would have done so by then. Since Britain did seriously to consider recognition/intervention during that period however the failure to secure a victory in the Maryland campaign coupled with a similar failure in Kentucky had much more impact.

But those are mostly political goals so if we look just the military side of things Maryland campaign could be only considered to be more of like inconclusive than defeat.

I think all along (even with Antietam which seems so crazy!) Lee was looking forward for that perfect win in major battle that would change the course of the war. I personally believe that was actually the reason why Lee made some bit strange decisions also later. He thought it was his chance to make anything drastic to change the outcome.

Unfortunately as said the odds never favoured Lee or the South. The reason was always behind the inability of anyone in south to determine proper campaign goals (they were almost lingering on straws if we really consider the realism of the goals of Maryland campaign originally) and basically all victories were bittersweet. Pulling a victory never seemed to achieve them nothing but maybe some more time but always assured some more lost good men which they simply couldn't affored and ultimately lost cause.

 

[privatehudson]

You're probably right. Then again none of them made anything spectacular in Antietam IIRC but probably at least most of them pulled their weight and where more of victim of the circumstances which was partly (great part, must be added) the fault of McClellan and his inability to move forward and also communicate in proper way with his fellow officers.

Burnside performed badly in his efforts to get across the bridge that bears his name then falling prey to pessemism later on in the battle, but its hard to say how much of this was him being obstinate to McCellan after his perceived demotion. Porter has a black mark against him for arguing against pushing Lee towards the close of the battle. Sumner was attacked after the battle and heavily criticised by historians ever since but recent research suggests he didn't do as badly as people have thought. The remainder mostly didn't do too badly but as you say were hampered by the fact that whatever moves they made were isolated from those of other commands making it easy for Lee to switch reserves to meet the threat.

I see McClellan as organizer for military operations but not certainly a planner or firebrand instigator. Maybe he could have get some sort of role as staff sergeant to fit his talents better. Ok, now I'm being almost too obnoxious.

He would have made a good staff officer but the problem was that McCellan's big ego and near total lack of diplomacy and respect for many of those around him would have alienated anyone he was assigned to.

McClellan IMO saw whole his task as some kind of police operation towards the southern forces. I think this is clearly displayed especially how he managed always be so overly cautious and especially how he handled the Lee's army's withdrawal from Antietam. It seems like he considered it was enough to take that amount of forces and move them to specific place with his own rhythm and then everything would work ok. But without that tip of aggression the whole spear is useless. McClellan seemed not to know this.

It's one of those attributes of humans, that killer instinct that allows making decisive moves and act accordingly. Some people have it, some people don't. Lee and Grant definately had it and I think it kind of rises them above most leaders of that war. It's possible McClellan could have achieved it over time but I think the Seven days battle series really hurt him. And I think he lost his faith to himself. It might have even effect towards his corps commanders.

There's been some suggestion that he didn't believe in prosecuting the war to the fullest like say Grant or Sherman clearly did. I think he believed in preserving the Union and wanted what amounted to almost a return to the pre-civil war situation. Unfortunately he appeared unaware that this was unlikely given the amount of blood shed and the irrevocable stances of the two parties.

But those are mostly political goals so if we look just the military side of things Maryland campaign could be only considered to be more of like inconclusive than defeat.

That might be true but I don't see any reason to treat the results of a battle from a purely military viewpoint when assessing success or failure. Generals fight battles to achieve a change in both the military and political situation, they don't operate in a vaccum and frequently base their decisions on what political consequences may arise. Hood for example stood next to no chance of shifting Sherman from his positions around Atlanta but knowing that he'd been put in charge with the specific aim of attacking Sherman and driving him back he had little choice but to do so.

I think all along (even with Antietam which seems so crazy!) Lee was looking forward for that perfect win in major battle that would change the course of the war. I personally believe that was actually the reason why Lee made some bit strange decisions also later. He thought it was his chance to make anything drastic to change the outcome.

Unfortunately as said the odds never favoured Lee or the South. The reason was always behind the inability of anyone in south to determine proper campaign goals (they were almost lingering on straws if we really consider the realism of the goals of Maryland campaign originally) and basically all victories were bittersweet. Pulling a victory never seemed to achieve them nothing but maybe some more time but always assured some more lost good men which they simply couldn't affored and ultimately lost cause.

There's a lot of truth in what you are saying here, but I believe that was just one aspect a;beit an important one of how Lee made his decisions.

 

[Cutlass]

I don't recall if anyone mentioned Midway, which was certainly a disaster for the Japanese.

 

[C~G]

Burnside performed badly in his efforts to get across the bridge that bears his name then falling prey to pessemism later on in the battle, but its hard to say how much of this was him being obstinate to McCellan after his perceived demotion. Porter has a black mark against him for arguing against pushing Lee towards the close of the battle. Sumner was attacked after the battle and heavily criticised by historians ever since but recent research suggests he didn't do as badly as people have thought. The remainder mostly didn't do too badly but as you say were hampered by the fact that whatever moves they made were isolated from those of other commands making it easy for Lee to switch reserves to meet the threat.

