Objectivism

[newfangle]

As far as I can tell, QM just replaces determinism with blind probability.

I'd saying that even at the subatomic level, things don't happen without cause. More theoretical models of fundamental physics, such as M-theory and Loop Quantum gravity do away with this notion.

Because of this, I'd be weary to discuss determinism in scientific terms. I believe it will forever (or at least a very long time) remain an argument of philosophy.

 

[Ayatollah So]

The same question can be asked. If the "consciousness" is an exterior instance generating concepts (randomly?), then what weight does the "individual" have on decision making. [...] Does the individual have any role in the creation of the said concepts?

I don't get it. Surely consciousness is an interior thing if anything is? How can a wedge possibly be driven between the individual and his consciousness? Whatever my consciousness does, I do - this follows from the way we understand the word "I".

 

[The Last Conformist]

I'd saying that even at the subatomic level, things don't happen without cause. More theoretical models of fundamental physics, such as M-theory and Loop Quantum gravity do away with this notion.

I'm not able to parse this with certainty, but if you're saying that M-theory restores determinism, my understand is that that's quite wrong.

 

[Aphex_Twin]

I don't get it. Surely consciousness is an interior thing if anything is? How can a wedge possibly be driven between the individual and his consciousness? Whatever my consciousness does, I do - this follows from the way we understand the word "I".

Then newfangle does accept some idea of free will (that is, that of the "consciousness"). I was merely trying to point out that if consciousness generates "concepts" as an independent entity, but theese "choices" dictate the actions of the individual and theese actions are entirely deterministic, consciousness may be separated from the self.

 

[Gothmog]

'Man can do what he wants, but he cannot will what he wills'
A. Schopenhauer

 

[newfangle]

I'm not able to parse this with certainty, but if you're saying that M-theory restores determinism, my understand is that that's quite wrong.

I was referring to Quantum uncertainty.

Good quote btw Gothmog.

 

[Ayatollah So]

Then newfangle does accept some idea of free will (that is, that of the "consciousness").

Well, that's what I'd say, but you have to be careful with the wording here. Consider that people with views like Newfangle's (or mine, at least) on human freedom face a verbal dilemma. Shall we call our position "free will" and thereby risk having our views confused with a long misguided tradition of belief in disembodied souls which do things for no particular reason? Or shall we call our position "no free will" and risk leading people to think we deny moral responsibility, and equate humanity with blind automatons rather than intelligent agents?

The verbal choice depends which of these potential misunderstandings you think is more likely and/or worse. In my opinion, they're equally likely but the second misinterpretation is much worse, so I call my position "free will". However, Newfangle may assess the verbal risks differently.

Either way, the best defense against misunderstanding is plenty of explanation. But you have to start somewhere.

 

[WillJ]

Sorry guys for the very delayed response. I had forgotten about this thread...

"the choices you have made WERE made and could NOT have been made any other way" - potentially misleading. I think talk about what choices a person "could have made" refers to their options. An option is a future course of action whose realization depends on the intelligence of the person involved. So for example: If you are massively stronger than me, and throw me off the top of a house, whether I will hit the ground is not an option for me. But, if I have a little athletic skill, whether I hit the ground feet-first is an option for me. It depends on what I decide.

I make my decision for reasons. I want to live, I want to break as few bones as possible, etc. And those reasons have causes - they wouldn't be reasons if they didn't; if they didn't respond intelligently to my experience. And feet-first is the logical consequence of those reasons. But that doesn't mean that head-first and butt-first weren't options. They were, because which of them happened or didn't happen depended on my intelligent decision-making process. I could have landed butt-first, because if I had concluded in favor of it, that's how I would have landed.

In other words, people who imagine a conflict between determinism and freedom are confusing two different uses of the word "could". One, the moral/pragmatic context, is about options. The other context is about causal possibility. Given all the details about me immediately prior to the violent incident, it was causally guaranteed that I'd land feet-first. That means that an observer who knew enough about me and about causal laws could not have concluded other than that I would land feet-first.

