History questions not worth their own thread V

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I don't know if I'd call Alawites Shiites. While they claim to be Twelvers, and the dudes in Qom etc, accept them as such that link only dates back to the 1930s and 1940s. Prior to that most authorities who mentioned them had trouble considering them Muslims. (Really the only reason they decided to become Twelvers was because none of the religious authorities in Syria could be persuaded that the Awalites were Muslim.)

Good point; indeed, Alawites in Lebanon are considered a separate group from other Shias.

The Middle East is more stable than it should be, apparently. :crazyeye:

Eh. The Middle East from the West looks like this big Arab monolith but really it's a very diverse place. Calling all the Arabs one nation is a bit like saying all Latin Americans comprise one nation, except it makes even less sense. Not that diversity has to mean instability, anyway.
 
taillesskangaru said:
Good point; indeed, Alawites in Lebanon are considered a separate group from other Shias.

I think that has more to do with the fact that Alawites are a distinct grouping within the Shiite spectrum. The Islmaili are treated much the same, despite the latter being much more clearly Muslims.
 
Fascinating discussion, guys! :D

Yup, I am glad I brought my questions up.

Tailless answered regarding the Alawites, which clears things up. I am finding the impression that religious denominations appear to take precedent in distinguishing regional identities instead of ethnicity. This appears to be true for Alawites and Druzes, but I am wondering if it also holds true for Ibadi's and Sufi's as well as other groups I might not know?

The Arabian Peninsular is pretty arid and desolate outside of the coastal regions, so except for some oases there really wasn't a large sedentary population in the interior. Semi-pastoralist trading societies, like the Berbers in the Sahara, were by necessity the norm. I believe that even today one-third of all Saudi citizens are semi-nomadic, despite government attempts to settle them. One of the major border issues Saudi Arabia had with Yemen and Oman, in fact, was over where the border was in that ungodly arid region, and who was responsible for the nomads who wandered back and forth across it.

What about all those Yemeni kingdoms that were present in pre-Islamic Arabia? There were several of them I am aware of.

Also you mentioned Lebanon being a nightmare, care to explain? :p

I know little of the Lebanese Civil War, if someone has a source or reading to recommend on the topic that would be fantastic.
 
Eh. The Middle East from the West looks like this big Arab monolith but really it's a very diverse place. Calling all the Arabs one nation is a bit like saying all Latin Americans comprise one nation, except it makes even less sense. Not that diversity has to mean instability, anyway.

Hell, I think Turkey and Iran are also "part of the Arab world" according to your average American.
 
I am finding the impression that religious denominations appear to take precedent in distinguishing regional identities instead of ethnicity. This appears to be true for Alawites and Druzes, but I am wondering if it also holds true for Ibadi's and Sufi's as well as other groups I might not know?

Yeah... ethnicity is a bit complicated and you are looking at things from a Western point of view, which isn't necessarily accurate (can be though!) in the context. This is a region of the world where, for various historical and accidental reasons, religion was and remains the main marker of identity. Of course there will be multiple layers of identity, and someone can think of herself simultaneously as Alawite, Muslim, Syrian, secular, Damascene, Arab, and so on, but religion is particularly prominent and in many case dominant.

Note too that the ethnoreligious minorities, whether Alawites, Alevis, Druzes, Kurds, Ibadis, Assyrians, tend to be concentrated in historical borderlands, or highlands, or otherwise isolated by desert or something. So there's a non-religious aspect insofar as geography affects the development of cultural differences and identity.

Sufism is a diverse world. It's less a distinct ethnoreligious group but rather disparate groups of people following loosely-related sets of tradition, belong to many different orders. It spreads and stays connected by trade, with Sufi lodges traditionally serving as rest stops for travellers. Some orders also participated in wars of conquest, most (in?)famously one such order became tied to the Ottoman Janissaries. As a result, you find Sufis all over the Muslim world and not necessarily concentrated in any geographic locale, and plenty of people who would describe themselves as Sunnis or Shias but are influenced by Sufi practices and thoughts. As far as I know, aside from some of the more zealous orders Sufis don't generally make a big deal out of them being Sufis; Sufism is not part of an ethnoreligious identity for them. Those that do are Wahhabists and Salafists, as they consider them outside of Islam.

What about all those Yemeni kingdoms that were present in pre-Islamic Arabia? There were several of them I am aware of.

Mostly coastal or highlands. However, there's a region of Yemen (part of the old South Yemen) that is part of the Rub al'Khali. IIRC even now the border in that region has not yet been defined, because of the "uninhabitable wasteland" factor.
 
Any recommended books or dpcumentaries on the issue?
 
Hell, I think Turkey and Iran are also "part of the Arab world" according to your average American.

Wait, who thinks this: you or the average American?

Or are you saying you are an average American?
 
Wait, who thinks this: you or the average American?

Or are you saying you are an average American?

Since the statement was extremely clear to anyone in possession of higher language capacity than a three-year old, I'm going to have to decline to respond as I suspect that you aren't asking me a sincere question.

