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Questions on Mao.

Godwynn

March to the Sea
Joined
May 17, 2003
Messages
20,523
The worst dictator thread made me think about him.

1. Was his last name 'Zedong' or 'Tse-Tung'?
2. What did he do that was so bad?
3. I was reading on Wikipedia, it said he was elected Chairman, I thought he fought the nationalists, so wouldn't he have taken power by force?
4. Is he looked upon favorably by Chinese people today?
 
1) Both. Zedong is the hanyu pinyin transliteration of his Chinese name; Tse-Tung is fr the older format.

2) Under his leadership and push for the Great Leap Forward in the mid 1950s, tens of millions of Chinese starved to death as the Commies concentrated on a haphazard form of backyard industrialization, amongst other things IIRC.

3) In the early days, Mao had to maneovur for power, amongst the Commies. It wasn't until the end of the Long March that he held unquestionably the no 1 role; so in effect he was sort of 'chosen' by the Commie leadership to lead.

4) Yes. reverently. For reunifying China, restrengthening it.
 
You could have added 5) What good did he do for China? (away from the bias of the "dictatorship" perspective). :)

OK, that was answered succinctly by XIII wrt Q4.

But I think much insight into the achievements of Mao could be gained from a comparison of the state of China pre- and post-Mao (and the Communists). Little is made in the West (esp USA) about the absolute corruption of the Kuo-Min Tang under Chiang which greatly increased the suffering of the common people with the shunting of the copious foreign (mostly US) aid money into the cofferes of the ruling elite esp the Finance Minister (which basically funded the powerful anti-communist lobby in the US after the defeat of Chiang). One could make a case for Chiang Kai-Shek being a greater dictator than Mao.
 
Chiang himself was clean IIRC; however he surrounded himself with corrupted cronies, esp after the time he was in Chongqing during WW2. IMO, many of the KMT's best and brightest had perished during the upheaval of the Japanese invasion, leaving little for Chiang to work with.

Plus, China's economic plunge and massive inflation during the years 45-49 didn't help the KMT cause. Nor their avengeful reprisals against those who'd live under the Japanese occupation - declaring them as collaborators, and seizing their assets.

This is even more hypocritical when you consider that in some regions, the Chinese puppet troops simply rejoined the KMT after the Japanese defeat, leading many to suspect a prior arrangements betw KMT and the Japanese. And in some places, remnant Japanese forces actually actively participated in the war against the Commies, on the side of the KMT.

Mao was a great revolutionary; but he's a horrible administrator. Fortunately, Deng picked up well after Mao; otherwise China today would be even worse off possibly.
 
I'm afraid I have a rather lower opinion of Chiang. My reading seems to imply a policy of "strategic retreat" in the face of the Japanese advance all the way to Chongqing. At least Mao and his communist troops did provide some resistance.

I still am quite horrified by the photos and historical footage of the summary execution of Communists and those suspected to be their sympathisers. Thousands were rounded up in cities like Shanghai and never saw the light of day again. In the light of these massacres, the survival and growth of the CCP was indeed miraculous. In the ensuing internal struggle Mao gained the initiative over his more conventionally Marxist colleagues and must be credited with the strategic success in both eluding the encircling KMT forces via the historic Long March and the resurrection of the PLA as a major military force (of course with the help of trusted committed lieutenants like Chu Teh and Chou En-lai).
 
Mao is one of those cases where you have a genius and heroic figure on one side, and a criminal on the other, and both sides are roughly balanced (maybe the criminal aspect is a bit stronger).
 
What XIII said and a few my own opinions.
1) ZeDong is like Beijing, it's the Chinese name. Tse-Dung is Peking, the English name.

2) Great leap forward and cultrual revolution mainly. They were horrandous. If you are able to, talk to some Chinese people in their 40s or older (or talk to me! :D), otherwise try read some objective books on the issue (probably hard to find) It's absolutely horrandous and ridiculous netherless. (yet it's not killing 100 million as Mr Saravok and others would want you to believe)

If you compare it with other things straight up, it's not more evil but less. It's just more weird, happened in a way the world haven't seen before. (ever heard of great leap forward or backward or some'ing like that) So it feels more ridiculous. China was in the doghouse for too long, all craziness released.

3) The Chinese communist parties was following the Soviets' steps. But Mao had his own way, the 'Chinese' way. He got pushed a lot because he dared to deffer, but in the end only his way worked so they elected him as the leader.

4) Yes. But he did do terrible things, so some people hate him.

