Blitzkrieg

[D0NIMATRIX]

Recently I did a bit of research on the topic of blitzkrieg, and I came across this article.

From what I understand [of the article], blitzkrieg was Germany's military doctrine during WWII, which was to have quick wars which would tax the country as little as possible in any respect, and to rinse and repeat with different nations until a position of true power was achieved. (This is the GRAND plan, not the tactical realities)

Please correct me if I'm wrong, because this article is really interesting.

 

[GoodGame]

Pretty much semantics whether you call it Blitzkrieg or Blitzopperationen. I think of Blitzkrieg as more of an operational concepts, and the concepts in the second paragraph of the article (schwerpunkt an all) basically sound like operational strategy, but the concept telescopes up well. So I think it's fair to say, it's really semantics what Blitz-<name> you prefer. The article does a decent job explaining it, and really you do have to understand the concept in the backdrop of WW1, since it really was an attempt to replay WW1, but decisively, through speed and surprise. Like the article does, it's a good idea to examine Blitzkrieg in comparison to the WW1 strategies such as the Schlieffen plan, since in effect the invasion of the France was a second try at the Schlieffen plan.

But regardless of semantics, really what the Germans did was:1. surpass Poland technologically and with experience; 2. bypass the French static defenses (Maginot Line) by going through Belgium, and doing it at a rate so fast that the French couldn't regroup reasonably---which doesn't need a fancy term; The French set themselves up for defeat by being in a static line as much as the Germans out-maneuvered them. Germany did think they could do the same thing in Russia, taking Moscow before winter, but they failed; I'd say that probably, Blitzkrieg failed vs. Russian defense in depth, totally failed at urban warfare conditions (though could bypass cities), and failed at logistics in depth; And also Germany failed to keep the required air superiority against all sides. And as the article hints, the master German strategy also involved deception, secret deals, and diplomatic appeasements which aren't in the Blitzkrieg strategy.

The article also rightly mentions that there were technical/tactical innovations that made blitzkrieg possible---like tank radios, a general trend to motorize all aspects of the mililtary to make them faster. There was also the mechanized practice that Germany got leading up to 1939----the article makes a good point of the amount of practice the Germans put practicing integrateing vehicles on a large scale. One could say this is the start of modern mechanized operations and tactics, and why Germany was so successful early.

Conclusion: It's a good article, but I wouldn't get hung up on the terminology.

 

[LightSpectra]

As far as I know, the Maginot Line did extend into Belgium. However, it had no fortifications against aerial assaults.

 

[Dachs]

Like the article does, it's a good idea to examine Blitzkrieg in comparison to the WW1 strategies such as the Schlieffen plan, since in effect the invasion of the France was a second try at the Schlieffen plan.

Sichelschnitt wasn't a rerun of the Schlieffen Plan. The original scheme of Fall Gelb was, but it was revised to become radically different in the final implementation.

1. surpass Poland technologically and with experience;

wat

The French set themselves up for defeat by being in a static line as much as the Germans out-maneuvered them.

Actually it was more of a French timing issue at Sedan than an issue of bypassing a static line.

As far as I know, the Maginot Line did extend into Belgium. However, it had no fortifications against aerial assaults.

Maginot Line did not extend into Belgium due to political considerations; the Belgians did have their own fortresses like Eben Emael but they did not effectively cover the Ardennes and were in no way integrated with the French military.

 

[GoodGame]

As far as I know, the Maginot Line did extend into Belgium. However, it had no fortifications against aerial assaults.

The Maginot line was very sparse around Beligum. Beligum and the Ardennes were to be one big area that Germany wouldn't dare enter.

Spoiler :

The solid lines, 'ouvages', are the real forts of the line.

Belgium's had some fortifications itself, but part of the German plan was to bypass and go straight into the Ardenness, which was unthinkable to the allies. They thought Germany couldn't speedily cross the Ardenne forest. They were wrong.

Spoiler :

The main Ardennes rush is the long, red hook on the bottom. Everything south of it is the hard core Maginot line. The allied troops to the north are drawn in by the invasions into Beligum and the Netherlands, and there's also a feint against the Maginot line to make an impression of a direct attack.

