The Firebombing of Tokyo

[Lord Baal]

Politically, yes an unconditional surrender was required, it is just unfortunate that the main condition they wanted was something the Allies willingly gave them anyway.

Guaranteeing Hirohito's security?

@ParkCungHee: I don't think Japan put out peace feelers until after the firebombing had already started. I could be wrong though. I know they had definitely had them out for some time before the atomic bombings.

 

[ParkCungHee]

They had them out since Tojo fell from power, which was after the fall of the Philippines.

And what would a naval blockade lead to?

An inability to supply their armies in China, the collapse of their industry, I could go on...

Also, how many thousands of lives would be expended in any conquest of Japanese large colonies? How much time?

Only Complete unconditional surrender would be acceptable. A negotiated surrender would have been an affront to the whole region under Japan's jackboot.

If you're going to make the "Anything to quicken surrender" argument, an afront would have quickened surrender much faster, and nobody died because of an "afront". And if we were concerned about afonts to the people under the Japanese Jackboot, maybe we shouldn't have told the Japanese Army that it had to stay in areas like China, Indonesia and Indochina, for up to a year to fight off the resistance movements created against it.

Also, how many thousands of lives would be expended in any conquest of Japanese large colonies? How much time?

Interesting Story that.
Somewhere between 33,000 and 95,700 Military KIA, with Negligible civilian losses, and about two weeks.

Also, considering the Japanese had 10,000 men in Korea at the time, Mostly garrison troops in a less then friendly area, I'm going to say losses there, for everyone involved couldn't have been more then 15,000.

 

[say1988]

An inability to supply their armies in China, the collapse of their industry, I could go on...

And thousands upon thousands of Japanese civilians starving and many Chinese civilians dieing as the Japanese desperately cling to their conquests.

 

[Lord Baal]

And thousands upon thousands of Japanese civilians starving and many Chinese civilians dieing as the Japanese desperately cling to their conquests.

I think the greater problem would be Communist insurgencies - which were often the most successful resistance movements - being in a position of power when the Japanese were removed. That was the main reason the Philippines were reconquered instead of skipped, after all; the Huk insurgents were in a position to take over on a Japanese surrender. That's not to mention China and Korea, since the Soviets were in the best position to profit from a prolonged war.

 

[ParkCungHee]

And thousands upon thousands of Japanese civilians starving and many Chinese civilians dieing as the Japanese desperately cling to their conquests.

Better then them having to be afronted.

 

[Imperialmajesty]

They had them out since Tojo fell from power, which was after the fall of the Philippines.


An inability to supply their armies in China, the collapse of their industry, I could go on...




If you're going to make the "Anything to quicken surrender" argument, an afront would have quickened surrender much faster, and nobody died because of an "afront". And if we were concerned about afonts to the people under the Japanese Jackboot, maybe we shouldn't have told the Japanese Army that it had to stay in areas like China, Indonesia and Indochina, for up to a year to fight off the resistance movements created against it.


Interesting Story that.
Somewhere between 33,000 and 95,700 Military KIA, with Negligible civilian losses, and about two weeks.

Also, considering the Japanese had 10,000 men in Korea at the time, Mostly garrison troops in a less then friendly area, I'm going to say losses there, for everyone involved couldn't have been more then 15,000.

You ignore the fact that hundreds of thousands of Japanese would starve from a full blockade.

Nobody died from an affront? Read a history book.

And... what about telling them to stay and fight resistance movements? You have a source?

Anyway, none of this changes the fact that Japan was engaged in total war, basically conscripting the populace to produce arms and in the event of invasion, repel it.

Something you seem to forget is that Japan refused to surrender even after the destruction of close to 70 cities. What makes you think they would surrender if there industrial complex was left intact?

And even then, it took an additional two Nuclear weapons and the Soviet invasion to finally make them surrender.

 

[ParkCungHee]

Nobody died from an affront? Read a history book.

Ah yes, I forgot the famous time that 40,000 thousand frenchmen died from shame when their emperor wasn't invited to Britain. When will people learn that insults are a deadly matter.

And... what about telling them to stay and fight resistance movements? You have a source?

