Prinz Eugen

it certainly lost the war for Japan , if one wants to be open hearted for it . Not in making Americans angry , but unbalancing them greatly . Without it , Americans could have sailed into harm's way , full of racial prejudices , a contempt for the art of war at sea and all that and get fully blown off the water off Philipinnes . A Leyte in January 1942 , without radar and F6F and the Japanese would be almost the tech level of '44 .
That is probably the best approach.

There is a saying in golf, "You cannot win on the first hole, but you can lose." Also relevant are frogs and hot water, dogs and slumber, tigers and sticks, etc.

J
 
going on with the same tangent Saburo Sakai mentions the training they got , pointlessly wild if you are to ask me . Including wrestling bouts , ı believe out of the blue , and the guy that lost most during that month was unceremously kicked out of the job , sent to infantry and the like . Resulting in aggression and aggression . Because Japan would fight but one battle and they demanded utmost from their pilots . Attrition warfare and the Japanese are bleeding white and tons of new pilot candidates are in . Wounded in action , Sakai is an instructor and he is horrified at the material he has to work with . Thinks those kicked every month in the past were better . But ı can't remember now whether he had a numerical value in mind , like twice better ot ten times better .
 
The Japanese (and German for that matter) pilot training programs had a serious problem in that experienced pilots were very rarely rotated back from the frontlines to aid in training, meaning their knowledge was never passed down to the replacements brought through during the war. The WAllies (not sure about the Soviets) meanwhile tended to have limited tours of duty, and many of their best pilots were brought into the training schemes at the end of their tours. So while the Axis did keep their best pilots fighting for longer, and started the war with better pilots, the average quality of WAllied pilots became noticeably higher over the course of the war thanks to freshly trained men having a much more up to date understanding of air combat.
 
no doubt helped by the never ending numerical superiority of the Anglosaxons and Russians . Germans or the Japanese could not remove their best from action as they were becoming unable to cope with the numbers already .
 
The Japanese (and German for that matter) pilot training programs had a serious problem in that experienced pilots were very rarely rotated back from the frontlines to aid in training, meaning their knowledge was never passed down to the replacements brought through during the war. The WAllies (not sure about the Soviets) meanwhile tended to have limited tours of duty, and many of their best pilots were brought into the training schemes at the end of their tours. So while the Axis did keep their best pilots fighting for longer, and started the war with better pilots, the average quality of WAllied pilots became noticeably higher over the course of the war thanks to freshly trained men having a much more up to date understanding of air combat.


Also just plain more time flying. The Axis were more and more short of fuel as the war went on. And so didn't 'waste' as much on training.
 
if you mean Rolls Royce , R-2800 was like much better . If Rest and Recreation , well becomes hard to argue .
 
Refit and Repair

It refers to the practice of pulling units off the front line to check, fix and update equipment. This allowed time to integrate new personnel, issue new equipment and and do training for the equipment and techniques. It was good for morale because it was a relief from the stress of combat situations. It also provided incoming green troops contact with combat experience.

One obvious point of impact was carrier pilots. Zeroes manhandled F4Fs at Midway. During the Solomon campaign, the reverse was true. Midway cost the Japanese the cream of the naval air corp, so the replacements were much less experience. Also important was the American strategy of flying in pairs. One on one a Zero was more than a match for a Wildcat, but two F4Fs, flying buddy, had a chance against four zeroes. At Leyte Gulf, the difference resulted in a Turkey Shoot.

J
 
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A lack of any Machinery refit after 1942 is why the HMS Rodney rarely left her mooring in the last year of WW2. Tat and her hull defects, rivet defects that were never fixed and lack of proper overhaul on the level of the HMS Nelson.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HMS_Rodney_(29)
 
Wildcat and Zeroes barely faced one another at Midway. And even at the Coral Sea (where they did face one another), the Zeroes and F4F losses were comparable (19 Zeroes to 21 Wildcats). The Thach weave was a fairly early invention in the war for countering the zero.

