Pure Pacific War

[Cheezy the Wiz]

If you want an example of the usefulness of battleships in the Pacific, just look at Leyte Gulf.

That's like saying that fyrdmen are useless because of the lone berserker on Stamford Bridge.

Battleship effectiveness is far better demonstrated by the fate of the HMS Prince of Wales.

The Japanese had eleven battleships to the Americans' zero.

The Japanese brought seven battleships with them to Midway, only two of which were part of the battle.

 

[ace99]

On that topic what were the Germans playing at with the Bismarck? I just don't get how they figured that would have ended well.

 

[Masada]

Interesting point. Dutch submarines caused more damage to the Japanese in the opening months of the war than did the combined British, American and Dutch fleets (excluding the submarines). Conrad Helfrich was a cool dude.

*

Other related point, the Dutch were under no illusions about Japanese capabilities to invade the East Indies. In OTL the only thing that kept them onside was explicit guarantees from the United States and Britain of intervention in the advent of invasion. Had that stiffening not been present, the Dutch would have rolled and sold the Japanese the oil, rubber, copra and so forth they wanted. As it was, there was support for that idea in East Indies circles and that was, more or less, what the Japanese themselves wanted. The Japanese had actually asked for just that a number of times. I'd also suggest that had the Dutch not blocked exports to the Japanese there would have been little to no impetus to invade. What could be achieved from peace far outweighed what could be achieved by war so far as the Japanese were concerned. To some extent, this was based on a belief that the Dutch would wreck all the oil infrastructure and that it would take 12-18 months for the Japanese repair it all, if they could. (In OTL this didn't happen because of the speed of the Allied collapse and the unilateral surrender of Allied forces by the Dutch Commander in Java, whose name I forget). So the Japanese were kinda, sorta, ambivalent to invasion as a solution to their resource problems, reckoning in the short term that it would simply exacerbate their existent supply issues. The garrisons in the Indies in OTL were second only to those in China. This is ignoring obvious factors like Medan being within sight of Singapore on a clear day; probable violation of British territorial waters to invade the aforesaid; British Borneo abutting to Dutch Borneo; Australia and New Zealand freaking the hell out; the British colonials freaking the hell out; the Americans freaking the hell out; and the Japanese almost certainly needing to secure supply bases much closer to the East Indies to launch an invasion.

Battleship effectiveness is far better demonstrated by the fate of the HMS Prince of Wales.

Disagree. The fate of Prince of Wales and Repulse demonstrates the effectiveness of aircraft against capital ships in the absence of a comprehensive escort screen. Had Adm. Phillips elected to remain on station near Singapore he could have assembled a far more substantial force in a short while. (He had something like ten additional destroyers, five light cruisers and one additional heavy cruiser on or close to hand). As it was, he still manged to leave Singapore with a force that was probably inferior to the Japanese one he was sent to intercept. That alone should suggest the utter insanity of what he did, quite apart from the aerial attack that lost him his life. Another point to consider is that Allied naval strength was competitive in the South right up until the Battle of the Java Sea and its follow-ups: Java II and Sunda Strait notably. All up the total losses from those amounted to 5 cruisers and 9 destroyers. Japanese strength in the region wasn't much greater than the allied losses...

 

[Cutlass]

If you want an example of the usefulness of battleships in the Pacific, just look at Leyte Gulf.

I don't think that's a fair comparison. The Japanese battleship group did so poorly there more than any other reason because of timid Japanese leadership.

 

[Antilogic]

Agreed, and very well stated might I add. I still think that it was the loss of the experienced pilots, naval personnel, and logistical teams that truly took the Japanese out of the fight before the loss of majority of their ships.

I don't mean to overemphasize the ships, but it's a real sticking point for me since the Japanese never built good carriers in any quantity after the war started. The Taiho was decent, but the rest were converts with ridiculous tonnages (prime example: Shinano) and mismatched machinery from commercial passenger liners that caused so many mechanical problems (like the Hiyo and Unyo classes). Later in the war, they were able to produce light carriers like the Chitose class and the "fleet"-sized Unryu class, but they could only launch 30 and 50ish planes respectively, whereas the American Essex-class vessels had airgroups numbering between 90 and 100+ depending on the craft. At least one class, I think it might have been the Unryu class, could not launch a particular model of dive bomber because the elevators were too small for the fixed wings (which didn't fold for some silly excuse--it's a carrier, the wings gotta fold so you can load more planes!). The Chitose and Unryu classes would have been respectable contenders in 1941 but by 1944, going up against the American Independence and Essex/Ticonderoga analogs, they were no match.