Amongst others, you can try In the Ruins of Empire by Ronald Spector.

Something you seem to forget is that Japan refused to surrender even after the destruction of close to 70 cities. What makes you think they would surrender if there industrial complex was left intact?

It refused to surrender unconditionally. As I pointed out, it was open to an end of hostilities and negotiations over a year before they surrendered.

 

[Imperialmajesty]

Ah yes, I forgot the famous time that 40,000 thousand frenchmen died from shame when their emperor wasn't invited to Britain. When will people learn that insults are a deadly matter.


Amongst others, you can try In the Ruins of Empire by Ronald Spector.


It refused to surrender unconditionally. As I pointed out, it was open to an end of hostilities and negotiations over a year before they surrendered.

Think harder, I'm sure you will find a war caused by an offense to a person(s).

Well, until you provide actual proof that such an offer was tendered, I will ignore it.

I'm sure they were open to negotiations all the way back in 1941, if you gave enough up. What would the US have had to tolerate in such a treaty, with a Japan that has virtually undamaged cities?

 

[ParkCungHee]

Think harder, I'm sure you will find a war caused by an offense to a person(s).

No that is people dying because someone decides that taking offense is reason to start a war. In fact if that's a good justification, you can say that Japan was entirely entitled to start it's war.
But really follow through the scenario you're outlining: We needed to burn Japanese cities to the ground, because if we didn't and negotiated with them, China, Indochina, Korea and/or Indonesia will start a war with Japan (presumably at a much, much, much later date) because they are so offended by the fact that we signed a treaty with them?
And for this remote possibility, we needed to extend the war by several months, kill countless Japanese civilians and American Citizens?

Well, until you provide actual proof that such an offer was tendered, I will ignore it.

Argument ad Ignoranum.
Fine, since you're not actually interested in actually addressing my points, you can ask yourself, why in July of 1944 the Kodaha are out and the Toseiha are in?

What would the US have had to tolerate in such a treaty, with a Japan that has virtually undamaged cities?

Given what they were discussing? Most likely an end to the economic sanctions, a guarantee of Japanese Territorial Integrity (minus Korea, Manchuria, Taiwan, etc.) and a Guarantee not to interfere with the Tenno system.

 

[Imperialmajesty]

No that is people dying because someone decides that taking offense is reason to start a war. In fact if that's a good justification, you can say that Japan was entirely entitled to start it's war.
But really follow through the scenario you're outlining: We needed to burn Japanese cities to the ground, because if we didn't and negotiated with them, China, Indochina, Korea and/or Indonesia will start a war with Japan (presumably at a much, much, much later date) because they are so offended by the fact that we signed a treaty with them?
And for this remote possibility, we needed to extend the war by several months, kill countless Japanese civilians and American Citizens?


Argument ad Ignoranum.
Fine, since you're not actually interested in actually addressing my points, you can ask yourself, why in July of 1944 the Kodaha are out and the Toseiha are in?


Given what they were discussing? Most likely an end to the economic sanctions, a guarantee of Japanese Territorial Integrity (minus Korea, Manchuria, Taiwan, etc.) and a Guarantee not to interfere with the Tenno system.

Now you are just taking my words out of context. My point is, that America would lose any and all good will towards it in East Asia if it had negotiated a deal with the Japanese. I'm not saying for simply this reason things like firebombing should have been continued.


I am certainly not Arguing ad Ignoranum. You have failed to bring up the source, besides the title of a book. A quote would be nice.

Oh, Tojo resigned because of his handling of the war. Simple as that. Oh, and Tojo was a member of the Toseiha grouping, not the Kodaha. Even then, the Kodaha and Toseiha existing as meaningful factions ended after the 2.26 incident.

And if such an offer had been accepted by the allies, with Japan's cities not burned to the ground, the military would have launched a coup. I cite the historical example of the Kyujo incident. And, considering that Japan had not been pulverized, it probably would have succeeded.

Then what? Well, then you don't have the Emperor to announce the Gyokuon-hōsō, peace would be much harder to come by, and without the Emperor, even the firebombing and atomic bombs might not convince uch a leadership to surrender.

 

[Masada]

An inability to supply their armies in China, the collapse of their industry, I could go on...

