What if ... Napoleon had won?

[storealex]

Very interesting discussion. Well, I wouldn't say my knowledge about this subject is as extensive as yours, so I'll just say what most historians say:

Napoleon was definitly a great statesman and general, he was a good organiser, and he invented many things we to day take for granted, but he also had flaws and this eventually lead to his downfall.
About Waterloo, the historians I've read says that in this battle he show none of his earlier brilliance.
________
HERBALAIRE REVIEW

 

[Birdjaguar]

If you have read Chandler and still believe that Wellington and Napoleon were equals, then I know that there is little I can say to persuade you otherwise.

History may be a poor judge, but in the long run its the only judge. Patton, Rommel, Montgomery, Lee, Jackson, Grant all are far to recent to be fully evaluated for a final place, but I don't think any of them will be regarded by history as major contributors to the art and science of war. They are all rather like Wellington: important for what they did at the time and recognized for their skills. The WWII guys will remain prominent (whether they deserve it or not) because they are associated with the defeat of Hitler and as long as he remains significant, they will also.

 

[privatehudson]

If you have read Chandler and still believe that Wellington and Napoleon were equals, then I know that there is little I can say to persuade you otherwise.

I place different emphasis than he and you do on certain things, I agree with much of what he says, but analysis wise I look for other qualities in my leaders.

Patton, Rommel, Montgomery, Lee, Jackson, Grant all are far to recent to be fully evaluated for a final place, but I don't think any of them will be regarded by history as major contributors to the art and science of war.

So because they came later their ability or eventual judgement is lessened because someone else already laid the foundations? Sorry, but I disagree with this form of analysis entirely. What you're talking about is contribution to history, not talent or ability. That's entirely seperate matters

About Waterloo, the historians I've read says that in this battle he show none of his earlier brilliance

Entirely true, though appologists usually come up with a few dozen exuses for why this is and even manage to blame his subordinates too Fact was his tactics when he showed them were little short of frontal assault time and again.

 

[Birdjaguar]

There are two concepts here. I think we are answering two different questions.

1) If we ask "Does General X qualify as a superior general/leader when compared to his contemporaries or others?" we will get answers that, as you have pointed out, can be very subjective. You like Wellington, in part, because he was British. I favor Lee and Jackson, in part, because they were Americans. Neither of us I presume would include Mack or McClellan on our top ten list.

If we asked the question "Who would you include in a list of the top 10 generals of all time?" of forum members and compiled the results from 100 members would probably see some consensus about who we all felt were the best of history's generals.

2) Now if we ask a different question: "List the five leader/comanders who you feel have most significantly contributed to our knowledge and understanding of how to conduct war. And again collect 100 sets of responses. We will most likely get a different consensus. But, I suspect that most of these would be included the first set of lists. This list should be less subjective if the responders have some level of knowledge beyond basic.

Originally posted by privatehudson

So because they came later their ability or eventual judgement is lessened because someone else already laid the foundations? Sorry, but I disagree with this form of analysis entirely. What you're talking about is contribution to history, not talent or ability. That's entirely seperate matters

Exactly my point! Do you know who conducted the second human heart transplant? Is that person a worse heart surgeon than the first guy? Could the second guy actually be a better heart surgeon? Maybe. Who will go in the history books for developing the techniques for heart transplant surgery? Doctor #1. Which guy actually paved the way for improved health care? Dr. #1.

Talent and ability can make a great commander. And being later in time should not keep a commander off of the top ten posited above, if they showed skill, tenacity, whatever. In a limited number of cases great commanders contribute to history at a trancendant level in what they teach us about warfare. Like our heart surgeon above. These are the guys on list 2.

Would Naopleon be on your top 10 list? If so where? Who would you put on the second list?

Maybe we should ask the forum.

 

[wurkwurk]

Sure, I'll give in. My top ten list (though not in order):
Napoleon
Wellington
Fredrick the Great
Lee
Hannibal
Jackson
Marlborough
Wolfe
Alexander
& Davout

 

[privatehudson]

List the five leader/comanders who you feel have most significantly contributed to our knowledge and understanding of how to conduct war

That's not how I rate generals though, I see your point, but I consider generals based on their talent and performances depending on the factors against them. In regards to the above I consider what you might call "the art of war" to either be far to generalised to be attributed to any one person, or far too specific to one period to be useful to another general. Whatever Napoleon did or did not write down, whatever Caesar and Alexander did, I consider their contributions to be of little overall value to anything either outside their period, or to be very much a case of common sense to begin with. Much of what Napoleon codified was nothing especially new or especially brilliant, and whilst you may wish to attribute genius to those facts, I rather prefer not to. The essential problem with labelling genius based on the art of war theory is that it relies more on the General's reputation and people's knowledge of him than it does his actual talent. All 3 of those you mention are extremely good soldiers and commanders, however, I don't personally consider brilliance to be based on an ability to write down what has almost always been practised, or to publicise his abilities better than others.

