Spain, Suchet, and the lessons learned

[insurgent]

The nature of the campaign was a divergence from what we had come to expect. There was no experience upon which to plan a campaign. . . . The armed and disciplined enemy army sustained with steady constancy a national struggle against French armies on fields of battle and especially in besieged towns. But the greater part of the population, sometimes without any distinction of age or sex, embarked in that active and obstinate species of contest which brought enemies upon us in all directions and exhausted us far more than regular engagements.
- Marshal Louis-Gabriel Suchet, in his memoirs on the war in Spain

It was a fateful decision when this nation was chosen as the destination of the next campaign. It was a hostile territory to any conventional army, a barren landscape with scattered forests, and occasionally rough and hilly terrain. It was unsuitable for large strategic manoeuvres, and the supply lines were stretched far over land. This war was nothing like the other wars of this, the strongest army in the world. Suddenly the army was given the task of handling a hostile population, fighting guerrillas roaming the countryside, fighting gangs of robbers attacking supply lines, and fighting conventional troops either supporting the guerrillas or sometimes even appearing for full-scale battle.

Today, this is not an unusual situation for a large conventional force to find itself involved in. Neither is it a new one, it could be seen when the Romans attacked Germany, when the French attacked Tyrol and Calabria, when the Germans fought partisans in Russia, when the Americans intervened in Vietnam, the Russians in Afghanistan, and the list could go on. So far, we do not seem to have found any “solution” to this problem, and to this date, a guerrilla war in a hostile remote country is the terror of many or most conventional armed forces. To find another, and perhaps more interesting example of this warfare, and more significantly of how to fight it, we should look at the origin of the word guerrilla. It is Spanish and literally means “little war”.
The word originated in the French wars on the Iberian peninsula from October 1807 till the end of Napoleon after The Russian Campaign in 1814. These wars were to be known as some of the most brutal and bitter fighting of the Napoleonic Wars with French forces fighting far away from home in a country nothing like the fertile lands of Germany and Italy they were used to.

Napoleon used to boast that 20,000 troops could find food for themselves in a desert, and it remained a doctrine of the French and many other armies of the Napoleonic Wars that armies should support themselves through confiscating, foraging, in the territories they fought. This had worked well for the French troops when fighting in the fertile Po valley or the rich fields of southern Germany – but the situation was entirely different in Spain. Spain consisted of large hilly plateaus, sunny desert-like plains, and mountains, as unwelcoming as possible. Furthermore, the practice of foraging in enemy territory did, as could be expected, spark hostility among the natives. In Spain, where the locals were already living in poverty and in conditions close to starvation, this became a huge problem.

The War

By 1807, Napoleon dominated the continent. The Austrians had been defeated at Ulm and Austerlitz in 1805 in two of the most stunning victories of military history. In the ensuing war with Prussia, Napoleon and his perhaps most able marshal, Davout, had finished off the Prussians at Jena and Auerstedt in 1806. After defeating the Russians in Eastern Prussia at Friedland in 1807, Napoleon stood left uncontested on the continent. But one foe remained. This was the British.
The British had since the start of the revolutionary wars been the most stubborn and tenacious enemy. The French had intended an invasion of Ireland as early as 1796, and Napoleon had contemplated invading the British mainland many times until the disaster at Trafalgar in 1805, where the bulk of the French navy was irreparably destroyed.
Napoleon had consequently decided to try and starve the British to subjection by means of the Continental Blockade. This was an attempt to close all the ports of continental Europe from British shipping. For this to be effective, which it never was, all ports of continental would have to be under Napoleon’s control, directly or indirectly.
The only exceptions to this rule by the time were Denmark and Portugal.
Denmark, Sweden, and Russia had had an armed union of neutrality to enforce the independence of their shipping, but this was destroyed by a British attack on Copenhagen in 1801, and when the British returned in August 1807 and besieged and bombed an undefended Copenhagen killing thousands of civilians, the Danes had been pushed into the arms of Napoleon. Consequently only Portugal had to be forced into submission.
To accomplish this, Napoleon saw an opportunity to kill two birds with one stone: Spain had been an ally of France for a long time, and that had kept French forces out of Spain, and French influence at bay. The blockade of Britain had therefore not been taken as seriously in Spain, as Napoleon had hoped for, and an invasion of Portugal through Spain would allow the French to place troops in the country, while at the same time ending the “Portuguese problem”.

