Any military leaders that are known for instilling morale in their troops?

[anpd]

Hi, are there any generals in history that were recognized for being great at increasing the morale of his troops?

And similar, any leaders known for demoralizing their opponents troops?

 

[Dachs]

There have been plenty of so-called 'soldiers' generals' throughout history.

The American examples are probably the easiest to go through. Phil Sheridan, despite his fractious relationship with his own subordinate generals, was quite well-liked by most of his own troops. His personal appearance in the ranks during the Battle of Cedar Creek - the immortal "Sheridan's Ride" - can reasonably be said to be one of the few times in history when a single man completely altered the course of a battle: he ended the rout, re-formed his army's ranks, and directed a counterattack that drove Early's forces from the field. Of course, it's hard to find an entire army completely devoted to one man. Omar Bradley had a reputation among the press as a soldier's general, but this was widely disputed by men in First and Ninth Armies. Many, if not most, soldiers in Patton's Third Army regarded their commanding officer with considerable admiration and affection, and thought that Brad was more or less useless. But then, Patton's the guy who struck his own soldiers because reasons, so.

In Chinese history, Zeng Guofan is probably the archetype of this sort of general officer. His Hunan Army, which defeated the Taiping, was essentially an extension of his own personality. His troops were devoted to their home province initially, but then, as the army's actions ranged farther downriver towards Jiangnan, to their commander personally. He was, with no exaggeration, the necessary condition for the army's existence, and they would never have served under anybody else. He could have chosen to march on Beijing at the end of the war if he wanted, and his men would have backed him to the hilt.

An example from classical history: Eumenes of Kardia, Alexander's former secretary, who became one of the warlords who fought for power after the king's death in Babylon. Eumenes, who made much of the fact that he was a 'Greek' and therefore 'unusual' among Alexander's officer corps, which was mostly Makedonian (something that nobody else seems to have brought up or even used as a factor in decision-making), successfully converted a disparate army cobbled together from Alexander's elite veterans, newly recruited Iranian soldiers trained after the Makedonian style, Greek colonists, Taksashilan soldiers from the Indos valley, and mercenaries from regions scattered from Ionia to central Iran, into a worked-in, well-trained fighting force devotedly loyal to himself. His reputation was such that the original commanders of many of those men, who had brought them into Eumenes' service, worried about his popularity with them and plotted to murder him to try to regain control over their own soldiers. Eumenes' popularity, unfortunately for him, ultimately was not enough to save him when his soldiers' families and belongings were taken hostage after the Battle of Gabiene, but asking a soldier to rate his general over his wife and children is going more than a little too far.

On the note of demoralizing the enemy, one of Eumenes' subordinates, Antigenes (satrap of Sousiane and commanding officer of the argyraspidai, Alexander's elite Silver Shields), one of the men who was involved in the plot to murder him, did something fairly noteworthy immediately before the Battle of Gabiene along those lines. Antigenes rode out between the lines of Eumenes' army and that of Antigonos Monophthalmos and harangued the soldiers of the latter's army, comprised largely of Makedonian and Greek colonists from Phrygia, random mercenaries from all over the place, and Asians trained in the Makedonian style. He taunted them with the famous line, "Wicked men, are you sinning against your fathers, who conquered the world under Philip and Alexander?" Antigonos' phalanx was badly demoralized, and according to Hieronymos, this, along with the incredible skill and training of the argyraspidai, led to the almost total destruction of Antigonos' infantry in the ensuing battle.

 

[anpd]

Wow Dachs, thanks for the thorough answer! Will take a closer look at the names mentioned.

 

[Domen]

Do you mean - increasing by impassioned speeches, by the sole fact that he was in charge (their reputation), etc.?

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If you mean also the method of increasing the morale by impassioned speeches, then this guy qualifies:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Krzysztof_Radziwiłł

One of his speeches to his soldiers was:

"Whoever looks in the past must admit, that worthy nations which in the name of the Kingdom of Poland are included, have never considered anything as more important than pride. Armies of great emperors and great monarchs brushed against the lands of this kingdom, but our ancestors repulsed them, so that neither in skill nor in bravery they let their enemies to take the upper hand. And when at stakes was the pride, the entire homeland, then no enemy was fearful. What caused this fact? Love to homeland, which includes all other comforts in itself. This love has not faded also in your hearts, because everyone can see it, without mentioning the old days, during the reign of our current King. What kinds of odds and what invasions has our homeland repulsed these days, thanks to the bravery of yours, and at the expense of not only luxuries of domestic life, but also of your own blood!"

