Which is still a lot further than a lot of other historians - good ones, like Glantz, Hillgruber, and Showalter - would go. Your opinion may be valid (and I certainly lack the knowledge or interest to argue with you about it) but it certainly isn't unchallengeable.
It's not unchallengeable, but
most - yes, I"m aware of the weasel-words nature of what I just said - of the recent historiography on the period is of the mind that Germany wasn't getting out of the war without an occupation after Yalta, possibly earlier. A successful assassination of Hitler combined with a separate peace with the USSR - Stalin kept the option open, though most believe this was merely to use as a bargaining chip with the West -
might have kept the door open to some sort of limited occupation, like in the Rhineland after WWI, but that's likely the best option they had.
Even so, yeah, that characterization of you might be an exaggeration. It's hard to tell, because you've clearly been of at least two minds of this in the past few years; you've said that "history is contingent" and "nothing is inevitable" and then within a few hours you say something like this:
To be fair, the altar boy was much more uncompromising on that sort of thing than you have been. I was really thinking more about him.
That's not so much that I am of two minds, it's more that I tend to say "this is not possible" rather than "this is unlikely." My own fault, but it's not like I'm alone in that. I've seen you do it yourself, on occasion.
So why couldn't the Germans do the same? Weren't they starving and cold and short on supplies?
You mean why couldn't they supply their forces during the invasion of the USSR? The problem was not the supply lines, which were probably better for the German invasion of the USSR than the Soviet counterattack, but the fact the Germans didn't have any supplies to send.
Barbarossa was, by necessity, meant to be over within three months, because the Germans only had enough supplies to cover their invasion for three months, give or take. It wasn't a very well-planned invasion - though the
execution was superb - but it was intended as a surprise attack, and that part went very smoothly. Germany got the majority of its supplies from the USSR under the terms of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and other treaties. By going to war with the USSR, Germany forfeited that source of supplies, which meant they needed to acquire control of said supplies by force before it ran out of its stockpiles. It didn't.