About Jiang he gave my homeland to Japan for free and let it rot in hell for 15 years. I'll never forgive him. He is pretty patriotic though, I like that part of him.
 
IIRC the failure of The Great Leap Forward was alot to do with Mao's stupidity, rather than malicious intent - he meant to do well, he just made one or 2 rather large mistakes (and was also ill informed).

Mao distrusted specialists, so many of the policies that were carried out were counter productive, such as the mass killing of sparrows (as they eat seed). This allowed insescts to flourish, with the end result of more of the harvest being destroyed.

He also encouraged backyard steel making, leading to millions of people melting down they're cooking pots to make poor quality steel, which was then scrapped.

The commune system that they had in place was also counter-productive. The communes fought for favour in the higher echelons of the CCP, and lied about food production to look better than their neighbours. This lead to Mao thinking the country had more food than it actually did, so he concentrated on massive construcion projects (all using manual labour), which were poorly designed (lack of specialists) and took longer than expected.

All this lead to two years of famine (68-69 IIRC), and it is approximated that 20 million people died as a result of it (though the real figure is not known, and Chinese authorities claimed it to be much lower).

Mao wasn't evil, he was stupid.
 
Originally posted by lz14
What XIII said and a few my own opinions.
1) ZeDong is like Beijing, it's the Chinese name. Tse-Dung is Peking, the English name.
Both are Chinese transliterations. The later is simply the Cantonese version - Guangzhou (Canton) used to be the only port where foreigners could dock in China. I.e. Beijing (Mandarin), Peking (Cantonese).
 
Originally posted by Achinz
I'm afraid I have a rather lower opinion of Chiang. My reading seems to imply a policy of "strategic retreat" in the face of the Japanese advance all the way to Chongqing. At least Mao and his communist troops did provide some resistance.
Jiang had lost most of his best divisions in the defence of Shanghai and the lower Yangzi. One reason why the Japanese troops engaged in the massacre that was the Rape of Nanjing was pure frustration over the harder-than-expected resistance put up by the Chinese earlier. IMO, he simply had no way to defend against the better-trained, better-equipped and better-led Japanese forces pouring into China. A strategic retreat was required - trading space for time.

See how well the Americans and Europeans did in SE Asia; despite the fact that the Japanese forces sent there only numbered a small fraction of the forces engaged in the China campaign. ;)

Mao's faction put up some fight, but most of the time, they're spending their time reorganizing and guerilla warfare (which barely affected the Japanese much, in terms of the overall war). Their only conventional 'Hundred Regiments Offensive' campaign was easily put down by the Japanese forces.

It was the KMT bearing the brunt of the Japanese attacks.

I still am quite horrified by the photos and historical footage of the summary execution of Communists and those suspected to be their sympathisers. Thousands were rounded up in cities like Shanghai and never saw the light of day again. In the light of these massacres, the survival and growth of the CCP was indeed miraculous.
Yeah, Jiang's Blueshirts were terrible. Jiang was obsessed with exterminating the Communists, and he seemed to realize earlier than most just how dangerous they were.

In the ensuing internal struggle Mao gained the initiative over his more conventionally Marxist colleagues and must be credited with the strategic success in both eluding the encircling KMT forces via the historic Long March and the resurrection of the PLA as a major military force (of course with the help of trusted committed lieutenants like Chu Teh and Chou En-lai).
Which would all be more naught had the Japanese not invaded. Jiang's forces were in the midst of another extermination campaign against Yenan when the Japanese poured across the Great Wall. I blame the fact of Communist rule in China solely on the Japanese.
 
Originally posted by XIII
Jiang had lost most of his best divisions in the defence of Shanghai and the lower Yangzi. One reason why the Japanese troops engaged in the massacre that was the Rape of Nanjing was pure frustration over the harder-than-expected resistance put up by the Chinese earlier. IMO, he simply had no way to defend against the better-trained, better-equipped and better-led Japanese forces pouring into China. A strategic retreat was required - trading space for time.
Fair enough as it goes but this was quite inconsistent with his decision to stake his best in Shanghai to start with, given that the Japanese were certainly vastly superior in military technology and discipline. In any case, Chiang (I'll continue to use the old Wade-Giles transliteration for older names) himself must be held responsible for the poor quality of KMT military leadership as he was well-known for surrounding himself with "yes-men", favouring loyalty above competence.