With one very interesting exception: if the "observer" is me. If I concluded in favor of landing butt-first, I would land butt-first. That is one of the relevant causal laws: the way my psychology works: I do what I decide to do. That is why I have no epistemic obligation to "figure out what nature has in the cards" for me. I can conclude whatever I want, without fear of being mistaken. I am the author of the story of my life, not a mere reader.

I might be misreading what you say, but it seems like you think of the human mind as "outside" the physical world. But surely this isn't a given? Isn't it possible that the world is deterministic and/or random, and that your mind isn't an exception; you WILL choose something, with no possibility otherwise, or perhaps your choice is just random or probabiliistic.

Sure, stipulative definitions do exist, which is why I'm not going so far as to say the analytic/synthetic distinction is totally bogus. But for the most part, as Newfangle so correctly points out, concepts are open-ended. Or rather, for the whole part, because stipulated definitions rely on other concepts, which in turn are open-ended.

Consider that when language was just beginning, all definitions had to be ostensive. At least, I don't see any other way. So how do you know which things are "covered" by a word a member of your tribe just invented, when he only pointed to a few of them? What analytic statements could you possibly make using the new word? Point again and repeat the word? But now you're assuming that while you weren't looking, the items in question didn't go away and get replaced by very similar ones.

In the "cat" case, I suppose I'd start out by referencing the order Carnivora, subset of the class Mammalia and kingdom Animalia, and then try to distinguish cats from the rest of the order. One obvious way this could go wrong is if the "order" "Carnivora" turns out to be a bogus hash of animals with little in common. Not bloody likely at this point, of course, but it's the kind of thing one needs to keep an open mind about.

I think that's confusing "wrong" with "useless."

Take the cat example. If "carnivora" turns out to be an unrelated group of animals, it's useless to continue grouping them together, but not wrong per se. Let's say that I decide that a moctugula is a group consisting of carrots, pieces of paper, and catfish. Now is this grouping/word/definition useful in any way? No, I don't see when anyone would ever use it. Is it wrong, though? No, it's right if I say it's right; we're talking about a definition after all.

 

[Ayatollah So]

I might be misreading what you say, but it seems like you think of the human mind as "outside" the physical world. But surely this isn't a given? Isn't it possible that the world is deterministic and/or random, and that your mind isn't an exception; you WILL choose something, with no possibility otherwise, or perhaps your choice is just random or probabiliistic.

You are misreading what I say: I'm saying that being part of the physical world doesn't deprive us of any powers. Stipulate for the sake of argument that determinism is true. Then there is some X such that I WILL choose X. But it doesn't follow that I could not choose Y. All that follows is that you (not me, just you - and others) could not conclude that I choose Y without being wrong.

Are you familiar with modal logic? Consider the argument:
A
Necessarily, if A then B.
---
Necessarily B.

The argument is invalid. Only "B" follows, not "necessarily B".

How is this relevant? Well, consider the case where A describes past events and "Necessarily, if A then B" expresses a causal law connecting past to future events.

[on definitions:] Take the cat example. If "carnivora" turns out to be an unrelated group of animals, it's useless to continue grouping them together, but not wrong per se. Let's say that I decide that a moctugula is a group consisting of carrots, pieces of paper, and catfish. Now is this grouping/word/definition useful in any way? No, I don't see when anyone would ever use it. Is it wrong, though? No, it's right if I say it's right; we're talking about a definition after all.

But there's a key difference between "cat" and "moctugula", namely that "cat" already has an established meaning; that's why a definition of it can be wrong. Now, part of the meaning of "Carnivora" in biological science involves the idea that in the future, new species might be discovered which will properly belong to this category, while other new species will not belong. However, if it is in fact an unrelated group of animals, we have two choices if we want to keep the word: change the meaning and stipulate it to be this list of species, or leave it open-ended but with no coherent way to classify things as Carnivora or non-Carnivora.

