Boris Gudenuf
Deity
There was quite a bit of paranoia going around not helped by the Abwehr, not sure all the underlining was by gentlemen.
Messages with lots of caps are a hotbed of double meanings as I understand it. Fascinated by the work you are doing, have you considered the duality of these messages? I know Kluge was very loyal but not fanatical. You must have some good insights into his personality.
My writing partner and I have gotten access to the German records down to division level, including copies of von Kluge's messages and orders in draft form, drafted in his own hand, so the format (and capitalization) are straight from him, not some intermediate staff officer.
Our contention in writing yet another book about the Battle of Moscow is that October 1941 was the last chance Germany had of winning the war, in that it was the last realistic chance they had of taking Moscow. Taking Moscow would not have knocked the Soviet Union out of the war, but there's no way they could have defeated the Soviet Union without taking Moscow, and as long as the Soviets remained actively in the war, Germany was losing it: the Nazi State did not have the resources in raw materials, industrial capacity or manpower to survive against both the USSR and the British Empire, let alone against the Industrial Colossus across the Atlantic.
Von Kluge has been the 'scapegoat' for the failure to take Moscow in the last German offensive that started in mid-November. We have copious evidence from both German and Soviet archive documents that the November Offensive didn't have a prayer of taking Moscow despite all the popular accounts after the war (many by German officers who, frankly, were making Excuses for their own failures as tacticians and strategists). Among other things, the German infantry divisions were already missing over 2/3 of their infantrymen to casualties and the Red Army had already massed 8 Reserve Armies east, northeast, and southeast of Moscow. As the Panzer Groups attempted to advance from the southwest and northwest (with very mixed results and some complete tactical failures) Von Kluge's 4th Army in the center failed to attack and 'hold' the Soviet Reserves. This was presented after the war as the reason for the failure of the entire offensive.
Except that we've discovered the Soviet reserves weren't at the front to be held (we have the actual Soviet orders and reports from their archive files), they were already massed in separate armies behind the front, and Von Kluge's army at the end of October had not only stopped attacking, it was being attacked across most of its front: and those attacks, at Dorokhovo on the Moscow Highway, Naro-Fominsk, and Panino on the Podolsk/Warsaw Highway, were inflicting serious casualties: the lead battalions of three infantry divisions had been virtually annihilated at Dorokhovo and Panino, and at Naro-Fominsk the 258th Infantry Division was suffering up to 120 casualties a day - the equivalent of one of their 27 rifle companies every 24 hours. It doesn't take a mathematical genius among the German infantrymen for them to know exactly when their time is up and they become, as Bill Mauldin so neatly put it, "A fugitive from the Law of Averages."
Von Kluge knew all this, and was accordingly reluctant to stick his neck out or the collective necks of his army. In fact, he did make one attack, on 1 December just as the rest of the offensive was falling apart, and we have already written a 100 page account of that action, which may have been the most quickly crushed German attack of the entire war: within 48 hours the entire attacking force was retreating back to its start line having had a panzer regiment shot to pieces (4 company or battalion commanders killed in a single 2 hour period) and 3 infantry regiments mauled - one of them fleeing in panic from a Soviet counterattack, which is never a good sign.
We may end up rehabilitating von Kluge, which wasn't our original intention at all - the man was, in the end, utterly and notoriously selfish when it came to condemning other officers to divert attention away from his own failings throughout the war. But he seems to have seen the real situation in late October - November 1941 far more clearly than anyone else in the German command, from Hitler down to his fellow army commanders.
My apologies to all for the Complete Digression, but this has filled most of my time for the past 4 years, obtaining and translating several thousand pages of German and Russian archive documents.
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