 

[vogtmurr]

Truthfully, I think it was only continuous along the Rhineland where the border departs from the river to the Ardennes in Luxembourg. Of course this is where they came through, it wasn't a repeat of WWI's modified-Schlieffen plan. There were discontinous fortifications across Belgium as well as their own forts, and in Alsace Lorraine across the river, and along the Italian border.

EDIT: oops guess I'm late.

 

[GoodGame]

Sichelschnitt wasn't a rerun of the Schlieffen Plan. The original scheme of Fall Gelb was, but it was revised to become radically different in the final implementation.

wat

Actually it was more of a French timing issue at Sedan than an issue of bypassing a static line.

I can't comment on the first point---I'm not a historian and you probably know more German than me. To this layman, it's taking a visit to France, detouring through the lowlands, trying to do it faster than the French can reorganize, which sounds like Schlieffen plan to me in large scope, but I guess I can understand if you're talking a detailed comparison including all the simultaneous movements (netherlands, beligum, feint at the line, etc..) and direction of attack.

On the second point----ok Poland had a lot of experience with horse cavalry.

France put the bulk of its strength on the line, so I'd say they outmaneuvered themselves. True there is some clever enticement/entrapment of the allies in the north.

Not sure what you mean by a 'timing issue at Sedan' ( dark humor?). That's where they blitzed the Ardennes, skirting the maginot line, so it was still outmaneuvering a static line, on the strategic scope.

 

[Dachs]

I can't comment on the first point---I'm not a historian and you probably know more German than me. To this layman, it's taking a visit to France, detouring through the lowlands, trying to do it faster than the French can reorganize, which sounds like Schlieffen plan to me in large scope, but I guess I can understand if you're talking a detailed comparison including all the simultaneous movements (netherlands, beligum, feint at the line, etc..) and direction of attack.

The point of the von Schlieffen Plan is generally accepted to have been a 'hinge' on the Ardennes, with the strong right wing pivoting round that hinge to seize Paris. Sichelschnitt was different; originally the plan was to rerun the von Schlieffen scheme and have tanks form the mobile right wing, but that was eventually revised to the plan that was eventually used, which was a decoy movement on the right wing into the Netherlands and Belgium, and a fixing attack on the Maginot Line, while the decisive thrust was delivered through the Ardennes by the tanks, which would move straight to the sea (ignoring Paris in the first thrust) to pocket the Allied armies that moved into the Low Countries. And, hey, it worked. After that, the Germans would be in a fantastic position to debouch into France proper.

On the second point----ok Poland had a lot of experience with horse cavalry.

The point is that the Germans weren't really experienced much either. Outside of the Legion Condor members none of them had recent combat experience, except for the few men who were left from the old core of the Reichswehr that had served in the First World War - and there weren't many of those.

France put the bulk of its strength on the line, so I'd say they outmaneuvered themselves. True there is some clever enticement/entrapment of the allies in the north.

Not sure what you mean by a 'timing issue at Sedan' ( dark humor?). That's where they blitzed the Ardennes, skirting the maginot line, so it was still outmaneuvering a static line, on the strategic scope.

The timing issue at Sedan was this: at Sedan, the Germans of Guderian's panzer corps were debouching from the Ardennes and preparing to swing west. This was the hole in the French lines, and it was covered by only militia and levies, who even so put up a reasonably good fight. But that hole was supposed to be covered by reservists leavened with regulars, it's just that those better quality French troops didn't quite get there in time - it wasn't expected that they'd need to, since the Ardennes weren't supposed to be as easy to get through as they ended up being. I think the French were off by one, maybe two days, but by then Guderian was off on his merry romp west and there was jack-all they could do about it.

 

[GoodGame]

The point is that the Germans weren't really experienced much either. Outside of the Legion Condor members none of them had recent combat experience, except for the few men who were left from the old core of the Reichswehr that had served in the First World War - and there weren't many of those.