In the first case our definition of "cat" has been abandoned because we changed one of the key terms. In the second case, "cat" is indeterminate and it's neither true nor false that Fluffy or Frisky or ... are cats. Either way something has gone wrong - we failed to capture the meaning that people associate with this word.

 

[WillJ]

You are misreading what I say: I'm saying that being part of the physical world doesn't deprive us of any powers. Stipulate for the sake of argument that determinism is true. Then there is some X such that I WILL choose X. But it doesn't follow that I could not choose Y. All that follows is that you (not me, just you - and others) could not conclude that I choose Y without being wrong.

Are you familiar with modal logic? Consider the argument:
A
Necessarily, if A then B.
---
Necessarily B.

The argument is invalid. Only "B" follows, not "necessarily B".

How is this relevant? Well, consider the case where A describes past events and "Necessarily, if A then B" expresses a causal law connecting past to future events.

No, I'm not very familiar with modal logic.

Despite your explanation, I still don't see how that applies to what we're dealing with. We're supposed to be dealing with things in absolute, not perceptual, terms, right? Well then the first part might as well be "necessarily A," and thus the conclusion "necessarily B" would be valid. No?

"Then there is some X such that I WILL choose X. But it doesn't follow that I could not choose Y." Whaaaat? Isn't the lack of options the very meaning of "will" (in that context)? If you WILL choose something, you can't change this. Obviously *I* can't say that you will choose something else; we agree on that. But neither can you, if the previous events in a deterministic world have "ordered" you to choose X.

But there's a key difference between "cat" and "moctugula", namely that "cat" already has an established meaning; that's why a definition of it can be wrong. Now, part of the meaning of "Carnivora" in biological science involves the idea that in the future, new species might be discovered which will properly belong to this category, while other new species will not belong. However, if it is in fact an unrelated group of animals, we have two choices if we want to keep the word: change the meaning and stipulate it to be this list of species, or leave it open-ended but with no coherent way to classify things as Carnivora or non-Carnivora.

In the first case our definition of "cat" has been abandoned because we changed one of the key terms. In the second case, "cat" is indeterminate and it's neither true nor false that Fluffy or Frisky or ... are cats. Either way something has gone wrong - we failed to capture the meaning that people associate with this word.

Okay, I guess I see what you're saying. There ARE indeed analytic truths that I can conjure up (the definition of moctugula being one of them, I suppose), it's just that pretty much nothing falls under this, and thus the whole AS dichotomy is---although technically true---useless, right?

 

[Ayatollah So]

Okay, I guess I see what you're saying. There ARE indeed analytic truths that I can conjure up (the definition of moctugula being one of them, I suppose), it's just that pretty much nothing falls under this, and thus the whole AS dichotomy is---although technically true---useless, right?

Or at least, its usefulness is confined to very narrow domains, like the study of logic and linguistics.

 

[Ayatollah So]

Despite your explanation, I still don't see how that applies to what we're dealing with. We're supposed to be dealing with things in absolute, not perceptual, terms, right? Well then the first part might as well be "necessarily A," and thus the conclusion "necessarily B" would be valid. No?

Some philosophers try to argue along those lines, but I don't think it works. If you take "necessarily" to mean "it follows logically from causal laws that ...", then you can't say that the conditions at the Big Bang are "necessary". They could have been different - a little more energy over here, a little less over there - consistent with physical law. And similarly for any other time in the history of the universe: events could have been different. All that follows from the laws of physics is that necessarily, IF events are such-and-such at time t1 THEN they must be so-and-so at time t2. And if determinism is true, then this holds regardless of whether t1 is earlier or later than t2. Given that I'm doing what I'm doing now, then relevant parts of the Big Bang had to be so-and-so, if determinism is true. Causal determination has an elegant symmetry.

"Then there is some X such that I WILL choose X. But it doesn't follow that I could not choose Y." Whaaaat? Isn't the lack of options the very meaning of "will" (in that context)? If you WILL choose something, you can't change this. Obviously *I* can't say that you will choose something else; we agree on that. But neither can you, if the previous events in a deterministic world have "ordered" you to choose X.