French troops in Spain

So, in October 1807, Napoleon sent a force of 25,000 French commanded by marshal Junot into Spain, and he reached Lisbon uncontested on the 1st of December. The supply line of Junot was long and stretched all the way back through the friendly Spain and into France. This did not remain so for long, however. Napoleon had intervened unwisely in some complicated affairs of the Spanish royal family, and soon Spain turned hostile. To “relieve” the French in Portugal, Napoleon sent an army of 82,000 men into Spain under command of Murat. Murat occupied large parts of the country, and moved into Madrid in March 1808.
The French had already now antagonised the Spanish population which rose against the French in Madrid in May and all over the countryside, as urged to by the Spanish nobility and clergy bacause of the abovementioned French meddling in the affairs of the royal family. The French army was successful against these initial uprisings, and fought well against the Spanish regulars who faced them, but with the people against them, the French were unable to secure their supply lines and rear guards. This meant that large contingencies had to be left along their path to occupy the roads, and fortresses.
The French consequently got stuck in a siege of Saragossa, were repelled at Valencia, and 18,000 French were forced to surrender at Bailén. The situation was chaotic, and the British soon decided to intervene. 15,000 British troops landed in Portugal on 1 August under the leadership of Sir Arthur Wellesley – the later duke of Wellington and nemesis of Napoleon at Waterloo in 1815 – and defeated the French at Vimeiro on the 21st of August. After Vimeiro, all the French captured were sent back to France by the British in the absence of Wellesley.
After much fighting and spectacular French failures, Napoleon decided to go to Spain himself, and finish of the enemy. He brought with him forces to raise the total strength to more than 300,000. He defeated the Spanish army, marched into Madrid, then defeated the British, who evacuated and left through Coruña. He then considered the war to be over, and left again for Austria, taking large forces with him. Spain was now formally under the control of Napoleon’s brother, King Joseph.
But the British soon returned, again under the command of Wellesley, together with British trained Portuguese, Germans, and other nationalities. Assisted by the British and remnants of the Spanish regular forces, the guerrillas were able to harass the French disastrously. Wellesley was able to secure Portugal, and fortified himself at Lisbon. Again, and again, French onslaughts on Portugal and Lisbon had to be abandoned.

French troops executing Spanish civilians. Painting by Goya - "May the Third" from 1814.

The French let the civilian population suffer from the French frustrations and anger, and resorted to mass murder, extensive plundering and raping. The Spanish reacted, as could be expected, by attacking the French more and more Frequently. This soon became a downwards spiral, and the French lost control of larger and larger parts of the country. Several times, the British, in cooperation with the Portuguese and remaining Spanish regulars attempted to first secure Portugal, then march into Spain. But they were unable to do that, as the French forces were still formidable in conventional battle.
The French suffered from many serious problems with their leadership: Napoleon never returned after 1809, but he still tried to command the troops and lead the administration from Paris. This gave much confusion, since the formal ruler of Spain was King Joseph, who did not have much to say against the marshals of France, and in fact did not seem to be interested in the affairs of his kingdom. The marshals themselves couldn’t agree, and as the only one with authority over them was Napoleon, the leadership wasn’t as dynamic, as the French staff organisation was known for.
Many separate offensives were launched by the marshals, and they each fought their own separate wars, in their own provinces against the civilians. That was another mistake in the leadership of the French. The army corps had each been assigned a province or territory to rule. This meant that there was virtually no unity of effort. Each force was relatively small and could not call on the other formations, as they would be busy too. Therefore, out of a force of more than 200,000 troops, the French were only able to mobilise about 60,000 for battle.

French troops strung up on a tree to die. Painting by Goya from his "Disasters of War" series.