The Taiho, as I mentioned above, was the one Japanese carrier I respect outside the original 6 fleet carriers. It had a well-fortified deck, better AA guns, was refitted for radar and more advanced electronics, and could originally carry 78 planes but due to the changing size of new aircraft (and the lack of wing fold-ability, for the lack of a better term), it had to be cut down to the 50s-60s. Of course, incompetent Japanese damage control prevented them from having nice things.

Armchair generals like to talk about the battle of Midway in the same fashion as Pickett's Charge, i.e. stupid plans that had no chance of success and only got a lot of people killed. And similar to Pickett's Charge, this just isn't true.

The IJN had good reason to try to force a battle at Midway. After the battle of Coral Sea, the IJN believed that they had destroyed two of the American fleet carriers and that they only had two more to go. This fit into their general plan of trying to knock the wind out of the American fleet, making their industry have to play catch-up for a while and along with the absence of the British fleet in the Pacific give the Japanese time to fortify and hopefully bring about a diplomatic end to the war. Too bad for them they only knocked out one of the American carriers, making the U.S. total at Midway 3 against 4 + 4, odds that the American could work with.

Just compare the orders of battle.

The only slight advantages the Americans may have had was in number of aircraft, due to the airbase at Midway, and submarines. Although the ground-based aircraft weren't all that great at bombing ships, they still played a very significant role in absorbing attacks and distracting the Japanese fleet with attacks of their own.

Edit: But lets not forget the quality of those aircraft. The Zero was the best fighter in the air, and had completely annihilated wave after wave of American attacks over the course of June 4th, until late in the day when they were out of fuel and ammunition, and caught out of position by the last few American air groups.

The Japanese had eleven battleships to the Americans' zero. They had about 185 surface ships altogether, to the USN's 28. And while I know people like to think battleships don't matter, they actually came fairly close to engagement range with the American carriers, and would have at the very least forced the USN to high-tail it back to Hawaii if the IJN's 4 carriers hadn't been destroyed in spectacular fashion.

The Japanese brought seven battleships with them to Midway, only two of which were part of the battle.

Part of the reason why there's a discrepancy here is because the Japanese operational plans involved a simultaneous strike on the Aleutian Islands just because, where the excess battleships and some of those lighter carriers were allocated. And after completing one mission, these two armadas were to reinforce each other. The Japanese were fond of overly complicated timetables that ended up scattering their forces around instead of concentrating them appropriately at a high-value target. The Americans had the advantage of force concentration, surprise since they were able to slip through the Japanese sub screen undetected, as well as the fortified base at Midway (an island is a much more durable and defensible airbase than a carrier).

The other problem I've touched on above--those seaplane tenders only carried at most 20 planes and couldn't fulfill the same role as a fleet carrier. Japanese light carriers and converted seaplane carriers (one of those tricks to get around the naval treaties) could barely screen themselves, much less have the capacity to effectively launch offensive strikes and sustain them in the face of losses.

The correct strategy for the Japanese was to identify targets that were worth sending all 6 fleet carriers at, and those that were worth sending 0; Midway had to be either a 6 or a 0. It couldn't be a 4. The simultaneous code-cracking, crummy sub deployment scheme, etc. only made worse the flaw in the strategic allocation of resources.

Disagree. The fate of Prince of Wales and Repulse demonstrates the effectiveness of aircraft against capital ships in the absence of a comprehensive escort screen.

Your above on the East Indies was pretty interesting. I also agree particularly with the highlighted part--battleships still served a few niche roles in the war, if nothing else as major batteries to support amphibious assaults. Difference is, they couldn't accomplish their intended roles without air cover from at least a escort/light carrier task force, depending on the age of the ships and average speed of the fleet.

 

[Gen.Mannerheim]

Interesting point. Dutch submarines caused more damage to the Japanese in the opening months of the war than did the combined British, American and Dutch fleets (excluding the submarines). Conrad Helfrich was a cool dude.

*

Other related point, the Dutch were under no illusions about Japanese capabilities to invade the East Indies. In OTL the only thing that kept them onside was explicit guarantees from the United States and Britain of intervention in the advent of invasion. Had that stiffening not been present, the Dutch would have rolled and sold the Japanese the oil, rubber, copra and so forth they wanted. As it was, there was support for that idea in East Indies circles and that was, more or less, what the Japanese themselves wanted. The Japanese had actually asked for just that a number of times. I'd also suggest that had the Dutch not blocked exports to the Japanese there would have been little to no impetus to invade. What could be achieved from peace far outweighed what could be achieved by war so far as the Japanese were concerned. To some extent, this was based on a belief that the Dutch would wreck all the oil infrastructure and that it would take 12-18 months for the Japanese repair it all, if they could. (In OTL this didn't happen because of the speed of the Allied collapse and the unilateral surrender of Allied forces by the Dutch Commander in Java, whose name I forget). So the Japanese were kinda, sorta, ambivalent to invasion as a solution to their resource problems, reckoning in the short term that it would simply exacerbate their existent supply issues. The garrisons in the Indies in OTL were second only to those in China. This is ignoring obvious factors like Medan being within sight of Singapore on a clear day; probable violation of British territorial waters to invade the aforesaid; British Borneo abutting to Dutch Borneo; Australia and New Zealand freaking the hell out; the British colonials freaking the hell out; the Americans freaking the hell out; and the Japanese almost certainly needing to secure supply bases much closer to the East Indies to launch an invasion.

