The Firebombing of Tokyo

[privatehudson]

An equally important question is whether the War Cabinet could stop Japan from negotiating a settlement.

Given the level of power enjoyed by the military and the War Cabinet I would say that they probably could. It took the Emperor himself to get them all to agree to a surrender after two atom bombs and months of firebombings and other raids, I doubt they would roll over and accept a negotiated peace without them. Much would rely on his stance I imagine but since he didn't seem to accept the futility of continuing the war until mid to late June I doubt he would have felt strong enough had the home islands not been suffering so badly.

One of the great problemsof the Japanese government at the time is that it was what Herbert Bix termed "a system of collective irresponsibility", nobody was accountable for anything, and so everyone did what they could get away with. The possibility that a relatively small (the Toseiha now being the dominant faction) military clique could and would have launched a military coup to forgo negotiations is of course impossible to answer, however it is one that is largely irrelevant. The fact that a coup could potentially happen is no reason for not dealing with a government, in fact if that was true, diplomacy as we know it wouldn't exist.

The Army didn't need to launch a coup to forestall peace negotiations, the War Council could legally prevent Japan entering a peace agreement unless the War Council unanimously agreed to it. The Army also held what amounted to a veto since the Council couldn't exist without an Army representative. If they had felt that negotiations may have lead to something akin to the 4 points programme then they may well have not opposed such moves. Otherwise, without a demonstration of how Japan could be systematically destroyed it's hard to see them agreeing.

That rather misses the point though since the Allies didn't worry much about the possibility of a coup preventing negotiations. The Allies made it abundantly clear that they wanted unconditional surrender, the feelers put out by Japan talked about negotiating one. The official line from Tokyo was enough to put the allies off, the possibility of a coup was more a problem for the Emperor and men like Sato.

I stopped reading there, because this is simply untrue.

Agreed, some factions in Japan were willing to try and negotiate a peace. Its just that the peace they wanted to negotiate wasn't acceptable to the Allies and was frequently based on rather naive assumptions.

 

[ParkCungHee]

The Army didn't need to launch a coup to forestall peace negotiations, the War Council could legally prevent Japan entering a peace agreement unless the War Council unanimously agreed to it. The Army also held what amounted to a veto since the Council couldn't exist without an Army representative. If they had felt that negotiations may have lead to something akin to the 4 points programme then they may well have not opposed such moves. Otherwise, without a demonstration of how Japan could be systematically destroyed it's hard to see them agreeing.

That rather misses the point though since the Allies didn't worry much about the possibility of a coup preventing negotiations. The Allies made it abundantly clear that they wanted unconditional surrender, the feelers put out by Japan talked about negotiating one. The official line from Tokyo was enough to put the allies off, the possibility of a coup was more a problem for the Emperor and men like Sato.

That's a very, very good point, but couldn't Prime Minister Koiso himself take the position of Minister of War, being a Full General if push came to shove? I mean the army was hardly monolithically in favor of fighting.

Agreed, some factions in Japan were willing to try and negotiate a peace. Its just that the peace they wanted to negotiate wasn't acceptable to the Allies and was frequently based on rather naive assumptions.

Possibly. The problem is, no one will ever know what would have come of negotiations. But the fact that they were willing to means a moral obligation to try and end the war as quickly as possible, not only for the sake of the Japanese, but for the Chinese, Koreans, Indochinese etc. and moreover the point to this whole discussion is the "Invade Japan or Atomic Bomb/Firebombings" is largely a false dilemma. And considering the emphasis on the arguments of the importance of moral compromise to end the war quicker, you would think the possibility of a negotiated settlement would come up more often.

 

[Dachs]

Threads like this are why I avoid Second World War stuff.

 

[ParkCungHee]

Threads like this are why I avoid Second World War stuff.

I really need to start reading more pre-twentieth century stuff.
Your threads look so pleasant.

 

[Dachs]

I really need to start reading more pre-twentieth century stuff.
Your threads look so pleasant.

Okay, okay, fair enough, I got no room to talk. But still.

 

[Earthling]

At least the Jews aren't yellow.

Or led by "we refuse to trade technologies because WE would become too advanced" Tokuwaga.