Moderator Action: Infracted for flaming. Keep the discussion civil.
Please read the forum rules: http://forums.civfanatics.com/showthread.php?t=422889
 
The Middle East is more stable than it should be, apparently. :crazyeye:
There's a saying about the Middle East; everyone there was killing each other for millenia before Israel showed up. Now they have a common enemy, so they've mostly stopped. When Israel goes down, they'll go straight back to killing each other.

Yup, I am glad I brought my questions up.

Tailless answered regarding the Alawites, which clears things up. I am finding the impression that religious denominations appear to take precedent in distinguishing regional identities instead of ethnicity. This appears to be true for Alawites and Druzes, but I am wondering if it also holds true for Ibadi's and Sufi's as well as other groups I might not know?
There's a lot of truth to that. I think - and this is purely opinion here, I've not read on this particular subject - that a lot of that likely has to do with the proliferation of large empires in the region. There was seldom a single ethno-religious groups that controlled a territory for a very long time, and thus had the capacity to impose itself upon that territory in a distinct way. Exept for the inaccessible regions tk spoke of, much of the Middle East has been contested by multiple empires, with the Ottomans eventually emerging triumphant.

The Ottomans had a policy of not really giving a damn about religion except where it became a political threat, so they mostly let their people govern themselves, so long as the Ottomans got the taxes and troops they demanded. Most of the other empires that ruled the region, with the slight exception of the various Arab sultanates during the Crusader period, felt pretty much the same. The Romans taxed the territory pretty heavily, but otherwise never really centralised its rule the way they did in most of their empire, I assume for reasons of distance and corruption; very few Emperors actually cared about the Asian provinces, so the governors did as they pleased.

The Crusader period itself helped perpetuate the religious diversity in the region, since the Crusaders had a tendency to massacre Muslims and Jews, which kept the Christians from being completely marginalised. This was especially true the Crusader state based around modern-day Lebanon; hence the large proportion of Christians there compared to the rest of the region. The Muslims only rarely committed such atrocities, so when they reconquered the Levant, the Christians weren't similarly slaughtered.

With no long-term polities to be loyal to, except possibly for a city or tribe, religion tended to play a pretty important role in the region. Combined with a level of religious tolerance and a region that had many isolated areas where new heresies and religious off-shoots could propagate, it led to the ethnoreligious patchwork now extant.

What about all those Yemeni kingdoms that were present in pre-Islamic Arabia? There were several of them I am aware of.
Most of them were separated from the rest of the Peninsular by deserts and highlands. With the exception of Saba (Sheba) none of them seem to have extended their territory very far inland, preferring to remain coastal, trade based empires. And Saba spread as far into Ethiopia as it did into Arabia, anyway. Similarly, a few Ethiopian kingdoms spread into Yemen. That area is as much Ethiopian as Arabian, culturally.

Also you mentioned Lebanon being a nightmare, care to explain? :p

I know little of the Lebanese Civil War, if someone has a source or reading to recommend on the topic that would be fantastic.
I don't have any sources, unfortunately. Just a lifetime of reading bits and pieces here and there on the subject.

Lebanon was an artificial state, deliberately constructed by the French in order to give themselves an ally in the region when they were eventually forced out. The French knew they weren't going to be able to stay in the Levant, but they needed a proxy to conduct their policies through. Lebanon was to be that proxy. They deliberately made the state as large as possible while keeping a Christian majority, the theory being that that majority would need to look for France for protection from big, bad Syria.

What kicked off the Civil War was that the incumbent President, a Christian, attempted to extend his rule past his constitutionally permitted period. While initially he was successful in this, largely due to playing on fears of both Israel and Lebanon's increasingly large Palestinian refugee minority, eventually rival Muslim and Christian militias formed and began fighting one another. These initial groups eventual blossomed into dozens, if not hundreds of factions, some of them the size of a largish street-gang, others dominating whole provinces. Hezbollah, the most famous, practically controlled all of South Beirut at one point, left it when the Israelis showed up, but came straight back as soon as the IDF left.

Syria, seeing a chance to annex Lebanon, blatantly interfered in the Civil War by supporting various factions, primarily Hezbollah. Israel, both concerned about Syrian influence and as part of the butcher Sharon's ridiculous idea for "peace from Antioch to Alexandria" launched its own invasion, which primarily succeeded in turning public opinion globally against Israel due to the mass-rape of Palestinian refugees in camps by Israel's Christian militia allies. Israel's invasion also achieved the remarkable side-effect of getting every Muslim militia in Lebanon to briefly unite to kill as many Israelis as possible.

The IDF stayed just long enough to give the illusion that they were leaving of their own free will, then promptly limped home with their tail between their legs, having at a single stroke destroyed Israel's reputation as a nation that only acted in self-defence. Hezbollah had stood back and allowed most of the other Muslim militias to get killed fighting the Israelis, so it actually became the largest militia in the country following this, absorbing or destroying the majority of the others.

