Although committed to the original strategy of eliminating the feudal order in rural India, they parted ways on the question of tactics - one group of followers deciding to lay stress on the parliamentary path of elections (e.g. the Liberation group of the CPI - M-L, concentrated in Bihar), and the others preferring to go back to the path of guerilla warfare, like the PWG - People's War Group - in Andhra Pradesh, and MCC - Maoist Communist Centre - in Bihar. During the last two decades since the 1980s, these two different streams of the Naxalite movement drifted along with their respective tactics – often fighting among themselves.
But during this period, it is these armed groups which have emerged as the main challenge to the Indian state. They have also expanded their area of operations (from their old pockets in West Bengal, Bihar and Andhra Pradesh in the 1970s) to new guerilla zones in other states like Orissa, Maharashtra, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh in the new millennium. Their main support base in these states are the poorest and the most deprived classes – the landless and tribal people who are ousted from their homes by up-coming industrial projects, are being denied access to their traditional forest resources, regularly exploited by landowners and money lenders and persecuted by the police, and who continue to suffer from non-availability of education and health facilities in their far-flung and inaccessible villages.
Apart from expanding their guerilla zones within India, the PWG, MCC and other smaller armed Communist groups have been able to build a network with similar Communist revolutionary organizations in the neighbouring states of Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Bhutan and Nepal under the banner of the Coordination Committee of Maoist Parties and Organizations of South Asia. Their representatives met in a guerilla zone in eastern India in July 2003, to chalk out future strategy of coordination of their activities. All these South Asian Maoist parties are also members of a larger international organization called the Revolutionary Internationalist Movement.
It should be pointed out however that despite their survival for almost four decades, the Naxalites do not yet control any large area comparable to the `liberated zone' that the Chinese Communists could establish in Yenan within a decade or so in the 1930-40 period, or the sizable tract that the Maoists occupy in neighbouring Nepal today. They have not been able to reach out to the masses of the peasantry in the vast countryside of other parts of India, and have expanded only to a few isolated pockets and stretches of areas inhabited mainly by tribal and landless poor. Closeted in their rural underground shelters, the Naxalite leaders have ignored the task of setting up bases among the large number of workers both in the organized industrial and the unorganized sectors. They have also failed to build up a regular army like the Chinese People's Liberation Army, or the Vietnamese military organization – that helped both the Chinese and the Vietnamese to effectively fight their enemies.
These shortcomings have both crippled and distorted the character of the Naxalite movement. The failure to establish a `liberated zone' has frustrated their original strategy of setting up an alternative order to bring about agrarian and social reforms. Instead, all their energies are now devoted to defensive actions to preserve their pockets of influence, and offensive assaults which are degenerating into acts of terrorism against soft targets like village headmen or junior government employees.