The timing issue at Sedan was this: at Sedan, the Germans of Guderian's panzer corps were debouching from the Ardennes and preparing to swing west. This was the hole in the French lines, and it was covered by only militia and levies, who even so put up a reasonably good fight. But that hole was supposed to be covered by reservists leavened with regulars, it's just that those better quality French troops didn't quite get there in time - it wasn't expected that they'd need to, since the Ardennes weren't supposed to be as easy to get through as they ended up being. I think the French were off by one, maybe two days, but by then Guderian was off on his merry romp west and there was jack-all they could do about it.

Well the Germans had experience doing motorized maneuvers, which is what would count for the type of war. So let me edit and say the Germans were technologically superior to the Polish, and had enough training to use their equipment well.

So you think the French had a real chance of bottling up the Germans in the Ardennes?

 

[Dachs]

So you think the French had a real chance of bottling up the Germans in the Ardennes?

I think it's a reasonable assumption, with the caveat that World War II ain't ma field. I hear Steph knows a fair bit about this particular incident, and Verbose probably does too.

 

[Sharwood]

Well the Germans had experience doing motorized maneuvers, which is what would count for the type of war. So let me edit and say the Germans were technologically superior to the Polish, and had enough training to use their equipment well.

So you think the French had a real chance of bottling up the Germans in the Ardennes?

Don't forget their experience at beating on Poland. Poland's about due to get beaten on by the Germans again, I think. 1918-1939 was 21 years, 1989-2009, hmm, 20 years. I predict an invasion next year.

If the French had fortified the Ardennes better, they most certainly could have bottled up the Germans there. Although even that wasn't necessary for a French victory. I've said it before, and I'll say it again: Petain's surrender was treasonous and unecessary. France could have defeated Germany, it never should have surrendered. If De Gaulle and Reynaud's plans had been followed, France might have been spared four years of Vichy and Nazi rule.

EDIT: My cross-post was better.

 

[Dragonlord]

I've said it before, and I'll say it again: Petain's surrender was treasonous and unecessary. France could have defeated Germany, it never should have surrendered. If De Gaulle and Reynaud's plans had been followed, France might have been spared four years of Vichy and Nazi rule.

Sounds like typical hindsight reasoning to me. We, today, know how weak Germany's mechanized forces actually were at the time of Fall Gelb. Consider, however, how it must have looked to Petain & co. : Germany has just knocked out the Poles in a matter of weeks instead of months or years, as expected. They've just bypassed the fixed fortifications your country has spent 20 years building and depends on psychologically, and eliminated your best armies in the Low Countries. They've also sent your British allies packing from Dunkirk, leaving their heavy equipment behind.
They accomplished this by slicing right through your country with contemptous ease, utlilizing tanks in a manner never seen before.

How was Petain to know Germany couldn't repeat this feat at will? Especially since France's forces had, as yet at least, no doctrine on how to defeat the Blitzkrieg tactics?

Seen from that point of view, it was quite understandable, even laudable, for Petain to save at least a nominal independence for half his country, not to mention keeping the rest of France's armed forces from being slaughtered to no purpose - no doubt hoping for a reversal in fortunes later on. I doubt he envisioned it taking 4 years, though.

You can call it unnecessary, from hindsight, but treasonous? No.

 

[nokmirt]

Vernichtungsgedanke, literally meaning "concept of annihilation" in German and generally taken to mean "the concept of fast annihilation of enemy forces" is a Prussian/German tactical doctrine, dating to Frederick the Great. It emphasizes rapid, fluid movement to unbalance an enemy, allowing the attacker to impose his will upon the defender and avoid stalemate. It relies on uncommonly rigorous training and discipline and thoroughly professional leadership. Much of Vernichtungsgedanke can be seen in Clausewitz&#8217; classic treatise Vom Kriege (On War). This doctrine was used successfully in the War of Austrian Succession, The Seven Years' War, The Napoleonic Wars, The Austro-Prussian War, and The Franco-Prussian War (1870-1871). The military success of Kingdom of Prussia/Germany was the catalyst of the alliance systems of 19th century Europe. The arms races of this period produced the military equipment which eroded the attacker&#8217;s advantage during Europe's "Long Peace". It gave decisive advantage to the defender and set the stage for the catastrophic stalemate of the First World War. Vernichtungsgedanke&#8217;s long reign as the prime tactical doctrine of modern warfare ended on the Western Front. When the antebellum concluded and Europe went again to war, many of the officers in high command in Germany (chief among them General Heinz Guderian) were all too aware of this doctrinal failure and had specific ideas for its replacement. They had, however, to fight prewar battles to overcome bureaucratic inertia. They mostly won those battles, bringing forth a doctrinal evolution during the Second World War which included the methodology now known as Blitzkrieg. Early enthusiasm for the opportunities provided by armored mobile units was referred to in the 1930s as the armored idea.

