Two WW2 questions

Just some petty sniping and nonsense. :)

Yes to both questions. Britain alone could have defeated Germany - as Cheezy said, they'd simply starve them out - let alone with US help, and Russia was much stronger than Nazi Germany. Its economy also wasn't crumbling, unlike Germany's.

Well I suggested it was possible, depending on the timing and circumstances.

As other people have already said though, the main question is one of timing. Germany damn near defeated Russia simply because of Russia's incredibly piss-poor defensive efforts in the months following Barbarossa, until Zhukov and others began to get their act together.

A major problem was the Stalin lackeys in charge of the Army during that time, principally Voroshilov. There are few people in Soviet history I hate more than Klement Voroshilov; every thing he touched failed, and he stank of boot-licking and arrogance. Timoshenko wasn't really a poodle, but he wasn't a great high-command guy, and he was one of the few that Stalin trusted before Zhukov proved himself at Leningrad. But even putting him in charge was a huge gamble, and he wasn't without his screwups.

If Germany hadn't made some of its rather large mistakes in the Eastern Front, they may actually have pulled out a victory there, though it's doubtful.

I really don't think so.

There's also the question of how the Allies would go about invading Continental Europe without Soviet help. Presumably through North Africa, but a Germany without a Soviet threat to its East may well have flooded troops into French North Africa to forestall such a move. Despite common belief, Erwin Rommel could never have conquered Egypt no matter how many troops and supplies he was given, because El Alamein was impassable.

The bigger problem was his horrid supply lines. He stopped at El-Alamein primarily because his supplies had to come over land on rickety dirt roads from Tunisia.


A more interesting counter-factual is what would happen if the USSR joined the Axis, as once seemed likely? As a willing and equal partner, not merely to buy time to prepare itself for war?

This was the only purpose of the Soviets ever proposing the idea in the first place.

That is the only realistic situation in which Hitler would not still keep numerous forces along the Soviet frontier to forestall an invasion, even if Operation: Barbarossa never went head. Leaving the German-Soviet frontier undefended would be an invitation for a preemptive strike by Stalin, who had to know that he would be on Germany's hit-list eventually.

This had been the understanding since 1924, and was the major driving force behind all major developments in the USSR after 1927.
 
Just some petty sniping and nonsense. :)
When aren't your posts full of petty sniping and nonsense? :p :mischief:

Well I suggested it was possible, depending on the timing and circumstances.
Possible, yes, but unlikely.

A major problem was the Stalin lackeys in charge of the Army during that time, principally Voroshilov. There are few people in Soviet history I hate more than Klement Voroshilov; every thing he touched failed, and he stank of boot-licking and arrogance. Timoshenko wasn't really a poodle, but he wasn't a great high-command guy, and he was one of the few that Stalin trusted before Zhukov proved himself at Leningrad. But even putting him in charge was a huge gamble, and he wasn't without his screwups.
I think Stalin himself was a bigger problem than his lackeys. After all, he put them in their positions. And I agree, Zhukov was capable of glaring mistakes on occasion. He was also an, ah, interesting theorist. I presume you've come across his opinion on how to tackle minefields in the past? Quite possibly the origin of the story about Russia just sending unwashed hordes at their enemies until they overwhelmed them.

I really don't think so.
I doubt it myself, but it's possible. They'd definitely blown it after they attacked the Kiev Army Group instead of focusing on Moscow, which they at least had a slim chance of taking.

The bigger problem was his horrid supply lines. He stopped at El-Alamein primarily because his supplies had to come over land on rickety dirt roads from Tunisia.
A bigger problem was having planes operating from Malta destroying half of his supplies before they arrived. But his supply lines would never be as good as the British possessed, which means he could never break trough the pass at El-Alamein. Short of the British stupidly abandoning the pass - admittedly, given the calibre of several British commanders in this period, that's possible - Rommel could never break through. Even in a game of Civ II you need to lay down some railroads from Tunis to Tobruk if you want to take Egypt. Rommel couldn't have broken through El-Alamein even if he had all the supplies he desired.

This was the only purpose of the Soviets ever proposing the idea in the first place.
I tend to think so myself, but the sheer attractiveness of the offer has always intrigued me. I'd have taken it if I were Hitler.

