Most powerful ww2 general from each country

[Evie]

Yamamoto was just plain outfought?

While Yamamoto was in command of the IJN, Japan suffered one major defeat, due to the failure of their codes and extreme american luck - Midway.

Other than that?

Coral Sea was a stalemate - Japan didn't take Port Stanley, but America took far heavier losses there (heavy carrier + oiler + destroyer to a light carrier).

The battles around Guadalcanal went both way. Both sides took heavy losses - 2 carriers for the USN, 2 battleships (I believe) for the IJN, and cruisers and destroyers aplenty for both sides.

And the whole naval campaign prior to Coral Sea with perhaps the exception of a single battle (around the Java coast) can be summed up as "Japan win".

As for Leyte, the plan was very sound ; and it came very close to being a MAJOR american defeat - only, one of the commanders on the field for Japan chickened out at the last moment. If the Yamato task force, after routing the light carriers, had gone on to attack the transports, there was NO one to oppose them - because the Americans had done exactly what the Japanesse had planned, which is, rush north to attack the carriers. Oldendrof had expended almost all his naval ammo at Surigao straight the night before sinking about two old battlewagons, so there was only a handful of small carriers, a few of them wounded, to cause any trouble to the IJN at that point.

The Japanesse commander chickened out, like Nagumo at Pearl Harbor. These two officers really cost a lot to Japan.

 

[Evie]

Originally posted by Bill_in_PDX


But why did the Japanese fleet only have the advantage of one extra carrier? Because Yamamoto's plan had split his force, including the meaningless occupation of Attu up north, designed to draw out the US fleet to just a about the spot they actually attacked from.

Worse still for Yama' was that he knew full well from the Pearl Harbor planning on that he was on borrowed time and had to achieve a decisive victory before the US mobilized. This was even more evident following the Doolittle raid. Yet he failed to mass his forces for that decisive strike.

We CIVIII players who love to complain about combat results could learn the same lesson here. If you have decisive force, but fail to concentrate it, you are playing into the opponents hand.

Bill

Failed to mass his forces his hardly obvious.

He sent AFAIK a light carrier (perhaps two) up north. They would hardly have made a difference at Midway. What would have made a difference were the Shokaku and Zuikaku and their experienced crews, but both had to undergo repair after the Coral Sea, which battle happened to close to the planned attack on Midway to allow for the attack to be postponed. Yet, since the Japanesse high command had decided to take on Port Stanley, he could hardly tell them "Screw you, I'm not sending my carriers there."

His mistake, I reckon, was to not keep the battleships of the main fleet with the carriers. He would have had spare seaplanes to send out at that point, and the US carriers would not have sneakend up on him. A minor change in plan, a little detail that appear insignificant - their were enough scout planes to send out, or would have been without the defectuosity on the Tone.

 

[DingBat]

Originally posted by Oda Nobunaga
Yamamoto was just plain outfought?

While Yamamoto was in command of the IJN, Japan suffered one major defeat, due to the failure of their codes and extreme american luck - Midway.

Other than that?

Coral Sea was a stalemate - Japan didn't take Port Stanley, but America took far heavier losses there (heavy carrier + oiler + destroyer to a light carrier).

The battles around Guadalcanal went both way. Both sides took heavy losses - 2 carriers for the USN, 2 battleships (I believe) for the IJN, and cruisers and destroyers aplenty for both sides.

And the whole naval campaign prior to Coral Sea with perhaps the exception of a single battle (around the Java coast) can be summed up as "Japan win".

As for Leyte, the plan was very sound ; and it came very close to being a MAJOR american defeat - only, one of the commanders on the field for Japan chickened out at the last moment. If the Yamato task force, after routing the light carriers, had gone on to attack the transports, there was NO one to oppose them - because the Americans had done exactly what the Japanesse had planned, which is, rush north to attack the carriers. Oldendrof had expended almost all his naval ammo at Surigao straight the night before sinking about two old battlewagons, so there was only a handful of small carriers, a few of them wounded, to cause any trouble to the IJN at that point.

The Japanesse commander chickened out, like Nagumo at Pearl Harbor. These two officers really cost a lot to Japan.

What you say about Coral Sea and Guadalcanal MIGHT be considered valid and relevant if a simple tally of carriers lost decided the war. Obviously it doesn't.

