@ XEn, look at the statistics, and you will see that Hannibal's invasion of Italy during the Second Punic War seemed to be completely suicidal in nature.Rome wanted to fight the wars on the soil of its opponent. Rome also wanted the destruction of the Carthaginian empire and to expand (something that is clear in the way the initiated previous wars, the treaty with Saguntum and later wars). Rome had made that clear, not in words, but in deeds in the previous century (Rome always fought "defensive wars" during its existence, however flimsy the pretext). He also knew that he had a party in the Carthaginian Senate that was opposed to the war, almost solely because they were afraid of or opposed to the Barcid family. Which consequently left Hannibal on his own (in the end not that dissimilar as the situation that arose between Rommel in North Africa and the Italian High Command).
So Hannibal knew he had to fight, basically had to do it on his own, and had to take the fight to the Romans. [/quote[ exactley- and he failed to do that effectivlly- he fougth three battles, and then he lost his campaign in italy, because the Roman stratigists simply out witted him- they refused to give him (hannibal) what he needed to win his campaign, and that was firm feild battles.
This last part in order to prevent Roman troops from being sent to the Carthaginian lands... Yet it was also clear that the Romans controlled the seas, and that it was all but impossible to regain control, so the sole option to get to Italy was by land, through hostile territory, and live of the land. He also knew that using the coastal road to pass the Alps would mean a certain death, as he could be easily blocked, attacked from sea, and have troops landed in his rear. He also knew that he would not have the logistical capability to do it on his own, and mount a siege of Rome. So he saw as his best option to try and dissolve the Roman confederation, which was a reasonable assumption if one realizes that Rome had fought until recently numerous wars against its allies, and would do so again in the future (and actually lost in many respects). If he gained enough Italian allies, he would have the support and possibilities to lay siege to Rome.
and agian, he failed at this endeavor- not even the samnites, who woudl eventually rebell on thier own, later during the social wars, saw fit to join hannibal.
So Hannibal decided that he would have to out march the Romans, get into Italy before the Romans got into Spain, and destroy the Roman armies in order to both force troops to be recalled from abroad, and dissolve the Roman confederation.
and agian, he failed at this- which is the reason why he dosetn deserve to be on tthe list- your worship of hannibal dosent mean he was the all great general- he was a battlefeild genious, and a daring commander- but he was no grand stratagist.
And he did so in a masterly fashion, that has been bettered by no-one... (closest IMHO actually comes Xenophon with the withdrawal of his 10,000). He marched with maximum speed, through largely hostile territory with, if taken all into account, not that many losses at all... and basically was in Italy before the Romans knew what had happened. On a tactical level, he was awesome. He used the vulnerabilities of both the armies he opposed, and the commanders of those armies. His infantry was largely inferior (sole exception being the core of Spanish troops),
not really- the spanish troops were awesome, but the drilled infantry of mercenaries carthage was using was hardley somthign to snuff either mind you- as while they on thie rown could copare ot a Rome legionary, they were more then enough to be able to put hannibal in similer situation, infantrywise
and his only edge was his cavalry, which he put to very good use.
his cavalry, and spanish infantry both had the edge in both equpiment, and trianing
his sole miscalculation was the fact that the Roman allies mostly stayed loyal to Rome, even after the massive defeats... Yet he had Rome stretched to its breaking point...
not at all true- throuought the wars rome maintianed a multiple legion garrison of Sicilly, an dofcourse kept the iberian front well manned and maintianed, and still had enough troops left over to garrison the loyal parts of Italy
One of the reasons the Romans refused battle after Cannae was the fact that they could not afford any more big defeats,
not really- they just wiused up and saw that hanniabl could be defeated on the open battl efeild- which is whty they continued to persue hannibal, but by using attrition warfare
or they would be forced to give up their plan of operations, and have to recall their army form Spain.
more likelyl call ion the Sicillian legions, which woudl have been a disaster, since that woudl leave the sicillian seige yards open for invasion which woudl have given hannibal seige capabilties- unless he had gone to the trouble to make seige weapons in southern italy, which was perfectlyl possible, but somthign he didint bother to do.
and thats all assuming Rome couldnt find the manpower to equipp more legions; thats possible, but not extreasmlly likelly, theyed just create mor epenal legions- equipment was no problem, hannibal hardley controlled the width and bredth fo the country side, and resource operaitons essentially cotinued as needed
In major battles he was outnumbered by the Romans, stranded in a hostile land with no hope of retreat, reinforcement or even supply. Strategically it was a great move because the Romans expected the War to be fought in Iberia
and you seem to be forgetting, the war WAS fought in iberia- hannibal made a bloody crusade into italy that had no lasting effect other then to make the Roman better tacticians, and nothing else- it was the Romans, who waged a true war in Iberia, taking cities, and gathering allies, who waged the real "war" in the second punic war
, and they dispatched a force to fight him there... Hannibal then crossed the Alps (no small achievement in itself because of Barbarian tribes and the rugged terrain) and invaded Northern Italy, forcing his enemy onto the defensive. Hannibal also eluded and defeated three separate armies to trap him in their own territory. The idea of marching overland from Italy to Spain was a truly original thought, and put the seat of the war firmly in enemy territory. In total Hannibal waged war in Italy for Sixteen years with dwindling numbers of the same group of men, fefectors from the other Italian people were his only meathod of re-enforcing his numbers. Ff course in hindsight it looks bad because he was ultimately unsuccessful, but how can you not call this greatness?