This had been the understanding since 1924, and was the major driving force behind all major developments in the USSR after 1927.
1927? That seems a little early, since there was a chance that Germany could go Communist at that time. Do you mean a war with Germany specifically, or just the West in general?
 
The West in general. 1927 was the year they gave the go-ahead for the first Five Year Plan, which represents the abandonment of hope for a European revolution in the near future (something that had been a very real possibility after 1916). The real "point," so to speak, of the Russian revolution was to make permanent gains against the bourgeoisie while they had the capability to, and to then either wait for, or help create, the real revolution in the much more developed West, which would then end the war if it was still being waged, and turn and help Russia come up to speed with them. The possibility of revolution no longer being considered by the Soviets, they accepted that they had to do it themselves, at least, for the meantime. The Westerners were returning, either as socialist brothers to build socialism in the USSR, or as imperialist invaders, to destroy socialism where they had failed to do so before (Civil War). The possibility of the former was gone, so only the latter remained.

The above paragraph is, essentially, a summary of the mindset of Soviet policy for the entirety of its existence. You must always see it through that lens, because that is how they saw things.
 
I always see people either saying that without the US Europe would be speaking German now and the usual response to that seems to be that it was the Soviet Union who did all the work and that the USSR would of won with or without the allies helping. So what is everyone opinion on this?

I'll put it this way (without what ifs) : the Wehrmacht was defeated by the Red Army,
and the Eurpoean war was decided at Kursk. D-day had zero to do with whether or
not Germany would be defeated, but it's the reason all of Europe did not wind up speaking Russian, and definitely shortened the war. The US/UK did play an important
part in winning, but mostly by Lend-Lease aid to the Soviets (especially raw materials, Jeeps, trucks, and transport aircraft), and the bomber offensive against Germany
which diverted a good deal of the Luftwaffe away from the Red Air Force (the Germans lost more fighters over Germany in the first half of July 1943 than they did in
Russia, even with Kursk raging).
 
Scenario #1: Germany does not declare war on the United States after Pearl Harbor.

The Battle of Britain has still decimated the Luftwaffe and sucked enormous amounts of resources and manpower. The Germans still have to defend North Africa and other areas from Great Britain. The Soviet Union, even with the loss of Moscow is able to continue the war and the United States enters the war, later, anyway.

Conclusion: Germany loses, but is over-run by the Western Allies before the Soviet Union can recover. Poland and most of Eastern Europe are still over-run by communism. The Cold War still happens.



Scenario #2: The Allies throw Poland under the bus.

The full force of the German war machine is concentrated to the East. The Soviet Union is completely over-run before Winter and ethnic cleansing begins. It is entirely likely that they spare most of USSR in Asia, whilst consuming the European portion. Later expansions might occur.

Conclusion: The USSR ceases to exist as we know it and the Third Reich lives to see the atomic age, but the death of Adolf Hitler leads to substantial change when Herman Goering takes over. The successive decades of dictatorship likely lead to the collapse of the Third Reich due to instability and popular uprisings (circa 1955 - 1980).




Scenario #3: Germany does not invade the Soviet Union and instead concentrates its efforts on consolidation of its new territory and the war effort against Great Britain. They do NOT declare war on the United States after Pearl Harbor.

Germany continues attacks on British shipping and a limited offensive air war, but never attempts an invasion. The war continues for another two or three years. No significant advances are made by either side, other than in Africa, which Germany and Italy consume.

Conclusion: Winston Churchill is removed from power and the new government sues for peace, which Germany accepts. Germany eventually collapses as indicated in my last conclusion (Circa 1955 - 1970).




Scenario #4: Germany does not invade the Soviet Union and instead concentrates its efforts on consolidation of its new territory and a toned-down effort against Great Britain. They do declare war on the United States after Pearl Harbor.

The Allies focus on stabilizing the British positions at home and in Africa. Advancing technology slowly defeats the U-boat threat and the pressure on the British people is relieved. Strategic bombing on Germany is conducted and is somewhat less successful than IRL. The Allies, in this scenario, focus on Japan, all but defeating them as early as 1944, allowing for the concentration of resources to be redirected to the European Theatre. A massive build-up of as many as ten million troops begins with as many as three landing points. Atomic weapons end the war in Japan, in 1945. Germany, under an increasingly deluded Adolf Hitler refuses to surrender. Hitler is eventually assassinated in a successful plot and the new government agrees to terms to ending the war, which leads to essentially the Germany we have today.