 

[insurgent]

The talented Suchet

Louis-Gabriel Suchet, Marchal de France.

"This is difficult to say, but it seems to me that it is Suchet..."
- Napoleon, when asked which of his commanders was the best.

One of the abovementioned marshals was a talented cavalry officer by the name of Louis-Gabriel Suchet. He had fought with valour at Toulon together with Napoleon, earning his trust. Throughout his early career Suchet was an outspoken opponent of Napoleon’s politics and efforts to take over the leadership of France, but he had also been an admirer of Napoleon’s warfare. These factors meant that he had been ignored at promotions several times, but he at last is promoted to the title of marshal in 1811. Before this, he had fought under marshal Massena, another one of Napoleon’s most talented officers, in the victorious campaigns in Italy. Suchet was given command of a division under marshal Mortier in the siege of Saragossa. There he was confronted with the brutal reality of guerrilla warfare, as his division was assigned with defending the supply lines of the corps.
Suchet received command of III Corps in Aragon – a land-locked region in north-eastern part of Spain around Saragossa. III Corps had suffered much in the war, and was in a terrible condition. His forces were demoralised, poor, and hungry. They were fighting then fighting a bitter war against local guerrillas and Spanish regulars in the region. Much as a consequence of this, Suchet lost a battle against the Spanish forces at Alcaniz. Suchet immediately set out to change this – he secured supplies for his corps, imposed extra, but organised, taxes on the local population. He reformed the leadership, and forced his officers and troops to act with dignity and discipline. He then marched out to defeat the Spanish regulars and did so quite spectacularly at the battles of Belchite and Maria.
After doing this, the province had been secured, and he now turned his attention on fighting the guerrillas and the administration.
The French approach to fighting the partisans had been much similar to that of Germany in Russia during WWII, where entire villages were executed and burned to the ground because of a few resident partisans. Suchet called an end to this. The French investigated as police would have, and apprehended the partisans. The partisans were then handed over to the local juntas – a kind of local executive council in rural areas of Spain. The juntas and local authorities were then given the task of punishing the partisans. This gave the locals a feeling that they were given a say.
Another step that Suchet took was to restore a separate civilian authority, instead of letting the French troops run the administration, as was usually done. He let the local noblemen, and commons run the administration, and even let the Spanish themselves tax the people. The Spanish police was even restored to hunt down criminals and partisans by themselves.
All this gave the Spanish a feeling of independence, and they began tolerating the French, although it was not a warm relationship. The locals faced that if they paid the taxes to support the soldiers, then the soldiers would not go foraging in the local provisions. This atmosphere of co-existence even reached a point, where local villages persecuted and fought the guerrillas by themselves.
Suchet still saw that a fundamental problem was the repeating incidents of violent episodes between the Spanish and French occupiers, and to end this, he punished his troops for their crimes, and forced them to treat the locals with respect. But perhaps more significantly, he sought complete segregation between the French troops and the locals. He knew that contact between them would inevitably lead to undesirable episodes. So he made the troops build their own cantonments outside the towns, instead of living in local homes and domains as was common then.
After these actions, the guerrilla activities slowly ceased. French troops could now march alone again without being stabbed, kicked, killed, or kidnapped and tortured. This accomplishment was acknowledged by the leadership in Paris, and he was given the task of subduing the neighbouring provinces of Valencia and Catalonia. But he did not receive additional resources or troops, and was forced to spread his troops thinner. And there were other problems. The French war in Spain was turning in the British favour, encouraging guerrillas to step up activities. Catalonia and Valencia both were coastal provinces and as such were more vulnerable to British influence, as it was easier for the British to assist the local guerrillas. But Suchet gave it a shot, and attempted to repeat his success in Aragon. He started by defeating the local Spanish forces, even though his army was over-stretched by this time, and he continued to implement his reforms.