Exactly my point! Do you know who conducted the second human heart transplant? Is that person a worse heart surgeon than the first guy?

Warfare changes, only the blindingly obvious remains the same. The talents of one general cannot IMO be removed just because someone happened to be a very capable general hundreds of years ago. The situations of the past are of use to the present, but ultimately, it must be for each generation to provide it's own rules on war outside of the textbook theories and studies of campaigns that may not be relevant to the situation.

So in that respect, I have no list two. Alexander etc were extremely good generals, however, their ability to teach the modern period about anything the modern period can't figure out in the first place from common sense is to me limited. I've not really thought about an overall top ten either as I prefer to divide it into periods. One commander may have been extremely capable at his time, Napoleon for example, but in another time period, with armies more rigid and a moral code less free his performances may have been much worse. That's why I move away from sweeping the whole of history as I don't believe that one man can transcend the entire history of man and have such an impact.

Of course all the above is just my personal take, each to their own naturally

Co-incidentally, if there's one thing I definately admire Napoleon on, it was his ability to run an empire from one man and his attention to detail. Cynics claim that a quick word with the Regiment's officers helped his "memory" of his men of course, but given his rather remarkable ability to deal with Minute detail whatever the subject that seems unlikely. Then again, Napoleon's style of government and situation enforced this in a way.

Just reading an excellent book on the 1809 campaign at the moment. What's remarkable is the stake he placed on events there and what would have happened had he failed. Had he fallen at Rattisbon rather than be wounded slightly his army, campaign and state would almost certainly have been lost. Or had lost Wagram as badly as he did Aspern Essling for another example, just how badly that would have damaged his position. As he himself said, (roughly, I'm paraphrasing ) he ruled by victory, glory and fear, lack of any destabalised his position.

Oh and on comparing the two (Wellington/Napoleon)... well Napoleon once did apparently. When first hearing of Wellington's skilled retreat before Massena in 1810 he remarked "My god! there is a man for you" and concluded by admiring his ability to retreat before a larger army and still inflict punishing losses at every turn. He concluded saying "all of europe, only Wellington and I are capable of carrying out such measures". Rare praise indeed from Napoleon.

 

[Birdjaguar]

Originally posted by privatehudson

I have no list two... I've not really thought about an overall top ten either as I prefer to divide it into periods.

You seem to be saying that becaue each period of history is different, with changing military and social norms, that commanders should only be compared to others within their period and not compared to others from another place and time.

I presume then that:
Wellington and Marlborough should be treated separately.
Patton should be compared to Rommel and not Jackson or AD Charles.

How would you divide up history to slot the commanders?

 

[privatehudson]

Nice to see such a long post reduced to two comments

You seem to be saying that becaue each period of history is different, with changing military and social norms, that commanders should only be compared to others within their period and not compared to others from another place and time.

Not exactly, I see value to comparing their abilities, what types of operations they faced, their record, their attitudes and their situation, but no value in attributing genius on top of this for something that nearly all great military commanders showed. Taking something like art of war and handing it's creation to 3 or 4 people based on their writings or fame is not a true picture to me.

I don't think the comparisons cross-period can go too far though as it is hard to compare Alexander's speed of conquest with Hitlers for obvious reasons as an example. However you could compare Alexander's ability to problem solve and his bravery with another commander and see how they match up.

As for periods, I've always followed the loose wargames ones which combine time period sometimes with location and to me are (roughly)

Ancients
Medieval
Renaissance
18th Century
Napoleonic
American Civil War
Colonial
Franco-Prussian (and other inter-european wars of the latter 19th cent)
WWI
WWII
Modern

Obviously there's crossovers in there in terms of mindsets and personalities, for example, early napoleonic campaigns fell in the 18th Century. but I'm sure you can work those out I'm sure you could have lots of fun poking holes in the list, but such is life

 

[Birdjaguar]

Originally posted by privatehudson

Just reading an excellent book on the 1809 campaign at the moment. What's remarkable is the stake he placed on events there and what would have happened had he failed. Had he fallen at Rattisbon rather than be wounded slightly his army, campaign and state would almost certainly have been lost. Or had lost Wagram as badly as he did Aspern Essling for another example, just how badly that would have damaged his position.

