Shadowbound
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Signed,
A. Rostovsky of the Foreign Directorate
A. Rostovsky of the Foreign Directorate
From British Royal CommonwealthTo: The Royal Commonwealth of Great Britain
Salaamu'lekum,
Considering the current global situation, it has come to our attention that you are no longer capable of properly administering your enclaves along the Maghrebi coast. With that in mind, we ask that you cede their administration to the royal authority of the Sultan, effective immediately. We can guarantee that British nationals and British interests will be protected with the fullest assurances of Maghrebi laws.
We have every desire to avoid unnecessary bloodshed in this matter, and we trust that you believe the same, for it would be terribly regrettable if Britain were to make the wrong decision.
Treaty of Odessa
EGYPT, INDOSTAN, and RUSSIA, these powers united being henceforth defined as the Coalition Powers, alongside
ARMENIA, KURDISTAN, and PERSIA, these powers henceforth defined as the Liberated Nations, on the one part;
And the OTTOMAN STATE, on the other part;
Following the armistice conceded by the Coalition Powers unto the Ottoman State for the prompt negotiation of a Peace Treaty,
Following the firm wishes of the Coalition Powers that the state of war mediating between them and the Ottoman State should be terminated and replaced with a durable peace, and
Following the stern resolve of the Coalition Powers that any peace settlement must conclusively settle the issues that led to the onset of war, as outlined in the Joint Statement of 1894 and in the Declaration of War of the Coalition Powers on the Ottoman State of 1st January 1895,
The HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES, through their properly appointed Plenipotentiaries and representatives, HAVE AGREED AS FOLLOWS:
From the coming into force of this treaty, the state of war will terminate,
From that moment and subject to the provisions of the present Treaty, official relations will be established between the Coalition Powers and the Ottoman State.
I. The Ottoman State shall effect a complete withdrawal from the internationally recognised territory of Persia, and relinquish all assets unlawfully acquired during its occupation.
II. The Ottoman State recognises the independent sovereignty of Armenia and will subsequently withdraw all forces from recognised Armenian territory, as well as relinquishing all of its public assets in Armenia to its sovereign administration.
III. The Ottoman State recognises the independent sovereignty of Kurdistan and will subsequently withdraw all forces from recognised Kurdish territory, as well as relinquishing all of its public assets in Kurdistan to its sovereign administration.
IV. Persia will, in the same spirit of peace of this Treaty and to prevent future bloodshed and internal strife, cede its Kurdish provinces to Kurdistan.
V. The Coalition Powers will verify the implementation of articles I-IV and supervise the restoration or transition to sovereign authorities in the Liberated Nations, and commit to preserve their integrity and independence.
The present Treaty, in Russian, Punjabi, and Arabic, shall be ratified. In case of divergence, the Russian text shall prevail.
This Treaty shall be considered to come into force upon ratification from all Coalition Powers on one side and from the Ottoman State on the other.
IN FAITH WHEREOF the Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Treaty.
Done at Odessa, the 5th day of February in 1895, in a single copy of which authorised copies will be distributed to each of the signatory powers.
Treaty of Odessa
EGYPT, INDOSTAN, and RUSSIA, these powers united being henceforth defined as the Coalition Powers, alongside
ARMENIA, KURDISTAN, and PERSIA, these powers henceforth defined as the Liberated Nations, on the one part;
And the OTTOMAN STATE, on the other part;
Following the armistice conceded by the Coalition Powers unto the Ottoman State for the prompt negotiation of a Peace Treaty,
Following the firm wishes of the Coalition Powers that the state of war mediating between them and the Ottoman State should be terminated and replaced with a durable peace, and
Following the stern resolve of the Coalition Powers that any peace settlement must conclusively settle the issues that led to the onset of war, as outlined in the Joint Statement of 1894 and in the Declaration of War of the Coalition Powers on the Ottoman State of 1st January 1895,
The HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES, through their properly appointed Plenipotentiaries and representatives, HAVE AGREED AS FOLLOWS:
From the coming into force of this treaty, the state of war will terminate,
From that moment and subject to the provisions of the present Treaty, official relations will be established between the Coalition Powers and the Ottoman State.
I. The Ottoman State shall effect a complete withdrawal from the internationally recognised territory of Persia, and relinquish all assets unlawfully acquired during its occupation.
II. The Ottoman State recognises the independent sovereignty of Armenia and will subsequently withdraw all forces from recognised Armenian territory, as well as relinquishing all of its public assets in Armenia to its sovereign administration.
III. The Ottoman State recognises the independent sovereignty of Kurdistan and will subsequently withdraw all forces from recognised Kurdish territory, as well as relinquishing all of its public assets in Kurdistan to its sovereign administration.
