The Battle of Assal Uttar (The Full Reply) Indo Pak War 1965

[allhailIndia]

I want to try something different with this article, my first one in more than a year or so.

After having done numerous research projects in Law school for the last two years, I have vastly improved y research methodology and perhaps writing skills as well.

What follows here will be a draft of what I will be looking at in this article. I invite those interested to offer some suggestions as to what you want to know about this decisive tank battle in the fields of the Punjab. Over the next couple of days, I shall also try to round up my research on this topic and include the inputs in the final article which will most likely be up on Monday night (IST). So here goes the preliminary draft of The Battle of Asal Uttar: The Fourth Battle of Panipat?

The 1965 War between India and Pakistan arose due to several factors, some of which included the recent drubbing the Indian armed forces recieved at the hands of the Chinese and the infusion of brand new American weapons including the famed Patton Tank and the Sabre Jet into the Pakistani Military. The first part of the article will also look into other political and military factors in Pakistan's decision to launch this war and what they hoped to achieve at the end of it.

The second part of the article will look at the immediate situation before the battle itself and the forces that were deployed on either side. I will also examine the equipment used and examine the reputations they carried, especially the Patton tank, versus the smaller Centurion.

The third part of this article will look at the actual course of the battle, and try to present various views on why this battle turned out as it did. Various reasons, military competency, equipment, terrain, tactics, etc. will also be looked at, along with the opinions of Indian and Pakistani generals' views on the battle as well.

The last part will put the battle in historical perspective and seek to understand the larger implications of the outcome of this battle, especially with relation to the question I have posed in the title, viz. Was it like the other decisive Battles of Panipat, which made or broke ambitions of many a future ruler of India.

I shall also compile a full list of sources for further reference. I hope it sounds interesting and am looking forward to feedback from CFCers on this.

Regards

 

[allhailIndia]

The war of 1965 is probably one of the less well known conflicts of this century, even within the countries that fought it. It did not end in very dramatic circumstances such as the partition of Kashmir (1947) or the creation of Bangladesh (1971). It did not have a huge level of media coverage either, as in the recent Kargil War. Indeed the Indian Army was anything but media friendly, and the Indian Foreign Office also maintained a profound mistrust of most foreign media. However, this War, coming as it did 3 years after the Indian humiliation at Chinese hands in the Himalayas, and a time of great national turmoil, did have implications on the future which I shall try to briefly sum up at the end.

The War itself was not a decisive win for either side. It ended in a stalemate after a Soviet backed ceasefire brought it to an end. Status quo was restored, but some have said that India can claim a marginal victory in light of certain decisive battles, such as Assal Uttar itself and also the fact that the Pakistani Army was better equipped than the Indian Army, and had not had to deal with the trauma of a thrashing at the hands of a superior army. I have in the above paragraphs mentioned a couple of causes for the war, and I shall proceed to try and enumerate the reasons for the break out of the War.

To understand some of the causes that led to the War, we must look back to 1962. The Indian Army, after the liberation of Goa from the Portuguese, was caught on the wrong foot by the Chinese, and some incompetence at the highest levels led to the humiliation at the hands of the Peoples' Liberation Army. The loss of some 50,000 sq.km. to China and the subsequent handing over of a part of that to Pakistan, by China, dented Indian psyche and, it has been speculated, also contributed greatly to Nehru’s death. In a brief digression, I shall proceed to examine why Nehru’s passing is so important in this context.

After Jinnah’s and Gandhi’s death within a few months of each other, one could say that both India and Pakistan were ‘orphaned’ at the death of the respective father’s of the nation. While Pakistan would never again have a leader of the stature of Jinnah to carry out his legacy, India had Nehru. Nehru, the apple of Gandhi’s eye, Nehru, the socialist aristocrat, Nehru, the Colossus of Indian politics. For 14 years Nehru had his way in Indian politics, a democratic dictator if I may use the oxymoron. One would say that democracy survives in India because Nehru, in his 14 years reign, decided it would. His personality towered over everybody else’s and he had his way in most matters. For a more detailed study of Nehru’s impact on Indian political life, I would highly recommend Sashi Tharoor’s book Nehru.

Nehru’s death in 1964 left a huge void, which simply could not be filled by any one person in India at that time. The Congress was still the only ‘national’ party at that time, and the only Opposition came from within the party itself. Party bosses, after 15 years of being under the shadow of Nehru, could not now think of a suitable successor as on one could come to a consensus as to who would be acceptable. Some were too far to the right, others too much to the left, some acceptable to the people, but not the bosses, and others vice versa. Ultimately the mantle fell on the most unassuming, unlikely person of all, Lal Bahadur Shastri. Shastri, a devout Gandhian had been Minister in Nehru’s government, and with his gentle, unassuming demeanour, he was chosen on the sole ground that he offended the fewest number than the other candidates. In hindsight, one can possibly say that he was the regent, a stopgap till the succession continued when the real successor came of age. Who that successor was and how she would come to power will be discussed in a further article, which I promise in the next few weeks.

Pakistan also, on the other hand had been through turmoil. After the death of Jinnah, Parliamentary democracy survived only a few years with few real institutions to guard and protect it, and ultimately the Army, which would play a huge role in this country, till this day, stepped in and Ayub Khan took over as President, in 1961. Dictatorships cannot survive long unless they are based on a cause or a cult of personality. Ayub Khan chose the former. The cause was the ‘liberation of Kashmir’. Kashmir was an emotional issue in Pakistan and a rallying call in times of distress and turmoil. A detailed examination of why and how, is beyond this article, and can only be got through reading several works, which I shall provide in the bibliography at the end.