Conclusion: Germany loses the war and a Versailles II-style treaty reduces its abilities and power, once more. I could not say with any degree of certainty if the US would deploy nuclear weapons in Europe. I don't think they would, if they managed to establish a secure position on the mainland. The Soviet Union would enter the war once Germany was weakened and claim most of Eastern Europe and we have the Cold War, anyway.
 
I'll put it this way (without what ifs) : the Wehrmacht was defeated by the Red Army,
and the Eurpoean war was decided at Kursk. D-day had zero to do with whether or
not Germany would be defeated, but it's the reason all of Europe did not wind up speaking Russian, and definitely shortened the war. The US/UK did play an important
part in winning, but mostly by Lend-Lease aid to the Soviets (especially raw materials, Jeeps, trucks, and transport aircraft), and the bomber offensive against Germany
which diverted a good deal of the Luftwaffe away from the Red Air Force (the Germans lost more fighters over Germany in the first half of July 1943 than they did in
Russia, even with Kursk raging).
The war was over long before Kursk. Kursk was a slaughterhouse, but hardly war-breaker. Germany had lost long before.

@JohnRM: What makes you think Germany could overrun the USSR or British Africa? It was significantly weaker than both powers in both regions.
 
The war was over long before Kursk. Kursk was a slaughterhouse, but hardly war-breaker. Germany had lost long before.

@JohnRM: What makes you think Germany could overrun the USSR or British Africa? It was significantly weaker than both powers in both regions.

Certainly Germany could have taken British (North) Africa, if they had made it first priority. Instead of attacking Russia after the Balkan Campaign, make a deal with Turkey, cross the Bosporus and roll up the Levant and Egypt from the north. No problem.
I very much doubt that would have won them the war though - Churchill would have fought on with or without the Suez Canal. Also, with the main German forces in North Africa, Stalin would probably have seized the opportunity and attacked Germany himself.
 
The war was over long before Kursk. Kursk was a slaughterhouse, but hardly war-breaker. Germany had lost long before.

True in the sense that even before Kursk Germany had no hope of winning. I still
think Kursk was the battle that pushed the German position from "at least the
possiblility of stalemate" to "definitely going to lose" because the divisions that
might have allowed them to maintain a stable Eastern Front were wrecked at Kursk.
 
Certainly Germany could have taken British (North) Africa, if they had made it first priority. Instead of attacking Russia after the Balkan Campaign, make a deal with Turkey, cross the Bosporus and roll up the Levant and Egypt from the north. No problem.
Not a chance in hell. A deal with Turkey was never possible through anything but the threat of force if Turkey didn't play ball. Turkey was courted by both sides for the duration of the war, and calmly ignored both sides until March 1945. Any threat that would have forced Turkey to allow the transit of German troops through their territory would have guaranteed an immediate Soviet response - if you think they'd calmly allow the Germans to seize control of the Zone of the Straits then you are a fool or completely ignorant of geopolitics - in addition to having the British rush troops into Vichy-controlled Syria and Lebanon to block the Germans there. The latter actually happened when the Axis attempted to supply the pro-Axis Iraqi regime through the French colonies. The British and Free French forces encountered more problems with the Vichy troops in the area than they did with the over-stretched Germans. The Germans didn't have a hope in hell of taking North Africa, even with a genius like Rommel in charge.

I very much doubt that would have won them the war though - Churchill would have fought on with or without the Suez Canal. Also, with the main German forces in North Africa, Stalin would probably have seized the opportunity and attacked Germany himself.
Taking North Africa and the Middle East would certainly have won Germany the war, as they would have been able to strike at Stalin with far more ease than Stalin could strike at them in this situation. Think for a second about where exactly the Caucasian oil fields are in relation to Turkey and pro-Axis Iran. What was impossible was the Germans taking the territories to begin with.

True in the sense that even before Kursk Germany had no hope of winning. I still
think Kursk was the battle that pushed the German position from "at least the
possiblility of stalemate" to "definitely going to lose" because the divisions that
might have allowed them to maintain a stable Eastern Front were wrecked at Kursk.
I tend to agree with this assessment. I think I mentioned that Kursk pretty much eliminated the chance of a negotiated peace, at least with the Russians.
 
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