No, if I WILL choose X, I won't change this. It does not follow that I can't change this. Talk about what a person can or can't do, refers to his abilities, not his probabilities.

We often use the word "could" in connection with probability, saying that something "could happen" meaning there's a chance it will. But to confuse this with what a person "could do" is just an equivocation. It is like thinking that left-handed people must be evil, because they're sinister.

 

[WillJ]

Some philosophers try to argue along those lines, but I don't think it works. If you take "necessarily" to mean "it follows logically from causal laws that ...", then you can't say that the conditions at the Big Bang are "necessary". They could have been different - a little more energy over here, a little less over there - consistent with physical law. And similarly for any other time in the history of the universe: events could have been different. All that follows from the laws of physics is that necessarily, IF events are such-and-such at time t1 THEN they must be so-and-so at time t2. And if determinism is true, then this holds regardless of whether t1 is earlier or later than t2. Given that I'm doing what I'm doing now, then relevant parts of the Big Bang had to be so-and-so, if determinism is true. Causal determination has an elegant symmetry.

So if I choose to wear a blue sweater today, the only reason I could have chosen a red sweater is because the initial conditions of the universe might have been different?

No, if I WILL choose X, I won't change this. It does not follow that I can't change this. Talk about what a person can or can't do, refers to his abilities, not his probabilities.

We often use the word "could" in connection with probability, saying that something "could happen" meaning there's a chance it will. But to confuse this with what a person "could do" is just an equivocation. It is like thinking that left-handed people must be evil, because they're sinister.

Granted, but I think the limits of a deterministic universe apply to both abilities and probabilities.

 

[Ayatollah So]

So if I choose to wear a blue sweater today, the only reason I could have chosen a red sweater is because the initial conditions of the universe might have been different?

No, the reason you could have chosen a red sweater is that if you had judged the red sweater best from your point of view, then you would have worn the red sweater. Which is to say, out of the coherent scenarios in which you do judge the red sweater best, there's at least one where you then wear it. If we wanted to specify all the details of that scenario, then in order to keep it coherent, it would suffice to make that scenario different in a few details at the time of the big bang.

So the possibility of different (initial or otherwise) conditions of the universe is just a precondition of "could have" and "would have" statements having truth-values at all. What makes one of those statements true, if it is true, is the causal powers of the object or person in question. Under relevantly different circumstances you still would make intelligent choices, not be stuck on blue - that is why you were not compelled to choose the blue sweater.

 

[Narz]

I've read Rand (Fountainhead, We The Living). I like her books. I agree with rational self interest. I believe personal happiness can be an end in itself. Contrary to Objectivism I also believe in the immortality of the human spirit (soul, consciousness, inherent personality, whathaveyou). I do not believe that the spirit is a creation of the body or mind. I believe the spirit of a person inhabits the body and mind the way radio waves inhabit a radio. I don't believe my spirit will be destroied when I die anymore than I believe I will destroy the music on 94.3FM (or whatever station) by smashing my radio.

Lady's got some good points though.

- Narz

 

[WillJ]

Sorry for the delayed response again.

No, the reason you could have chosen a red sweater is that if you had judged the red sweater best from your point of view, then you would have worn the red sweater.

But in a deterministic universe, how could I have judged the red sweater best? The conditions of the universe (including the conditions of my mind) led me to conclude that the blue sweater was best. For this to be any different, wouldn't conditions (in my mind or somewhere else) have had to be different?

Which is to say, out of the coherent scenarios in which you do judge the red sweater best, there's at least one where you then wear it. If we wanted to specify all the details of that scenario, then in order to keep it coherent, it would suffice to make that scenario different in a few details at the time of the big bang.

So the possibility of different (initial or otherwise) conditions of the universe is just a precondition of "could have" and "would have" statements having truth-values at all. What makes one of those statements true, if it is true, is the causal powers of the object or person in question.

Not quite sure I follow.

Under relevantly different circumstances you still would make intelligent choices, not be stuck on blue - that is why you were not compelled to choose the blue sweater.

