Maybe there can be some discussion on this...
It is another issue somewhat examined in the Theaetetos dialogue. In brief Socrates (while trying to attack the position he attributed to Protagoras) claims that there cannot be actually wrong statements or views by themselves (ie a person having a false view, but in earnest, will still be thinking of something other, true in itself or in his view).
Socrates argues that while one may easily (and routinely) be wrong in his view on things, he still will be wrong in thinking he was making a statement about the actual thing being discussed, but not wrong in what he thought he was discussing. Ie (to use a very very simple example) if one had in front of him a chair, but claimed it was a table, he would be wrong in our common defining system, but if he actually thought the chair was a table he would still be right in his own assumption. He would merely be talking about a different thing, of which he was right.
The question is tied to the ambiguity of what people more deeply regard as the terms they use, or even external realities. It rises from (source lost, but it is discussed in the dialogue) Protagoras' position that 'man is the meter of all things', which Socrates tries to attack as false but is aware of its tie to other established opinions on whether there is any stable or arcetypal reality/truth or not.
Another example, a bit more refined, is when some pupils go about writing a solution in a math problem, in some test.
Let's say the first pupil uses the formulae he was taught, and arrives at the solution asked for.
A second pupil is not good at remembering the lessons the test is based on, so makes a false progression there, but is (in theory) viewing the statements and terms in the test in a similar way as the first pupil was.
A third pupil sees the notions in the test differently, and builds up a solution according to what he thought the question was, a solution correct in his own impression of those terms, but false in the commonly agreed ones. We can say that the third pupil was in his own view also correct, and the phenomenon there is not about true or false in a system less defined than in the particular setting of the math or the test at that moment (keep in mind that math also is based on agreed terms, which aren't examined by pupils taught beyond a basic level, and ultimately are resting on unexamined axioms artificially bounding the system).
So the question on 'truth', when you are in a non-bounded system (eg abstract thought) is not as set, due to inherent ambiguities in the observers of that object examined as for its truth. Of course the other position in ancient Greek philosophy is the Parmenidian one, where some truth exists, eternal and changeless, but is entirely outside of any horizon of finite observers, such as humans.
It is another issue somewhat examined in the Theaetetos dialogue. In brief Socrates (while trying to attack the position he attributed to Protagoras) claims that there cannot be actually wrong statements or views by themselves (ie a person having a false view, but in earnest, will still be thinking of something other, true in itself or in his view).
Socrates argues that while one may easily (and routinely) be wrong in his view on things, he still will be wrong in thinking he was making a statement about the actual thing being discussed, but not wrong in what he thought he was discussing. Ie (to use a very very simple example) if one had in front of him a chair, but claimed it was a table, he would be wrong in our common defining system, but if he actually thought the chair was a table he would still be right in his own assumption. He would merely be talking about a different thing, of which he was right.
The question is tied to the ambiguity of what people more deeply regard as the terms they use, or even external realities. It rises from (source lost, but it is discussed in the dialogue) Protagoras' position that 'man is the meter of all things', which Socrates tries to attack as false but is aware of its tie to other established opinions on whether there is any stable or arcetypal reality/truth or not.
Another example, a bit more refined, is when some pupils go about writing a solution in a math problem, in some test.
Let's say the first pupil uses the formulae he was taught, and arrives at the solution asked for.
A second pupil is not good at remembering the lessons the test is based on, so makes a false progression there, but is (in theory) viewing the statements and terms in the test in a similar way as the first pupil was.
A third pupil sees the notions in the test differently, and builds up a solution according to what he thought the question was, a solution correct in his own impression of those terms, but false in the commonly agreed ones. We can say that the third pupil was in his own view also correct, and the phenomenon there is not about true or false in a system less defined than in the particular setting of the math or the test at that moment (keep in mind that math also is based on agreed terms, which aren't examined by pupils taught beyond a basic level, and ultimately are resting on unexamined axioms artificially bounding the system).
So the question on 'truth', when you are in a non-bounded system (eg abstract thought) is not as set, due to inherent ambiguities in the observers of that object examined as for its truth. Of course the other position in ancient Greek philosophy is the Parmenidian one, where some truth exists, eternal and changeless, but is entirely outside of any horizon of finite observers, such as humans.
He found it rather hard to accept that a dog in his yard was the same in the morning and in the evening, or when viewed from one angle or another, or when there was a passing shadow on it cast by a cloud, etc. And while abstraction there works in a human/set observer, and those instances are still deemed as the 'same' object (the dog there), it would not work for a very different observer.