Thus, on the one hand, you have a compromise candidate, trying to keep a diverse and divisive nation together after the passing of a towering leader, who was a truly national figure. On the other, you have a confident, powerful general, in charge of a seemingly unified, well armed nation, which ought to take what is rightfully belongs to it, Kashmir. This situation also led to the kind of myths that would be shattered by the war. Shastri epitomized the Indian or more specifically the Hindu, to Pakistanis. A vegetarian, Bania (shopkeeper at its crudest), who was a useless article as a soldier, and better at surrendering than fighting. Ayub Khan represented everything Indians found scary about Pakistan. A belligerent, war mongering people, always seeking to humiliate and berate India. In view of these crude stereotypes of each other, Pakistanis would perhaps be justified in believing that one Pakistani soldier was worth four Indian on any given day. Never mind that India also had four times as many soldiers as Pakistan.

On the military front, the causes tie up to the geo-political scene. Pakistan had thrown in its lot with the US and joined up CENTO and SEATO to ‘fight Communism’. Never mind that one of its biggest allies, China was a Communist nation herself. India, following Nehru’s legacy, continued to be part of the Non-Aligned Movement, and refused to join either power bloc. However, Nehru, a dedicated Socialist himself, also had a soft corner for the Soviets and this tainted his ‘non-alignedness’ leading to the accusation that although he was non-aligned, he was more aligned towards some.

Being part of the alliance, Pakistan received some of the latest American equipment and its military benefited from American training. This included the much touted Patton tank, and the renowned Sabre Jet , which had proved its mettle in American conflicts in the last couple of decades. Pakistan has also acquired a squadron of brand new Starfighters, acclaimed to be better than the Sabres as well. Pakistan also had better artillery and radar as compared to India, and also had the only submarine in either of the navies. Also, there was no problem of civilian ‘interference’ in the Pakistani military.

India on the other hand, had to make do with war-surplus Shermans, and the lesser renowned, shall we say, Centurion tanks. Its air force, though larger than Pakistan’s, did not have anything to compare to the Sabres and Starfighters, apart from the brand new Mig-21s. There was no radar coverage of the borders and lookouts and outposts had to be fill the gaps. Although a large part of the senior officer corps in the Indian military had had experience in the erstwhile British Army, the overall morale of the forces had taken a beating after the China debacle. The civilian leadership had allowed a brave, but poorly equipped, badly supplied Army to take a hiding in the cold mountain passes in the some of the highest battlefields in the world.

There are perhaps many more reasons and causes for the actual outbreak of the war, but these, I feel are the most important and have the greatest bearing on the outcome of the war. A well armed, united nation under a strong leadership, against a divisive, poorly equipped, nation, with a culture better known for its traders and priests, with a leadership in severe doubt. I shall next go into the actual course of the battle, and where it fit into the Pakistani master plan, Operation Grand Slam.

 

[allhailIndia]

I found this interesting article on the Internet written by a retired Pakistani Army man, Maj (Retd) Agha Humayun Amin which of all the sources I looked through, seemed least biased and most well researched. The full article discusses the whole war in detail. I have here put the relevant part, since this gives a good background to where and how the actual Battle of Assal Uttar took place. You can check out the full article at this site.
Operation Gibraltar

It appears that the idea of launching a guerrilla war in Indian held Kashmir was in vogue since the 1950s. Major General Mitha confirms in his GHQ inspired book, written soon after publication of Gul Hassan Khan’s memoirs10 that had outraged the Pakistani GHQ that he heard ideas that such an operation should be launched since 1958. Mitha claims that from 1958 to 1961 he had advised that “such operations had no chance of success and each time F.M Ayub Khan had agreed with me and vetoed the suggestions”. General Gul Hassan states that the secret “Kashmir Cell” formed by the Foreign Office on Ayub’s orders consisting of various key officials including the DMO i.e Gul Hassan was informed by the Foreign Secretary Aziz Ahmad that the President had ordered GHQ to prepare two plans to encourage/provide all out support sabotage/guerrilla operations in Indian Held Kashmir.

Gul states that the decision to mount guerrilla operations with active Pakistan Army involvement was taken after the Rann of Katch skirmish. Altaf Gauhar who was the Information Secretary at that time claims that the Foreign Secretary Aziz Ahmad had “convinced himself that Pakistan was in a position to dislodge the Indians from Kashmir” and that “Once trained Pakistani soldiers went inside Kashmir the people of the Valley would spontaneously rise in revolt” and that “fear of China would prevent the Indians from provoking an all out war that would give Pakistan army the opportunity to drive the Indians out of Kashmir just as it had done in the Rann of Kutch”. Gauhar further claimed that the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) Directorate and the Foreign Office drew up the plan for Operation Gibraltar.

Pakistani expectations, and this does not include Bhutto alone, as many self-styled experts based on personal rivalry would much later claim; were raised to unrealistic heights after the Rann affair and Ayub was convinced that Gibraltar would succeed! In a written communication before the war Ayub asserted that “As a general rule Hindu morale would not stand more than a couple of blows delivered at the right time and place. Such opportunities should, therefore, be sought and exploited”.

