History questions not worth their own thread II

[LightSpectra]

Comparing Lee to McClellan makes my heart ache. McClellan is the worst commander in American history, with the possible exception of Horatio Gates. Lee on the other hand, while having an ultimately overambitious strategic plan for the Confederacy, was a brilliant tactician and a highly respected general.

 

[Eran of Arcadia]

He was highly respected . . . was the point Dachs was making.

 

[Dreadnought]

Erm, let it be said that McClellan was perhaps the greatest army administrator that the United States has ever had. As a Chief of Staff, for example, he was unrivaled. The Army of the Potomac was superbly supplied, organized, etc., and the men loved him dearly.

That, of course, does not make up for his on-the-field caution and such.

The Civil War was also a showcase for excellent American military leadership on both sides of the field; men like Hancock, Gordon, Thomas, Sherman, Sheridan, and Forrest were quite up to par with Europe's varsity like Constantin von Alvensleben, Skobelev, and the elder Moltke. America had plenty of solid professional officers as well, men like Grant or Meade. There were plenty of poor military leaders in European contemporary armies as well, and not just the oft-decried Bazaine and Benedek - the Prussians had their fair share of blunderers, such as Karl von Steinmetz and Friedrich von Wrangel.

The United States also produced superlative naval leaders such as Porter and Farragut; as far as individual leadership went, their only contemporary in Europe was the Austrian Wilhelm von Tegetthoff.

I'd say that Sherman was perhaps the greatest army commander, on either side, during the war. He had his fair share of off-the-field problems, but [if you get to know him] he was actually quite an interesting guy. He was quite philosophical, and his campaign in Georgia/the South was certainly better than Grant's in Virginia.

If we count commanders in general, JB Hood as a brigadier/divisional commander was one of the greatest. On the division level, his aggressive nature and tactical flairs made all the difference in several engagements; his Texas Brigade was Lee's elite shock troops. The only problem was, as an army commander, he ordered the army around like one giant division, rather than many separate entities - I don't think he realized that army command, rather than brigade/division command, required much more finesse.

As for naval commanders, Buchanan on the Confederates stands out simply because of the lack of resources he had; he was still able to organize, field, and command the Confederate navy, despite the odds stacked against him.

I like your comparison to Europe too.

[I'll stop now before I start ranting....lol, once I start I can't stop with this history]

 

[LightSpectra]

Erm, let it be said that McClellan was perhaps the greatest army administrator that the United States has ever had. As a Chief of Staff, for example, he was unrivaled. The Army of the Potomac was superbly supplied, organized, etc., and the men loved him dearly.

Yet in spite of this, McClellan was unable to win a victory while gravely outnumbering his enemy. His "greatest" victory was Antietam, which was a tactical draw at best even though he literally held the Confederate war plan in his hands and outnumbered them over 2:1.

He loved his men, this is true, but the war could've been over in four months had McClellan not been such an awful commander, thus sparing the majority of their lives. And he was initially popular at first, but the overwhelming military turnout in favor of the Republicans in the 1864 presidential election demonstrates that they came to the same conclusion.

 

[Dachs]

Yeah, but at least McClellan kept his army intact. Lee destroyed his own armies so quickly and so often that they had to send reinforcements from other theaters to Virginia, weakening resistance against the Federals elsewhere.

 

[LightSpectra]

Yeah, but at least McClellan kept his army intact. Lee destroyed his own armies so quickly and so often that they had to send reinforcements from other theaters to Virginia, weakening resistance against the Federals elsewhere.

Yes, but you have to remember that the Davis' strategic goal wasn't to knock the Union out of the war, but rather to depress them into thinking that it was no longer worth the human cost; reminiscent of the Patriots' strategy in the Revolutionary War. In this instance, Lee performed extremely well prior to Pickett's Charge.

 

[Dachs]

He didn't perform extremely well. He managed a few victories at lower exchange ratios than were practical if the Confederacy were to employ the attritional strategy that Davis envisioned.

 

[LightSpectra]

He didn't perform extremely well. He managed a few victories at lower exchange ratios than were practical if the Confederacy were to employ the attritional strategy that Davis envisioned.

The strategy wasn't simply attritional, it was psychological and diplomatic.

 

[Dachs]

And Lee didn't have control over the other two, so it's irrelevant to talk about them in the context of Lee not conserving his men properly.

 

[Dreadnought]

Meh, I'll maintain that the best psychological/diplomatic victory the Confederates could of had was squandered by Bragg after Chichamauga. With the ability to reverse the Union gains in the west for the entire war up to that point, Bragg could have forced Lincoln out of office in '64.

Same goes for holding out in Atlanta, but that was much harder than the aforementioned.

And let's not start about Bragg

 

[LightSpectra]

And Lee didn't have control over the other two, so it's irrelevant to talk about them in the context of Lee not conserving his men properly.

I happen to agree with you, for what it's worth, that Lee is overrated as a general in this regard; though thus was the nature of warfare in that era. Nevertheless, it's untrue that Lee didn't have control over the psychology of war. He didn't propagandize to the same degree that Napoleon did, but he did entertain the notion that the Army of Virginia was indestructible, which had a great influence on Confederate versus Union morale.

 

[Dachs]

He kept the "indestructible" myth alive for less than a year in a four-year war.

 

[Dreadnought]

He kept the "indestructible" myth alive for less than a year in a four-year war.

Maybe he thought his survival at Antietam was deus ex machina.

 

[LightSpectra]

He kept the "indestructible" myth alive for less than a year in a four-year war.

In the eyes of the Confederate soldiers, it survived even past Pickett's Charge, which itself was blamed on Lee's subordinates (despite the fact that he rightfully tried to take the blame for it).

 

[ParkCungHee]

Canada did kick your arses, after all.

And a few years after the war, Canada actually lost a few battles to the Finnean Invasion of Canada.

 

[sydhe]

Bragg won at Chickamauga, but it was a Pyrrhic victory. He had a lot more dead or wounded than Rosecrans but his force was a little larger. A big reason his forces fell apart at Missionary Ridge is because they'd suffered so much at Chickamauga.

 

[Dreadnought]

Bragg won at Chickamauga, but it was a Pyrrhic victory. He had a lot more dead or wounded than Rosecrans but his force was a little larger. A big reason his forces fell apart at Missionary Ridge is because they'd suffered so much at Chickamauga.

He also had Rosecrans' army in full retreat, divided, and with little ability to reorganize and resist. Had Bragg immediately pursued Rosie, he could have retaken Chattanooga, annihilated a full Union army, and retake at least eastern and central Tennessee before Grant arrived with any sizeable force to counter him.

I remember NB Forrest had quite a good quote at the time of the battle (in a correspondence to Bragg), which suits the strategic situation of the day perfectly: "Every hour is worth ten thousand men."

 

[IdiotsOpposite]

Meh, I'll maintain that the best psychological/diplomatic victory the Confederates could have had was squandered by Bragg after Chichamauga. With the ability to reverse the Union gains in the west for the entire war up to that point, Bragg could have forced Lincoln out of office in '64.

Same goes for holding out in Atlanta, but that was much harder than the aforementioned.

And let's not start about Bragg

Sorry, but I had to fix it. It's one of my pet peeves...

 

[Dreadnought]

Sorry, but I had to fix it. It's one of my pet peeves...

 

[Dachs]

Naskra's recommendation of The Strange Death of Liberal England was a fantastic one; it was a superlative and highly entertaining book, and it's remarkable how close Dangerfield came to some stuff he can't possibly have known for sure.