Iraq Study Group: Pentagon systematically underreports violence for political reasons

[Uiler]

Anyway, I've been flicking through the Iraq Study Group report and here's an interesting fact that hasn't really made the media (though it's been on some blogs). The report finds that the Pentagon systematically underreports violence in Iraq by a magnitude and accuses it of doing so "to minimize its discrepancy with policy goals".

http://www.realcities.com/multimedi.../archive/iraqstudygroup_findings.pdf#page=112

In addition, there is significant underreporting of the violence
in Iraq. The standard for recording attacks acts as a filter
to keep events out of reports and databases. A murder of an
Iraqi is not necessarily counted as an attack. If we cannot determine
the source of a sectarian attack, that assault does not
make it into the database. A roadside bomb or a rocket or mortar
attack that doesn’t hurt U.S. personnel doesn’t count. For
example, on one day in July 2006 there were 93 attacks or significant
acts of violence reported. Yet a careful review of the reports
for that single day brought to light 1,100 acts of violence.
Good policy is difficult to make when information is systematically
collected in a way that minimizes its discrepancy with policy
goals.

Basically the Pentagon systematically underreports violence in Iraq by about 10 times. Also there are a grand total of 10 Pentagon analysts who have had more than 2 years experience with the Iraqi insurgency because they keep on getting rotated out:

We were told that there are fewer than 10 analysts on the
job at the Defense Intelligence Agency who have more than two
years’ experience in analyzing the insurgency. Capable analysts
are rotated to new assignments, and on-the-job training begins
anew. Agencies must have a better personnel system to keep analytic
expertise focused on the insurgency. They are not doing
enough to map the insurgency, dissect it, and understand it on a
national and provincial level. The analytic community’s knowledge
of the organization, leadership, financing, and operations
of militias, as well as their relationship to government security
forces, also falls far short of what policy makers need to know.

Ah, combine this with the other thing about only 6 fluent Arabic speakers in the American embassy. Don't you love bureaucratic incompetence?

 

[Xanikk999]

Just wondering do they have an obligation to report everything?

 

[Uiler]

Just wondering do they have an obligation to report everything?

I strongly doubt they are stupid enough to do it in a way which is illegal, but as the report says,

Good policy is difficult to make when information is systematically
collected in a way that minimizes its discrepancy with policy
goals.

While one can blast it on moral grounds, the Iraq Study Group is blasting it on intelligence grounds i.e. "How the hell are we supposed to know what's going on because you refuse to report things that are inconvenient for the government you idiots?"

 

[Atlas14]

The media more than makes up for any underreporting of violence.

 

[Xanikk999]

Yeah, well thats government and politics for you.

 

[Uiler]

More bureaucratic incompetence:

A lack of coordination by senior management in Washington
still hampers U.S. contributions to Iraq’s reconstruction.
Focus, priority setting, and skillful implementation are in
short supply. No single official is assigned responsibility or held
accountable for the overall reconstruction effort. Representatives
of key foreign partners involved in reconstruction have
also spoken to us directly and specifically about the need for a
point of contact that can coordinate their efforts with the U.S.
government.
A failure to improve coordination will result in agencies
continuing to follow conflicting strategies, wasting taxpayer
dollars on duplicative and uncoordinated efforts. This waste
will further undermine public confidence in U.S. policy in Iraq.

 

[Uiler]

And oil production is at pre-war levels:

Oil production and sales account for nearly 70 percent of Iraq’s
GDP, and more than 95 percent of government revenues. Iraq
produces around 2.2 million barrels per day, and exports about
1.5 million barrels per day. This is below both prewar production
levels and the Iraqi government’s target of 2.5 million barrels
per day, and far short of the vast potential of the Iraqi oil
sector. Fortunately for the government, global energy prices
have been higher than projected, making it possible for Iraq to
meet its budget revenue targets.

 

[Uiler]

US military at breaking point:

U.S. military forces, especially our ground forces, have
been stretched nearly to the breaking point by the repeated deployments
in Iraq, with attendant casualties (almost 3,000 dead
and more than 21,000 wounded), greater difficulty in recruiting,
and accelerated wear on equipment.

Additionally, the defense budget as a whole is in danger of
disarray, as supplemental funding winds down and reset costs
become clear. It will be a major challenge to meet ongoing requirements
for other current and future security threats that
need to be accommodated together with spending for operations
and maintenance, reset, personnel, and benefits for active
duty and retired personnel. Restoring the capability of our military
forces should be a high priority for the United States at
this time.

The U.S. military has a long tradition of strong partnership
between the civilian leadership of the Department of Defense
and the uniformed services. Both have long benefited
from a relationship in which the civilian leadership exercises
control with the advantage of fully candid professional advice, and the military serves loyally with the understanding that its
advice has been heard and valued. That tradition has frayed,
and civil-military relations need to be repaired.

Basically if you think the military costs ($$) of the Iraqi adventure have been high you ain't seen nothing yet...Actually they go on further about that saying that:

...the executive branch presents budget requests in a confusing manner, making it difficult for both the general
public and members of Congress to understand the request or to differentiate it from counterterrorism operations around the
world or operations in Afghanistan. Detailed analyses by budget experts are needed to answer what should be a simple question:
“How much money is the President requesting for the war in Iraq?"