Prinz Eugen

[Kyriakos]

The French navy was "rendered useless" by the fact they were fighting an enemy with no sea presence whatever. Much like air to air missiles and air superiority fighters are "rendered useless" by an opponent that has no aircraft.

In the case of France, their plan was to land troops, using the ships. The mere lack of any (war)ships by Prussia didn't matter, but the existence of large costal batteries did. In the end, the war was lost, and very badly, so if France had been able to land troops at Holstein (etc) (using their ships) it surely would have been better for it, and would cause Prussia to focus part of its army far FAR away from France.

Compare with the first (and to some extent, the second) Prussian-Danish war, where Denmark had naval superiority, and in the first war did land troops behind enemy lines.

 

[Timsup2nothin]

In the case of France, their plan was to land troops, using the ships. The mere lack of any (war)ships by Prussia didn't matter, but the existence of large costal batteries did. In the end, the war was lost, and very badly, so if France had been able to land troops at Holstein (etc) (using their ships) it surely would have been better for it, and would cause Prussia to focus part of its army far FAR away from France.

Compare with the first (and to some extent, the second) Prussian-Danish war, where Denmark had naval superiority, and in the first war did land troops behind enemy lines.

I understood the point.

My point is that the fact that France tried to use an ill suited fleet for a particular purpose against a particular foe and failed doesn't mean that all fleets are left with no purpose.

Similarly, the idea that a battleship is only useful when it is in range of coastal air defenses is correct enough, if you insist on discussing fleets made up of a single unit type...but since there are none such that's not really important. A battleship, by itself has a life expectancy of zero as soon as an appropriately armed plane crosses its path. That's why they would never be deployed by themselves. Give it a task force of air defense cruisers and you can do some damage. Throw in a carrier to provide a base for air support and you can really do some damage...as long as you can provide enough picket boats to fend off enemy submarines, of course.

 

[Kyriakos]

I understood the point.

My point is that the fact that France tried to use an ill suited fleet for a particular purpose against a particular foe and failed doesn't mean that all fleets are left with no purpose.

Similarly, the idea that a battleship is only useful when it is in range of coastal air defenses is correct enough, if you insist on discussing fleets made up of a single unit type...but since there are none such that's not really important. A battleship, by itself has a life expectancy of zero as soon as an appropriately armed plane crosses its path. That's why they would never be deployed by themselves. Give it a task force of air defense cruisers and you can do some damage. Throw in a carrier to provide a base for air support and you can really do some damage...as long as you can provide enough picket boats to fend off enemy submarines, of course.

Still, it was 1870, and France was the second largest empire (and likely second largest naval power too), and still its fleet got negated by some coastal guns. Which doesn't signify much use for it at the time. Now it was before planes, and Holstein is a thin bit of land (and after it comes a chokepoint), but one would expect more use out of the second largest fleet of the late 19th century.

There was also the vast charade at the Dardanelles, with a lot more capital ships used.

 

[Timsup2nothin]

In 1870 coastal batteries had tremendous range and accuracy advantages over ship mounted guns. That didn't last. No advantage ever does.

 

[Evie]

And again: the increase in the need for rare resources of a variety of kind to feel industrial and thus military power has made it practically impossible for all but the largest/most resource rich nations to keep their economy running if you cut off their sea trade. Both Britain and Germany in the two world wars demonstrated handily the price of letting yourself be on the receiving end of a naval blockade. And no amount of coastal batteries can stop a naval blockade.

 

[onejayhawk]

And again: the increase in the need for rare resources of a variety of kind to feel industrial and thus military power has made it practically impossible for all but the largest/most resource rich nations to keep their economy running if you cut off their sea trade. Both Britain and Germany in the two world wars demonstrated handily the price of letting yourself be on the receiving end of a naval blockade. And no amount of coastal batteries can stop a naval blockade.

Japan is a better example. They could not even get their own (for some values of owned) resources home.

J

 

[Broken_Erika]

That's because they never really bothered to implement a convoy system. As a result the US submarines ate the Japanese merchant fleet for breakfast.