Gauhar states that Mr Z.A Bhutto the Foreign Minister was so convincingly persuasive in his advocacy of Operation Gibraltar that he convinced many Pakistan Army officers serving in the GHQ, who in turn urged the Pakistani C in C Musa to “bite the bullet”. Further Musa, the C in C much later in 1983 claimed that Bhutto had “Brainwashed” his officers. These two assertions if true means that either Bhutto was a military genius or those army officers who he convinced had no grey matter and that the Pakistani C in C was a glorified headclerk whose function was that of a rubber stamp rather than anything to do with higher military strategy or operational planning.

Operation Gibraltar envisaged guerrilla operations inside Indian Occupied Kashmir by a number of guerrilla groups of roughly a battalion strength comprising of Kashmiri Volunteers trained by Pakistan Army, Pakistan Army Special Services Group (SSG) Commando personnel and some regular infantry troops.The total strength of the “Gibraltar Force” was not more than 5,000 to 7,000 men subdivided into five forces i.e (1) “Salahuddin Force” operating in Srinagar Valley, (2) “Ghaznavi Force “ in Mendhar-Rajauri area, (3) “Tariq Force” in Dras-Kargil area, (4) “Babar Force “in Nowshera-Sundarbani area, (5) “Qasim Force” in Bandipura-Sonarwain area, (6) “Khalid Force” in Qazinag-Naugam area, (7) “Nusrat Force” in Tithwal-Tangdhar area, (8) “Sikandar Force” in Gurais area and (9) “Khilji Force” in Kel-Minimarg area. The mission assigned to the various Gibraltar forces was warfare in the enemy’s rear including harassing enemy communications, destruction of bridges, logistic installations, headquarters with a view to create conditions of an “armed insurrection” in Kashmir finally leading to a national uprising against Indian rule leading to liberation of Kashmir or at least parts of it.

The infiltration operation of the Gibraltar Force commenced from first week of August 1965. General Harbaksh Singh the C in C Indian Western Command described the infiltration operation as “brilliant in conception”. The Gibraltar Forces mission was too ambitious and its achievement was beyond its means, however, in words of Indian military writer Major K.C Praval “Although the Gibraltar Force failed to raise a revolt, they did succeed in creating a great deal of confusion and disorder by acts of sabotage, violence and murder”. Praval praised “Nusrat Force” which was operating in Tithwal area which in his words “caused a great deal of damage before it could be pushed back over the ceasefire line”. Indian General Harbaksh Singh in the typical Indo-Pak style of not being intellectually honest once dealing with assessment of enemy actions, inadvertently admitted the mental dislocation that the Gibraltar Force had caused in the headquarters of Indian 15 Corps. Harbaksh thus stated “General Officer Commanding 15 Corps gave the following assessment of the prevailing situation: — The maximum success gained by the infiltrators was in the Mandi area where they had secured local support”2.......... “General Officer Commanding 15 Corps in a personal signal to me recommended the abandonment of the Hajipir offensive .....on account of the serious tactical situation in that sector”. This happened on 15th August!

On 17th August 1965 General Harbaksh Singh noted that the 15 Indian Corps Commander’s assessment of operational situation in Kashmir was “rather too grim and gloomy”. Even Joginder Singh who later wrote a book to refute most of Harbaksh’s assertions admitted in his book that “GOC XV Corps Lt Gen Katoch appeared to be overwhelmed by the scale of infiltration”. The reader may note that all this was happening despite an overwhelming Indian numerical superiority in troops. A small example being the 25 Indian Division area where the Indians had some 20 infantry battalions 28 at a time when the total strength of the 12 Pakistani Division responsible for all 400 miles of Kashmir was not more than 15 infantry battalions!

The local population of Indian Held Kashmir did not co-operate with the Gibraltar Force and by 18th August the operations of the Gibraltar Force were considerably reduced. The Indians brought in additional troops and the infiltration operation was checked by 20th August. As discussed earlier the Indian 15 Corps Commander was unnerved, however, the C in C Western Command Harbaksh Singh exhibited greater resolution and spurred the 15 Indian Corps into launching two major counter infiltration attacks inside Pakistan Held Kashmir to destroy the logistic bases in Hajipir Bulge and Neelam Valley areas. Both these attacks succeeded since the 12 Division was already over stretched with single infantry battalions holding frontages varying from 10 to 20 miles. There is absolutely no doubt that Gibraltar was an undoubted failure!

The loss of Hajipir Pass, the principal logistic base of the infiltrators on 28th August and Indian successes in the Neelam Valley and opposite Uri on 29-31st August 1965 unnerved the Pakistani GHQ who assumed that Muzaffarabad was about to be attacked! The supposed liberators of Indian Held Kashmir were more worried now about what they had held before commencement of hostilities! It was under these circumstances that the Pakistani GHQ ordered execution of Grand Slam with the aim of relieving Indian pressure against Muzaffarabad! Shaukat Riza the official historian of the 1965 War admitted that by 31 August the Indians had ruptured 12 Division’s defences and this was the main reason why the GHQ decided to attack Chamb “to ease pressure on 12 Division”. Shaukat also quoted Musa and the Chief of General Staff Sher Bahadur in stating that the main reason why Grand Slam was launched was that “there was danger of Indians capturing Muzaffarabad”. Musa in his roundabout way of saying things did not mention Muzaffarabad but merely stated that the main object of launching “Grand Slam” was “reducing pressure in the north by capturing Chamb and threatening Akhnur”.