See how well the Americans and Europeans did in SE Asia; despite the fact that the Japanese forces sent there only numbered a small fraction of the forces engaged in the China campaign.
This could readily be accounted for by land size and geography. The SE Asian countries were smaller and those easily reached by sea such as islands (in the Indonesian and Philippines archipalagos and famously Singapore) and peninsulas (Malaya, Thailand, Indochina) were easily taken. Which is equivalent to what happened in China with the conquest of the coastal strip and plains all the way from Manchuria to the old Canton. It was the vastness of the Chinese landmass and its difficult hinterland terrain that provided the barrier and aided the defence of both KMT and CCP forces.

Mao's faction put up some fight, but most of the time, they're spending their time reorganizing and guerilla warfare (which barely affected the Japanese much, in terms of the overall war). Their only conventional 'Hundred Regiments Offensive' campaign was easily put down by the Japanese forces.

It was the KMT bearing the brunt of the Japanese attacks.
I have to disagree here. Given the technological edge of the Japanese, guerilla warfare was the superior strategy. The CCP guerilla harrassment of the Japanese was more widespread and intensive than implied above. To give a quaint analogy if there are sufficient ants biting at different parts of the body, the larger human would stop in his tracks to get rid of the painful nuisance. The guerillas did in fact distract the Japanese from a more coordinated attack elsewhere eg Chongqing, which bore the brunt of aerial bombardment just because it was a conventional target on held territory.

Which would all be more naught had the Japanese not invaded. Jiang's forces were in the midst of another extermination campaign against Yenan when the Japanese poured across the Great Wall. I blame the fact of Communist rule in China solely on the Japanese.
Things are always more complex in fact. I would say that the mooted Japanese factor is irrelevant in the long run. There is overwhelming evidence for the impossible political state of affairs of Chiang and the KMT. No less a hands-on observer than General Joseph Sillwell, the first US military advisor to China, had these to say about Chiang and his policies:

"The military crisis is a result of breakdown in principle, policy and administration. Inflation, corruption and starvation were endemic. The architect of the 'manure-pile' was Chiang".
---
"I judge the KMT and CCP by what I saw:

KMT: corruption, neglect, chaos, economy, taxes, words and deeds. Hoarding, black market, trading with enemy.

CCP programme: reduce taxes, rents, interest. Raise production, and standard of living. Participate in government. Practise what they preach".
---
"He (Chiang) is bewildered by the spread of Communist influence. He can't see that the mass of Chinese people welcome the Reds as being the only visible hope of relief from crushing taxation, the abuses of the Army and (the terror of) Tai Li's Gestapo. Under Chiang they now begin to see what they may expect. Greed, corruption, favouritism, more taxes, a ruined currency, terrible waste of life, callous disregard of all the rights of men."
 
Let's look at the records instead of just the policies Sillwell saw then.

Chiang - lead Taiwan on to become one of Asia's most powerful and stable economies.

Mao - starved 60,000,000 Chinese and destroyed China.

Hmm.
 
Mao also had a love of... errr... to put it delicately "deflowering" young girls, if ya know what i mean
 
Originally posted by rmsharpe
Let's look at the records instead of just the policies Sillwell saw then.

Chiang - lead Taiwan on to become one of Asia's most powerful and stable economies.

Mao - starved 60,000,000 Chinese and destroyed China.

Hmm.
Pure hype! :rolleyes:
Extremely selective statements without any informed supporting evidence at all. Let's see some, so that there can be some informed and useful discussion! :cool:
 
Originally posted by rmsharpe
Chiang - lead Taiwan on to become one of Asia's most powerful and stable economies.
As a dictator. Life as a democrat under Jiang's regime wasn't all that cool. Just ask Taiwan's president today.

Mao - starved 60,000,000 Chinese and destroyed China.
Like I always said, Mao is a great revolutionary but an idiotic administrator. That said, he didn't do it intentionally; more like a result of idiotic state 'planning'.

'Sides, no one knows the figure. I don't think it's that many myself.
 
Originally posted by Achinz
Fair enough as it goes but this was quite inconsistent with his decision to stake his best in Shanghai to start with, given that the Japanese were certainly vastly superior in military technology and discipline.
I'm not too conversant with that part of the Sino-Japanese war, so can't really comment on it. But I think to appease his Shanghai supporters (the business people) and also succour national support, he'd have to put up a show of resisting at least. 'Sides, I think he was caught off-guard - the Japanese were attacking thru the Great Wall at that time, and they were also landing their forces in Shanghai thru amphibious operations. The KMT military wasn't exactly a fully professional Western-style force.