 

[Evie]

Japan is indeed a better example, but for a submarine blockade, the UK is the more famous one (and still demonstrate the potential threat of a blockade). Germany is useful as a demonstration of the utility of surface blockades - letting your opponent rule the sea surface is a *terrible* plan unless you're economically self-sufficient.

 

[Ajidica]

A battleship, by itself has a life expectancy of zero as soon as an appropriately armed plane crosses its path.

I wouldn't go quite that far. The most famous "demonstration" of air power over battleships was probably the sinking of the HMS Repulse and Prince of Wales, which isn't really a fair comparison. The ships were without any meaningful support and had continuous problems with their anti-aircraft guns because the fire control computers and electrics kept giving out in the humidity. It turns out what works just fine in the freezing North Atlantic has problems in the South Pacific.

 

[Cutlass]

I wouldn't go quite that far. The most famous "demonstration" of air power over battleships was probably the sinking of the HMS Repulse and Prince of Wales, which isn't really a fair comparison. The ships were without any meaningful support and had continuous problems with their anti-aircraft guns because the fire control computers and electrics kept giving out in the humidity. It turns out what works just fine in the freezing North Atlantic has problems in the South Pacific.

Better is the sinking of both Yamato class ships. Both were fully operational, and not alone. And massive air attacks destroyed them. It took a lot of planes, and a lot of hits. But they couldn't survive it.

 

[Timsup2nothin]

I wouldn't go quite that far. The most famous "demonstration" of air power over battleships was probably the sinking of the HMS Repulse and Prince of Wales, which isn't really a fair comparison. The ships were without any meaningful support and had continuous problems with their anti-aircraft guns because the fire control computers and electrics kept giving out in the humidity. It turns out what works just fine in the freezing North Atlantic has problems in the South Pacific.

You might notice that by including "were without meaningful support" you were agreeing in the main with my premise, even if differing in detail.

Admittedly, the "one plane" was a bit of hyperbole, but the main point is that the real world will always call for a mixed fleet. We can chatter now about carriers the same way people used to chatter about battleships, but a carrier by itself is no more likely to survive than a battleship by itself.

 

[Broken_Erika]

..........., but a carrier by itself is no more likely to survive than a battleship by itself.

Like the HMS Hermes?
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HMS_Hermes_(95)

 

[Ajidica]

While looking at wiki articles about WW2 carriers and battleships, I remembered this gem:

On the way through the Norwegian Sea the funnel smoke from Glorious and her two escorting destroyers, Acasta and Ardent, was spotted by the German battleships Scharnhorst and Gneisenau at about 15:46 pm.[Note 3] The British spotted the German ships shortly after 16:00 and Ardent was dispatched to investigate. Glorious did not alter course or increase speed. Five Swordfish were ordered to the flight deck and Action Stations were ordered 16:20. No combat air patrol was being flown, no aircraft were ready on the deck for quick take-off and there was no lookout in Glorious's crow's nest. Scharnhorst opened fire on Ardent at 16:27 at a range of 16,000 yards (15,000 m), causing the destroyer to withdraw, firing torpedoes and making a smoke screen. Ardent scored one hit with her 4.7-inch guns on Scharnhorst but was hit several times by the German ships' secondary armament and sank at 17:25.[41]

Scharnhorst switched her fire to Glorious at 16:32 and scored her first hit six minutes later on her third salvo, at a range of 26,000 yards (24,000 m), when one 28.3-centimetre (11.1 in) hit the forward flight deck and burst in the upper hangar, starting a large fire. This hit destroyed two Swordfish being prepared for flight and the hole in the flight deck prevented any other aircraft from taking off.[42] Splinters penetrated a boiler casing and caused a temporary drop in steam pressure. At 16:58 a second shell hit the homing beacon above the bridge and killed or wounded the captain and most of the personnel stationed there. Ardent's smokescreen became effective enough to impair the visibility of the Germans from about 16:58 to 17:20 so they ceased fire on Glorious.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HMS_Glorious

 

[onejayhawk]

That's because they never really bothered to implement a convoy system. As a result the US submarines ate the Japanese merchant fleet for breakfast.