Eventually a peace deal was brokered, with most of the militias disbanding and handing their weapons over to the new government. In practice, most of the militias didn't actually hand over their weapons, but Syria was only interested in funding Hezbollah, Iran had also focused on Hezbollah, the USSR was pro-Syrian and most of the rest of the planet supported the new government, so the arms shipments the militias had depended upon dried up. The illicit weapons trade couldn't compete with the sheer size of Hezbollah's trade with Syria and the government's trade with the US, France and other powers. So between them, Hezbollah and the army crushed all but a handful of militias, which never really threatened Lebanon's stability again.

Hezbollah, meanwhile, had become powerful enough to virtually control the southern half of the country and was able to gain an official exemption from the government to continue carrying weapons. The reason for this was largely because the government didn't trust its own soldiers to police the border with Israel and had a tentative plan to incorporate Hezbollah's armed elements into its own security arrangements. That plan never got off the ground, and Hezbollah is essentially a state-within-a-state these days. It prosecuted the 2006 war with Israel entirely on its own, for example. It is also very much immune to Syrian or Iranian pressure nowadays, though it does still rely on them for arms shipments. Syria and Iran (not so much Syria at the moment, for obvious reasons) are stuck in the quandary of being blamed for Hezbollah's actions when they have less and less control over them. Much like Soviet weapons shipments to North Vietnam, the continuing Iranian and Syrian relationship with Hezbollah is as much to keep what little influence they have left as it is to actually increase their influence.

Hell, I think Turkey and Iran are also "part of the Arab world" according to your average American.
I know a lot of Americans who think Persians are Arabs, so you may well be right there. I don't recall ever hearing any similar sentiments directed at Turks though. Possibly because of the close relationship during the Cold War, the most I've ever gotten from an American on the Turks is "I like them."

Since the statement was extremely clear to anyone in possession of higher language capacity than a three-year old, I'm going to have to decline to respond as I suspect that you aren't asking me a sincere question.
My three-year old's higher language capacity will rock your socks off, Herr Mouthwash.
 
Since the statement was extremely clear to anyone in possession of higher language capacity than a three-year old, I'm going to have to decline to respond as I suspect that you aren't asking me a sincere question.



Hell, I think Turkey and Iran are also "part of the Arab world" according to your average American.

Not really. The sentence is a jumbled mess of qualifiers, subjects, and objects acting as subjects ordered in a confusing manner. Who is the subject here? You? "the average American?" Turkey and Iran? You really need to start streamlining your syntax better. This sentence reads like a literary inception, and not in a good way.
 
Question, do you think the Israel/Palestine/Middle East situation would be better had Rabin not been assassinated or would he have encountered just as much inertia as his successor did?
 
Question, do you think the Israel/Palestine/Middle East situation would be better had Rabin not been assassinated or would he have encountered just as much inertia as his successor did?
If anything, his assassination gave greater freedom of movement. Political assassinations tend to encourage more radical policies, whether for or against the victim's pet projects. Compare Johnson's involvement in Vietnam to Kennedy's, for example.

To tell you the truth though, we're well outside my area of expertise on that one. It seems certain that nothing about Rabin's survival would help counter political inertia though.
 
If anything, his assassination gave greater freedom of movement. Political assassinations tend to encourage more radical policies, whether for or against the victim's pet projects. Compare Johnson's involvement in Vietnam to Kennedy's, for example.

Yes, things definitely escalated under Johnson in Vietnam, if that's what you mean. But Nixon, while topping the bill on that, also managed to finally withdraw from what was a totally unnecessary, losing war from the start.
 
Nixon's predecessor wasn't assassinated. By that point Vietnam was an issue in and of itself, whereas under Johnson it was just one of his predecessor's eccentricities that he felt the need to pursue.

The Vietnam war started in 1955.
 
Everyone knows that Turks are just Muslim Greeks. They have kebabs, barbers and an unhealthy preoccupation with Cyprus, therefore, Greek. Logic, innit?
 
Also, Baklava.
 
Everyone knows that Turks are just Muslim Greeks. They have kebabs, barbers and an unhealthy preoccupation with Cyprus, therefore, Greek. Logic, innit?

Also, Baklava.

jqdg.jpg
 
Eisenhower sent a few advisors and some materiel. Kennedy actually involved the US in the conflict on a sizable level.

My dear fellow, your suggestion was that Vietnam wasn't "an issue" prior to the Kennedy administration. The war started with US military advisors, because it was wrongfully assumed that South Vietnam would be able to put up some defense of its own. Those "advisors" became involved in actual fighting rather soon, when it became that advisors and materiel wouldn't hold up the South Vietnam "domino", which was considered essential in the then predominant containment policy. The US escalation in Vietnam resulted ultimately not only in Vietnam falling, but Laos and Cambodja as well. The fact that Kennedy started the escalation on a major level suggests that Johnson could make a "radical change", as you said. He failed.
 
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