To add a few footnotes to this fine piece, I must alse mention that it was not the first, nor the last time that a similar tactic was tried by Pakistan to wrest Kashmir from Indian control. The first instance was during the 1947-48 War when Pathan irregulars were sent across the border to 'convince' the Maharaja of Kashmir to accede to Pakistan. It failed on that occasion mainly because, the Indian Army, caught completely off guard by this daring move, had enough time to recover and drop paratroops into Srinagar (Kashmir's summer capital), because the Pathans took some time off to loot and pillage along the way!

1965 was perhaps better planned, and the Pakistani army was also better equipped to consolidate these gains. They had better troops and the advantage of surprise, which they admittedly, threw away at the most crucial moment. Also, there was an intelligence failure in not estimating the level of support they would get from Indian Kashmiris and even the resistance leaders on the Indian side were caught off-guard by the Pakistani move and could not provide the level of support the Pakistanis expected.

Pakistan also made a crucial mistake with regard to the Indian response. Their plans did not take into account an Indian counter-attack in the plains of Punjab, close to Lahore and Sialkot. This ultimately led to the failure of Grandslam as both sides got bogged down in a stalemate along the borders, but with the road to Indian held Kashmir still intact. Some have attributed this to oversight, others to blind overconfidence, and some also to the Pakistani assesment of the personality of Lal Bahadur Shastri, the Gandhian who took over as PM of India. The earlier loss of territory to Pakistan in the Rann of Kutch rankled in India and the image of a 'soft' state was re-inforced by the personality of Lal Bahadur Shastri, a soft-spoken unassuming man; a 'regent', unlikely to take bold decisions on the battlefield. I will discuss his decision in greater depth in the conclusion.

The Kargil War in 1999 also saw traces of Operation Gibraltar, (one Pakistani General refers to it as the beginning of Gibraltar 2!), but Pakistan, because of diplomatic pressure and the recent nuclear tests, could not commit its military on a scale similar to the War of 1965. The ensuing loss of 'face' after Kargil, where Nawaz Sharif was given a sound dressing down by Clinton, also saw General Musharraf taking power in a bloodless coup, putting an end to democratic rule in Pakistan.

In the next section, I will deal with actual battle itself and the equipment used by both the sides

 

[allhailIndia]

In this part, I shall look at the actual course of the battle of Assal Uttar itself, the orbats and the eventual outcome. At the outset, I must mention the common difficulty faced by most South Asian military historians; lack of unbiased, objective sources on either side. The only one I was able to get hold of was from this site, found here written by Ravi Rikhye, and Agha Humayun Amin, who was also the author of the previous snippet. This, to me, is by far the least biased and most objective of the sources I have come across and also makes for interesting reading.

Pakistani Orbat
1st Armored Division [Maj. Gen. Naseer Ahmad Khan]

12th Cavalry (Division reconnaissance regiment, Chaffees)

Division Artillery [Brig. A.R. Shammi] (killed in an ambush)

3 (SP) Field Regiment [Lt. Col. Ghulam Hussain]

15 (SP) Field Regiment [Lt. Col. Ehsan Ul-Haq] (later Major General)

16 (SP) Field Regiment [Lt. Col. Akram Chaudhry]

21 Medium Regiment [Lt. Col. Maqbool]

19 (SP) Light Anti Aircraft Regiment [Lt. Col. Mohammad. Sarwar]

1 Engineer Battalion [Lt. Col. Altaf Hussain]

3rd Armored Brigade [Brig. Moeen] (in reserve, did not enter battle)

19th Lancers (Pattons) [Lt. Col. Bashir Ahmad] (Later replaced at Chawinda) - See Correspondence

7th Frontier Force (Armored Infantry) [Lt. Col. Abdul Rahman]

4th Armored Brigade [Brig. "Tony" Lumb]

4th Cavalry [Lt. Col. M. Nazir] Pattons

5th Horse [Lt. Col. M. Khan] Pattons (sole pre 1947 unit not to fight in any Indo-Pakistan action)

10th Frontier Force (Armored Infantry)[Lt. Col. Fazal Kareem]

5th Armored Brigade [Brig. Bashir]

6th Lancers [Lt. Col. Shahibzad Gul] Pattons

24th Cavalry [Lt. Col. Ali Imam] Pattons

1st Frontier Force (Armored Infantry) [Lt. Col. Syed Shabbir Ali]


Indian Orbat
11th Infantry Division [Maj. Gen. Abdul Hamid Khan]

15th Lancers [Lt. Col. Iskandar Al Karim] I Corps Reconnaissance Regiment

32nd Tank Delivery Unit [Lt. Col. Aftab Ahmad] Shermans after war 32 Cavalry

Division Artillery [Col. Shirin Dil Khan Niazi] (Major General in 1971)

26 Field Regiment [Lt. Col. Ata Malik] (ex 7th Division)

38 Field Regiment [Lt. Col. Hamid Tamton] (ex 8th Division)

12 Medium Regiment [Lt. Col. Bashir] (ex 8th Division)

9 Medium Regiment [Lt. Col. Gulzar] (ex 10th Division)

35 Heavy Regiment [Lt, Col. M. H. Ansari] (later Major General) (35 Regt ex I Corps Artillery)

Troop/88 Mortar Battery (ex 8th Division)