In any case, Chiang (I'll continue to use the old Wade-Giles transliteration for older names) himself must be held responsible for the poor quality of KMT military leadership as he was well-known for surrounding himself with "yes-men", favouring loyalty above competence.
I don't think he has much of a choice - as his forces crept northwards during the Northern Campaign, they absorbed defeated 'warlord' forces and their commanders per se.

Of course he shld have installed a better, more professional military leadership. In fact, he was doing exactly that in the 30s - with help from... Germany (of all nations - the rest didn't want to help IIRC). The Japanese put an end to that with their invasion.

Fr the end of the Northern Campaign in 1927-28 to the full Japanese invasion in 1937 was only a decade or so. Sufficient for the KMT to fully modernize their military? Particularly when they're engaged in extermination campaigns against the Communists as well as busy with other stuff (like economic development etc).

This could readily be accounted for by land size and geography. The SE Asian countries were smaller and those easily reached by sea such as islands (in the Indonesian and Philippines archipalagos and famously Singapore) and peninsulas (Malaya, Thailand, Indochina) were easily taken. Which is equivalent to what happened in China with the conquest of the coastal strip and plains all the way from Manchuria to the old Canton. It was the vastness of the Chinese landmass and its difficult hinterland terrain that provided the barrier and aided the defence of both KMT and CCP forces.
Perhaps. But the British and US forces in particular shld have performed better... considering their vastly superior std compared with the threadbare KMT forces.

I have to disagree here. Given the technological edge of the Japanese, guerilla warfare was the superior strategy. The CCP guerilla harrassment of the Japanese was more widespread and intensive than implied above. To give a quaint analogy if there are sufficient ants biting at different parts of the body, the larger human would stop in his tracks to get rid of the painful nuisance.
The Japanese could absorb that; with their burn all, kill all campaigns across N China. Unlike a Western nation, they had no qualms about bleeding themselves holding on to the N Chinese plains and killing and destroying whole villages in reprisal.

I'll stand by my notion that the Communists didn't impact the IJA all that much in N China - except for holding down large numbers of Japanese troops maybe.

The guerillas did in fact distract the Japanese from a more coordinated attack elsewhere eg Chongqing, which bore the brunt of aerial bombardment just because it was a conventional target on held territory.
I think the KMT forces in the middle Yangzi were a greater barrier to the Japanese advancing on Chongqing than what the guerillas did further north. In fact, these forces managed to counterattack (under heavy US pressure to act), at least once before the operation ran out of steam and was roll-backed by the Japanese.

Things are always more complex in fact. I would say that the mooted Japanese factor is irrelevant in the long run. There is overwhelming evidence for the impossible political state of affairs of Chiang and the KMT. No less a hands-on observer than General Joseph Sillwell, the first US military advisor to China, had these to say about Chiang and his policies:
He was seeing the KMT as at Chongqing when irresistible rot had already set in.

The KMT China as administered fr Nanjing was a different creature altogether. Granted it was still oppressive - Jiang being the Chinese mini-equavalent of Hitler and Stalin but there was hope for the future. The KMT had managed to get most of the Western powers to quash their 'unequal' treaties with the Chinese, and were improving on their tax base and economic development, esp in their Lower Yangzi base.

Given time, it would have come out to more. Witness the development of Taiwan, with the KMT having no distractions (they had nothing else to do in any case). ;)
 
Originally posted by XIII
Perhaps. But the British and US forces in particular shld have performed better... considering their vastly superior std compared with the threadbare KMT forces.
Sure. They learnt a major lesson through their underestimation of the Japanese lulled by their racist beliefs! The silver lining perhaps from the colonised people's viewpoint?

The Japanese could absorb that; with their burn all, kill all campaigns across N China. Unlike a Western nation, they had no qualms about bleeding themselves holding on to the N Chinese plains and killing and destroying whole villages in reprisal.
And this had the effect of driving the masses to the guerilla cause, greatly swelling both the numbers and the will to desperately fight the brutal Japanese. It greatly increased the momentum of CCP guerilla war behind enemy lines.

I'll stand by my notion that the Communists didn't impact the IJA all that much in N China - except for holding down large numbers of Japanese troops maybe.
For a start I'd consider "holding down large numbers of the J troops" as a significant achievement in the prosecution of the war. I reiterate the fact that the CCP guerilla resistance was more committed and widespread than acknowledged. Besides the 8th Route Army in the north with Mao, there was also the New 4th Army with leaders such as Chen Yi, whom Mao ordered to operate behind enemy lines all the way from Nanjing to the eastern coast.