The Napoleonic Wars were transitional inmany ways, including that after 1815, I don't recall any Head of State (European) commanding any army in the field in the manner of Napoleon, Tzar Alexander, Fredrick the Great, Alexander etc. Of course the death of a nation's ruler in battle would hamper his cause. Had Alexander died at Granicus River, where he was saved from death by Spithridates, big ripples: no empire, no Ptolomey's in Egypt, no Cleopatra, etc.

Robert Crowley edited a book called "What If?" that has 20 essays by noted historians. Each makes a slight change to some event and then rewrites the future from there. Ancient through WW2. Well done and interesting.

Napoleon understood that and gambled his life and his empire on his ability to manage his campagins and battles. He was confident (some would say arrogant) in his intellect, charisma and leadership to do so for almost 20 years. He was a risk taker. Had he accepted the offered peace in early 1814, it would have been a different Europe. That was the moment when his judgement failed him. Of course, it is easy to see that now.

 

[privatehudson]

Robert Crowley edited a book called "What If?" that has 20 essays by noted historians. Each makes a slight change to some event and then rewrites the future from there. Ancient through WW2. Well done and interesting.

Got both it and it's follow on

And of course the empire would have collapsed without Napoleon, I mentioned it as a side issue, I find more interesting the political issues surrounding it and what may have happened had Wagram gone awry (quite likely considering the tactics used were pretty blunt). Though Prussia was subdued and far from ready for conflict for example, the king had been considering rising (as they did in 1813) from the ashes soon after any such reversal. Though Russia was technically an ally, and even declared war on Austria, she never fought in 1809 and barely even pretended to either. It's not stretching the imagination too far to asume that a decisive defeat at Wagram could have considerably affected the wars overall. Not to the extent of the Russian campaigns of course, but still a desperate issue.

The book also does a good analysis of the Austrian army and thinking during the war and how they had come to develop their forces and tactics to counter French styles. It's analysis of Charles (who it calls Karl IIRC) is also good as it covers much of his thought process at the time.

was confident (some would say arrogant) in his intellect, charisma and leadership to do so for almost 20 years

Indeed, the book makes the point that 1809 was the year in which he showed the first real signs of overconfidence/arrogance in his campaign styles and judgements of his enemies.

Had he accepted the offered peace in early 1814, it would have been a different Europe. That was the moment when his judgement failed him. Of course, it is easy to see that now.

Hmmm I'd say his judgement failed him when he broke his own theory on the Russian invasion and marched all the way to Moscow and so on too myself Also he showed a rather severe lack of understanding and sympathy for his marshals and brother over the whole penninsula wars expecting to be able to issue orders from afar and refusing to take the bull by the horns. Amongst other errors of course

 

[Birdjaguar]

Looking back on battles from a comfortable distance, we rarely assign any bad judgement to winners and usually blame the lossers for not seeing what is clear to those analysing the situation after the fact.

The decisions in 1812 and 1814 were very different. The campaign in Russia ended badly, but I suspect that Napoleon made the decision to invade based on his best understanding of what the possible outcomes could be. I think that when the campaign started in June there were a variety of outcomes that he foresaw and any one of several would have led to victory (ie. a peace deal with Alexander in Frances's favor). He was top dog at this point. By September the opportunities for a victory of any sort (diplomatic or military) to take shape had diminished significantly. So the question in September was how to force a win or how extricate himself from the campaign.

In 1814 he was offered peace. The terms were known. There was no uncertainty associated with a future campaign or how his army would fight. He decided to gamble on his own ability rather than accept a peace deal that kept him on the throne but diminished his position.

As far a Spain goes, Napoleon understood that it was a secondary arena. His Empire did not rest on victory in Spain. His enemies were Austria, Prussia, Russia and England. his talents were better utilized elsewhere. How many years did it take Wellington to fight his way across northern Spain? It was a sideshow of small armies and lesser importance. Had the French beat the English in Spain, it would not have changed the situation elsewhere in Europe. Would England have made peace? I doubt it. Napoleon abdicated in 1814 because he lost against the combined armies of Russians, Prussians and Austrians.

In hindsight it is easy to say he should have done this or that. I thnk he did what most leaders would have done: he kept trying to fing the right marshal who could keep the lid on things if not win outright. Spain wasn't the main event and Napoleon was a "main event" kinda guy.

