The fall of Greece *rant*

Without simplification isnt conclusion. The question when Greece become pusies cant be solved by pure history, because question itself is ahistorical. We should see history as times of downfalls and boosts. And when you will check last times of pelleponessian war, it led to decline on both sides, to cooperation with Persia or Egypt, razes of some cities and other signs of downfall. The revolt of Sparta wasnt clear revolt, Sparta was unlike other cities left untouched, weak in shadow of former power by decide of macedonians and their try wasnt to take independence but take whole Greece. In that time again they cooperated with persians againist other greeks.
 
"The question of when Greece became p*ssies can't be solved by pure history."

:confused:

Dude, what are you smoking, and how much did it cost?

EDIT: And p*ssies is banned? What the hell, it's not even a swearword, and there are several of them that aren't.
 
I have meant that history is always interpretation of sources. And my interpretation is rather psychological, something like when Greeks perceived defeat againist Persia as end, defeat againist Greek or Roman should be perceived as alternative way.
 
I have meant that history is always interpretation of sources. And my interpretation is rather psychological, something like when Greeks perceived defeat againist Persia as end, defeat againist Greek or Roman should be perceived as alternative way.
I think it was more a case of Rome knowing what it was doing, and having superior tactics and strategy, both military and political, to the Persians, combined with the fact that they "invaded by rust," as Nom Anor would say. Slowly, over a long period of time, until the Greeks weren't in a position to fight them off anymore.
 
It's funny to see how History changes if told accross the world. In Italy, the Romans fought the Greeks (starting in Magna Grecia) and conquered Greece, in other parts of the world, Greece was "absorbed". Perhaps it's just a nicer word meaning the same thing in the end, though.


So, to sum it all up:

1. The Greeks fight hard to defend there lands no matter what the odds.
2. They are good enough to defeat a superpower in there own country!

Here you are making a bit of confusion. First you speak of the spartans holding the pass and of how the greek alliance held off the invasion of Persia, then you suddently claim the Greeks defeated the Persian superpower. In that occasion, the greeks only defended their land and didn't defeat the superpower at all. That happened in another period of History, under different circumstances, and I don't really think you should put the 2 things together.
 
Ancient Greece's military history is ... well ... inconsistent. They handily defended themselves against the Persians, but got steamrolled by the Macedonians and then the Celts, without offering either invader much serious resistance.

Even fighting the Romans they never displayed any consistency. Pyrrhus nearly crushed Rome in an extremely bloody war, but the Roman conquest of Greece was a relatively easy one, compared with, for instance, Iberia or even Gaul.

Between Pyrrhus and Rome "marching in" lies a period where Spartan hegemony was eclipsed by Thebes and Philippos II defeated the Greek/Theban phalanx by superior tactics, notably the shock cavalry that became Alexander's trademark. No steamrolling involved.

So, Greece's powerbase was already eroded by internal warfare and Macedon before the Romans took it in steps, as noted below. Also, the concept of Greece as a united force instead of a division of city-states (like Rome originally), is a relative modern one.
 
Between Pyrrhus and Rome "marching in" lies a period where Spartan hegemony was eclipsed by Thebes and Philippos II defeated the Greek/Theban phalanx by superior tactics, notably the shock cavalry that became Alexander's trademark. No steamrolling involved.
Your timeline is kind of messed up. Pyrrhos came long after Philippos and Alexandros; his war, in the 270s BC(E), was a product of the Roman expansion into Megale Hellas. His army, which included phalangitai on loan from the Makedonian king, a mixture of light cavalry (which was excellent in southern Italy; the 'Tarantine' system of skirmisher cavalry was one of the better available in the Mediterranean) and heavy forces like the hetairoi, and elephants from the Arche Seleukeia, was definitely a model of the Hellenistic military system. (Although there were obviously improvements in the system later; the military never just 'stands still', there is always innovation to an extent. In this case perhaps the most salient point is the establishment of a corps of hysteroi pezhetairoi in Makedonia, which were able to fight on uneven ground better than the normal phalangitai.)