Correct me if I'm wrong, but didn't the Anglo-American guarantees to the Dutch come after the Japanese occupation of Indochina. If so, then there might not possibly have be any guarantee the the Japanese had to worry about.

During the OTL invasion of the DEI, one of the main staging areas of the Japanese force was Palau. Yes they used southern Mindanao as a staging point too, but in this possibility they could make due without. Formosa and coastal Chinese holdings were also used by the Japanese. Also both here and in OTL the Japanese quickly set up supply bases as the went deeper into the DEI.

Freaking out isn't the same as actually doing something. In 1914/15 when Japan went about absorbing German Pacific possessions, the Australians and Americans flipped a , but didn't oppose them about it. I certainly believe that the anglophone countries would be anxious about a Japanese takeover of some/all of the DEI, but doubt they would risk a Pacific war over it, similar to the American response to the occupation to Indochina. Fear of Dutch sabotage didn't slow them down when it came to OTL invasion because of the surprise of the Japanese attack, something that I think would again happen here.

 

[Masada]

Correct me if I'm wrong, but didn't the Anglo-American guarantees to the Dutch come after the Japanese occupation of Indochina. If so, then there might not possibly have be any guarantee the the Japanese had to worry about.

Informal guarantees had been made going back to the twenties. The Japanese were also convinced that Anglo-American intervention was inevitable in the advent of an invasion of the East Indies. That's why in OTL they never actually tried this or gave much thought to it outside of plans that presupposed simultaneous attacks on the aforementioned.

During the OTL invasion of the DEI, one of the main staging areas of the Japanese force was Palau. Yes they used southern Mindanao as a staging point too, but in this possibility they could make due without. Formosa and coastal Chinese holdings were also used by the Japanese. Also both here and in OTL the Japanese quickly set up supply bases as the went deeper into the DEI.

True. But it would have drastically limited where they could strike, the distances involved in striking and massively increased the time required to invade. The Eastern Islands would have been all but impossible to access in the initial strike without access to the Sulu Sea/Celebee Sea which were British/American turf. It would also have required sending naval task forces within kilometers of Singapore to take, say, Medan.

Freaking out isn't the same as actually doing something. In 1914/15 when Japan went about absorbing German Pacific possessions, the Australians and Americans flipped a , but didn't oppose them about it.

Singapore is within sight of Medan on a clear day. Bali is no more than an hour and a half from Darwin. Indonesia is right next to the Philippines. And most of the stuff the Japanese wanted was American and British owned and operated.

I certainly believe that the anglophone countries would be anxious about a Japanese takeover of some/all of the DEI, but doubt they would risk a Pacific war over it, similar to the American response to the occupation to Indochina.

Indochina was allowed to slide because the Brits were more concerned about the Nazis and because it was thought provident not to antagonize the Vichy anymore than had already been the case. Moreover, the Japanese presence was not an occupation at least initially, so much as pressure that later facilitated one. Indochina was therefore tolerable provided it keep the Japanese peaceable and allowed the British to focus on Europe. In a 'Pure Pacific War' without that consideration, why the hell would the British have even bothered. As it was they regarded Japanese military capabilities with contempt.

Fear of Dutch sabotage didn't slow them down when it came to OTL invasion because of the surprise of the Japanese attack, something that I think would again happen here.

The Japanese never anticipated the victories they got in OTL. Japanese planning always anticipated a most longer, harder fight with much more limited goals. So far as I know, pre-war Japanese planning envisioned merely taking the important parts of Sumatra and Borneo. The rapid Allied collapse allowed the Japanese to go further, and arguably into areas which it had no use for - e.g. Java. But it was never anticipated that this would happen. That's why the Japanese feared the specter of Dutch sabotage because they full-well expected to take months upon months to even get close. Not the weeks it actually took. And a lot of what happened in OTL was not predictable until the Battle of the Java Sea. Until that point, it was still thought possibly by both sides that allied naval strength could delay Japanese amphibious landings or outright stop them.