Three meals a day, but that was given. The Japanese did have a convoy system, but they never developed a sub hunter approach, which is what destroyed the Germans in the Atlantic.

Somewhat related to other post in this thread, the USN made significant use of escort carriers. The CVE, so-called jeep carriers, on merchant hulls with merchant propulsion. In the Atlantic, they were invaluable in both submarine suppression and the sub-hunter packs. In the Pacific they had an unusual chapter in the massive Leyte Gulf battle. As with victory ships, quantity has its own quality.

J

 

[Evie]

They did implement a convoy system, yes. Half-heartedly. With a whooping eight destroyers assigned to it to begin - because destroyers were surface combatants, not escorts. Even what escorts they built (destroyer escort equivalent) were built in small quantity and more often assigned as escort to military operations than to convoys, especially early in the war. The only started work on the cheap, mass-produced escort (eg, Flower-class counterpart) in 1943, and only started actually getting the ships at the end of February 44. Add training times for brand new ships, and you're left with...not much, actually. And that's only the first few of the class - of the hundred or so they built, several only were finished in late 44 or early 45. They just never had the resources to effectively protect their convoys. All the more so without any significant air support for their convoys.

 

[r16]

the best example of "Battleship" against "Shore batteries" is Averoff itself . Once defeating the Ottoman Fleet with or without British gunnery , it simply ensured we have this 4 decades of "We will have 12 miles-No, you won't" stuff . And the shore batteries , the heavy ones that turned back the Anglo French on March 1915 were already there and they did like squat for the Balkan Wars .

 

[hobbsyoyo]

They did implement a convoy system, yes. Half-heartedly. With a whooping eight destroyers assigned to it to begin - because destroyers were surface combatants, not escorts. Even what escorts they built (destroyer escort equivalent) were built in small quantity and more often assigned as escort to military operations than to convoys, especially early in the war. The only started work on the cheap, mass-produced escort (eg, Flower-class counterpart) in 1943, and only started actually getting the ships at the end of February 44. Add training times for brand new ships, and you're left with...not much, actually. And that's only the first few of the class - of the hundred or so they built, several only were finished in late 44 or early 45. They just never had the resources to effectively protect their convoys. All the more so without any significant air support for their convoys.

It took them a year to introduce new escorts?

 

[Cutlass]

It took them a year to introduce new escorts?

All the navies, even the British, who absolutely knew better, were under-provided with escorts and sub-hunters at the start of the war. But once you decide to build them, first you need to design the ship, then set up a production facility, then get some built, and then train the crews to operate them. All that takes time. And if you don't have good weapons systems already in the pipeline, it takes even longer. The Japanese under-provided for anti-sub work even more than the other major navies.

Part of this is psychological. Submarines were devious, underhanded, sneaky. Not the proper weapons for 'warriors'. So naval leaders tended to downplay the defenses against them. Until, of course, it was too late, and your available shipping is rusting at the bottom of the ocean. Then you scramble to find a way to combat the subs. For the Japanese, it was much too little, and much too late. The US entered the war badly prepared to defend against subs, but in less than 2 years had severely turned the tables on them.

And all of this despite the fact that all of these navies were at the same time building submarines, and planning to use them just as their enemies were planning to use them. There was some bad admiraling going on in those days.

 

[r16]

the Japanese were utterly bent on one single gigantic battle to defeat the USN . Understandable , because America is far too big and it has millions and millions of factories with raw resources to match . If they can't win at once the Japanese will be caught in a vice of attritional warfare . Especially if they win a "little" initial victory . Americans will then simply skulk at port , waiting for a couple of years to get a massive amount of ships . Hence the Japanese submarines are geared for engaging America battlefleets in case they catch them . A campaign to attack American Merchant Fleet is bad , detracts from the primary mission . Likewise escort ships are bad , steel for them better used for Fleet Destroyers to fire Long Lances on American battlewagons .

 

[Broken_Erika]

The idea of a massive climactic battle worked pretty well for them at Tsushima......
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Tsushima