 

[Birdjaguar]

Originally posted by privatehudson


The book also does a good analysis of the Austrian army and thinking during the war and how they had come to develop their forces and tactics to counter French styles. It's analysis of Charles (who it calls Karl IIRC) is also good as it covers much of his thought process at the time.

Indeed, the book makes the point that 1809 was the year in which he showed the first real signs of overconfidence/arrogance in his campaign styles and judgements of his enemies.

What is the book?

 

[privatehudson]

The decisions in 1812 and 1814 were very different. The campaign in Russia ended badly, but I suspect that Napoleon made the decision to invade based on his best understanding of what the possible outcomes could be.

Ahhh, but I never criticised the invasion, but the continued campaigning at such length against his own plan for the campaign. He planned a quick campaign with a shattering of the Russian army close to the border, he failed to do this. Having failed, he should not have allowed himself to be drawn onto Moscow and Borodino. IMO he should have withdrawn and called it a day. I personally wouldn't have invaded Russia myself, but it was still possible to suceed. Once he failed in his basic ideal though, he should not have followed the Russians to his army's doom.

As far a Spain goes, Napoleon understood that it was a secondary arena

Only at the time, afterwards he admitted that the loss of prestige and the impression of vulnerability that the British caused in Spain helped quite considerably towards his downfall.

His enemies were Austria, Prussia, Russia and England. his talents were better utilized elsewhere

That only applies to when he had to fight elsewhere, which begs the question as to what he did in 1810 and 1811 that was so damnably important (other than being dad oh and preparing for Russia in 1811) that drew his talents away. Fact is that instead of Russia, Napoleon could have crushed Spain by entering the arena and uniting the armies present (which were sufficient to do the job most of the time) to overwhelm the British. Or he could have pulled out of Spain/Portugal all together, though loss of prestige again prevented him taking that sensible solution to the problem there. Again a case of prestige playing aganist strategic choice.

How many years did it take Wellington to fight his way across northern Spain?

That's hardly the point, a lesser commander would never have managed it in the first place Wellington was beset with problems and heavily outnumbered for most of the years before he crossed spain finally. When he did overrun Spain though, that was a quick campaign. Wellington was not in the position were he could gamble, his was not the position of massed numbers or sole power.

It was a sideshow of small armies and lesser importance

Not according to Napoleon after the wars

Had the French beat the English in Spain, it would not have changed the situation elsewhere in Europe

Actually, in a way it would have. The British public were not quite so supportive of the war as we perhaps think they might have been. The cost of the conflict was astronomical and fell inevitabely to the people. The people needed to see results for their money, and patriotism demanded British involvement. Wellington loosing and being driven from the peninsula would have left Spain/Portugal without anyone to support their geurilla activities and the British Government with little to show for their expenditure. Whilst the British may have stayed in the war, it's equally possible the unpopular taxation may have brought a lessening of subsidies to the continent. And whilst it's important to remember that more than British gold brought the continent into the wars, it's also important to remember that more often than not, many of the powers on the continent relied on those subsidies to fight. Inevitably, the peninsula mattered, subtle ways perhaps, but still important.

Also, if you take the 2nd abdication, as you said, who else but Wellington could have held Waterloo? Would Wellington have even been in command if Spain and Portugal had not been his proving ground?

In hindsight it is easy to say he should have done this or that. I thnk he did what most leaders would have done: he kept trying to fing the right marshal who could keep the lid on things if not win outright. Spain wasn't the main event and Napoleon was a "main event" kinda guy.

Which still leaves the question of 2 years without involvement. Napoleon still interfered in the war anyway from afar and refused to promote one overall leader in the country to resolve the issue once and for all leaving infighting and jealousy to destroy many of the better campaigns. He didn't just ignore the area, he paid attention to it, but refused to pay either enough attention, or to leave it in the hands of someone who could.

 

[Birdjaguar]

You’re back to second guessing Napoleon after the fact, to stake a claim that he wasn’t such a great general after all. Any student of military history enjoys re-fighting great battles and doing better than the guy that lost. I don’t know if you are old enough to have enjoyed the board wargames of 70s and 80s, but I am and there is nothing better than kicking the snot out of Meade at Gettysburg or recreating Davout’s expert action at Auerstadt. Armchair generals have it easy and dead generals are easy targets.

Looking back we all can imagine how we would have done things. As you said, even Napoleon looked back and decided that he should have handled Spain differently. I’m sure Wellington refought the Peninsula campaign and battle of Waterloo many times. Wellington was a bright guy. He did what he did during battles based on the best information he had at the time. I wonder how many time Napoleon re-fought the battle of Waterloo and had a new outcome?