For more on this subject there is a very good book by Matthew Cooper called The German Army 1933-1945. I used to own this title, I learned much about the war from a German perspective. For instance, it explains in detail the theory of the armored idea, originally a British idea, which was immensely improved by Heinz Guderian, and others like Ernst Volckheim (Who is getting more attention to his ideas on tank warfare by Modern Historians). The foremost change was tank to tank communication, each tank to equipped with a radio, and visual equipment. So the tank commander could react swiftly and timely to any given situation on the battlefield. The book also, emphasizes the Westernization of the belated word Blitzkrieg. The coverage of the pre-war years is excellent, covering the rise of Hitler and his influence with the army. How the army gives in to the Fuhrer, at the cost to its own honor, forced into a war with out being prepared, with its hands tied more and more by Hitlers insistance on running campaigns, with disregard to the thoughts of his generals. The true state of unreadiness of the German army is shown at face value. The over reliance on the horse, shortages of equipment, and the unimpresive state of the panzer force, in which in reality, only a small portion of the defense budget was spent on armored vehicle production. Also not enough heavy tanks were produced. These and other concepts are explained in detail. However, what the German Army lacked, it made up for in the intuition of modern warfare, which dreadfully caught the, infantry only minded, armies of Poland, and France, completely off guard. The Germans needed to win quick decisive victories, to placate their non-ability to wage a long on-going war, for an extended period of time. There is one other thing from my own mind that I know about the war. The worst thing in many cases was the reluctance of the Wehrmacht and the Luftwaffe to work together and mutually support each other. Many times attacks, did not have the right air support, or non at all, or too late. Forces need coordination in the air and on the ground. Just a thought

 

[nokmirt]

The point of the von Schlieffen Plan is generally accepted to have been a 'hinge' on the Ardennes, with the strong right wing pivoting round that hinge to seize Paris. Sichelschnitt was different; originally the plan was to rerun the von Schlieffen scheme and have tanks form the mobile right wing, but that was eventually revised to the plan that was eventually used, which was a decoy movement on the right wing into the Netherlands and Belgium, and a fixing attack on the Maginot Line, while the decisive thrust was delivered through the Ardennes by the tanks, which would move straight to the sea (ignoring Paris in the first thrust) to pocket the Allied armies that moved into the Low Countries. And, hey, it worked. After that, the Germans would be in a fantastic position to debouch into France proper.

The point is that the Germans weren't really experienced much either. Outside of the Legion Condor members none of them had recent combat experience, except for the few men who were left from the old core of the Reichswehr that had served in the First World War - and there weren't many of those.

The timing issue at Sedan was this: at Sedan, the Germans of Guderian's panzer corps were debouching from the Ardennes and preparing to swing west. This was the hole in the French lines, and it was covered by only militia and levies, who even so put up a reasonably good fight. But that hole was supposed to be covered by reservists leavened with regulars, it's just that those better quality French troops didn't quite get there in time - it wasn't expected that they'd need to, since the Ardennes weren't supposed to be as easy to get through as they ended up being. I think the French were off by one, maybe two days, but by then Guderian was off on his merry romp west and there was jack-all they could do about it.