Coral Sea might look like a draw on paper, but the Japanese were checked in their advance for the first time in the war. That was significant. I sincerely doubt that Yamamoto considered this a win in any way. Or even a stalemate.

Who really cares how many ships were sunk around Guadalcanal. The end of the campaign saw the area under U.S. control and the major Japanese base at Rabaul had been rendered irrelevant. I don't care what accounting practices you use, that's a loss.

Leyte came close to being a MINOR American setback because Halsey behaved stupidly. The plan was ridiculously complex and depended on incredible luck for success. The fact that the Japanese actually got some luck initially doesn't alter the fact that the plan was desparate to begin with. In the end the battle wasn't even a minor inconvenience to the Americans.

So, yes, Yamamoto was outfought.

/bruce

 

[Bill_in_PDX]

Originally posted by Oda Nobunaga


Failed to mass his forces his hardly obvious.

He sent AFAIK a light carrier (perhaps two) up north. They would hardly have made a difference at Midway. What would have made a difference were the Shokaku and Zuikaku and their experienced crews, but both had to undergo repair after the Coral Sea,

He sent two light carriers and several cruisers up north in a meaningless deception move.

The light carriers would have provided additional fighter escort, and yes, having himself on the Yamato 500 miles behind the carrier group with a couple other light carriers if I recall correctly, lead to him being out of control of the battle (maintaining radio silence even after the Yorktown was spotted) as well as depriving the carrier group of additional (impressive) anti-aircraft support.

The Coral Sea battle itself hurt him due to the loss of the use of Sho and Zuikaku as you point out, but it was also yet another split of force. Was the goal Australia or Hawaii? In early 1942 the IJN had the power to dominate one area or the other, but clearly not both, the supply chain would be untendable, and thanks to the lack of a credible surface threat in Europe, the US was sending reinforcements from the East Coast.

He should have massed force and either taken the key cities of Australia, or taken out Pearl Habor permanently (something not accomplished on Dec 7th, and in my opinion, a far better strategic move). If he would have done that, the US would have needed several years to counter strike from West Coast bases, and the Europe first strategy would have been reality, vice just a way to placate the English and Russians.

There is just no way to justify the split of his navy. Far better to follow the doctrine of massing your superior force and beating the hell out of the opponent.

The US of course almost committed the reverse blunder at Leyte, though the IJN plan there also split their forces such that when the opportunity appeared thanks to Halsey's (Patton II) recklessness they were unable to bring the force to bear.

Bill

 

[Evie]

America won the Guadalcanal campaign in the end, yes.

Losing the overall campaign doesn't make one a bad tactician, far from it. When you can't hope to win - and ultimately Japan had decided to start a war it couldn't win - the best thing you can hope for is to set an high price. Yamamoto did that well enough in the Solomons.

And what you say about Leyte. It's interesting that when Japanesse fleets are defeated, it's their own fault, but when they hit America hard, it's always because of inept officers. IE, Japan can't come up with a good plan.

Leyte wasn't much of a complex plan : it went on a very reasonable assumption ("The sight of the carriers will draw the enemy north"). - especially reasonable since Mitscher had been blamed heavily for NOT doing that at Saipan.

With the carriers out of the way, the Japanesse attacked. A pretty good plan, all in all. Would have worked, if the admiral onboard the Yamato hadn't chickened out.

Right up to Coral Sea Japan ruled the seas. At the Coral Sea they were forced back but America paid a high price for it. Certainly, Yamamoto wouldn't have considered it a victory. But considering the price America paid to the price Japan paid, not much of a defeat either.

Then came Midway. The plan in itself wasn't so bad. Oh, there were weakness - a major one being the idiot on the bridge of the Akagi ; Nagumo should never have been allowed anywhere near a carrier - but it was hardly a bad plan. As was said before, extreme luck played for the Americans, as well as their knowledge of the japanesse plans. When you come right down to it, Halsey's only good move was to lauch its attack at the time where they would catch the planes refueling. The rest of the US triumph at Midway can be put pretty squarely on the back of US inteligence and Lady Luck. It wasn't Yamamoto's best plan, to be sure - that was, by far, Pearl Harbor, especially in its original form (including invasion of Hawaii right off the bat) which was rejected by Japanesse high command), but it was hardly THAT bad a plan.

