Tell of Charles De Gaulle

[innonimatu]

I think with many Americans there is at least something to be said for the fact that if the ally was not falling in line with what we wanted then they can be seen as much hindrance as help.

You have to look at in in context. France had historically had terrible fractures among its "elite", between liberals and conservatives (on several issues: religion monarcy, etc). Other countries, most countries in Europe in fact, suffered civil wars or broke apart due to the same kind of issues. Or broke apart entirely. France, after Napoleon, never went that far. Had several coups but no civil war (unless you consider Thier's repression of the commune a civil war, but it having been restricted to Paris and a short time makes it hard to argue that). Several generals had the opportunity to set themselves up as dictators but didn't take it. Napoleon (III) the one who did do it it, wasn't even a military man.

 

[Dachs]

Several generals had the opportunity to set themselves up as dictators but didn't take it.

And why not?

It's just as easy to argue that this was a flaw, even an intrinsic flaw, of French republicanism - that so many men could come so close to establishing a military dictatorship and not finish the job for a variety of reasons - as it is to argue that it was a strength. I think that when you described France as "lucky" in your earlier post, you were on the money.

 

[Cutlass]

You have to look at in in context. France had historically had terrible fractures among its "elite", between liberals and conservatives (on several issues: religion monarcy, etc). Other countries, most countries in Europe in fact, suffered civil wars or broke apart due to the same kind of issues. Or broke apart entirely. France, after Napoleon, never went that far. Had several coups but no civil war (unless you consider Thier's repression of the commune a civil war, but it having been restricted to Paris and a short time makes it hard to argue that). Several generals had the opportunity to set themselves up as dictators but didn't take it. Napoleon (III) the one who did do it it, wasn't even a military man.

I think that would be something few Americans would know much about. More the issue with de Gaulle was his obstruction of NATO, his disagreements with Ike, both during and after the war, and the extent to which France wanted to maintain empire after the war, even though they clearly weren't that Great Power any longer.

 

[innonimatu]

And why not?

It's just as easy to argue that this was a flaw, even an intrinsic flaw, of French republicanism - that so many men could come so close to establishing a military dictatorship and not finish the job for a variety of reasons - as it is to argue that it was a strength. I think that when you described France as "lucky" in your earlier post, you were on the money.

Why not is a good question indeed. Between the mid-19th and mid-20th century the french republican system produced more opportunities for conflict than the english parliamentarian one, by trying to change more about the country, faster, that the british system did. Yet the french military managed to resist the appeal of "pronunciamientos" that plagued young republics in Iberia, Latin America and later even central Europe after the dismemberment or the Austrian-Hungarian Empire.

That it nearly had one as its colonial empire collapses (with De Gaulle preventing it) was not really extraordinary, other countries also had that kind of trouble with finishing off their colonial empires. What was extraordinary was that century of civilian government. Why it happened, I cannot guess. Was it just luck or did they had some kind of institutional check on the way they trained generals, on what was socially acceptable for a general to do, what ambitions were legitimate?
Did de Gaulle's training made him abhor setting himself up as dictator? Was it a "faux pas" to have that ambition in his social circle? Or was he unique? I dunno.

I think that would be something few Americans would know much about. More the issue with de Gaulle was his obstruction of NATO, his disagreements with Ike, both during and after the war, and the extent to which France wanted to maintain empire after the war, even though they clearly weren't that Great Power any longer.

And he won on most of those clashes too. Which couldn't have done much for his image among most british and american intelligentsia!

 

[Lord Baal]

I think that would be something few Americans would know much about. More the issue with de Gaulle was his obstruction of NATO, his disagreements with Ike, both during and after the war, and the extent to which France wanted to maintain empire after the war, even though they clearly weren't that Great Power any longer.

De Gaulle and Ike actually got along pretty well. It was De Gaulle and the various Democratic Presidents that couldn't stand each other.

Mannerheim, I'm still waiting.

 

[Verbose]

I think with many Americans there is at least something to be said for the fact that if the ally was not falling in line with what we wanted then they can be seen as much hindrance as help.

Unless what the Americans at the time wanted might have been a more or less bad mistake — due to things like relative US ignorance of things like internal French politics, or just military short-sightedness, concern over what the post-war situation might end up like, etc. — in which case the ally preventing the US from making a potentially stupid move was instead actively helpful, even if the US reps might not have understood it at the time.

A lot of de Gaulle locking horns with Roosevelt and Churchill late in the war tended to be over things where the US/UK idea was to go ahead with something out of expediency, and de Gaulle deciding to stand on principle. Since he usually stood on the same principles as Roosevelt and Churchill, when called on the matter, he won pretty much every time this happened. Not that it in any way endeared him to them.

 

[Lord Baal]

Unless what the Americans at the time wanted might have been a more or less bad mistake — due to things like relative US ignorance of things like internal French politics, or just military short-sightedness, concern over what the post-war situation might end up like, etc. — in which case the ally preventing the US from making a potentially stupid move was instead actively helpful, even if the US reps might not have understood it at the time.