Also, Japanese pilot losses at Midway tend to be wildly exaggerated - the overwhelming bulk of Japanese plane losses at Midway came from the planes being on a sinking ship (a situation that, since the carriers had time to be evacuated, was unlikely to kill too many of the pilots). Actual in-action losses at Midway are roughly estimated at 40-odd japanesse planes ; that's less than half the losses at Coral Sea. It's the 7-900 planes lost in the Guadalcanal Campaign that bled the INJ dry of its best pilots, not the 40-odd planes lost in action at Midway.
 
IIRC, the big losses at Midway were among the support personnel - mechanics, technicians, etc. - as they were the last ones to be evacuated from the sinking ships.
 
The losses at Midway were not overwhelming, but it was from the best the Japanese had.

Thach was at Midway, in person. His fighter group was roughed up escorting torpedo planes. It is believed that this was the first combat use of the weave. The results were negative, since that most of the torpedo planes never made it to launch point. However, the action pulled attention away from the much more effective dive bombers at high altitude.

Even taking 1942 fighter kills as even, by the end of 1943 it was far different. There was a joke about it after Leyte.

Q: What do you call a carrier pilot that's not an ace?
A: Late for duty.
J
 
Calling the result of using the Thach weave in that engagement "Negative result" is a gross twisting of history. There were between 30 and 40 Zeroes up in the air on CAP ; Thach had 6 Wildcats. The Japanese could (and did) send overwhelming numbers against Thach to leave him unable to assist the bombers, while more fighters shot them down. Maybe flying F6F or F4U against 1945-vintage Japanese pilot it *might* have been doable ; before that it was an exercise in impossibility.

But, despite beign grossly outnumbered (15 to 20 Zeroes against 6 Wildcats)...Thach's flight, using the weave, traded 3 Wildcats for 4 Zeroes that morning - against the cream of Japanese fighters, flying the inferior Wildcat. Seems like a pretty positive demonstration to me.

(For the record: actual number wises, of all the aircrew present at Midway, a little over 20% were lost (110 lost out of 480). Which left nearly 80% of the elite Japanese pilot corp present at the battle (not including the aircrews that missed out on the battle ; eg Shokaku and Zuikaku aircrews notably) alive and well. he losses breakdown to 7 aircrew out of 114 for Akagi, 21/144 for Kaga, 11/111 for Soryu, and the bulk of them, 78/111 for Hiryu...which stand to reason as they kept launching strikes much later than the others, and Hiryu plane after those last sorties had nowhere to land)).
 
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I read a lengthy description of the battle at Guadalcanal, the Japanese basically lost to a bunch of PT boats and destroyers before USA BBs showed up. The Japanese split their forces and lost contact with each other. The one Japanese commander who made the right move of retreating got home with his ship and was canned for lack of aggression.
 
I read a lengthy description of the battle at Guadalcanal, the Japanese basically lost to a bunch of PT boats and destroyers before USA BBs showed up. The Japanese split their forces and lost contact with each other. The one Japanese commander who made the right move of retreating got home with his ship and was canned for lack of aggression.


There were multiple naval battles in the Guadalcanal campaign. As a tactical matter, Japan won almost all of them. As a strategic matter, Japan was not able to control the sea around the island in order to control the battle on the island.
 
Calling the result of using the Thach weave in that engagement "Negative result" is a gross twisting of history. There were between 30 and 40 Zeroes up in the air on CAP ; Thach had 6 Wildcats. The Japanese could (and did) send overwhelming numbers against Thach to leave him unable to assist the bombers, while more fighters shot them down. Maybe flying F6F or F4U against 1945-vintage Japanese pilot it *might* have been doable ; before that it was an exercise in impossibility.

But, despite beign grossly outnumbered (15 to 20 Zeroes against 6 Wildcats)...Thach's flight, using the weave, traded 3 Wildcats for 4 Zeroes that morning - against the cream of Japanese fighters, flying the inferior Wildcat. Seems like a pretty positive demonstration to me.