I must admit it's been some time I last actually looked into the issue of Antietam so I cannot possibly remember everything but pretty much that is the general picture I gather as well.

However I think it's always important question to ask since example if we consider Gettysburg and Lee & Longstreet, we can see that almost anyone can not to get along with each other in pivotal moments and it can have dire consequences. Who's fault it is depends greatly of many factors so it's possible that we might little bit are too tough for McClellan and it's possible example certain subordinates failures played also part in McClellan's hesitation to commit to the battle. I doubt it, but I cannot recall any better the course of the battle.

He would have made a good staff officer ...unlikely given the amount of blood shed and the irrevocable stances of the two parties.

I cannot anything but agree with your view of McClellan.

Like already said, I think he just lacked the edge that would have been required from the general of his position especially when being against foe like ANV.

That might be true but I don't see any reason to treat the results of a battle from a purely military viewpoint when assessing success or failure. Generals fight battles to achieve a change in both the military and political situation, they don't operate in a vaccum and frequently base their decisions on what political consequences may arise. Hood for example stood next to no chance of shifting Sherman from his positions around Atlanta but knowing that he'd been put in charge with the specific aim of attacking Sherman and driving him back he had little choice but to do so.

I kind of disagree here.

I think it all depends what we are defining and measuring. Even if Maryland campaign might have indirect goals (like that of gaining momentum from the public etc.) when considering the military aspects we have to concentrate into the direct military consequences rather than something that cannot even be clearly defined.

I have found extremely hard in the past to debate with some other people about history that see history of warfare somehow always related to the politics and not being able to see the actual tactical and strategical side of the warfare without the politics. Even though it's clear military is always tied to the politics it's also dire mistake think that in the battlefield where it's about the survival of your troops and possibility of gaining military advantage that politics play such big part in them. Politics can be seen as setting goals for battles and campaign which we can later rate as of success or failure based into the specific criteria and politics can motivate generals do decisions in the field towards specific goal but when considering the military aspect only I think politics must be set aside and ponder only those immediate results rather than something that might or might not be result of military operation. As mentioned though and being one of the themes I have mentioned that these politics do play part as psychological factors for armies and their leaders when they plan their actions but purely militarily they are just that, psychological factors and not raw data that can be gathered and analyzed.

Otherwise we're dead on water with history that is straight line without the possibility of creating those What-if scenarios and really analyzing military decisions or their actual results from military pov.

Example in case of Antietam it's clearly almost impossible to rate a result for both sides that would have caused example Lincoln not to make his declaration or that would have caused foreign power to show their sympathy towards South. We can even ask was that kind of success for South could have been possible in those circumstances so are we measuring their military success with a stick that has wrong scale on it, after all if we consider the political goals as the defining aspect of success and failure of Maryland campaign?

And if Maryland campaign was defeat for South it must be victory to North and we might ask with what grounds if considering the military aspects? What were their goals? Is that they didn't lose more ground good enough for an excuse when they didn't use their superior man power to overwhelm their opponent and make it beg for mercy? I don't think neither of the sides militarily achieved anything special so that's why I consider it inconclusive. There are some points favouring either of the sides though so in the end the rating of the result depends how you value example man losses.

I think this is very important question considering the whole issue of this particular thread and that is how military success or failure can be measured.

I consider it almost strange that winning side like that of Union can get away with lots of stuff militarily just because the side won and reached the political goals while Condeferacy's success is always measured from also political viewpoint making any kind of actual rating of their performance based into military type of stuff almost impossible.

And this isn't only about Civil War but also about other wars as well. IMHO there is time and place for everything and political and military aspects of operations can be measured either together or separately.

I'm not promoting "vacuum"-thinking but I think the different fields of any conflict can be viewed and measured separately while of course being linked to other factors. Just putting everything together might give you clearer picture of the course of the events in general but at the same time the important details and specific aspects like that of military are simply forgotten. I believe this is one of the follies of some of historians and I find it just awfully bad error.

There's a lot of truth in what you are saying here, but I believe that was just one aspect a;beit an important one of how Lee made his decisions.

Certainly, but I mention it because I believe it tend to be overlooked as a trait of Lee while I consider it being almost his defining quality. I think as long as he could he was looking forward for such a battle but after the defeat of Gettysburg (and I think this quite well explain's otherwise totally militarily insane Pickett's Charge) he was absolutely gutted to just sit and watch or play cat and mouse with Grant while South was being torn apart.

In the end it was all matter of time and simply there wasn't chance to pull that one rabbit from the hat to save it for the Confederacy.

 

[Cheezy the Wiz]

I cannot anything but agree with your view of McClellan.

Like already said, I think he just lacked the edge that would have been required from the general of his position especially when being against foe like ANV.