So the problem wasn't really a differing - or at least inferior - military system at all. Tactically, the Hellenistic system utilized a wider variety of forces than the Roman, and if properly used had the advantages of the Romans along with those of other units. The establishment of units like the thorakitai and thureophoroi (which were derided by Romans as being 'imitation legionaries', but which actually predate Roman contact in the Hellenistic world by some decades) allowed Hellenistic armies to fight in flexible formations that didn't have the disadvantage of the Makedonian syntagma when fighting on broken ground. Problem was, the later Hellenistic monarchs failed to maintain this combined arms approach, instead concentrating on the parts of the Alexandrine system that looked more prestigious, like units of elephants or massive multi-decked ships, and allowing the combined arms-based military to erode.

I think that the event that is most instructive here is the Battle of Magnesia, fought between the Seleukid monarch Antiochos III Megas (one of the more enigmatic and yet successful rulers in history...at least up to that point) and the Romans with their Pergamene allies; the battle in general played out much like that of Ipsos, whereat Antigonos Monophthalamos' superiority in cavalry was wasted by his son Demetrios Poliorketes, who upon defeating the cavalry forces of Antiochos I, fighting for the allied forces, decided to pursue the enemy cavalry off the field, allowing the allies to gain a local superiority in the center with their light infantry, and then bombard the Antigonid infantry until Antigonos himself was killed and his army disintegrated. So it was at Magnesia, sort of: Antiochos III, in charge of his own cavalry, drove off elements of the allied horse but then pursued off the field, allowing the Pergamenes to dart into the gap his cavalry had left and surround his infantry. Had the Seleukid king not made that critical error, the Romans were at a significant disadvantage, and I don't rate the chances of their victory very highly...(Of course, it was a mistake for him to even engage in the battle at all; he should've waited for the Romans' own political issues to force them to withdraw, whereupon he could have dealt with the Pergamenes at his leisure.)
JEELEN said:
So, Greece's powerbase was already eroded by internal warfare and Macedon before the Romans took it in steps, as noted below.
Not much more significantly than it was when fighting the Persians, I think. Athenian attempts to export the revolution following the institution of Cleisthenean democracy had done a good deal in increasing divisiveness amongst the Hellenic states. And it wasn't, as previously mentioned, as though the Greeks stood as one united front against Persia. Argos was the most heinous offender in failing to join the allies at Plataia and Salamis, of course, and the northern Greek states like Thessalia, Makedon, and the Boiotian cities were on the whole collaborators with Xerxes' forces. I think that the comparison is more instructive when one looks at the opposing methods of Persians and Romans. Darius and Xerxes made their attempts at the end of a logistical tether, in only two major efforts (490 and 481-79, natch). When the Persians ceased their attempts at blatant conquest, and instead sat relatively idly and played the Greeks off against each other (as in the Peloponnesian and Korinthian wars), they had much greater success: the Peace of Antalkidas, which ended the Korinthian war, was called the King's Peace because it essentially showed that the Great King in Susa was able to dictate to the Hellenic states the terms of their political arrangements, and those terms involved Sparte becoming unofficial hegemon. (It was mostly due to Persian internal problems and the overall erosion of their empire due to rebellions and weak leadership that Persia failed to capitalize on this; one must remember, after all, that Megas Alexandros was a friggin' Great Captain of History, and without him at the helm the Makedonian invasion would certainly not have seen the success that it did. Even a Iason of Pherai or Mausollos of Halikarnassos would have been hard pressed to secure the same magnitude of victory.) This Persian policy can be easily likened to the later Roman one, seeing as the Romans supported the Greek states against the Makedonians, and then upon the elimination of that enemy had achieved hegemony by default.

Playing off on intra-Hellenic dissension and conflict instead of overt attempts at conquest, it cannot be stated often enough, was the prime factor in Roman success.
 
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