I voted Yes but necessary.

 

[Imperialmajesty]

No that is people dying because someone decides that taking offense is reason to start a war. In fact if that's a good justification, you can say that Japan was entirely entitled to start it's war.
But really follow through the scenario you're outlining: We needed to burn Japanese cities to the ground, because if we didn't and negotiated with them, China, Indochina, Korea and/or Indonesia will start a war with Japan (presumably at a much, much, much later date) because they are so offended by the fact that we signed a treaty with them?
And for this remote possibility, we needed to extend the war by several months, kill countless Japanese civilians and American Citizens?


Argument ad Ignoranum.
Fine, since you're not actually interested in actually addressing my points, you can ask yourself, why in July of 1944 the Kodaha are out and the Toseiha are in?


Given what they were discussing? Most likely an end to the economic sanctions, a guarantee of Japanese Territorial Integrity (minus Korea, Manchuria, Taiwan, etc.) and a Guarantee not to interfere with the Tenno system.

Now you are just taking my words out of context. My point is, that America would lose any and all good will towards it in East Asia if it had negotiated a deal with the Japanese. I'm not saying for simply this reason things like firebombing should have been continued.


I am certainly not Arguing ad Ignoranum. You have failed to bring up the source, besides the title of a book. A quote would be nice.

Oh, Tojo resigned because of his handling of the war. Simple as that. Oh, and Tojo was a member of the Toseiha grouping, not the Kodaha. Even then, the Kodaha and Toseiha existing as meaningful factions ended after the 2.26 incident.

And if such an offer had been accepted by the allies, with Japan's cities not burned to the ground, the military would have launched a coup. I cite the historical example of the Kyujo incident. And, considering that Japan had not been pulverized, it probably would have succeeded.

Then what? Well, then you don't have the Emperor to announce the Gyokuon-hōsō, peace would be much harder to come by, and without the Emperor, even the firebombing and atomic bombs might not convince such a leadership to surrender.

 

[Imperialmajesty]

Okay, okay, fair enough, I got no room to talk. But still.

Who is the chick in your avatar?

 

[ParkCungHee]

Now you are just taking my words out of context. My point is, that America would lose any and all good will towards it in East Asia if it had negotiated a deal with the Japanese. I'm not saying for simply this reason things like firebombing should have been continued.

But America didn't care about Goodwill in East Asia. It largely spoiled that by Backing the French, Dutch and British in their colonies, backing Chiang in China, and backing Sygnman Rhee in Korea. Not to repeat the continued Japanese occupation.

I am certainly not Arguing ad Ignoranum. You have failed to bring up the source, besides the title of a book. A quote would be nice.

The entire book front to back is on the use of the Japanese Army as a police force in postwar asia. Every chapter, every page, is on that. Besides which, if you want to start abusing the burden of proof in a friendly board discussion, I would note that YOU haven't provided sources either.

Oh, Tojo resigned because of his handling of the war. Simple as that. Oh, and Tojo was a member of the Toseiha grouping, not the Kodaha. Even then, the Kodaha and Toseiha existing as meaningful factions ended after the 2.26 incident.

And if such an offer had been accepted by the allies, with Japan's cities not burned to the ground, the military would have launched a coup. I cite the historical example of the Kyujo incident.

Which was launched anyway.

And, considering that Japan had not been pulverized, it probably would have succeeded.

Considering it was launched with a single brigade, that seems unlikely. If so many Japanese were unwilling to surrender, you have to answer, why did so few of them continue to fight after the surrender announcement?
I mean, we seriously considered the possibility that the several million Japanese soldiers who had never been defeated in the field would have gone on fighting. But instead we get a single brigade, and a few lunatics like Hiroo Onada.
And again, if the potential of a coup is reason enough not to deal with a government, we wouldn't have made any agreements at all in that era. I mean, what would be the point of talking to Grandi, he was part of a coup a few weeks ago. In fact, why would we bother with accepting an unconditional surrender, surely people were more likely to revolt against a government doing that then a negotiated settlement, and the Kyujo incident was itself evidence that the government we were dealing with was unstable.