I never said it wasnt- but you have to face facts- any one unsuccessful in acheiving any of thier strategic necessities for victory, no matte rhow brilliant the battle feild commander, nor how how brave or adventerous the man, cannot have a place on a list of great camapaigns- he failed.
Scipio campaigns were indeed impressive, but he was never able to match the genius that Hanibal had. Scipio reversed the situation because the reversed Hanibal's move. Sneaking into Iberia, he attacked the Carthaginians there.
he hardley snuck- the carthaginains knew point balnk he was thier, and were expecting him
In the north he would have the support of the locals, who had only just been subdued by Hannibal, which would give him a very secure base of operations. Scipio was a better general than the relatively tactically weak generals that Hanibal had stationed in Iberia to protect Carthaginian holdings. Furthermore, Carthagian Iberia was tired from many years of war. It wasn't that hard to defeat the people in Iberia, they were tired of war and easy to submit to Roman gold and " luvin' ". While Hannibal was busy trying to break the stalemate the annoying consul Marcellus had imposed in Italia, Scipio had a great time laying waste to the Carthaginian colonies in Iberia.
indeed- if hannibal truelly had an eye for the bigger picture, he woudl have expected a roman counter attack, and statione dbetter comamnder sin iberia- he didnt, and then once trapped in a stalemate in italy, the war fell apart fo rthe carthaginians
Not only that is my problem, but again inferior troops? What? Most of the Roman army was better equipped than the Carthaginian soldiers. A Roman Army is "point and click" because the troops were so well trained that, if you can imagine it, they can likely do it. Those guys could march and maneuver like no other.
your right- but that dosetn stop the equipment fo troops themselves, in this case, firmlly on hannibals side, being far superio impliment sof war- added with the skill fo the troops,a dn the fact that spanish infantry- whos movemnt s were fluid due to thie rnon ridgeid orginization, and the fact that the other elite of Hannibals army was cavalry, makes it clear that even in manuverbaility, the romans were outclassed
Romans had standardized training, and it showed. No one else had it again for 1,500 years.
indeed- but spansih warriors, and berber cavalry trianed from child brith to be warriors
The Roman 'steamroller' was very hard for the relatively lightly armed Carthaginian center to stop, and only a general of Hannibal's quality could truly do so, and Kartágo only had one of those.
Scipio, despite what you say, was a commander whom could match hannibal; he successfully took on the Iberian infantry. partially by beign wise enough to see what they were using was more effective then what the romans were using at the time, an dpartially be being a leval headed commander, who took advatage of a situation as he saw it
Thus, the Romans could break the Carthaginian center and mop up the flanks that remained. To top that off, Italia was a place that had a far higher attrition rate than Iberia, apparently. This might've been caused by Marcellus in Italia, but maybe also because of other factors. It was because of this that it was not very hard for Scipio to trod around Iberia at his leisure, only having to worry about major battles.
Scipio fought several major actions in Spain
Also, Italia was fully under Roman control, while only the southern, Mediterranean side of Iberia was under Carthaginian control. The Gallic tribes to the north also supported the Romans, as did the Celtiberan cities to the north of the Carthaginian-Iberian border.
and rome used this to its full advatge- hannibal had the oppertunity to get gallic tribnes on his side from northert italy, and he missed it, he had th eoppertunity to get the illyirans on hsi side, and he missed that too, and he finally missed his chance to swing Itallian allies on his- all he got in the end, as I have said before, were some of the souther greek cities
Furthermore, the Roman Senate actually supported its "men at the front", while the Carthaginian Senate was scared that Hannibal would misuse his position and become dictator. In other words, they were scared that their asses would land on the street instead of on a plush cushion. They convinced the rest of the oligarchy of Kartágo to send as little support to Hanibal as they could. And even without support from Carthage, he was tantalizingly close, yet so far.
so far is very right- he never came close to achiening any thing he needed to win the war.
His sole, and very understandable miscalculation was the fact that the vast majority of the Roman allies stayed loyal to Rome. Hannibal knew as well that Rome would destroy Carthago in due time, if he was not the one to take out Rome.A few different factors would have tipped the scale and the 2nd Punic War would have had a different outcome.
a few? how about the enitre war
THough he overcame quite a few impossibilities during his camaign, which makes it the best, but if you want to argue about the outcome of the war, all I can say is that he would have overcame the ultimate impossibility.
no, he wouldnt have; the only way carthage woudl have won was to take back its supply base in Iberia, and stop fooling around in italy, where they woudl never get a true victory, because the romans woudl just deny them of large scale battles.