The Solomons campaign was ultimately lost by Japan - but Yamamoto was noticeably dead at that point. The Guadalcanal campaign wouldn't have lasted half as long (thanks to army incompetence) if the IJN hadn't made life so hard for the American with such things as the "Tokyo express".

To put it another way, if you won't make Yamamoto the "best Japanesse admiral" , who will you? Midway is hardly enough to put him below any competitors.

 

[DingBat]

Originally posted by Oda Nobunaga

To put it another way, if you won't make Yamamoto the "best Japanesse admiral" , who will you? Midway is hardly enough to put him below any competitors.

Is that supposed to be a ringing endorsement? The fact that most other Japanese admirals are unknown compared to Yamamoto?

I would prefer to simply leave the category unfilled.

/bruce

 

[Evie]

Originally posted by DingBat


Is that supposed to be a ringing endorsement? The fact that most other Japanese admirals are unknown compared to Yamamoto?

I would prefer to simply leave the category unfilled.

/bruce

No. What I say is that despite his shortfalling, he was the best they had - and one of the best around. Unless you happen to have a better name to offer, the question is "Who was the best Japanesse admiral in WW II?". Answering "no one" is nonsense.

Japan had many admirals. They were of varying skills. Therefore, one of them had the best. IMHO, Pearl Harbor makes Yamamoto qualify.

 

[andycapp]

Originally posted by Bill_in_PDX


Was the goal Australia or Hawaii? ..........

......He should have massed force and either taken the key cities of Australia,

The goal was to isolate Australia and thereby hinder any attempt to mount an Allied millitary buildup and counter atttack from Australia that would pose a threat to the Japanese 'co-prosperity sphere' in Southeast Asia.

The Japanese had no immediate plans to invade Australia - at that time they didn't have the resources. Key islands between Australia and the US west coast were their targets to achieve the isolation of Australia.

 

[Bill_in_PDX]

Originally posted by andycapp


The goal was to isolate Australia and thereby hinder any attempt to mount an Allied millitary buildup and counter atttack from Australia that would pose a threat to the Japanese 'co-prosperity sphere' in Southeast Asia.

The Japanese had no immediate plans to invade Australia - at that time they didn't have the resources. Key islands between Australia and the US west coast were their targets to achieve the isolation of Australia.

I don't disagree with you at all. I think you are missing the context of the discussion that I responded to.

Either Yamamoto had the power to perform just that isolation you discussed in the New Guinea area, or he had the power to take out the bases in Hawaii, if not outright invade them. But he didn't have the power to do both. Nevertheless he squandered two of his best operational carriers at Coral Sea, both of which (heck, either of which) would have saved the battle at Midway.

So the question remains the same, what was his goal Australia or Hawaii, clearly he tried to keep the initiative at both locations, and further blundered by splitting his force at Midway.

The issue is, was he defeated by luck, as postulated above, or did he take decisive actions that lead to his early (he would have lost either way eventually) downfall.

Bill

 

[DingBat]

Originally posted by Oda Nobunaga


No. What I say is that despite his shortfalling, he was the best they had - and one of the best around. Unless you happen to have a better name to offer, the question is "Who was the best Japanesse admiral in WW II?". Answering "no one" is nonsense.

Japan had many admirals. They were of varying skills. Therefore, one of them had the best. IMHO, Pearl Harbor makes Yamamoto qualify.

I see we're going to agree to disagree here.

I admit to not knowing much about the more junior Japanese admirals. However, what I do know about Yamamoto makes me confident that, if I did a little reading, I would find a better candidate with little trouble.

So, I will elect to NOT vote Yamamoto as the best Japanese general and make my selection "someone else".

/bruce

 

[Evie]

Originally posted by Bill_in_PDX


I don't disagree with you at all. I think you are missing the context of the discussion that I responded to.

Either Yamamoto had the power to perform just that isolation you discussed in the New Guinea area, or he had the power to take out the bases in Hawaii, if not outright invade them. But he didn't have the power to do both. Nevertheless he squandered two of his best operational carriers at Coral Sea, both of which (heck, either of which) would have saved the battle at Midway.