Then what? Well, then you don't have the Emperor to announce the Gyokuon-hōsō, peace would be much harder to come by, and without the Emperor, even the firebombing and atomic bombs might not convince such a leadership to surrender.

What makes you so certain such leadership COULD maintain it's position, especially after assaulting or killing the Emperor.

 

[Dachs]

Who is the chick in your avatar?

Michelle Branch. There's a link in my sig...

 

[Masada]

They would not unconditionally surrender. They fought on in the belief that it was possible to drag the war on long enough that the allies would come to the table, and make concessions. It wasn't an unreasonable belief.

When you've murdered hundreds of thousands of allied servicemen and millions of innocent civilians through forced labor for the construction of railways then you've abdicated any right to a negotiated peace. And that was only one aspect of the war which Imperial Japan had to pay for. It was every bit as pernicious as Nazi Germany and did not deserve anything approaching to accommodation for its actions.

This is because they were conducted by the Dutch and French. The Dutch and French almost immediately began warring with the native populations. Tell me how many thousands died in Taiwan, Korea, or Manchuria?

The forced acquisition of rice and other foodstuffs in Indonesia alone during the war contributed to the death by starvation of a between approximately a half million people. The use of forced labor by the Japanese contributed to perhaps another fifty thousand dead. And there are perhaps twenty thousand who were summarily executed by the occupation authorities as well. To my reckoning that is close to eight-hundred-thousand-people in Indonesia alone. Similar numbers are available for Burma and Malaysia with one railway project the Burma Railway -- also know as the 'Death Railway' -- resulting in the deaths by forced labor of 42,000 Burmese and 40,000 Malays. Remember this was mostly achieved during a relatively peaceful period for Indonesia, Burma and Malaysia -- allied forces were not major contributing factors to these deaths.

And obviously you have absolutely no understanding of the nature of the Dutch 'Police Actions' in Indonesia in 49'. The deaths were the direct result of the limited destruction of infrastructure (mostly by accident) and the disruption of the food supplies to major cities and populated centers. We now know what the Japanese plans were in the advent of an invasion of the army controlled section of Indonesia (which is broadly synonymous with the 'near islands') which can be summed up as the utter destruction of any and all infrastructure, specifically aimed at the destroying the economic potential of the main islands in order to deny the Dutch anything at all they might find useful and to create a situation which was conducive to starvation and deprivation in the hopes that resources would be diverted away from the war effort to fulfill humanitarian purposes. They also intended to torch most of the cities and towns. The Dutch 'Police Actions' were also conducted against the backdrop of an Indonesian agricultural sector which had recovered from the forced diversion of food, fertilizer, fuel and transport by the Japanese. If the allied invasion had been conducted while Japanese forces were in place and during the period where starvation was at its most acute even removing for the disruption to critical infrastructure the result is eminently predictable -- starvation on a scale which was simply not comparable to the Dutch actions in 49'.

The situation in Vietnam was broadly similar and the effects would similarly have been as deleterious. I don't think I need to go into further detail to explain why that might be the case, most of the pertinent examples have already been explained in the Indonesian section. I'm not even going to deign to explain the vast gulf of differences between Manchuria, Korea and Taiwan viz. the rest of Asia. Since I suspect your well aware of them and your well aware of the nature of the Japanese occupation -- including the wholesale attempt to destroy Korean and Taiwanese culture. But whatever.

But America didn't care about Goodwill in East Asia. It largely spoiled that by Backing the French, Dutch and British in their colonies, backing Chiang in China, and backing Sygnman Rhee in Korea. Not to repeat the continued Japanese occupation.

The Americans did not support the Dutch in their move to recapture the Nederlands-Indiëas as you seem to assert. They were ambivalent to the whole operation, did not support the use of violence and as time wore on and the Republic continued to resist they began to actively support a diplomatic solution favorable to the Republic. Sukarno placed little or no fault at America's feet and as the de-facto heart and conscience of the nation at time his word bore significant weight. The break-down between the United States and Sukarno's Indonesia only came after he suspended Parliamentary Democracy and replaced it with 'Guided Democracy' with Sukarno as the somewhat jovial and politically insecure President-cum-dictator.