They were already under a blockade which had managed to stop shipments of supplies and war material to-and-from Japan. Shortages of essential war materials and even basic commodities had stilled or slowed the productive capacities of the Japanese population and industry. A huge number of Japanese troops were effectively encircled and isolated in Indonesia, Malaysia, Burma, Thailand and even China by the complete allied supremacy on the sea and air and by the wholesale destruction of the Japanese fleet, air-force and critically the merchant marine. The situation was manifestly hopeless. The enemy were so overwhelming supremacy in every military aspect that all the Japanese could do better was to die. And they would not surrender.

Liberating areas under Japanese Occupation.

You would be trading Japanese lives for the lives of those that labored under the Japanese boot-heel. We already know roughly how many lives the Dutch 'Police Actions' cost in Indonesian lives ~ 500,00 to 1,500,000 due to the interruption of critical infrastructure and the economy. And that was after the Japanese had already been forced to surrender which gave the economy time to recover. Similar actions by the French after the war in Indochina also cost a significant numbers of lives.

 

[Bugfatty300]

ALL of the allies including China sat down and unanimously decided that there would be no conditional surrender for Japan. The U.S. had a immensely important diplomatic and strategic responsibility to adhere to the alliance. Not only for immediate after effects of the war but for the anticipated confrontation with the Soviet Union.

 

[ParkCungHee]

ALL of the allies including China sat down and unanimously decided that there would be no conditional surrender for Japan. The U.S. had a immensely important diplomatic and strategic responsibility to adhere to the alliance. Not only for immediate after effects of the war but for the anticipated confrontation with the Soviet Union.

We were equally committed to the complete and total surrender of Italy, but that got thrown out the window when Dino Grandi started talking to us. I don't remember any ill consequences of that. So we can throw out the responsibility based on principle.

Besides which, of ALL the allies we have basically three that matter in this discussion, China, which had already tried negotiating with Japan before it got allies, and who's aims were the reunification of China, and possibly the Ryukus, as well as removing Japan from having a foothold in Asia to threaten them. Considering the rate at which China is losing human lives, (not to mention the fact that personally Chiang wanted the Japanese on their feet as soon as possible after the war) means they were likely to go along with a negotiated peace as long as their safety, present and future, is secured.

The British want their Empire Back.

And Australia wants to be sure they are secure.

All of these real issues are addressed. Besides concerns about the coming conflict with the Soviet Union are
1) Ahistorical since that was not an immediate concern in 1944/1945
2) Largely irrelevant. England, the RoC and Australia are not going into the Soviet Block, and certainly not because America insisted that we have a negotiated peace with an enemy we defeated.

The enemy were so overwhelming supremacy in every military aspect that all the Japanese could do better was to die. And they would not surrender.

They would not unconditionally surrender. They fought on in the belief that it was possible to drag the war on long enough that the allies would come to the table, and make concessions. It wasn't an unreasonable belief.

You would be trading Japanese lives for the lives of those that labored under the Japanese boot-heel. We already know roughly how many lives the Dutch 'Police Actions' cost in Indonesian lives ~ 500,00 to 1,500,000 due to the interruption of critical infrastructure and the economy. And that was after the Japanese had already been forced to surrender which gave the economy time to recover. Similar actions by the French after the war in Indochina also cost a significant numbers of lives.

This is because they were conducted by the Dutch and French. The Dutch and French almost immediately began warring with the native populations. Tell me how many thousands died in Taiwan, Korea, or Manchuria?

 

[say1988]

We were equally committed to the complete and total surrender of Italy, but that got thrown out the window when Dino Grandi started talking to us. I don't remember any ill consequences of that. So we can throw out the responsibility based on principle.

Because nobody really cared about Italy. It was just the junior partner. There is no way that the Allies would have taken anything but an unconditional surrender from Germany. And you forgot one thing: the public reaction to the surrender.

 

[Bugfatty300]

We were equally committed to the complete and total surrender of Italy, but that got thrown out the window when Dino Grandi started talking to us. I don't remember any ill consequences of that. So we can throw out the responsibility based on principle.

Do you really think the defeat of Italy held as much stock with the Soviet Union and China as Japan and Germany?