IV. Persia will, in the same spirit of peace of this Treaty and to prevent future bloodshed and internal strife, cede its Kurdish provinces to Kurdistan.
V. The Coalition Powers will verify the implementation of articles I-IV and supervise the restoration or transition to sovereign authorities in the Liberated Nations, and commit to preserve their integrity and independence.
The present Treaty, in Russian, Punjabi, and Arabic, shall be ratified. In case of divergence, the Russian text shall prevail.
This Treaty shall be considered to come into force upon ratification from all Coalition Powers on one side and from the Ottoman State on the other.
IN FAITH WHEREOF the Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Treaty.
Done at Odessa, the 5th day of February in 1895, in a single copy of which authorised copies will be distributed to each of the signatory powers.
Signed, Foreign Councillor Count Franz Anton von Thun und HohensteinTreaty of Frankfurt
Recognizing the need for closer cooperation beyond simple economic means in case of resurgent armed aggression against the Fatherland, the two nations of the Fatherland hereby agree to the following obligations.
1. Two nations will agree to make military and civil assets available for the defense of the Fatherland as defined by current territories of NGF and Austro Bavaria
2. In case of an armed aggression against a member state, the other shall devote all available military and civil asset for the defense of the Fatherland.
3. The two nations will hereby agree to adopt a common foreign policy against the aggressor if the aggressor attempts armed invasion of the Fatherland.
Signed, Chancellor Rosenburg of the North German Federation.
Indostan Army General Battle Concepts
Foreword:
The art of war has always depended on two basic, essential, factors: the quality of a fighting force and its equipment, and its commander’s skill in employing it. Gifted commanders have existed throughout history, possessing a genius that supplemented but in no case substituted for experience and instruction. Ancient wisdom holds that knowledge, of oneself, of one’s enemy, of the battlefield and the rear, is paramount. Battle concepts were developed with the goal of providing officers with a basic knowledge of their force and its capabilities, and to establish guidelines for the waging of war, the conduct of operations, and the fighting of battles with such forces.
This document, brief but comprehensive, is the cornerstone of Indostani military understanding and learning. It is the duty of every officer or prospective officer to familiarise themselves with the principles and indications compiled in these General Battle Concepts and any future revisions of them. Battle Concepts outline and define the characteristics of the army and its tools and establishes the way in which they ought to be employed. As new tools emerge, new capabilities are developed, and the army itself changes, so do Battle Concepts have to evolve accordingly.
As the General Staff have formulated them, we envision these Battle Concepts as the definitive framework within which the Indostani Army and its formations and units will act and achieve success in any combat environment of the current war against the British Empire.
V.A. Singh
Jarnail, Chief of the General Staff
General Battle Concepts
1. War between sufficiently large and well-armed nations has become a single, protractred, magnified battle. It is not necessary to win decisively once, but to win decisively every time, as fresh troops replace defeated ones. Every sector of the front affects the entire front. Strategic success, then, can only be enabled by tactical victory. Operations constitute a framework to mobilise all tactical options towards the achievement of strategic objectives.
2. Warfare is a two-sided affair. The object of war is to achieve political objectives by military means. Equally, war can be won by destroying the enemy will to fight or by destroying the enemy’s ability to fight. Strategy concerns itself with establishing the objectives, military or political, whilst tactics concerns itself with defeating or avoiding the forces before those objectives.
3. The age of industry and machinery has irreversibly changed the face of warfare. Deadlier guns than ever are manufactured faster than ever. More men are made to wield rifles. Artillery has become paramount. Machineguns are the definitive defensive weapon of any army. Cavalry is shifting roles and evolving to reclaim its former pre-eminence. Fighting from the air is becoming possible. Charges, be it of infantry or of cavalry, have gone from bloody to suicidal, and are completely obsolete. Flesh must not be sent defenceless against a flying wall of bullets. In modern war, lives are cheaper, and men just as valuable as the weapons they wield.
4. Military forces never operate in isolation. Armies act and manoeuvre through and amidst a civilian population that conditions battlefields, engagements, logistics and every other element that must be considered by a military force. Therefore, an army must take care of such civilian populations. A content population will afford an army secure bases in its rear, whilst a restive one will be a permanent threat pointed at its back. Officers must take care to reduce civilian damage to a minimum, and prevent their operations from endangering such populations as much as it is feasible.
5. With larger armies and more complex weapons, armies become more expensive to maintain and supply. Entire factories are dedicated to it, and railroads and rolling stock are requisitioned and apportioned to deployment and distribution of said supply. Once off rails, the complexity and size of a logistical train increases greatly. An army cannot advance faster than it can be supplied. Officers must be aware that the limit of its advance is not how fast it can advance on the enemy but rather how far can its supply train reach.