Napoleon was a bright guy too. He was a voracious planner and analyzer who did not campaign haphazardly. When he decided in August 1812 to pursue the Russians he did not do so reluctantly or with regret. He certainly didn’t do it expecting to lose. He was convinced he could still win. He saw a way and pursued it. Had he brought Russia to its knees, no one would ever have raised the issue of a aborted campaign as an option. He lost in Russian for a lot of reasons and we could rank them in importance. Pursuing the Russians is one part of that story.

But because he did not win in Russia, you say:
“he should not have allowed himself to be drawn onto Moscow and Borodino. IMO he should have withdrawn and called it a day. I personally wouldn't have invaded Russia myself, but it was still possible to succeed. Once he failed in his basic ideal though, he should not have followed the Russians to his army's doom.”

I am not so arrogant to claim that I would/could have made better decisions in his place without the benefit of hindsight. Would you have been so bold as Nelson at Trafalgar? If he had lost, I guess we all would revile him for his stupidity and repudiated him for sacrificing the British Navy in such a dire hour. How many historians question Napoleon’s dangerous extensions in the 1805 campaign? But had he lost at Ulm or Austerlitz he would have been branded as foolish and showing poor judgement.

It would be more interesting to figure out what went into his decision to continue the campaign. Why did he think he could win? What was his plan to bring the Russians to battle? Our thinking is pretty much irrelevant; it is his thinking and that of Alexander that drove the campaign.

Now about Wellington in Spain. You said:
“Wellington was beset with problems and heavily outnumbered for most of the years before he crossed Spain finally. When he did overrun Spain though, that was a quick campaign. Wellington was not in the position were he could gamble, his was not the position of massed numbers or sole power.”

He was beset with problems!! How sad. I’m sure none of the French commanders in Spain had any. And I know Napoleon didn’t have any on his 1812 excursion to Moscow and back. What army doesn’t have problems. Good commanders find a way to work around problems. Wellington may have been out numbered, but he routinely had more troops in battle than the French. And at some where he had fewer he still won. So what if he was out numbered. I believe Wellington won the following:

Rolica 1808 15,000 Br. Vs ??? Fr. Wellington attacked
Vimero 1808 17,000 Br. Vs 14,000 Fr. French attack failed
Talavera 1809 55,000 Br. Vs 46,000 Fr. French attack failed
Busaco 25,000 Br. Vs 40,000 Fr. French attack failed
Fuentes de Oneros 1811 34,000 Br. Vs 50,000 Fr. French attack failed
Salamanca 1812 48,000 Br. vs 50,000 Fr. Wellington attacked
Vitoria 1813 70,000 Br. Vs 50,00 Fr. Wellington attacked
Orthez 1813 25,000 Br. Vs 30,000 Fr.
Surauren 1813 24,000 Br. Vs 60,000 Fr. French attack failed
Toulouse 1814 40,000 Br. Vs 42,000 Fr. Wellington attacked
Waterloo 1815 85,000 Allied and 28,000 Prussians vs 72,000 Fr. French Attack failed

Napoleon’s victories when he was outnumbered.
Abensburg 1809 113,000 Fr. Vs 160,000 Austrians Charles
Austerlitz 1805 73,000 French vs 85,000 allied
Berezina 1812 60,000 French vs 64,000 Russian
Dresden 1813 150,000 French vs 170,000 allied
La Rothiere 1814 40,000 French vs 110,000 Allied
Ligny 1815 80,000 French vs 84,000 Prussians
Marengo 1800 28,000 French vs 31,000 Austrians
Rivoli 1796 20,000 French vs 28,000 Austrians

Davout
Auerstadt 1806 27,000 French vs 63,000 Prussians
Hannibal
Cannae 216 BC 55,000 Carthaginians vs 86,000 Romans

I’m not so sure Wellington needed more troops to win. I think he was afraid to lose.
Every Commander has the option to take military risks. Every battle presents that opportunity. Wellington chose not to gamble; he was not the risk taker that Napoleon was. Nor do I believe the strategist. And if he chose to put politics above military victory what kind of judgement does that show in a general? Patton vs Bradley or Smith?

We can probably attribute Wellington’s failure to capture Spain in a timely manner to many reasons. And we could list them. From your list:
Being beset by problems is a silly one.
Not being a risk taker is a real one.
Being out numbered didn’t have to be. Reflects on his ability as a commander.
Politics makes one question his seriousness as a military commander.