 

[anpd]

Do you mean - increasing by impassioned speeches, by the sole fact that he was in charge (their reputation), etc.?

I would say both. Thanks for the suggestion!

 

[Flying Pig]

Slim and Montgomery were famous for creating a sense of solidarity and loyalty among their men during the last war, as was Patton; Nelson, Napoleon and Wellington, or Robert E Lee, might figure from before it, and somebody like Schwarzkopf, Mattis or H Jones (from my own experience) from more recent times. I quote an anecdote about Wellington, reported by one of his subalterns:

We had continued this arduous journey during five hours, when, on reaching the summit of an isolated green hill, at the back of the ridge already described, four mounted officers crossed us, one of them riding a little ahead of the rest, who, on the contrary, kept together. He who rode in front was a thin, well-made man, apparently of the middle stature, and just past the prime of life. His dress was a plain gray frock, buttoned close to the chin; a cocked hat, covered with oilskin; gray pantaloons, with boots, buckled at the side; and a steel-mounted light sabre. There were in the ranks many veterans, who had served in the Peninsula during some of the earlier campaigns; these instantly recognised their old leader, and the cry of “Duro, Duro!” the familiar title given by the soldiers to the Duke of Wellington, was raised. This was followed by reiterated shouts, to which he replied by taking off his hat and bowing.

As I had never seen the great Captain of the day before, it will readily be imagined that I looked at him on the present occasion with a degree of admiration and respect, such as a soldier of seventeen years of age, devoted to his profession, is likely to feel for the man whom he regards as its brightest ornament. I felt, as I gazed upon him that an army under his command could not be beaten; and I had frequent opportunities afterwards of perceiving, how far such a feeling goes towards preventing a defeat. Let the troops only place perfect confidence on him who leads them, and the sight of him, at the most trying moment, is worth a fresh brigade.

George Robert Gleig The Subaltern (1825).

 

[anpd]

Thanks for the suggestions

 

[Domen]

Patton - I think he was a controversial figure among his soldiers. Some loved him, some others hated him.

Robert E. Lee came to my mind as well - "the most beloved general in American history" - that's how he is often described.

 

[Lord Baal]

Napoleon had a reputation for being able to raise his soldiers' spirits with a quick speech, at least in his early days. He once prevented his expeditionary force in Italy from being routed by riding in front of their ranks, claiming that it was his custom to sleep on the battlefield. I'm not sure why, but this inspired them.

 

[Domen]

And similar, any leaders known for demoralizing their opponents troops?

What about leaders known for demoralizing their own troops? For example Darius III, who escaped at Gaugamela when Alexander charged his position, setting a bad example for his troops, many of whom also routed (except for those who did not know about the escape of their King - they continued to fight).

 

[Dachs]

Before trading blows with Alexander, Darayavahush was known as an up-and-comer in Iranian military circles, one of the men who participated in the 'restoration of order' of the decade and a half prior to the Makedonian invasion and who distinguished himself in personal combat against the Kadousioi. (He also demonstrated political skill by outmaneuvering the kingmaker Bagoas upon assuming the throne.) His decisions to command his troops personally at Issos and Gaugamela were made because, unlike previous Iranian monarchs, he felt comfortable and capable leading large numbers of troops.

This is not to say he had a soldiers' general reputation before the battles, but he was a reasonably competent and successful officer. Unfortunately, running up against a near-God of War tends to make even the competent look bad. I wouldn't say that Darayavahush ought to be 'known for' demoralizing his troops; his retreat was part and parcel of the general rout that occurred when Alexander's troops hit the Schwerpunkt of the Iranian army.

 

[Domen]

unlike previous Iranian monarchs

What about Cyrus the Great?

his retreat was part and parcel of the general rout that occurred when Alexander's troops hit the Schwerpunkt of the Iranian army.

That "Schwerpunkt" (is it justified to use the 19th-20th century military terminology to Ancient Greco-Persian conflicts?) was the King of Kings himself.

The general rout started from Darius - he routed first, then his soldiers (check Arrian, Anabasis, 3.14.2-3). And it was not really such a completely "general" rout, because it did not encompass the right wing of the Persians - as soldiers of the right wing had no idea that Darius had routed.