It's worth remembering that McClellan was a foreign observer during the Crimean War, and knew well the ease with which catastophe could ensue in a pressed attack on fortified or protected positions. So yes, he was a timid commander, but not for lack of courage, rather, out of compassion for his men (which is also well-recorded), and the unwillingness to shed their blood; he was arguably afraid of creating a bloodbath like those he witnessed in the Ukraine, and understandably so.

 

[Dreadnought]

It's worth remembering that McClellan was a foreign observer during the Crimean War, and knew well the ease with which catastophe could ensue in a pressed attack on fortified or protected positions. So yes, he was a timid commander, but not for lack of courage, rather, out of compassion for his men (which is also well-recorded), and the unwillingness to shed their blood; he was arguably afraid of creating a bloodbath like those he witnessed in the Ukraine, and understandably so.

Honestly, in my opinion, it didn't matter what his motive was. He lacked the aggression to be in command. I think its great that he didn't want to shed any blood; but, if he didn't want anyone hurt, maybe he should stay home and play a game of chess. War involves losing men, and he should have realized that.

 

[Cheezy the Wiz]

There's no need to be snide; it wasn't that he didn't want to hurt anyone, he was obviously still a general, it was not wanting to throw away lives that need not be lost because of overzealousness of commanders, or cavalier soldiers, again, both of which he was well aware could result in catastrophe. While this might not account well for his performance after Antiedam, it characterizes and defines his actions at the Seven Days' Battles. And again, it wasn't lack of agression, it was mindfulness and regulation of agression. His attacks were purposeful, and not rashly made. Unfortunately for him, his opponents were daring and willing to take risks he would not, and because of that, his tentativeness is a fault, not a gift.

 

[onejayhawk]

So long as he doesn't get 'shell-shock' again, his planning would actually be pretty brilliant.

When a general claims the defeat was a result of his own cowardice, it says something.

McLellan had his uses as a commander. Put him in Johnston's position in Georgia, for example. He prepared well, and reacted well when on the defensive. However his sense of tactical timing was just dreadful.

I think much of the discussion deals with lopsided deafeats, rather than disasters. Disaster, to my mind, means losing the ability of the nation, or at least a corps or its equivalent, to continue the fight.

J

 

[C~G]

Cheezy the Wiz, I cannot really agree with you.

Like said if you are against foe like ANV and it's trio you just simply cannot be "soft". And it's of course very possible the reason you described is why McClellan acted like that.

And I'm not sure if being cautious causes your army not to engage it's entirely into the battle that it is really compassion towards your own troops but more like compassion towards your enemy. They got still hell of beating in Antietam. Whether it's compassion, courage or something else, I'm not sure can I approve especially since the war continues for more years and those same men are sent to the battle all over again. You give good beating in Antietam to South and it never is able to hold back that long as it now did.

I think much of the discussion deals with lopsided deafeats, rather than disasters. Disaster, to my mind, means losing the ability of the nation, or at least a corps or its equivalent, to continue the fight.

We could use that of course as definition of disaster but then again if we base it into the ability of nation to continue fighting then different nations are treated differently as those with superior forces have chance to continue fighting and others don't.

Example in case of Civil War we can see that South probably never would have had simply chance to continue fighting when compared to North following similar defeats. Also I posted Battle of Raate road which was complete disaster for the SU but it could continue fighting (even though not in the north) but compared to scenario where finns would had suffered same type of defeat it would have finished finns entirely.

Same goes to army level that bigger armies can be seen to able to cope with bigger defeats before they are considered disasters as they are still able to fight but for me example Cold Harbor is disaster. Surely Grant can continue fighting but that is just because he has superior odds and shouldn't that be originally counted towards what to expect from such force rather than it is allowed to "slip away" from definition of disaster military-wise?

This was the thing which I was referring to earlier that the scale and also the perspective must be right in order us to define what is militarily disaster and which not. Of course in the end it's mostly matter of opinion really based mostly to the very definition of disaster...

Personally I would consider disaster as something that based into the beginning of that campaign the expectations that are waited to be achieved have been much higher compared to the eventual results. We consider what kind of succes with the troops etc. the sides had could had been to expected if the faulty decisions and actions wouldn't have been affecting the outcome. (Of course we can also call military disasters plans that have been wrong all along and based into dire miscalculations of one's ability to fight the enemy and reach the goals.)

I think it's all about reasonable results considering the circumstances and also the actions of the opponent that defines military success or disaster. Not some outside factor that the actual battling sides cannot directly affect by playing their cards just right or whether they have just enough more power compared to the enemy to cope with the defeat.

Example in case of Antietam if you look the strategic advantage Union had (troops placement, enemy plans known, man-advantage) the odds very heavily favoured for the McClellan and his army. We can only dream what would had happened if ANV would have even some more troops to make it even worse for AoP. If he couldn't succeed in there, what exactly would have made it as disaster for Union? Whole army forced to swim in Potomac?