I do not know why Napoleon choose to deal with Spain the way he did. But, had he been as smart as you and me, and understood the importance of Spain, I’m sure he would have put the Iron Duke in his proper place in short order.

You know this could go on forever. There is more to be said. Maybe tomorrow.

 

[privatehudson]

ARGHHHHHH FOR **** SAKE!

I just typed a large post to be told "sorry too many signatures" and loose it all

Might take me some time to get back to that

 

[Birdjaguar]

I'm sorry. Don't rush, It's sunday AM and life can go a a leisurely pace. BTW what is the 1809 book you mentioned above?

 

[privatehudson]

Napoleon conquers Austria by James R Arnold, Arms and Armour press

 

[Birdjaguar]

Hmmm I had some correspondence with him 15 or 20 years ago regarding the terrain at Borodino. I have copies of a fabulous British Museum map of the Borodino area. It was made by the Russians in 1839 and used in the war games that year. The military exercises re-enacted the 1812 battle with applied hindsight and surprise! surprise! a new out come.
The gist of my correspondence was that most post 1839 depictions of the Borodino battlefield used the 1839 map as their guide and incorrectly copied the tree coverage as it was in 1839 rather than use what was shown on period (1812-1817) maps.

 

[privatehudson]

It's impossible to refight any wargame without hindsight unless you either force set decisisons or disguise the motive of the battle by moving the period or armies involved. Of course it would end up different, no wargame usually ever is the same as history, that's half the fun What most wargamers (that I know anyway) do is try to limit slightly the options facing the commanders, or change events a little, or finally offer scenarios that might have happened. In the example of Borodino, Napoleon (or to be accurate the gamer playing his role) would be offered the chance of using a flank march/attack as Davout suggested.

Arnold makes the good point in his book though that Napoleon's adversaries had found a major way round his battlefield tactics through the application of massed artillery and larger armies. Napoleon's habit of smashing into the centre of the enemy to drive them appart was thereby countered by causing massive losses (usually by cannon fire) amongst the french army during battles. Whilst this did not always ensure short term sucess such as at Wagram or Borodino, it did cause Napoleon to have to fight one bloody battle after another with little hope of strategic sucess. Napoleon had no answer for this in his latter campaigns, time and again he would use the same tactics and though they often worked (ligny and so on) ultimately the failed to do the job.

Hmm your correspondance would be like someone using the current Terrain of Waterloo for a battle, reduced slope and massive mount in the middle for observations I guess That would have been interesting The British museum and "offical" accounts are more often than not inaccurate though, just look at Swinbourne's version of Waterloo

 

[Birdjaguar]

My knowledge of Waterloo terrain is cursory and I cannot speak to the changes since 1815. At Borodino, later changes were less invasive and detailed Russian documents are very helpful. In 1912 the Tzar commissioned a photographic survey of the country that included a number of pictures of the Borodino battle field. And as part of the centenial, a detailed topo map of the region was made. If you look at the battle maps used by field commanders, the very precise 1839 map (3 feet x 5 feet in size), the 1912 photos and maps a pretty clear picture emerges. When you restore the battlefield to its most probable state in 1812, you get something very different looking than has been traditionally depicted.

I also think that the Russian description of the action prior to the 7th was distorted by Kutusov after fact. I believe that K thought the French would advance only along the new or high Smolensk-Moscow road which runs on the north side of the Kolocha until it reaches the town of Borodino, and he set up his defense on Sept 4 to defend against an attack from across the Kolocha stream. He established his forts and line of defense from the Shevardino redoubt to the Moskova and he expected the French to attack him across the Kolocha.

On the 4th the Russian defenses stretched from Shevardino to the Moskva River and the fleches were not built. From left to right the Russian Corps would be: 8th around Shevardino, 7th between Shevardino and the redoubt, 6th between the redoubt and Gorki, 4th right of Gorki, and 2nd on the far right. 5th and 3rd Corps in reserve along with the various cavalry units and artillery.

The unexpected French attack on the 5th came not only from along the high road, but included the French 5th corps along the old road flanking the Russian position. K was not prepared for this and had to adjust his plans. In typical Napoleonic fashion he had been out manuevered. But not fatally so.

On the 6th he built the fleches and shuffled his 3rd corps the the left. He then declared the shevardino redoubt an outpost and said his original plan was the right angle disposition arranged on the 6th.

The French approach along both roads and their attack on the 5th gave them better position for the ensuing battle and a better chance of pinning the Russians against the Moskova and closing the escape route to Moscow.