I also believe your simplifying the situation in the future Malaysia and Burma. The former was largely supportive of a return of the British and did not resist in the least their return. The proclamation of the Malayan Union elicited at most annoyance at the reduction of the Princes powers and not a whit more. Even the opposition, amongst them the UMNO -- after 46' -- ,were broadly supportive of the direction that the colonial government under Sir Gent took with regards to independence. Besides, it didn't serve their interests to have the British withdraw after the beginnings of the Emergency either. Burma is even more complex, not only did a significant portion of the Burmese population welcome the British back, many did not want them to ever leave again -- for reasons which would become apparent with the fall of Democracy and its accompanying descent into civil war.

 

[Dragonlord]

All indiscriminate bombing of civilians is a war crime, IMO. I see a huge difference between unavoidable 'collateral damage' incurred while aiming at legitimate targets, and deliberately targeting civilians - no matter who does it to whom.

 

[say1988]

But the city was designed so that there was no real way to differentiate factories from residential areas (they were all mixed together and using even the best technology at the time it would cause massive damage to residential areas).

 

[privatehudson]

That's a very, very good point, but couldn't Prime Minister Koiso himself take the position of Minister of War, being a Full General if push came to shove? I mean the army was hardly monolithically in favor of fighting.

Possibly, I don't honestly know to be honest if he could or not. He resigned before the fire-bombing raids began in earnest though and also lacked popularity amongst both hawks and doves which tends to suggest that such a move would not be well received. Even if it could be forced through though the Big Six would almost certainly have still opposed a negotiated surrender without evidence that the Home Islands were under severe threat. Short of replacing them one by one with pliant representatives or undermining the power of the Big Six completely there was no easy way of getting past the group's belligerence.

Even that scenario presumes that the Emperor would have wanted to undermine or replace the War Cabinet and force a negotiated peace. Since it took months of air raids and other disasters for him to realise the futility of the conflict it doesn't seem likely that he'd consider such a drastic option without a visible, close to home demonstration of Allied supremacy. Much more likely would be him eventually attempting to persuade/order the existing members to accept his way forward (as he had to do in order to get many of them to agree to the actual surrender). The Emperor's view carried great weight, after all it was what helped keep hard-liners like Anami (who was still opposing surrender even after the Atom Bombs were dropped) in line and out of the camp of those who launched the coup. Whether he'd have quite as much clout trying to negotiate a surrender without the Atom Bombs and Air Raids is another matter.

Possibly. The problem is, no one will ever know what would have come of negotiations. But the fact that they were willing to means a moral obligation to try and end the war as quickly as possible, not only for the sake of the Japanese, but for the Chinese, Koreans, Indochinese etc. and moreover the point to this whole discussion is the "Invade Japan or Atomic Bomb/Firebombings" is largely a false dilemma. And considering the emphasis on the arguments of the importance of moral compromise to end the war quicker, you would think the possibility of a negotiated settlement would come up more often.

We cannot possibly be certain what would have occurred but like any counter-factual debate we can come up with a scenario based on the facts we do know. The balance of these facts suggests that without some form of attacks on the home islands a negotiated peace acceptable to both sides was all but impossible.

 

[xchen08]

Possibly. The problem is, no one will ever know what would have come of negotiations. But the fact that they were willing to means a moral obligation to try and end the war as quickly as possible, not only for the sake of the Japanese, but for the Chinese, Koreans, Indochinese etc. and moreover the point to this whole discussion is the "Invade Japan or Atomic Bomb/Firebombings" is largely a false dilemma. And considering the emphasis on the arguments of the importance of moral compromise to end the war quicker, you would think the possibility of a negotiated settlement would come up more often.