So the question remains the same, what was his goal Australia or Hawaii, clearly he tried to keep the initiative at both locations, and further blundered by splitting his force at Midway.

The issue is, was he defeated by luck, as postulated above, or did he take decisive actions that lead to his early (he would have lost either way eventually) downfall.

Bill

You are missing an important point though. HIS goal was Hawaii, but he was forced by commands from higher up to also send forces to help isolate Australia. IE, he had no choice to send the Zuikaku and Shokaku there to support the planned offensive, because he wasn't in charge of the whole Japan military, and thus there were people above him to give him orders.

 

[Bill_in_PDX]

Originally posted by Oda Nobunaga


You are missing an important point though. HIS goal was Hawaii, but he was forced by commands from higher up to also send forces to help isolate Australia. IE, he had no choice to send the Zuikaku and Shokaku there to support the planned offensive, because he wasn't in charge of the whole Japan military, and thus there were people above him to give him orders.

I don't disagree, there are always people above you to give orders

If he would have concentrated his force at Midway he would have been prepared to deal with the remainder of the US Fleet. If he didn't have the force necessary to take chance into account, he should have waited until Sho or Zui were repaired. Even if the strategic split was flawed (and it was), the tactical split was worse, and if, as you say, Nagumo was not qualified to command the carrier group (and I'd be curious as to why you feel that way) then Yamamoto was the guy who put him in that position.

Politics always enters into it to be sure, and the Japanese Army seemed to carry the most weight in decisions, probably based upon culture, and the years of battle in Asia leading up to Pearl Harbor, but if he had any influence at all, it would have be during the early '42 timeframe, when these decisive decisions were made.

I think Yamamoto was a good strategist, but what is surprising about him is that while he was one of the few in the Japanese high command who knew that they had to complete their offensive moves, and win decisively within 18 months, or they would be overwhelmed, he failed to really execute on that knowledge in key instances:

1) He failed to destroy Pearl Harbor as a port / base of operations, instead focusing on sinking what he knew to be symbolic battleships. All the worse because of the blundered notification of US officials of the state of war, thus creating a huge motivation for the "sleeping giant".

2) He constantly planned for decisive battles to take out the carriers of the US fleet, but would often split his force so that when the opportunity presented itself he would not have the necessary assets to finish the job.

I personally think luck worked against him in two instances that of themselves wouldn't have made a big difference if his plan had not dwindled his force, first, the US was lucky in catching the carriers with planes and bombs on deck, leading to catastrophic effects when the dive bombers came (and yes it was fortuitous that the torpedo bombers sacraficed themselves and brought the escort low, but that may be Nagumo's blunder as well considering that a Japanese strike would have mirrored the US, i.e. both dive bombers and torpedo, yet he allowed his entire fighter cover to go low). Second, his counter attack found the ship most "expendable" from a strategic perspective, as the Yorktown was going to be shipyard housed for a couple years after this battle in any case.

Bill

 

[Mikoyan]

U.S: Patton
U.K: Monty
Soviet Union: Zjukov
Germany: Guderian or Rommel
Japan: Yamamoto
Finland: Mannerheim (Ok, Finland was'nt listed, but this guy was one hellova leader)

 

[Evie]

By the time Coral Sea had cost him Sho and Zui though, it was already too late to postpone Midway. As for Pearl Harbor, the exact details of the Air Raid were worked out by Genda, who wanted to launch a third wave to knock PH as a base.

Nagumo, however, was basically a chicken without much experience of airborne operation. He had no reason to be afraid with teh damages to Pearl and the firepower he had - he could have swept over Pear Harbor easily. The cost of a third wave would have been little in comparison to the gains to be had from it. Yamamoto could have ordered him to launch a third wave, but he decided to trust his commander in the field at that point.

Yamamoto's original plan, as well, was literally to invade Pearl. He was overruled by high command though.

 

[veal]

The Japanese had no immediate plans to invade Australia - at that time they didn't have the resources. Key islands between Australia and the US west coast were their targets to achieve the isolation of Australia.

I don't know if this is a dead argument but I feel I must chime in here. Japan definitely had plans to invade and occupy Australia.

You want proof?

They had already printed currency to be used in the new Japanese occupied Australia...