(For the record: actual number wises, of all the aircrew present at Midway, a little over 20% were lost (110 lost out of 480). Which left nearly 80% of the elite Japanese pilot corp present at the battle (not including the aircrews that missed out on the battle ; eg Shokaku and Zuikaku aircrews notably) alive and well. he losses breakdown to 7 aircrew out of 114 for Akagi, 21/144 for Kaga, 11/111 for Soryu, and the bulk of them, 78/111 for Hiryu...which stand to reason as they kept launching strikes much later than the others, and Hiryu plane after those last sorties had nowhere to land)).
None of this contradicts what was said earlier, which is that there were severe but not crippling losses at Midway. 20% losses in any battle is a bunch.

J
 
There were multiple naval battles in the Guadalcanal campaign. As a tactical matter, Japan won almost all of them. As a strategic matter, Japan was not able to control the sea around the island in order to control the battle on the island.

I didn't know the Japanese actually had some success... The one I read about was a night battle during the summer '42, the first time I guess US BBs (5) got revenge for Pearl Harbor. I dont remember the numbers but collateral damage accounted for a significant loss of life on our side when one of our ships took hits as it moved in on the enemy for a torpedo launch. I cant find the link, it was at yahoo and the title was about US BBs avenging Pearl. The Japanese loss of life was considerable, a couple larger ships went down with most of their crews while we lost a few dozen people. Much of the damage we did happened during a ~20 minute exchange.
 
Berzerker - that's Leyte you're describing (specifically, Surigao Strait), in Fall 44, not summer 42. The battleships lost at Pearl by and large didn't return to action until 1944.

Guadalcanal did see the other significant battleship vs battleship engagement of the Pacific war when Washington butchered Kirishima in the second part of the naval battle of Guadalcanal. But she was a much more recent North Carolina class, which had only actually been completed after Pearl Harbor. (South Dakota was there too, but ran in slight mechanical issues that largely kept her out of the fight).

(Incidentally, the USN did not perform *that* poorly at Guadalcanal - they lost Savo horrendously, and Tassafaronga was bad too, but they did well at Cape Esperance, and Naval Guadalcanal was a pretty solid performance)
 
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I didn't know the Japanese actually had some success... The one I read about was a night battle during the summer '42, the first time I guess US BBs (5) got revenge for Pearl Harbor. I dont remember the numbers but collateral damage accounted for a significant loss of life on our side when one of our ships took hits as it moved in on the enemy for a torpedo launch. I cant find the link, it was at yahoo and the title was about US BBs avenging Pearl. The Japanese loss of life was considerable, a couple larger ships went down with most of their crews while we lost a few dozen people. Much of the damage we did happened during a ~20 minute exchange.


This isn't a good or accurate description of the naval campaign of the Guadalcanal campaign. The First Battle of Savo Island was considered possibly the worse defeat the US Navy ever suffered in a gun battle. It was a night battle, like the other naval battles of the Guadalcanal campaign. A force of American and Australian cruisers and destroyers got their asses kicked. The place is now called Iron Bottom Sound for all the American iron that's on the bottom of it.

The First and Second Naval Battles of Guadalcanal came in November of 1942. This is where the first battleships became involved, with the arrival of 2 Japanese battleships. While one of those battleships was sunk, it was still a Japanese tactical victory. You ever heard of the 5 Sullivan Brothers? This is where they died. This is where the US Navy learned to not put 5 brothers on the same ship. In the later battle, 2 new American battleships showed up. Neither had been at Pearl Harbor. They did terminal damage to the remaining Japanese battleship. But this was 2 new construction ships with 9x16" guns with the newest in radar and fire control each against one 8x14" ship that had been launched in 1913. And one of those American ships left the battle almost as mauled as the Japanese ship.

There were multiple other smaller battles as well. The US Navy did not cover itself in glory. The US won the campaign because the location of it was beyond what Japanese logistics could support, and so American forces could keep entering the battle, where Japanese forces could not. But that was despite a poor showing at sea by American forces. Not to mention the destruction of the cream of the Australian navy.
 
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