8. Capacity of Plant and Equipment
a. The aircraft plants built by Germany in the years immediately preceding and in the first two years of the war had a capacity, on a single-shift basis, adequate to supply the aircraft requested by the General Staff. This fact had a very important bearing on strategic bombing. Theoretically half of the plant capacity could have been destroyed and the other half, by working, two shifts, could have produced just as many planes as before. There was no problem of a major expansion of aircraft manufacturing capacity during the war, therefore, as there was in the United States. In 1943 and 1944 strategic bombing made necessary the provision of alternate plant capacity in dispersed locations, but it is probable that the plant and equipment which Germany possessed in 1941, if undisturbed, could have produced the quantity of aircraft turned out in the peak months of the war. (Figure I-1).
b. Not only was plant capacity exceedingly large at the beginning of the war, but production tooling had been built for a scale of operations much greater than that actually carried on in 1938 and 1939. German manufacturers had made an intensive study of aircraft tooling during the thirties, and had evolved techniques of "series" or line production for the industry averaged 700 airplanes a month, only one shift of 40 hours a week was worked. Holidays were observed, and most models stood high on the learning curve. These facts as to the capacity and advanced conceptions of German aircraft factories had been noted by visited and had been reported in magazine articles in the United Statesand Great Britain long before the war.
c. Plant capacity apparently was at no time a limit on aircraft production. For at least the first three years of the war there was a substantial excess of capacity. Until 1943-44 the General Staff of the Air Forces was content with programs which constituted a light load on the industry. The existence of excess capacity and the practice of having several plants manufacture the same model with production tooling controlled by master tools, increased the difficulty of the strategic bombing attacks against the industry.