For a time Alexander himself led his men in column, but when the cavalry, charging the Persians who were trying to surround the Macedonian's right wing, first breached the barbarian phalanx, Alexander wheeled about opposite the gap, arrayed the Companion cavalry and the nearby portion of the phalanx in a wedge formation and led them at full speed and with a war cry at Darius himself. For a brief period the fighting was hand to hand, but when Alexander and his horsemen pressed the enemy hard, shoving the Persians and striking at their faces with spears (xustois), and the Macedonian phalanx, tightly arrayed and bristling with sarisae, was already upon them, Darius, who had long been in a state of dread, now saw terrors all around him; he wheeled about - the first to do so - and fled.

(...)

The Persians on the right wing, who had not yet become aware of the flight of Darius, rode round Alexander's left wing and attacked Parmenio in flank. At this juncture, the Macedonians being at first in a state of confusion from being attacked on all sides, Parmenio sent a messenger to Alexander in haste, to tell him that their side was in a critical position and that he must send him aid. When this news was brought to Alexander, he turned back again from further pursuit, and wheeling round with the Companion cavalry, led them with great speed against the right wing of the foreigners. In the first place he assaulted the fleeing cavalry of the enemy, the Parthians, some of the Indians, and the most numerous and the bravest division of the Persians. Then ensued the most obstinately contested cavalry fight in the whole engagement. For being drawn up by squadrons, the foreigners wheeled round in deep columns, and falling on Alexander's men face to face, they no longer relied on the hurling of javelins or the dexterous deploying of horses, as is the common practice in cavalry battles, but every one of his own account strove eagerly to break through what stood in his way, as their only means of safety. They struck and were struck without quarter, as they were no longer struggling to secure the victory for another, but were contending for their own personal safety. Here about sixty of Alexander's Companions fell; and Hephaestion himself, as well as Coenus and Menidas, was wounded. But these troops also were overcome by Alexander; and as many of them as could forced their way through his ranks and fled with all their might. And now Alexander had nearly come into conflict with the enemy's right wing; but in the meantime the Thessalian cavalry in a splendid struggle, were not falling short of Alexander's suc cess in the engagement. For the foreigners on the right wing were already beginning to fly when he came on the scene of conflict; so that he wheeled round again and started off in pursuit of Darius once more, keeping up the chase as long as there was daylight. Parmenio's brigade also followed in pursuit of those who were opposed to them.

Of course Arrian might be wrong or biased here - some other Ancient sources are silent regarding such a portrait of a terrified Darius.

But even a usually brave commander could face a moment of psychological weakness when facing a terrible danger - and could start to flee.

 

[Dachs]

What about Cyrus the Great?

Kurush was one of the few. The first Darayavahush also led troops in battle. Xsayarsa didn't, although he had the courtesy to at least attend some of the battles. Going further down the line, some of the more recent monarchs hadn't bestirred themselves to exercise battlefield command at all. Ardaxshacra II famously tried to take credit for Mithridates' victory over Kurush at Kounaxa, and his predecessor Darayavahush II similarly did basically nothing.

If one were inclined to systematization, one might connect Ardaxshacra III and Darayavahush III as some sort of new-model military monarchs reviving an older tradition after decades of more hands-off shahs. But a trend of two isn't really a trend.

 

[Domen]

BTW - when you write that they did not lead troops in battle - do you mean that they did not go with troops on campaigns at all (i.e. they stayed in their palaces or whatever, rather than leading their army in the field), or only that they did not fight, but were giving orders from some command post in the rear area of the battlefield (like the Polish king Władysław Jogaila at Grunwald in 1410 - and the Grand Master of the Teutonic Order, up to some point, as well)?

The second option - controlling your army from a safe and secure position, rather than risking your life in the first line - is rather wise.

BTW - at Grunwald there was also a moment when a Teutonic unit could attack the command post of Jogaila, but they did not realise what they had in front of them and thus they did not attack with all of their available forces. Jogaila even called for support of one of his royal banners when he saw those Teutonic soldiers coming, but commander of the banner refused to support his personal guard, because he knew it would only rivet the Teutons' attention.

To find a single man on the battlefield is not easy. I wonder how was Alexander able to localize the command post of Darius at Gaugamela?

Perhaps Darius did nothing to hide the location of his "HQ", but rather manifested his splendor (as is shown in the 2004 movie "Alexander").

Xsayarsa didn't, although he had the courtesy to at least attend some of the battles.

"Attending" battles means that he was in charge from behind - or that he was only observing, while someone else was the commander in chief?