37 Corps Locating Regiment [Lt. Col. Khalil Ahmed Khan] (37 Regt ex I Corps Artillery)

3 Engineer Battalion [Lt. Col. Saleem Malik]

25 Signals Battalion [Lt. Col. Anwar Ahmad Qureshi]

21st Infantry Brigade [Brig. Sahib Dad] initially detached, returned Sept. 6 Div striking force/reserve

5th Frontier Force [Lt. Col. Mumtaz]

13th Baluch (now spelled Baloch) [Col. M. Hussain]

52nd Brigade [Brig. S.R.H. Rizvi] (deployed from Kasur-Khem Karan Road to Kasur-Ferozepur Road)

2nd Frontier Force [Lt. Col. Fateh Khan]

7th Punjab [Lt. Col. Shirazi]

12th Baluch [Lt. Col. Akhtar]

106th Infantry Brigade [Brig. Nawazish Ali] (deployed Bedian Sector, North of Kasur)

1st East Bengal [Lt. Col. A.T.K. Haque]

7th Baluch [Lt. Col. Rasul Bux]

Indian Orbat

Werstern Army (Kashmir theatre, Punjab theatre down to Bikaner in Rajasthan)

[Lt. Gen. Harbax Singh] Commanding XV, I, XI Corps, total 11 divisions

XI Corps [Lt. Gen. J.S. Dhillon] Commanding 4, 7, 15 Divisions

2nd Independent Armored Brigade [Brig. T.K. Theograj]

3rd Cavalry [Lt. Col. Salim Caleb] Centurions

8th Lancers [Lt. Cpl. P.C. Mehta] AMX-13

(Third regiment was away in another sector)

1st (SP) Field Regiment (Sextons)

4th Mountain Division [Maj. Gen. Gurbaksh Singh]

9th (Deccan) Horse [Lt. Col. A.S. Vaidya, later Army Chief] Sherman IV/V

A Squadron [Maj. J.M. Vohra, later Lt. Gen.]

B Squadron [Maj. G.S. Bal]

C Squadron [Maj. D.K. Mehta]

7th Mountain Brigade [Brig. Sidhu]

4th Grenadiers

7th Grenadiers

9th Jammu and Kashmir Regiment

62nd Mountain Brigade

1/9th Gorkha Rifles

13th Dogra

18th Rajputana Rifles

In 1965, Pakistan had two armored divisions, the 1st and the 6th. Both fought major battles. While the 6th Armored Division acquited itself well, the 1st Armored Division failed miserably and completely. Its division commander, two of its three brigade commanders, and most of its staff officers were transferred out as reprimands for their unacceptable performance. This division witnessed scenes that have never taken place in the history of the Pakistan cavalry, before or since. We have an armored regiment where, after the CO is killed, the 2nd in command refuses to take charge and none of the squadron commanders picks up when the 2 i/c refuses. We have armored infantry abandoning their APCs when they come under friendly fire, and then running from the field, all the way back home. We have a regimental commander who achieves his phase line, but does not bother to inform brigade, and then decides if brigade - who has no idea where he is - does not link up with him that night, he will surrender in the morning, Seventy officers and men from two squadrons decide they had best push off while they can, and leave for Pakistani-held territory. The next morning, as good as his word, the regimental commander surrenders as soon as someone can be arranged to accept the surrender, and hands over 11 running tanks in the process. We have a divisional engineer regiment that builds a bridge across an obstacle, only to find the banks are too high for passage, and then has to rectify the problem, halting the entire division in the process. We have regimental commanders arguing with brigade commanders, brigade commanders arguing with the division commander, instead of cooperating to get on with the battle.

The Pakistan Army during this period normally assigned only seven infantry battalions to an infantry division (with the exception of the 12th Azad Kashmir Division). It was thought that Pakistan did not need a full complement of infantry. Great reliance was put on the excellance of Pakistan Artillery (justified, in the event), and in the numerical and quantitative superiority of the Pakistan Cavalry (only partially justified, in the event). After the 1965 War Pakistan recognized its error and increased infantry in its divisions to a more standard nine battalions.

11th Division was a new raising only some months old. For this reason, all its artillery came from other divisions and was either not replaced or replaced with new raisings. In the Pakistan Army new raisings relied heavily on recalled reservists who were not necessarily pleased to return to active duty, sometimes just weeks before the outbreak of war. The issue is not that some of the battalions failed to perform well, but that so many actually did a commendable job. In 1971, when India mobilized its reservists Territorial Army battalions, it remained unsatisfied with their performance even though the reservists had at least six months to retrain.

Pakistan raised four cavalry regiments as Tank Delivery Units (30, 31, 32, 33 TDU), intending to decieve the Indians as to their real strength. This gave Pakistan 17 regiments vs India's 15. Four of India's regiments were, however, equipped with the AMX-13 or PT-76, tanks which while excellent for reconnaissance, were near useless against Pakistan's M47/48 and M4 Shermans, and quite inferior to Pakistan's two M24 Chaffee regiments. This widend the disparity in Pakistan's favor even further.

On September 5/6, Indian XI Corps (4 Mountain, 7 and 15 Infantry Divisions, 2nd Independent Armored Brigade) launched its three divisions against Lahore. 4th Mountain Division was on the southern axis, alunching from Khem Karan towards Kasur, which lay perhaps 6-7 km from the international border. 7th Division was to the north of 4th Mountain Division, also aiming at Kasur from a different direction. The Indians deny Lahore was their objective, saying instead that their attacks were limited to keeping Pakistan from launching a major attack against the Punjab. Be that as it may, had India gained Kasur, it could have outflanked the Lahore defenses, which would have been under attack from two different direcxtions. The defenses of Kasur were immensely difficult to negotiate. The Pakistanis had done a superb job of building defenses that could hold superior Indian numbners failing that, inflict such heavy losses that the gain would be unworthwhile.