The issue was also German resolve, which was very resolute

Even after the misjudgment that was the French initial deployment--the extra army on the left to hook up with the Dutch, the drive for the advanced position at the Dyle River, the weak Ninth Army holding the Meuse through the Ardennes--that left the French vulnerable to disaster should the Germans break through at the Meuse, the French *should* have been able to recover. The Ninth Army was weak, but the Meuse was a strong position. And once it was clear that there was a major attack through the Ardennes, the French Army was not that slow to respond.

We can track the French reaction to the Nazi attack across the Meuse. The first thing to note is that the Nazi lead elements took up to 70% casualties and kept coming--indicative of extraordinary ideological commitment. In a world in which any "normal" unit breaks at 25% casualties or so, it's hard to beat people who keep coming at you: you can only hope that the enemy doesn't have that many of them. Had the Nazi soldiers been "normal," the initial attack by the seven panzer divisions would probably have failed, and the French would have had time to redeploy.

"Gamelin and Georges on the morning of May 13 were keeping their eyes out not only for the great battle in Belgium but for... German forces debouching from the Ardennes and attempting to cut behind the Maginot Line..."

Thus three divisions from the general reserve were fed into the Meuse line on the 13th of May, and the French high command clearly knew it was a trouble spot. By May 15, the French First Armored division had been switched from the Belgian plain to the Ninth Army sector, infantry formations had been ordered to assemble behind the Ninth Army to form a new Sixth Army, and the Second Armored division had been ordered to assemble in its sector.

Within a few days later Charles de Gaulle was placed in command of the Fourth Armored division and told to attack the southern flank of the German breakthrough.

So what happened to all these forces--four heavy armored divisions with perhaps 800 tanks between them, plus a large chunk of the sixteen infantry divisions that were in the French strategic reserve on May 10?

Well...

... The First Armored division ran out of gas. While it was waiting for the fuel trucks to come up to refuel it, it was attacked by Rommel's panzer division and destroyed as a fighting unit.

... The Second Armored division... according to Shirer: "Orders for the [second armored] division to move... did not come until noon of May 13.... The trains with the tanks and artillery were not able to start until the afternon of the 14th.... The wheeled vehicles with the supplies ran into the panzers racing west from Sedan and, having no combat elements, withdrew south of the Aisne.... The tanks and tracked artillery were finally uinloaded from their flatcars... between Saint-Quentin and Hirson.... The division was hopelessly dispersed over a large triangle between Hirson, La Fere on the Oise, and Rethel on the Aisne..."

... The Third Armored division retreated to the south as General Huntziger had ordered: he thought its principal task should be to guard the Maginot line against a flanking attack should the Nazis turn south after crossing the Meuse

... The infantry formations of the Sixth Army were overrun by Reinhardt's Sixth panzer division on May 15 and 16 while they were trying to assemble.

By May 16, as Shirer puts it: "The three heavy [armored divisions] the French had, all of which in May 10 had been stationed... within 50 miles of the Meuse at Sedan and Mezieres, which they could have reached by road overnight, had thus been squandered.... Not one had been properly deployed.... By now, May 16, they no longer counted. There remained only the newly formed 4th [armored division], commanded by de Gaulle, which was below strength and without divisional training..."

Now talk about bad luck, and I believe this led to timing issue your suggesting. The French could have and should have had troops in sufficient numbers to block the German advance. And with the weakness in German armor, and the benefit of a strong position like that at Sedan, could have turned the tide. But it seems the French were always one step behind, their communications system was obsolete to mobile tank warfare. And also in war luck plays a part, and France had no luck.

But in reality, the Allies were superior to the Germans in men, artillery, tanks and aircraft. So why did the Allies lose? Germany was superior in its conduct of battle - strategically, operationally and tactically. And as good as Germany was, France and her allies were equally bad, strategically, operationally and tactically. But the Allies I believe lacked military imagination, and were simple minded when it came to the evolution of warfare. They were, and I here the term static defense, too defensive minded, which is exactly the way they fought and thought. Was it not Napoleon who said, "An army that stays inside its fortifications is beaten." He was right

 

[Sharwood]

Sounds like typical hindsight reasoning to me.