Sure, but how could there be relevantly different circumstances? Perhaps if the initial conditions of the universe were different, but beyond that, considering in a deterministic universe each cause has only one possible effect, I don't see how it's possible. And besides, I don't think it matters if you would have made a different decision if conditions were different; all that matters is that you wouldn't ever have made a different decision with the current conditions.

 

[Ayatollah So]

But in a deterministic universe, how could I have judged the red sweater best? The conditions of the universe (including the conditions of my mind) led me to conclude that the blue sweater was best. For this to be any different, wouldn't conditions (in my mind or somewhere else) have had to be different?

Yes. Things would have to be different throughout all of time.

Not quite sure I follow.

What I meant there is that, in order to evaluate a statement like "this water would dissolve salt if we poured it on some", or "WillJ could have worn a different sweater," we have to imagine a universe where conditions are different but the laws of nature are the same. The laws of nature should be the same because they are intimately related to the causal powers in question. Water has the power to dissolve salt; WillJ has the power to wear various sweaters. The fact that, in a universe with different natural laws, water might not dissolve salt, is irrelevant to the truth of the statement that water has the power to dissolve salt.

Now, if the laws of nature are deterministic, the only way conditions can be different is if they are different all through time. So then, that is what we have to imagine, if we want to defend either the claim that WillJ could have worn a red sweater, or the claim that he couldn't.

And besides, I don't think it matters if you would have made a different decision if conditions were different; all that matters is that you wouldn't ever have made a different decision with the current conditions.

Why? I think it's obvious that it often does matter whether you would make a different decision in different conditions: because, if you wouldn't, your action is irrational. If someone refuses to wear a red jacket even when that is the only way to avoid fatal hypothermia, the best explanation of their action is some sort of irrational compulsion. Which puts their freedom and their responsibility for the action in doubt.

 

[WillJ]

Yes. Things would have to be different throughout all of time.


What I meant there is that, in order to evaluate a statement like "this water would dissolve salt if we poured it on some", or "WillJ could have worn a different sweater," we have to imagine a universe where conditions are different but the laws of nature are the same. The laws of nature should be the same because they are intimately related to the causal powers in question. Water has the power to dissolve salt; WillJ has the power to wear various sweaters. The fact that, in a universe with different natural laws, water might not dissolve salt, is irrelevant to the truth of the statement that water has the power to dissolve salt.

Now, if the laws of nature are deterministic, the only way conditions can be different is if they are different all through time. So then, that is what we have to imagine, if we want to defend either the claim that WillJ could have worn a red sweater, or the claim that he couldn't.

Makes sense, but doesn't that make the answer to this question:

So if I choose to wear a blue sweater today, the only reason I could have chosen a red sweater is because the initial conditions of the universe might have been different?

yes? Perhaps when you answered no earlier, you misunderstood what I was asking. To clarify, let me try to get what you're saying straight:

In a deterministic universe, each cause has only one possible effect. However, this does not mean that any effects in this universe, if it's deterministic, must have happened the way they did; things could be different if the initial condition of the universe were different, because obviously a different cause might, depending on its relevance, lead to a different effect.

Why? I think it's obvious that it often does matter whether you would make a different decision in different conditions: because, if you wouldn't, your action is irrational. If someone refuses to wear a red jacket even when that is the only way to avoid fatal hypothermia, the best explanation of their action is some sort of irrational compulsion. Which puts their freedom and their responsibility for the action in doubt.

First, let's take a step back and look at why many people are afraid of determinism. I'll give what I think is a decent example, although you might disagree:

Adolf Hitler was an evil man. Adolf Hitler was faced with his environment and decided to kill a bunch of Jews, among others. His evil, sick mind chose to kill people. He could have done otherwise, and you or I would most likely have done otherwise, but no, he didn't; he killed people.

Your average person would agree with this characterisation, but it no longer holds up in a deterministic universe. Some would even say that goodness and evilness couldn't exist in a deterministic universe.