China, which had already tried negotiating with Japan before it got allies, and who's aims were the reunification of China, and possibly the Ryukus, as well as removing Japan from having a foothold in Asia to threaten them.

China was at war with Japan LONG before WWII began so that's hardly surprising if not understandable.

Considering the rate at which China is losing human lives, (not to mention the fact that personally Chiang wanted the Japanese on their feet as soon as possible after the war) means they were likely to go along with a negotiated peace as long as their safety, present and future, is secured.

The Chinese knew that only an utterly defeated Japan would procure that safety. The Chinese weren't even close to defeating the Japanese armies of occupation when the war ended. In fact Japan was still continuing major offensives in China as late as May 1945. How do you think the Chinese would have ever negotiated favorable terms with the Japanese?

 

[ParkCungHee]

The Chinese knew that only an utterly defeated Japan would procure that safety.

1) I just pointed out that Chiang didn't want them utterly defeated. In fact he was one of the ones strongly in favor of keeping the IJA in China to secure cities against "Banditry" and second as a bulwark against the Soviet Union.
2) How exactly would Japan be a threat if it was not "utterly" defeated? Explain to me how maintaining it's territorial integrity or the Tenno system would threaten China? Also, I assume this would mean that Japan still threatens China to this day.

In fact Japan was still continuing major offensives in China as late as May 1945.

But it was totally worth it so that they could get a symbolic victory over Japan!

How do you think the Chinese would have ever negotiated favorable terms with the Japanese?

By negotiating as a partner with the United States?

 

[privatehudson]

There was a feeling amongst some in the West that not defeating Germany utterly in 1918 left the way open for the "November Criminals" myth that grew so popular in Germany between the wars. Allowing a negotiated peace to either of the main Axis powers rather than dictating terms to them with the proverbial boot on the neck was perceived as likely to lead to either returning to haunt the Allied powers again.

Even after the Hiroshima bombing some in the War Cabinet still insited on 4 conditions for surrender which included no occupaion of not just the home islands but Korea and Formosa. How likely is it that an attempt to negotiate a peace treaty with Japan would bring adequate terms without some demonstration of the Allied ability to hurt the home islands and bring the war home to Japan's population? Decimating the armed forces and capturing one island after another wasn't having much impact on the War Cabinet after all was it?

Whether the allies should have been pursuing unconditional surrender or negotiated settlement is an interesting debate but ultimately it is trumped by whether a War Cabinet, seeing a home islands largely untouched by the war and preparing for a final showdown would not simply dig their heels in and refuse to contemplate any form of negotiated surrender.

 

[ParkCungHee]

An equally important question is whether the War Cabinet could stop Japan from negotiating a settlement. One of the great problemsof the Japanese government at the time is that it was what Herbert Bix termed "a system of collective irresponsibility", nobody was accountable for anything, and so everyone did what they could get away with. The possibility that a relatively small (the Toseiha now being the dominant faction) military clique could and would have launched a military coup to forgo negotiations is of course impossible to answer, however it is one that is largely irrelevant. The fact that a coup could potentially happen is no reason for not dealing with a government, in fact if that was true, diplomacy as we know it wouldn't exist.

 

[Cutlass]

See, that's the real problem. It's not that the Allies were holding out for unconditional surrender, it's that losing every battle from Midway on, and territory with it, and never was willing to try for a negotiated peace. Anyone willing to look at the facts should be able to tell that when you lose every battle, and the enemy is far outpacing you in war materials production and the training of new servicemen, then you are going to lose. By not even being willing to try to negotiate a peace, you encourage the enemy to do whatever necessary, no matter how brutal, to compel a surrender. Add in the suicidal actions by both Japanese military and civilians, and you get an enemy that you have a lot of reason to think that you can't defeat without completely crushing. That's not to say that a negotiated peace on terms that Japan could accept was ever really possible. But by not even trying attitudes were hardened and only one end solution was tolerable.

All that said, I still think they should have stuck to targeted bombing to the best the tech of the time would allow it.

 

[ParkCungHee]

and never was willing to try for a negotiated peace.

I stopped reading there, because this is simply untrue.