That's funny, Reynaud and De Gaulle reached the exact same damn conclusion as me while all this was happening. Were they time travellers?

We, today, know how weak Germany's mechanized forces actually were at the time of Fall Gelb. Consider, however, how it must have looked to Petain & co. : Germany has just knocked out the Poles in a matter of weeks instead of months or years, as expected. They've just bypassed the fixed fortifications your country has spent 20 years building and depends on psychologically, and eliminated your best armies in the Low Countries. They've also sent your British allies packing from Dunkirk, leaving their heavy equipment behind.
They accomplished this by slicing right through your country with contemptous ease, utlilizing tanks in a manner never seen before.

The British weren't evacuated until after De Gaulle's plan was rejected and Petain became the dominant force on the council. Reynaud was a ruler in name only for some time before he relinquished official power to Petain. De Gaulle and Reynaud were desperately seeking any means of keeping Petain from surrendering, even going so far as tto draw up a plan where France would become the fourth member state of the United Kingdom. That's right, the United Kingdom of Great Britain, Northern Ireland, and France.

Petain and his group rejected it, rejected the plans for a redoubt in Brittany and to utilise the resources of the Empire to fight on, rejected plans for De Gaulle to unleash crack troops to turn Paris into an urban warzone - instead it was simply abandoned - and basically just went about systematically destroying any chance his nation had to fight on.

How was Petain to know Germany couldn't repeat this feat at will? Especially since France's forces had, as yet at least, no doctrine on how to defeat the Blitzkrieg tactics?

That's funny, De Gaulle had written a book, in which he asked his former commander, Petain, to write the foreword for him, on those very same blitzkrieg tactics years earlier. Including methods to combat them, which De Gaulle had used successfully against the Germans already. Petain had read this book, blasted it, refused to write the foreword, then witnessed first-hand that everything De Gaulle wrote in it was true. The offensive war strategy De Gaulle had written about was being used effectively by the Germans, and De Gaulle and others of his school were successfully using the defensive measures detailed within against the Germans.

If Petain weren't a defeatist, if he'd pulled his head out of his arse and used that General's brain of his, he'd have realised that tanks might find it a little hard to advance in the rugged terrain of Brittany, and that France's resources were superior to those of Germany. You don't need to know the exact numbers of your enemy to determine that, this is the French empire we're talking about, of course it's going to have more to draw on than Germany. After all, De Gaulle still managed to use said Empire effectively, even with the majority of it loyal to Vichy.

Seen from that point of view, it was quite understandable, even laudable, for Petain to save at least a nominal independence for half his country, not to mention keeping the rest of France's armed forces from being slaughtered to no purpose - no doubt hoping for a reversal in fortunes later on. I doubt he envisioned it taking 4 years, though.

You can call it unnecessary, from hindsight, but treasonous? No.

It was cowardly and treasonous. The means existed to fight Germany, and if Petain didn't know that, then he must have already been going senile, as he'd been asked to contribute to the very manual on how to fight them. his actions were clearly treason, as proven by his direct assistance to Nazi Germany even after it became apparent that they much weaker than originally thought.

If all he wanted was to buy time, why assist in counter-strikes against Operation Torch? Why persecute Jews, when he very well could have told the Nazis to shove it? Why did he and Darlan refuse to turn over the French fleet to Britain, the "Betrayal of Bordeaux," to continue fighting Germany? His actions were motivated by cowardice, possibly a deep-seeded psychological belief in French weakness, which a man of his abilities and experience should not have had. The best thing for France would have been if De Gaulle, Reynaud, or someone else had simply drawn their pistol and shot him in the head when he vetoed the plan to fight in Paris.

 

[Dragonlord]

@Sharwood: Well, you've made some good points, some of which I wasn't aware of.

I agree that Petain was certainly past it and possibly borderline senile - much like Hindenburg in Germany BTW, who should never have allowed Hitler to get near the reins of power!
I still think you're being a little harsh on him - I very much doubt he had any pro-German sentiments, so he might have made errors in judgement (in fact, he almost certainly did), but treasonous? I doubt he meant to support Germany against France, which would indeed have been treason, but tried to put his country's interests first, which is the opposite of treason.
Why should he have turned over the fleet and supported the Allies, when he had made peace with Germany? That would have invited reprisals against his country - now THAT would have been treasonous!