If I'm not mistaken, you disregard this as unfounded, because Hitler would have done differently if conditions were different; it's not like he HAD to be evil. But I think that's beside the point. Proponents of free will don't actually argue that Hitler HAD to be evil in a deterministic universe. They see the free-will-universe as full of choices; Hitler is shown a choice of three doors and he should have chosen 1 or 2, but he chose 3, and thus is evil. In a deterministic universe, Hitler is only shown door number 3 in the first place, so how can we fault him for choosing it? We can't; if we were to throw him in jail or something, we could only justify this by saying we were faulting his environment, not his actual self.

It's equally troublesome when we look at the future instead of the past. You might say that I should give to charity some time this year. Or the American government should turn more libertarian. But in a deterministic universe, argument of what should or should not happen is pointless; one thing is certain to happen anyway.

Edit: Note that I personally disagree with the "free will-ists" on the thing about Hitler, because Hitler's environment includes his brain, and even if his brain had no "options," there's nothing wrong with criticizing it if it's a plague to humanity. Arguing otherwise would be like saying we shouldn't be so harsh on hurricanes.

With the thing about the future, though, I must say that determinism is a bit troublesome in that regard.

 

[Ayatollah So]

Makes sense, but doesn't that make the answer to this question:

So if I choose to wear a blue sweater today, the only reason I could have chosen a red sweater is because the initial conditions of the universe might have been different?

yes?

Not exactly. That's like saying, "the only reason murder is illegal, is because government exists." Sure, government has to exist for something to be illegal. But that's only one reason, there are others which are more to the point if someone asks "why is murder illegal?" The existence of government is simply a framework against which questions of "legal or illegal?" can be answered. Similarly the possibility of different conditions is a framework against which the question "free or compelled?" can be answered.

To clarify, let me try to get what you're saying straight:

In a deterministic universe, each cause has only one possible effect. However, this does not mean that any effects in this universe, if it's deterministic, must have happened the way they did; things could be different if the initial condition of the universe were different, because obviously a different cause might, depending on its relevance, lead to a different effect.

Right. And by the same token, the initial condition of the universe could be different if the current condition were different, or if the final (in a Big Crunch) condition were different, or anywhere in between. The interdependency relations are perfectly symmetric; no metaphysical envy is called for.

Your average person would agree with this characterisation, but it no longer holds up in a deterministic universe. Some would even say that goodness and evilness couldn't exist in a deterministic universe.

If I'm not mistaken, you disregard this as unfounded, because Hitler would have done differently if conditions were different; it's not like he HAD to be evil. But I think that's beside the point. Proponents of free will don't actually argue that Hitler HAD to be evil in a deterministic universe. They see the free-will-universe as full of choices; Hitler is shown a choice of three doors and he should have chosen 1 or 2, but he chose 3, and thus is evil. In a deterministic universe, Hitler is only shown door number 3 in the first place, so how can we fault him for choosing it? We can't; if we were to throw him in jail or something, we could only justify this by saying we were faulting his environment, not his actual self.

You're right, I regard as unfounded the idea that determinism would prohibit blame. I'd wager that Hitler did actually consider other options - pursuing negotiations with the Allies, changing his staff, changing the German economy - besides just blaming the Jews for every woe of Germany. He just failed to give those alternatives the appraisal they merited. There were reasons why not, but those reasons don't excuse him, because he had enough rationality and intelligence in general to be responsible for his actions.

It's equally troublesome when we look at the future instead of the past. You might say that I should give to charity some time this year. Or the American government should turn more libertarian. But in a deterministic universe, argument of what should or should not happen is pointless; one thing is certain to happen anyway.

Not "anyway". Argument of what should or should not happen is one of the causal factors, sometimes critical factors, determining action. We are talking about intelligent human beings, after all. Our thoughts and debates matter.

 

[The Last Conformist]

I was referring to Quantum uncertainty.

M Theory leaves that quite intact.

(An interesting consequence of assuming that subatomic particles have classical positions and momenta is that solid-state physics collapses; we'd literally not have a clue what a rock is.)