4th Mountain Division (two brigades, a third was in another sector) and a Sherman regiment attacked at seven points, expecting to be opposed by a single regular infantry battalion. Instead, it found a brigade reinforced with armor, and the entire Pakistan 1st Armored Division sitting behind. Pakistan 11 Infantry Division defended the Southern Lahore area with six battalions. Because of the large frontage, only its 21st and 52nd Brigades were defending Kasur, now subject to a two-pronged attack by India. 11th Division, though a completely new formation, was led by a geenral who repeatedly showed a capacity for rapid action aimed at keeping the initiave. Pakistani plans were to seize Khem Karan, opening the way for a rapid advance to the Beas River. The Beas had two bridges over it at this time Pakistan was to seize one bridge and then turn north. If successful, this manuver would have isolated eleven divisions of the Indian Army, more than half its effective strength at the time, in the Punjab, Pathankot, Jamm, Kashmir, and Ladakh. The way to Delhi would also have been open, a liesurely one-day drive. This was because India had no reserves, and no troops east of the Beas River. Had Pakistan succeeded, a Fourth Battle of Panipat could have taken place: the first three, fought from 1526 onward, changed the fate of India each time, and the Fourth would have been no different.

The Pakistani counterattack caught advanced Indian troops in a difficult position. They had pushed forward as far as possible under the impression they faced only one regular infantry battalion supported by paramilitary forces, and were without reserves to sustain their offensive. They also had only one tank regiment of Sherman IVs and Vs armed with 76mm guns in support, absolutely no match for the Pakistan M47/48 Patton. Pakistan artillery was, as usual, superbly handled, with the 140 guns available to the sector by pooling all units within range. The Indian division was completely outgunned in artillery: as a mountain division it had 120mm mortars and 105mm pack howitzers, though a single heavy regiment was deployed in support. Indian 106mm RCLs were deployed on a meagre scale of six per infantry battalion and were essentially ineffective against the Pakistani tanks except at close range. The PAF - again as always in contrast to the IAF - supported the ground troops with all means at its disposal. Last, and this is very important, the Indian infantry had insufficient training on facing armor, quite aside from the shortage of appropriate anti-tank weapons. RCL crews would hold their fire for fear of giving away their positions.

Considering the situation, GOC Indian 4th Mountain Division immediately ordered the division to fall back and assume a horseshoe shaped defensive position with Assul Uttar as its focal point. This village of 1500 persons had presumably been evacuated, but we do not know the situation here. As in most accounts of battles, the civilians who live on or near the battlefield are seldom mentioned. Both India and Pakistan, however, have a good record of clearing civilians off the field before fighting, and neither side bombs civilian targets. So the non-combatant loss on both sides is low. Assul Uttar was chosen because it was located at the focal point of two roads leading from Pakistan to Khem Karan, and thus the defenders could cover both likely axes of advance.

The Pakistanis have said that 4th Mountain Division was routed. From their viewpoint, it is understandable they thought so: some Indian infantry units, unable to take the pressure of Pakistani artillery and air attacks, unable to defend themselves against Pakistani armor, and quite aware of how seriously outgunned the Indian tanks were, retreated before being ordered to withdraw, or withdrew in a disorderly manner. Considering the speed with which the Indians set up their new defense line which was never breached - about 24 hours - it is, however, more reasonable to accept that the division withdrew in an overall organized manner.

Either on the 6th itself or on the 7th, Pakistan 11th Division etablished a bridgehead in Indian territory. On September 7, Pakistan 5 Armored Brigade of its 1st Armored Division began the first Pakistani attack that culminated in the battle of Assul Uttar. Also concentrating in the bridgehead were 4th Armored Brigade and 21st Infantry Brigades. It is difficult without better accounts to tell how many attacks the Pakistanis made: 4th and 5th Armored Brigades made at least five, perhaps seven or even eight attacks between them. At the very first, Pakistan 5th Brigade overran Khem Karan. Subsequently, however, every attack was defeated by the Indians though they did npot suceed till after the ceasefire in getting back lost ground. Even Khem Karan, however, was not fully under Pakistan control till September 10.

By now, HQ Indian 2nd Armored Brigade with two regiments (one Centurion, one AMX-13) had moved to reinforce Indian 4th Mountain Division. On the 8th and 9th Pakistan armor attacked repeatedly, to be beaten back with heavy losses, both to the Indians and the terrain, which was soft in many places. On September 10th, the day of the last attack, the advancing Pakistani tanks ran into 4th Division's horseshoe ambush, and the attackers were annhilated. The ambush was placed in sugarcane fields - the crop was standing tall and ready to be harvested - and Indian Shermans had learned by now to hold their fire till Pakistani tanks came within 550-750 meters. At longer ranges Indian shot simply bounced off the Pattons.This ambush was only one part of the reason for the Pakistani defeat at Assul Uttar.

