D0NIMATRIX
Full of drivel
I was just wondering if anybody knew the purpose of a screen in ancient age and medieval combat. Do they mask your movements or harass the enemy? Thanks in advance.
Screening tactics
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Sharwood
Rich, doctor nephew
Depends on what kind of a screen you're talking about. If you mean the kind explicitly mention in Sunzi's Art of War, then it's a combination of masking one's movements and misinformation. By putting up more screens - which were usually made of woven grass - than the number actually needed to disguise troop movements, one could give the impression of greater numbers. Similarly, fewer screens could give the impression of fewer numbers, while the bulk of the troops were hidden elsewhere.
Time to play my Greek role to the hilt, no Spartan jokes. 
At the Battle of Leuktra, one notices the employment of cavalry forces in front of both the Boiotian and Lakedaimonian armies. The defeat of the Lakedaimonian horsemen allowed the Boiotian army to prevent their enemies from noticing the elaborate tactical maneuvering that Epaminondas was carrying out, which culminated in the destruction of the Lakonian army. Hilarity ensues.
A different way to employ a screen would be in securing the flanks for some time. At Paraitakene, Eumenes of Kardia used his superiority in elephants in a novel way; he screened the left flank of his army, allowing him to perform the maneuver that eluded Porus at the Hydaspes and transfer cavalry from his left wing to his right, allowing him to achieve local superiority on the right wing, smash the enemy in front of him, and secure a favorable outcome to the battle.
At the Battle of Leuktra, one notices the employment of cavalry forces in front of both the Boiotian and Lakedaimonian armies. The defeat of the Lakedaimonian horsemen allowed the Boiotian army to prevent their enemies from noticing the elaborate tactical maneuvering that Epaminondas was carrying out, which culminated in the destruction of the Lakonian army. Hilarity ensues.
A different way to employ a screen would be in securing the flanks for some time. At Paraitakene, Eumenes of Kardia used his superiority in elephants in a novel way; he screened the left flank of his army, allowing him to perform the maneuver that eluded Porus at the Hydaspes and transfer cavalry from his left wing to his right, allowing him to achieve local superiority on the right wing, smash the enemy in front of him, and secure a favorable outcome to the battle.
frekk
Scourge of St. Lawrence
Then you've got plashing, which was used by Celtic and Germanic groups - basically camouflaged screens made out of intertwined branches, thorny vines etc (kind of like barbed wire) they'd put up in the area around an ambush (in forested areas) to try and contain the enemy in the killing zone.
Cheezy the Wiz
Socialist In A Hurry
It could also refer to the early purpose of the destroyer, which involved chasing away other destroyers and torpedo boats from the main battle fleet, i.e. the battleships. The ship's name even comes from this purpose: "torpedo boat destroyer."
Ironically, by the Second World War, it was the battleships who were doing the screening, but this time to protect carriers from torpedo attack, as well as low-flying bomber aircraft and, at the end of the war, kamikazes.
Ironically, by the Second World War, it was the battleships who were doing the screening, but this time to protect carriers from torpedo attack, as well as low-flying bomber aircraft and, at the end of the war, kamikazes.
D0NIMATRIX
Full of drivel
If I understand correctly, then, a screen skirmishes with the enemy to prevent any large-scale assault while also masking your own formation? (screen=light, mobile troops here)
Basically, yes.
Sharwood
Rich, doctor nephew
Ah, that kind of screen. Yes, as Dachs and others said, that's basically their job.
Cheezy the Wiz
Socialist In A Hurry
Time to play my Greek role to the hilt, no Spartan jokes.
At the Battle of Leuktra, one notices the employment of cavalry forces in front of both the Boiotian and Lakedaimonian armies. The defeat of the Lakedaimonian horsemen allowed the Boiotian army to prevent their enemies from noticing the elaborate tactical maneuvering that Epaminondas was carrying out, which culminated in the destruction of the Lakonian army. Hilarity ensues.
Unless I misunderstand, Leuktra was significant in that the Epaminondas essentially invented oblique infantry deployment on the spot, because of his extra-deep ranks on the Spartan Right.
joycem10
Deity
and attempts to gain inteligence on enemy composition and disposition. In land warfare your screen should be your eyes and try to punch out the opposing forces eyes.
Yes, those were the primary features at Leuktra; the deep column of attack on the Boiotian left wing, which literally ran over their opposite numbers (the whole bit about Epaminondas' "one last push for me"), and the oblique order on the right that allowed Epaminondas to essentially engage the Lakedaimonians with two strong forces at the same time, while leaving his weak middle out of the fight. It was Epaminondas' cavalry screen's defeat of the Lakedaimonians at the opening of the battle, however, that allowed them to carry out such a maneuver without it being countered by Kleombrotos on the other side.
Yep, indeed. Cavalry screens: blinding your enemy since 371 BC(E).
Cheezy the Wiz
Socialist In A Hurry
This was actually the dominating strategy of the Wehrmacht through most of the Eastern War. Local superiority of force works best when the location of the hammer's fall is unforseen, hence the need to "screen;" to achieve this repeatedly, German lines were almost never, at least by their choosing, close enough to the Russian lines for them to know what the hell was going on. Zhukov appears to be the first Russian commander to both realize this and to design a counter-strategy. Through the second half of the war, the advancing Russians always made sure the were constantly in contact with the Germans, always pressing just enough to be able to see the blitz before it happened. This had the consequence of wearing down front line soldiers, because there was little chance for them to be switched out for fresher ones. It was this weakness that resulted in the failure of Operations STAR, and Manstein's subesquent riposte at Kharkov; the front-line soldiers had been serving on the front line since Voronezh nearly a year before, and were suffering both in morale and in manpower. Zhukov hardly ever repeated this mistake again (of course, it was Rokossovsky in command during the Donets campaign), and at the next big battle, Kursk, he made sure his units were fresh, better armed, and at full manpower.