I think the KMT forces in the middle Yangzi were a greater barrier to the Japanese advancing on Chongqing than what the guerillas did further north. In fact, these forces managed to counterattack (under heavy US pressure to act), at least once before the operation ran out of steam and was roll-backed by the Japanese.
See above about the presence and activity of the New 4th Army. In fact the duplicity and ambiguity of Chiang relating to the temporary coalition with the CCP was belied by the treacherous attack by his troops on the New 4th Army in the area, decimating the CCP forces. It is testimony to the saying attributed to him that "The Japanese is a skin disease; the Communists are a disease of the heart".

The KMT China as administered fr Nanjing was a different creature altogether. Granted it was still oppressive - Jiang being the Chinese mini-equavalent of Hitler and Stalin but there was hope for the future. The KMT had managed to get most of the Western powers to quash their 'unequal' treaties with the Chinese, and were improving on their tax base and economic development, esp in their Lower Yangzi base.

I would say that the rot had set in for Chiang and the KMT well before the Chongqing sojourn. The autocratic dictatorship style of Chiang was fixed very early in his ascendency. My low opinion of his abilities are echoed by his contemporaries, local and foreign:

He was said to be incorruptible "but only because he had everything, unlimited budget, a fleet of limousines, the best house wherever he went, and the Anericans gave him a private plane."

He was no strategist. American officers said of him, "He's a sucker for a feint".
"He still speaks of a National Revolution but the fact that the Revolution involved the will of the people escaped him. Chiang relied not on the emotion of the peasant masses but on an army and its guns."

He was a poor administrator: "He controlled all the massive misery in the countryside by the loyalty of the landlords and warded off pressure from America with promises of reform".

Given time, it would have come out to more. Witness the development of Taiwan, with the KMT having no distractions (they had nothing else to do in any case).
Thanks to lots of aid from Uncle Sam and a much reduced scale of operation - smaller island and population to control. But didn't the repression and autocratic style not continue - Mandarin over the Taiwanese dialect, jobs for the boys? ;)
 
Originally posted by Achinz
And this had the effect of driving the masses to the guerilla cause, greatly swelling both the numbers and the will to desperately fight the brutal Japanese. It greatly increased the momentum of CCP guerilla war behind enemy lines.
Perhaps. But I am not that conversant with this part of Chinese history so I can't really say either. The Communists like to paint this picture though.

For a start I'd consider "holding down large numbers of the J troops" as a significant achievement in the prosecution of the war.
It didn't work with the IJA. The Japanese could afford to field millions of troops in China, who lived off the occupied lands; thus needing low maintenance fr the homeland.

See above about the presence and activity of the New 4th Army. In fact the duplicity and ambiguity of Chiang relating to the temporary coalition with the CCP was belied by the treacherous attack by his troops on the New 4th Army in the area, decimating the CCP forces. It is testimony to the saying attributed to him that "The Japanese is a skin disease; the Communists are a disease of the heart".
He really disliked the Communists. Probably because of his military training in the Soviet Union?

I would say that the rot had set in for Chiang and the KMT well before the Chongqing sojourn. The autocratic dictatorship style of Chiang was fixed very early in his ascendency. My low opinion of his abilities are echoed by his contemporaries, local and foreign:

He was said to be incorruptible "but only because he had everything, unlimited budget, a fleet of limousines, the best house wherever he went, and the Anericans gave him a private plane."

He was no strategist. American officers said of him, "He's a sucker for a feint".
"He still speaks of a National Revolution but the fact that the Revolution involved the will of the people escaped him. Chiang relied not on the emotion of the peasant masses but on an army and its guns."

He was a poor administrator: "He controlled all the massive misery in the countryside by the loyalty of the landlords and warded off pressure from America with promises of reform".

Thanks to lots of aid from Uncle Sam and a much reduced scale of operation - smaller island and population to control. But didn't the repression and autocratic style not continue - Mandarin over the Taiwanese dialect, jobs for the boys? ;)
No dispute there. Jiang was no angel, and neither was Mao.
 
Originally posted by Achinz
He was said to be incorruptible "but only because he had everything, unlimited budget, a fleet of limousines, the best house wherever he went, and the Anericans gave him a private plane."
Yet, he's not corrupt, compared with the likes of many in the region.

I had not heard of his descendants in Taiwan holding on to great wealth despite his long long years in power - compared with the likes of the Suharto clan in Indonesia, the various military generals in Thailand, the Marcos in the Philippines etc. ;)
 
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