I agree his stance wasn't very couragous, even perhaps cowardly, but that isn't the same as treason - IMO he believed he was doing the best for his country, even though I might have done differently.
I think it takes it's own brand of courage to stand convicted as a coward in the eyes of the world to save the lives of your countrymen... think about it.

 

[Sharwood]

@Sharwood: Well, you've made some good points, some of which I wasn't aware of.

Yeah, years of studying De Gaulle. Too much free time after seeing The Day of the Jackyl a few years ago.

I agree that Petain was certainly past it and possibly borderline senile - much like Hindenburg in Germany BTW, who should never have allowed Hitler to get near the reins of power!

He did die in prison only a few years after the war, and was supposed to be senile he was ordering his nurses to launch cavalr charges, despite the notable lack of horses or anything to charge. He may very well have been in the early stages during the war. In fact, he almost certainly was by the end of it. Whether he was or not in 1940 is anyone's guess. De Gaulle didn't think so, but the two were actually friends prior to the war, so who knows how their relationship effected his opinion. I don't think anyone else who knew him personally ever commented on it.

I still think you're being a little harsh on him - I very much doubt he had any pro-German sentiments, so he might have made errors in judgement (in fact, he almost certainly did), but treasonous? I doubt he meant to support Germany against France, which would indeed have been treason, but tried to put his country's interests first, which is the opposite of treason.

He didn't have any pro-German sentiments, but he certainly wanted to change France to his own little utopia. The Nazis had "blood and soil," Vichy had an eerily similar philosophy, the exact name of which escapes me now. I think "paternalism" was one of the three things in the philosophy, and the other two were analogues of "blood and soil."

Treason isn't just turning against your nation to aid a foreign power, it's also betraying a legitimate government in an attempt to set up your own. That's what Petain did. Reynaud was the legal head of the French government, and Petain, while he may have thought he was acting in French interests - which proves he was an idiot, if not senile - repeatedly disobeyed direct orders from him. De Gaulle's plan to form a redoubt in Brittany and to send his hand-picked men to defend Paris wasn't just a request to Petain from a subordinate, it was a direct order from Reynaud, who even signed the order and gave it to De Gaulle to give to Petain. Needless to say, neither of these things happened.

It should be noted that one of De Gaulle's reasons for wanting to defend Paris at so heavy a cost was to give Parisian Jews a chance to evacuate to Brittany. So there's definitely an argument to be made that Petain's responsible for their deaths as well, but I won't go there.

Why should he have turned over the fleet and supported the Allies, when he had made peace with Germany? That would have invited reprisals against his country - now THAT would have been treasonous!

Darlan and Petain promised to evacuate the fleet BEFORE making peace. Darlan eventually got what was coming to him in North Africa when he was assassinated by Gaullists - probably without De Gaulle's knowledge, but if he'd been asked he would certainly have approved - after he'd switched sides a second time.

The French Fleet was the fourth greatest navy in the world, and if Germany got their hands on it, they could have successfully invaded Britain. It was capable of dominating the Channel and had a large number of troop transports. The British had no choice but to destroy as much of it as they could it in a surprise attack, even though Vichy was technically neutral, and De Gaulle hated himself for helping them.

That fleet, on Britain's side, could have prevented North Africa from siding with Vichy, and could have forced the Axis out of Libya years earlier. Not turning it over was a clear betrayal, especially since Reynaud and Churchill signed a secret treaty - apparently the French and English hadn't quite gotten them out of their system in the First World War - promising its return to France when the Germans were kicked out of the country. It could also have ensured the safety of Atlantic trade, as there's no way Germany could compete with the British, American and French fleets, even with U-boats. By not turning it over, Petain destroyed the last chance the French had to regain their own freedom. Even when the Empire defected to De Gaulle's Free French, they still had to rely on the British and Americans for transport, which prevented them from striking at targets of their own choosing.