6. The principal purpose of a military formation is to achieve victory, not to lay destruction. It is unfeasible for an army to maintain itself through foraging alone, and its dependence on infrastructure is a double-edged: what railroad or bridge seems critical to enemy supply in a given moment, will inevitably be critical to the own force’s supply once it has been captured. An army must always be ready to rebuild what it has destroyed and to preserve what it cannot rebuild.
7. Infantry is the basis of any army’s power, offensive and defensive. Men occupy positions and defend fortifications, men take ground and assault entrenchments. Industry has allowed for nations to equip and maintain more and larger armies than at any point before. Larger formations and deadlier weapons are conductive to greater losses. Whether they can be afforded or not in pursuit of an objective, it is the utmost duty of a commander and their staff to mitigate them as much as possible. Alternative means must to deal with the enemy before the infantry has to. Every man that falls is a soldier who will not fight again.
8. Artillery was already decisive in warfare, but the breakneck pace of advances have turned modern artillery into the offensive and defensive weapon of choice. Rifled canons are now the necessary foundation of any assault, destroying enemy positions and allowing the infantry to operate under its cover safe from enemy fire. Artillery must be the first preoccupation of a commander and their staff.
9. Cavalry has waned in importance since massed infantry fire rendered its shock value almost null. Nevertheless, cavalry still has an important role to play in warfare as reconnaissance, harassment, and pursuit. Crawlers are the first specimen of a new, armoured, cavalry that will reclaim its decisive role on the battlefield in the future. All that cavalry can achieve, it does for the benefit of the infantry. They are to be employed cautiously and never unsupported.
10. Aircraft has barely made its entrance into warfare. Already it provides more complete reconnaissance from the safety of the air than human means hitherto allowed for. It is a matter of time until new crafts are outfitted with weapons and compete for dominance in this new layer of the battlefield. Although necessarily auxiliary to the land battle, control of the air will inevitably provide great advantages to whomever has secured it. Thus officers need to weigh the balance in the air into their assessments, and must remain attentive to new advances that can alter it.
11. The most important skill that an officer must possess is awareness. A commander must know what their force and their enemy’s are capable of at every moment, and act accordingly. More importantly, they need to recognise what position will their and their enemy’s action or inaction generate and leave the respective forces in, and the course of action to adopt thereof. Actions and positions are never only tactical or strategic, but always both at the same time.
12. Where the conditions for a successful engagement do not exist, they must be created. There is always a decisive point that should be attacked and must be defended. Deception, diversion, coordination, and redeployment are any army’s greatest tools to inflict surprise. Coordinated action and rapid manoeuvres can ensure that the enemy cannot attack where he should and cannot defend where he must. It is a commander’s responsibility to maintain adequate horizontal communications and to properly coordinate with other formations.
13. Lack of success cannot stem from a failure to bring all available firepower to bear. Diversions and feints cannot detract in this sense from the main effort. If their cost cannot be compensated for in enemy losses of materiel, personnel, and preparedness, they become unaffordable. Military action demands a certain economy: that the enemy should be made to suffer more than the own force. No device or tactic should be employed for its own sake.
14. The key to successful action is preparation. If one is to attack, one must concentrate their forces, accumulate artillery, and know how the battle will unfold. If one is to defend, fortifications are to be erected, forces distributed accordingly, and every possible scenario taken into account. Knowing what performance can be expected from one’s own force is half the battle won. Knowing what performance to expect from the enemy’s force is the other half.
15. Only an organised force can sustain a fighting action. Organisation must be achieved through discipline and through leisure, and has to be maintained throughout the fighting. Order has to be kept at every step of the way. Formations have to advance and fall back in unison, withdrawn before they deplete, sent forth before they lose discipline. It is a commander’s duty to keep their force well-disciplined and cared for. Morale is critical in maintaining cohesion, and vice versa.
16. Disorganisation is the surest road to defeat. An organised force with insufficient planning will drive through a disorganised enemy with a plan. Though the object of an action be to take a position or drive an enemy from it, it’s primary and unspoken goal shall be to shatter the enemy’s cohesiveness. An attack overwhelming enough to achieve that goal will always succeed and cannot be fought back effectively.
17. A force retreating in good order can avoid defeat, preparing a new defence or a counter-attack on their enemy. One that falls into disarray will lose its position and jeopardise the entire army. A force which is doomed must attempt an orderly escape. A force who has dislodged or surrounded an enemy must pursue it vigorously to prevent it from reforming. Order and organisation are necessary at all levels. An offensive must be stopped before momentum throws attacking forces into disarray. Positions have to be reinforced before they have a chance to collapse.