A lot of de Gaulle locking horns with Roosevelt and Churchill late in the war tended to be over things where the US/UK idea was to go ahead with something out of expediency, and de Gaulle deciding to stand on principle. Since he usually stood on the same principles as Roosevelt and Churchill, when called on the matter, he won pretty much every time this happened. Not that it in any way endeared him to them.

This is a pretty accurate post. It must be said, though, that the British often agreed with De Gaulle, but were forced to publicly support FDR because they needed the US far more than they needed the FRee French. At one point the British even kept De Gaulle a prisoner in Britain rather than allow him to "run amok" (Churchill's words) in the French territory he controlled; mostly Africa, though the Free French were also governing the Levant by this point. This was out of fear that he'd antagonise the Americans - which he managed to do anyway, with his sneak attack on Vichy's North American territories.

Charles De Gaulle actually got on very well with most of the American generals he met. Eisenhower privately conceded that everything De Gaulle told him was correct - they were discussing Operation: Torch, which De Gaulle was informed of only the day before it occurred, from memory - but was ordered to support Vichyites and make military decisions which he personally believed were foolish due to FDR's micro-management. I believe Eisenhower and Bradley even threatened to relinquish their commands at one point over FDR's micro-managing of military affairs in North Africa. Bradley responded to Darlan's assassination by a Gaullist conspirator - the assassination was never definitively linked to De Gaulle himself, but the Free French were funding the group that carried it out, and De Gaulle certainly seemed happy about it - by saying "well that simplifies things." Only Darlan's death stopped FDR from supporting him, even though the former was still rounding up Jews in Algiers.

 

[Verbose]

This is a pretty accurate post. It must be said, though, that the British often agreed with De Gaulle, but were forced to publicly support FDR because they needed the US far more than they needed the FRee French. At one point the British even kept De Gaulle a prisoner in Britain rather than allow him to "run amok" (Churchill's words) in the French territory he controlled; mostly Africa, though the Free French were also governing the Levant by this point. This was out of fear that he'd antagonise the Americans - which he managed to do anyway, with his sneak attack on Vichy's North American territories.

True about the British. Eden in particular kept de Gaulle in the loop at such times when Churchill had somehow come down on the side of de Gaulle being more or less insane.

Re these "North American territories", that would be early in the war, over St Pierre and Miquelon, the micro-islands off the coast of New Foundland, right?

Afaik that signalled the opening shots in the US govt. campaign against the Free French. De Gaulle had despatched Adm. Muselier and a little task-force on such naval vessels the Free French possessed. The way I have it, specifically Cordell Hull of the State Dept. got very unhappy about this. Not over taking St P and M away from the Vichy (islands used for radio com purposes by the German U-boats), but about the Free French doing it. London at Washington's request then instructed de Gaulle to have his people stand down. De Gaulle acquiesced, on the understanding that the operation was off and there would be no move against St P and M at this point in time.

THEN the US State Dept. asked the Canadian govt. to despatch forces and carry out an outright occupation of the islands. This de Gaulle got wind off, promptly blew his top — since now it was a matter of a foreign power instructed to outright occupy French territory. As a consequence Muselier and his force promplty landed on the islands, removed the Vichy functionaries, and organised a referendum ending with a fairly massive vote that the islands now was part of the Free French territories.

Would Cordell Hull and the US State Dept. accept this? Noooo. They remonstrated to London, and wanted London to force de Gaulle to withdraw his people, at which point the Canadians were still going to go and remove the new Free French administration, by force if need be, and install a Canadian occupation govt. on the islands. At this point apparently London asked what the devil was the American problem here, really? This the State Dept. couldn't quite explain, and so St Pierre and Miquelon remained Free French.

It might have established a precedent for de Gaulle over the value of establishing "facts on the ground" I suppose.

 

[Lord Baal]

It wasn't really the beginning of the FDR administration's issues with De Gaulle - FDR flirted with Vichy from the get-go, and his ambassador to Vichy, Admiral William Leahy, was a firm Petainist, to the point that he was still claiming that Petain was "the only man who can save France" after the Marshal had abandoned France to tag along to Germany with his Nazi masters. But otherwise, yes, that's essentially correct.

Part of it though, is due to De Gaulle's own Anglophobia. He was convinced, with absolutely no evidence, that the British would try and absorb the French colonial empire, in part or in full, during the course of the war. It was for this reason he was so incalcitrant towards the British in the Levant.

 

[Verbose]

Part of it though, is due to De Gaulle's own Anglophobia. He was convinced, with absolutely no evidence, that the British would try and absorb the French colonial empire, in part or in full, during the course of the war. It was for this reason he was so incalcitrant towards the British in the Levant.

Wouldn't quite know how much he worried about the British — initially perhaps, given that after the summer of 1940 there would be bugger all he could do about, should the British try it?

What seems better testified is that the Americans, not least Roosevelt himself, had it in for the French empire — not necessarily just for being French, but since they had it in for the entire phenomenon of colonial empires, the British included.

But that's another aspect of it. From a British WWII perspective the continued maintenance of the French colonial empire also meant better insulation for the British empire.