I agree his stance wasn't very couragous, even perhaps cowardly, but that isn't the same as treason - IMO he believed he was doing the best for his country, even though I might have done differently.
I think it takes it's own brand of courage to stand convicted as a coward in the eyes of the world to save the lives of your countrymen... think about it.

I don't think it was courage at all. I think it was defeatism. His entire life Germany had been besting the French in war - largely through French stupidity, it must be noted, rather than German brilliance - and he believed that France couldn't win. This was in spite of myriad evidence to the contrary. He also refused to trust Britain, which had been an ally of France for his entire goddamn military career.

His assistance in persecuting Jews - something the Nazis didn't even actually tell him to do, he just did it - and continued adherence to Germany even after it became obvious they were losing the war casts doubt on his motives, and certainly illustrates that whatever backbone he might have had was long gone. More Frenchmen died because of Petain than would have had De Gaulle's plan been followed, and as an experienced military man, he should have known that. That makes him a fool and a coward, and his actions in assisting the Germans and disobeying his own legal head-of-state - although, to his credit, he refused to turn Reynaud over to the Nazis, though some (myself included) would say that was more due to the fact that Reynaud was a suitable counter to Darlan and Laval, Petain's rivals for control of Vichy - makes him a traitor.

 

[Dragonlord]

Hmmm.... OK, you've convinced me! You've mentioned quite a few points I wasn't aware of - I bow to your superior knowledge!

That's what I like about these forums, and the History Forum in particular - I'm always
learning something new! Thanks!

 

[Winner]

I've said it before, and I'll say it again: Petain's surrender was treasonous and unecessary. France could have defeated Germany, it never should have surrendered. If De Gaulle and Reynaud's plans had been followed, France might have been spared four years of Vichy and Nazi rule.

No. France was in no shape to fight Germany even before the Germans destroyed the best of allied divisions in Sichelschnitt. It's military organization was obsolete, it's strategy passive, it's tactics outdated, it's leaders elderly, the communications were a joke (the Germans were moving faster than the messages could reach those in command of the French defense) and the morale of the troops was abysmal.

After Dunkerque there was no hope, I am surprised they didn't surrender earlier.

 

[Sharwood]

No. France was in no shape to fight Germany even before the Germans destroyed the best of allied divisions in Sichelschnitt. It's military organization was obsolete, it's strategy passive, it's tactics outdated, it's leaders elderly, the communications were a joke (the Germans were moving faster than the messages could reach those in command of the French defense) and the morale of the troops was abysmal.

After Dunkerque there was no hope, I am surprised they didn't surrender earlier.

Bullcrap. France was superior to Germany in just about every way, except for the people in charge, who were primarily idiots. Their strategy and tactics were wrong because of morons like Petain. The morale of the troops was absolutely fine before they got arse-raped by Germany due to said deficiency of leadership. France could have beaten Germany at any time before Germany invaded France, without British assistance.

As for after the invasion, France could most definitely have won, and there was still plenty of hope after Dunkirk. Admittedly, far less than if they hadn't been wallowing in stupidity beforehand, which is what forced the evacuation - during which many French troops also fled the country - but they could still have held out.

I don't have the exact exchange with me right now, but to paraphrase, when De Gaulle was told the Germans would take Paris within the day, he asked; "And then?" The response of whichever general he speaking to was; "And then what? That's it. What is there after Paris?" "The nation." "There is no nation without Paris." "The Empire then." He was scoffed at. Who turned out to be right? The guy that successfully led those same troops to victory after victory in Africa and the Middle East, before assisting in Europe itself, not that idiot general, who may well have been Petain himself.

All the problems you speak of are a result of having morons in charge, those elderly commanders you speak of - as if being elderly is in itself a problem for a commander. They could be easily fixed, especially if the front line were dramatically shortened, as would have happened with a retreat into Brittany. The surrender was unecessary, cowardly, and treasonous. It took De Gaulle's personal intervention to keep Petain from being shot, and my opinion is that he should have let it happen.