 

[Flying Pig]

Wouldn't the equivalent of the King's Colour been evident flying above the HQ position, to provide a rallying point for the line in adversity and to allow subordinate officers to locate the overall commander?

 

[Domen]

Wouldn't the equivalent of the King's Colour been evident flying above the HQ position, to provide a rallying point for the line in adversity and to allow subordinate officers to locate the overall commander?

Well, you are right. At Grunwald the King's Colour was hastily furled immediately after the personal guard of the King noticed the Teutonic soldiers coming - and this is why they did not manage to recognize that what they were facing was the King's command post:

Quote from the book "Banderia apud Grunwald. Polish banners at Grunwald" (the book is originally in English):

(...) During the battle itself the royal pennon was stationed in front of king Władysław II. However, during one of the attacks launched by the Knights of the Order, it had to be furled hastily, in order that the enemy would not be able to pick out the person of the monarch. Consequently the king and the small unit accompanying him escaped notice. However one of the guest knights fighting for the Order, the Lusatian knight Dypold von Kóckritz, did notice the king and launched a single-handed attack. It is possible that he recognized the king because he had frequently served on embassies of the Order to Cracow, or perhaps he simply noticed the king's horse and armour. Von Kóckritz was first wounded by Jagiełło himself and then killed by the king's secretary Bishop Zbigniew of Oleśnica. (...)

(...) The Court Banner was stationed towards the rear of Jagiełło's order of battle, behind the Banners of Lesser Poland and Halych-Ruthenia. When the king seemed threatened by the attack of a group of enemy under the command of Ulrich von Jungingen, and the young Royal Secretary Zbigniew of Oleśnica sent a request that the Banner should bring help to the small group defending the king, it was turned down, according to some sources by Mikołaj Kiełbasa 'Sausage' one of the antesignani (i.e. knights fighting in the front ranks) of the Court Banner. Had the Banner obeyed its orders, its advance would undoubtedly have brought the position of Jagiełło to the attention of the enemy. As it was, the royal pennon was furled in time, and an untimely attack was avoided. Only von Kóckritz decided on his one-man attack. (...)

 

[Dachs]

BTW - when you write that they did not lead troops in battle - do you mean that they did not go with troops on campaigns at all (i.e. they stayed in their palaces or whatever, rather than leading their army in the field), or only that they did not fight, but were giving orders from some command post in the rear area of the battlefield (like the Polish king Władysław Jogaila at Grunwald in 1410 - and the Grand Master of the Teutonic Order, up to some point, as well)?

The second option - controlling your army from a safe and secure position, rather than risking your life in the first line - is rather wise.

Usually it meant not going on campaign at all. Or, alternatively, going on campaign met a definition that didn't involve actually witnessing combat. Think of the way most Ottoman sultans defined "campaigning": going on tour with the army as it left the capital and moved north through the Balkans, but then stopping at, say, Sofia or Belgrade and going back to the pleasure-domes around the Marmara while the army continued on to Hungary or Podolia or wherever.

"Attending" battles means that he was in charge from behind - or that he was only observing, while someone else was the commander in chief?

The impression given in Herodotos' account is that Xsayarsa just sat there on the throne they set up for him on the hillside and watched. Imagine the difficulty of command and control from afar, though, in an era in which one could not rely on distant intelligence, maps, or even spyglasses. How would Xsayarsa have reliably transmitted orders to the constituent squadrons of his fleet, at least in a way that would have had effect quickly enough to matter? How clear a picture of the confused melee could he have reasonably had?

I mean, yeah, it's generally a good idea to have a general officer sufficiently acquainted with the big picture on the battlefield to be able to respond to situations as they develop, and so getting bogged down in individual heroics and such can degrade the general's ability to command his army. (Gordon Granger and François Achille Bazaine would be able to speak to that.) But at the same time, having a general officer so divorced from the battlefield that he exercises no real control over anything at all is arguably worse.

To find a single man on the battlefield is not easy. I wonder how was Alexander able to localize the command post of Darius at Gaugamela?

Perhaps Darius did nothing to hide the location of his "HQ", but rather manifested his splendor (as is shown in the 2004 movie "Alexander").

The possibility exists that, as you and Flying Pig said, Darayavahush wanted to demonstrate royal splendor as a sort of morale booster and whatnot, and so made his position a target on purpose. But commanding in the center of the army is described as standard operating procedure for Iranian generals by Arrianus' narrative, so maybe Alexander just acted on that knowledge instead.