As the war was turning in Spain, the French forces retreated further and further back, and were forced to retreat behind the Ebro River. But they were defeated by an army under Wellesley on the 21st of June 1813 at Vitoria. After this defeat, marshal Soult was made commander of all French forces in Spain, except those under Suchet’s command. Suchet withdrew from his provinces to Barcelona, to unite with other French armies, and retreat into France. Suchet had by then been proclaimed governor of Valencia.
Soult had made a last stand at the Nivelle river in France, but he was defeated on December 10th, and Wellesley captured Toulouse in France on April 10th 1814.
As French troops had retreated across Aragon, and Allied victories became more frequent, the situation in Aragon erupted into violence again. The French troops, who had been fighting the partisans all over the country in a very brutal manner abused the locals of Aragon, as much as they had abused other Spaniards. With these forces came the uncontrolled foraging again, the confiscation and intrusion of privacy, and all the things that Suchet had tried to cope with in his own forces.

The lessons learned

On the overall level, the French were unsuccessful in fighting the guerrillas and displayed the pattern seen many times since, when large conventional forces are sent into such remote and hostile territory. Keeping in mind how poor the possibilities were for supplying large armies away from home, this was a great distance away. In Spain, the guerrillas showed their efficiency and ability to exploit the weaknesses of such large conventional forces – especially when reinforced by contingencies of regular troops, foreign as well as national.
The Napoleonic armies were desperately unable to fight these guerrillas, and the constant small-scale low intensity fighting was tough on the French troops. Their reaction was to be expected, as they got an outlet from their frustrations by killing, pillaging, and destroying, prompting further guerrilla activities. The French problems were also derived from some very basic mistakes in their warfare. First of all, they did not have unity in command. Second, they scattered their troops, and made them unable to do what they did best – fight large-scale engagements with the enemy. Third, they did not make any serious attempts to legitimise their presence in Spain, or why Joseph was now to be king. Fourth, they did not understand, how this theatre of war was fundamentally different from what they used to fight in.
This, as it would later be said, became the bleeding wound in mighty France.
Suchet is the obvious exception. He has taught us much, and many lessons of his have been employed later. For instance, the effect of letting the locals into the administration had a similar effect when the British did it in India. Much more attention should be paid to his accomplishment – if the local population is treated with at least some respect, then it is possible to pacify the partisans. If the locals are involved in the government of the area, then there is a much better chance that they will respect the authority of the occupiers. Some fundamental problems were still inherent. For instance, the legitimacy of the French troops in Spain was, as mentioned, fundamentally accepted. This means that the mutual tolerance in the Aragon province could not have lasted forever. Sooner or later, as the locals gained power in the administration, they would have tried to get rid of the French.
Many parallels to the situation in Spain exist today, and most don’t even need mention. And the lessons of Suchet have been employed in one form or another in many of those areas.

 

[insurgent]

I wrote this article on another forum in July 2003, I just dug it up to get into the "History Articles" sticky... I won't try to find the sources I used on the internet, and my literature on the subject is in Danish, so I won't provide a bibliography.

 

[dgfred]

Interesting stuff , I know little of this situation and enjoyed the
reading . Maybe we should apply Suchet's knowledge to our campaign
in Iraq . Looking (lurking) for more from you in the near
future .

 

[mrtn]

An interesting read.

 

[yaroslav]

:b: Very insteresting

Although a bit nationalist, there is a small idea: explain more of Bailén.... I believe it was the first defeat of the Napoleonic Imperial French Army

 

[privatehudson]

In furtherance of your points if I may, and in defence of Wellington's reputation I would add that the peace agreed after Vimerio was not his idea or intention and he was overuled by two other commanders senior to him who arrived after he had landed. Both of these were reprimanded for their stupidity and Wellington came out of the campaign reputation entirely intact due to his victory. The period between Wellington leaving and returning also saw one other fine British commander take the field at Corunna, Moore who conducted a skillful retreat in the face of overwhelming French numbers to get there.

Suchet is one of the more underated Marshals, usually because of his relatively low profile compared to Lannes, Ney or Davout, however I would not personally rate him the highest of all as a military man. Perhaps his lack of high-profile commands means that his battlefield experience on large engagements never was really shown to the full, so we'll never know, but militarily my vote rests with Davout.