The other reason was that the Pakistan Chief of General Staff himself arrived to push the offensive forward. He took over the business of giving orders to the brigades - three command levels down. Odd as this may seem, GOC Indian XI Corps, otherwise an excellent commander, was at one point ordering the movement of tank troops and even single tanks on the battle field, five and six levels down! To ensure the CGS's orders were executed, GOC 1 Armored Division ordered the Officer Commanding Pakistan 5th Armored Brigade to drive back some kilometers for a meeting. The conversations were intercepted, and the Indians ambushed the GOC's convoy, an indication of how intersperesed the two armies were and how fluid the battlefield. The artillery brigadier was killed, and though the GOC escaped - contrary to Indian belief he also had been killed - it appears that Pakistan 1st Armored Division completely disintegrated.

If the twin setbacks of Assul Uttar and the ambush were inusfficient, on the same day Pakistan GHQ ordered the division's third brigade to the Sialkot sector, where the fiercest tank battles since World War II were underway. The next day 1st Armored Division was reorganized. Its 4th and 5th Brigades were given one tank regiment and one armored infantry battalion each, and the division HQ plus 4th Armored Brigade was sent north against the possibility of an Indian breakthrough at Sialkot.


This did not end the battle of Khem Karan-Kasur. The Indians continued attacking until the ceasefire was announced - by September 19th Pakistan had started to run of ammunition, aircraft spares, and reserve equipment. The Chief of the Army General Staff and the Chief of Air Staff met with the President of Pakistan that day to request a ceasefire be negotiated. Twenty-three days into the war, Pakistan was done for - hardly surprising, as the Americans had kept Pakistan on a short leash, giving just 14-21 days of supplies. Enough time for the Americans to arrive should a communist power attack Pakistan insufficient to do India any serious harm. Meanwhile, India was just getting into its stride, learning from its mistakes, pulling fresh mountain troops from the east into the western theatre. Logically, India should have continued the war, but was talked into a ceasefire by Russia and America, both of whom wanted the status quo preserved. That is another story.

An interesting bit of trivia...General Pervez Musharraf, current President of Pakistan was a lieutenant of artillery in the 16 (SP) Field Regiment, 1st Armored Division Artillery. It is perhaps ironic that he is also considered the 'author' of the Pakistani incursion into Kashmir which triggered off the Kargil War 1999. It is a completely different matter that Nawaz Sharif took the bullet for him when he was forced to withdraw the troops under international pressure, and lose his Prime Ministership in a coup when he tried to make Musharraf resign.

 

[allhailIndia]

Conclusion
As for the War itself, it was inconclusive. India was in possession of 710 sq kms of Pakistani territory and Pakistan, 250 sq km of Indian territory. 22 days was too little time to achieve any sort of decisive outcome on the battlefield, especially since both the sides were equally matched. The Indian victory at Assal Uttar was also matched by the Pakistani defence of Sialkot further south, which caused serious casualties to the Indian First Armoured Division.

However, the official history of the War has not been released and some controversy has been raised recently by Guhar Ayub Khan, son of Ayub Khan in a biography of his father, regarding the war. The author alleges that an Indian brigadier sold plans to the Pakistanis for Rs.20000 and alleges a war crime where 4,000 Pakistani commandos were "butchered" by India. While the first is too sketchy and vague to comment upon, the second refers to the badly executed plan of the Pakistani Army to attack Indian airfields by dropping commandos in a night raid. The raid failed because they were dropped too far off, and too late in the night, so that they were caught in the open in light, and did not cause any damage, as they were either captured or killed in the firefights that ensued.
Check here

On the military front, Indian morale was boosted. They had technologically inferior weapons on most fronts, were just recovering from a humiliating blow at Chinese hands and did not have the initiative as the Pakistani Army had. The initiative was wrested with the victory at Assal Uttar, and this helped the push toward Lahore, which in turn forced the Pakistani Army to pull back troops from its primary objective of cutting off Kashmir from India. Ultimately, the Indian Army was on the outskirts of Lahore when the ceasefire was called. The failure of the Pakistani Army to triupmh over the supposedly technologically inferior Indian Army, also raised questions about the American weapons used. Although the US itself had long ceased to depend on most of the weapons it sold Pakistan, their 'export potential', was somewhat dented, whereas the British and Soviet equipment recieved a boost in their reputation, especially tanks and armoured vehicles. Crucially, 1965 also saw a shift in Pakistani military expenditures from American to Chinese made weapons, a tie-up which continues to this day.

On an international arena, there were some interesting re-alignments and movements. The US, which Pakistan believed to be a close and all-weather ally, had refused to send spares (it equipped Pakistan with only 14-21 days of spares and ammo), to enable it to continue the war. Not only that, the US had also warned Pakistan against continuing its growing friendliness with China, something which Pakistan refused to do, and was a sign of things to come later on. On that front too, Pakistan found that China was, like the US, sound belligerent and threatening, but do little to open a second front to tie India up. As a result of this, Pakistan found itself in a tight spot as ammunition started running out, more Indian divisions from the Eastern sector were being thrown into the Western sector.

There has been some controversy in India as to the acceptance of the cease-fire. Lal Bahadur Shastri, was convinced by the generals that India cannot continue the war as ammunition was running out and the effort could not be kept up longer. However, it was known to the generals that at least 80% of India's ammunition was still unused, while Pakistan barely had 15-20% left. Some have suggested that India should have carried on, ignoring the cease-fire call, and captured Lahore denting Pakistani morale and destroying more of its army. However, others have also said that the Indian Army was not ready, militarily or psychologically, for the prolonged urban warfare, and continued warfare, against the cease-fire may only hurt India's higher moral ground, especially since it claimed to be the victim. Besides, the cease-fire was sponsored by both the Americans and Russians, so there was no one really to back India up.