Let's get one thing straight here. There were no serious peace negotiations prior to the Atomic bombings, initiated by Japan or otherwise. The idea that there was, but it got scuttled by American intransigence due to either vengence seeking or wanting to demonstrate power to the SU is an urban myth common among anti-Americans. This myth is based on 2 main occurrences. The first is a peace feeler sent through the Soviet Union, which for whatever reason, was never passed on to the Western Allies. The second were the "negotiations" through the Japanese Naval attache to Switzerland between the U.S. OSS and Admiral Toyada of the Japanese Naval Ministry. This was the most serious of Japan's peace feelers, and Toyoda never even brought it up in Cabinet due to fear of Army opposition. Notice that this was in July of 45, just a few weeks before the Atomic bombings. There were a number of even more tentative feelers prior, but none were official, represented more than a handful of members of the Japanese Cabinet, or even gave serious terms. For example, they demanded Japan retain some of its holdings in China, and didn't even discuss letting go of Korea or Taiwan. They seemd to think that if they just return what they took from the U.S./UK, they could keep everything else.

 

[cool3a2]

I didn't voted as I am not familiar with that topic. Still, I have to say that what I am reading here is quite shocking. Some pretty morbide opinions here. I think this should have been closed after the first page. I mean, making that poll is okay, I'd say, but these statements... For example, no mentally healthy man should consider droping atomic bombs an option. Seriously. If you still do, you are morally not better then massmurders. The only difference between you and those are: they did these bad things - you only would. Furthermore, I wouldn't say that a warcrime automatically justifies another. That's "eye for an eye..."-philosophy which is simply wrong in my eyes.
Not enough, using words like 'Japs', lower the value of the Japanese and Hews under that of humans by saying things like 'at least they are not yellow' - that's racistic. And that's why this thread should have been closed. Sorry. Not to mention that I would have awaited more from users like Dachs for example whom I thought to be well educated.
I don't hate Americans and I don't believe in those prejudices about you guys, but you also have your corpses in your backyards. No need to speak that dismissive about others.

Sorry, if these things were meant ironically and if I misunderstood you guys. But then, guys, you should consider that this is very easily mistakable. At least for us foreigners who don't speak perfectly english.

 

[say1988]

For example, no mentally healthy man should consider droping atomic bombs an option.

Why not? Compared to firebombing it was probably more humane and likely had more of an impact on the Japanese leadership, mentally. It all depends on the situation.

 

[Lord Baal]

I didn't voted as I am not familiar with that topic. Still, I have to say that what I am reading here is quite shocking. Some pretty morbide opinions here. I think this should have been closed after the first page. I mean, making that poll is okay, I'd say, but these statements... For example, no mentally healthy man should consider droping atomic bombs an option. Seriously. If you still do, you are morally not better then massmurders. The only difference between you and those are: they did these bad things - you only would. Furthermore, I wouldn't say that a warcrime automatically justifies another. That's "eye for an eye..."-philosophy which is simply wrong in my eyes.
Not enough, using words like 'Japs', lower the value of the Japanese and Hews under that of humans by saying things like 'at least they are not yellow' - that's racistic. And that's why this thread should have been closed. Sorry. Not to mention that I would have awaited more from users like Dachs for example whom I thought to be well educated.
I don't hate Americans and I don't believe in those prejudices about you guys, but you also have your corpses in your backyards. No need to speak that dismissive about others.

Sorry, if these things were meant ironically and if I misunderstood you guys. But then, guys, you should consider that this is very easily mistakable. At least for us foreigners who don't speak perfectly english.

Most of the "yellow" references were indeed ironic, as were the Jewish references. Atomic bombs are a weapon of war, to be used or not as the situation warrants. No different than any other bomb, just way more powerful. And I don't recall anyone saying that one war crime justifies another.

 

[Dachs]

Not to mention that I would have awaited more from users like Dachs for example whom I thought to be well educated.
I don't hate Americans and I don't believe in those prejudices about you guys, but you also have your corpses in your backyards. No need to speak that dismissive about others.

Sorry, if these things were meant ironically and if I misunderstood you guys. But then, guys, you should consider that this is very easily mistakable. At least for us foreigners who don't speak perfectly english.

It wouldn't make a whole helluva lot of sense for me to be rasist against yellow people when my avatar is partly of Indonesian descent. No, I wasn't being serious earlier in the thread.

 

[Lord Baal]

It wouldn't make a whole helluva lot of sense for me to be rasist against yellow people when my avatar is partly of Indonesian descent. No, I wasn't being serious earlier in the thread.

So now you're claiming Indonesians are yellow, huh? RACIST! If anything, they're little brown brothers.