Anyway, not corrections, your article was well written and kind of halts one I had half a mind to write about the Penninsula wars and the problems the Marshals ran into there, so well done

Edit: Yaroslav, you're wrong on it being the first defeat of the French, the British defeated the French at Madia in 1806, though the scale was much smaller of course. Bailen was mostly lost because Dupont's inexperienced troops were cut off and surrounded without water and forced to attempt a fighting retreat which they failed to pull off. They then surrendered.

 

[insurgent]

Thanks, folks!

yaroslav: Nah, I won't be revising this article - it's been too long time since I wrote it. I merely posted it here to get into the history articles sticky...

privatehudson: Yeah, I'd say Davout was probably the most talented. Particularly his conduct at Auerstedt showed his abilities. And Massena and Lannes would be my choices then. But the fact remains, that it seems Napoleon appreciated Suchet the most.
I know Napoleon was a little envious at Davout after Jena-Auerstedt and tried to downplay Davout's accomplishments, and indeed in 1815, Davout was left in Paris during the Waterloo campaign. Instead of having this, one of his most able commanders with him, he chooses the hotheaded and impulsive Ney and the unexperienced Grouchy to command his flanks (IIRC). Davout it stuck in Paris trying to raise a second army, which he in fact does to Napoleon's satisfaction. Lannes was killed at Aspern-Essling (right?), and Massena - what became of him? But Massena wasn't at Waterloo either, and Suchet was given command of the troops in Switzerland, I think, proving his abilities once again on this secondary theatre against the Austrians.

 

[privatehudson]

I could write a small post on Bailen later if you want based on a book I have on the French Marshals in the penninsula

Massena was disgraced after looting in the Penninsula and loosing Busaco and Fuentes de Onoro, he returned to france but never held another command. I would further point to Marmont as an extremely talented Marshal alongside the others who showed his worth against Wellington in the Penninsula amongst other areas. Davout though consistently fought well throughout the wars and had a deep care for the men under his command unlike other Marshals. With him on the right and say Soult on the left in 1815...

Talking of soult he deserves a mention for his strategical ability which he used to the full in the Penninsula. I would though say that both Ney and Grouchy are hard done by in traditional literature about the 1815 campaign, their reputation takes a battering as they unfairly get the blame for Napoleon's mistakes. If you take a glance at here I went into some detail about this and tried to adress the common image that Grouchy and Ney lost the campaign

Davout was also in Paris to guard against any coup against Napoleon during that period. As one of the few Marshals to not co-operate with the Royalists he was trusted quite a lot by Napoleon unlike Ney and Soult. Lannes was indeed killed when a cannon ball struck his leg at Aspern-Essling, and despite Larrey operating on him to amputate he died soon afterwards, depressing Napoleon considerably. This is one of the reasons we must take what Napoleon says about others with a pinch of salt, because he also declared Lannes to be his best Marshal and IIRC the only one he considered a friend. He praised Wellington early in the peninsuala, but later in Belgium lambasted him.

 

[dgfred]

Anything on the French Marshalls would be great reading , especially
something done by P H . I'll be lurking, ah looking for it .

 

[privatehudson]

My thing was purely on Bailen... I could write something on the marshals but it would be huge

 

[insurgent]

I could write a small post on Bailen later if you want based on a book I have on the French Marshals in the penninsula

I don't think you need to. It's a little besides my point, but sure, I'd like to read what you have to say about it. Why don't you post an article about it?

Massena was disgraced after looting in the Penninsula and loosing Busaco and Fuentes de Onoro, he returned to france but never held another command. I would further point to Marmont as an extremely talented Marshal alongside the others who showed his worth against Wellington in the Penninsula amongst other areas. Davout though consistently fought well throughout the wars and had a deep care for the men under his command unlike other Marshals. With him on the right and say Soult on the left in 1815...

Yeah, agreed, Marmont deserves mention. Also, his campaign in France after the Russian campaign is admirable. Soult, well, I could accept him. At least he was completely useless as chief of staff during the hundred days. Napoleon could have used Berthier.
My dream team would consist of Davout and a pardoned Massena on the flanks, and Grouchy or (perhaps) Murat to lead the cavalry. Ney and Soult wouldn't quite qualify in my opinion. Suchet should probably tag along - or perhaps he should've been given the Rhine army. He would have done much good there.