Ironically, Lal Bahadur Shastri did not enjoy the mantle of being India's war hero for long. He died immediately after signing the cease-fire in Tashkent. Although he died of a heart attack in his sleep, questions still persist as to the timing and nature of his death. Some have said that the strain of being a war prime minister was just too much for the otherwise quiet, unassuming man, while some others controversially attribute a Pakistani angle to this. Of course he was an old man, India still had not yet "experimented" with young leaders and it is possible that the strain of the last few months had gotten to him. He was never supposed to be anything but a Regent, to keep the throne warm enough for the natural successor to Nehru. His finest moment, when he showed great nerve and iron in calling for retaliatory strikes against Pakistan when India was invaded, also perhaps proved to be his nemesis. Some also suggest that having to give back land, that had been taken with the blood of several Indian soldiers, may have also caused just too much of a strain on an otherwise gentle Gandhian.

POlitically, Ayub Khan faced the brunt of criticism. Having been fed continuous propaganda on the inherent superiority of the Pakistani soldier, ordinary Pakistanis were stunned by the successes of the Indian Army in penetrating upto Lahore before the cease-fire was called. Scapegoats were needed, and the Army top-brass was found. Most were replaced or resigned and Ayub Khan himself quit after a couple of years citing "health reasons" after his popularity had clearly waned. More shocking for the Pakistan military was the seeming lack of support the infiltrators from Pakistan had found in Kashmir for a guerilla war. While infiltration had begun a few weeks before the war itself, it was wound up without too much trouble, as the native populace on the Indian side of Kashmir did not seem too keen to take up arms and support the Pakistani guerillas. Pakistan's efforts to call the infiltration a "local uprising" also fell flat after nobody in the international arena bought it. Several Pakistani generals and retired army men have also criticized 'Operation Gibraltar' as a serious intelligence failure. Ironically, while the Pakistani Army learnt from its mistake, Indian political leaders successfully managed to alienate Kashmiris over the next 2 decades culminating in the rigged elections which saw Kashmiris taking up arms and militancy on a large scale.
The 1965 Indo-Pak war is also among the less known wars of the twentieth century, more so because of the absence of a decisive result either way. However, it did have important repercussions domestically and internationally for both Pakistan and India in the years to come.

 

[Shaihulud]

I am interested in the war if you would kindly write it down.

 

[allhailIndia]

Ok, I'll probably include the course of the war briefly in the introduction and conclusion...full details may require a separate article.

 

[silver 2039]

I'm very happy about this....

 

[Dann]

Awaiting eagerly...

 

[blindside]

I am interested in the war if you would kindly write it down.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indo-Pakistani_War_of_1965
Pretty much sums it up. There was no real winner as both sides backed down.

 

[allhailIndia]

Due to a sudden in crease in workload..I will have to delay this and stagger the four parts over the course of the week.

Sorry for the delay.

 

[~Corsair#01~]

You really should've posted this thread AFTER writing the article.

 

[silver 2039]

While we're waiting. Whats intresting about this battle is the fact that Pakistan as using modern Patton tanks while India had Sherman tanks and AMX tanks mostly. there were about 4 divisons of Centourions. Many Pakistani tanks were captured as well in the end of the war 156 tanks had been captured (Pattons) while that Pakistani's had captured 40 Indian tanks mostly AMX's.
Some tanks were simply just abonded in the middle of fields with their motors left running sometime!!!
During this war the largest tank battles since world war II occured.

 

[allhailIndia]

I finally have the time....!!!

Ok so the next few parts will take a couple of days more, but here's part 1

 

[silver 2039]

So when can we expect more?

 

[allhailIndia]

Tomorrow, PArt 2: Operation Gibraltar and Operation Grand Slam

 

[YNCS]

I understand that English is not your native language. However, there are a number of vocabulary and grammatical errors in the first part of your essay that should be corrected. Here's some examples:

I have in the above paragraphs pre-empted a couple of causes for the war...

Preempt (no hyphen) means "1. To acquire or buy before others have the opportunity. 2. To settle on land with the right to purchase in preference to others. 3. To attack before the enemy has attacked." You might instead say "I have already given a couple of causes for the war...."

...the People’s Liberation Army...

The apostrophe goes after the "s," not before.

...because Nehru, in his 14 years reign decided it would.

There should be a comma after "reign."

I also have a couple of historical quibbles:

The Indian Army, after the liberation of Portugal,

I believe you mean Goa, not Portugal.

...the renowned Sabre Jet and Starfighter, which had proved their mettle in American conflicts in the last couple of decades.

While the F-86 Saber fought quite effectively in the Korean War, the F-104 Starfighter was never actually used in combat, having come into service too late for Korea and been taken out of front line service before Vietnam.

 

[allhailIndia]

Thank you for the corrections....

I did write it in a bit of a hurry...

I'll make sure the next part has fewer mistakes

 

[Dann]

The F-104 was a very advanced design for its time, but had a very high mishap rate. Things got so bad it was nicknamed "Widowmaker" by pilots.

 

[YNCS]

The U.S. Air Force only bought 300 F-104s. However, many other countries, notably Germany, Japan, Canada, and the Netherlands, used them for years.