Davout was also in Paris to guard against any coup against Napoleon during that period. As one of the few Marshals to not co-operate with the Royalists he was trusted quite a lot by Napoleon unlike Ney and Soult.

I think that's a bad excuse. Napoleon always disliked Davout, facing that Davout was a commander with skills quite comparable to those of himself. I don't think it would be unfair to say that Davout was perhaps even as talented as l'Empereur himself. Napoleon envied that and felt threatened by this commander. 1815 was, as I see it, probably the time in Napoleon's reign where he was the most popular, the least threatened, and at a time when Davout is needed more than ever, he is left in Paris.


BTW, that's an excellent article, ph!

 

[privatehudson]

I don't think you need to. It's a little besides my point, but sure, I'd like to read what you have to say about it. Why don't you post an article about it?

Because I only have 1 source for the battle and I'd have to quote almost word for word from the book That's not an article, and besides it would only be a couple of paragraphs, too short.

Soult, well, I could accept him. At least he was completely useless as chief of staff during the hundred days. Napoleon could have used Berthier.

No he couldn't, Berthier died before the campaign but after Napoleon's return, he wasn't able to use Berthier Soult was useless mainly because he had never served as a staff officer and lacked the experience needed. Napoleon didn't help either, his orders tended to waffle and be vauge on important points, sometimes going off onto something else mid order. Napoleon needed as Chief of Staff someone who understood how to interpret his dictates into a sensible order that left things clear. Berthier could, Soult could not due to lack of experience.

My dream team would consist of Davout and a pardoned Massena on the flanks, and Grouchy or (perhaps) Murat to lead the cavalry. Ney and Soult wouldn't quite qualify in my opinion. Suchet should probably tag along - or perhaps he should've been given the Rhine army. He would have done much good there

The problem with using Murat is that quite rightly, Napoleon did not trust him one bit. Murat's desertion in 1814 hit Napoleon badly and he never forgave him, sending him away without even meeting him in 1815. I chose Soult because he understood Wellington better than Massena IMO and was capable of beating him. However, Ney did well during the hundred days given the situation, as did grouchy, so I find it hard to believe that it would have made a massive difference to the result. IMO the hundred days were lost because of Napoleon's errors and no amount of genius could stop him from screwing things up

I think that's a bad excuse. Napoleon always disliked Davout, facing that Davout was a commander with skills quite comparable to those of himself. I don't think it would be unfair to say that Davout was perhaps even as talented as l'Empereur himself. Napoleon envied that and felt threatened by this commander. 1815 was, as I see it, probably the time in Napoleon's reign where he was the most popular, the least threatened, and at a time when Davout is needed more than ever, he is left in Paris.

Well you say that, but you have to appreciate that there was considerable opposition to Napoleon during 1815, largely because the people and politicians of the country were heartily sick of the wars and dying. His support came almost entirely from the army who had fared the worst during the Bourbon rule. Politics had also changed dramatically, he was reigned in heavily in terms of power and ability to decide things alone during the period and the various factions that opposed him threatened his rule considerably. I don't doubt some of his choice was based on what you say, but he certainly was also affected by needing a solid, trusted man to deal with home affairs. Davout also had considerable experience and a good reputation with dealing with internal politics in the cities and areas he was put in charge of earlier in the wars, so I guess all round best choice.

But yes, I would rate Davout equal if not better than Napleon And thanks for the compliment

 

[insurgent]

Fair point.
I agree that Napoleon is to blame for the defeat in the Hundred Days. Your article made that clear as well.

Yeah, Berthier was dead... doh. Napoleon was growing sick in his mind - he wasn't worth the 40,000 men anymore.

Davout all the way! Still, I think he would have been more useful on the battlefield.
Perhaps we should have an article on him...

 

[privatehudson]

I could probably do that Maybe I could do a series of articles, one on each marshal