The Schlieffen Plan: Good or Bad?
- Thread starter Dachs
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Adler17
Prussian Feldmarschall
Well, on the military aspeact there were and are much critics. But they all forgot: It worked! It only was failing, when Moltke the younger sent his reserves to Tanneberg. If he kept them, Paris would have fallen. That's for the military aspect.
For the political aspect we do have to see the problems: The plan saw the breech of the neutrality of a country: Belgium. The consequence was the declaration of war of Britain. Also Germany gave the first shot, to be shown by France as agressor. The plan was here fatal: Without Britain France would have fastly come back to the discussion table- or again lost against Germany, also disrupted of overseas materials by the Hochseeflotte. So it would have been better to let the French fire the first shot and to "help" Belgium against the agressor, just as Bismarck did before. Then moving to Belgium, destroying the French army there and taking Paris. As belgium was attacke, the French could not past as fast while the Germans could now be deployed fast at the border of France, without the problems with the Belgish fortresses. That would have given Germany the time back the French won due to their first shot. And without the German breech of neutrality the British were hardly able to declare war on Germany- or being breaking the neutrality, too.
Here is the fatal error of the plan.
Adler
For the political aspect we do have to see the problems: The plan saw the breech of the neutrality of a country: Belgium. The consequence was the declaration of war of Britain. Also Germany gave the first shot, to be shown by France as agressor. The plan was here fatal: Without Britain France would have fastly come back to the discussion table- or again lost against Germany, also disrupted of overseas materials by the Hochseeflotte. So it would have been better to let the French fire the first shot and to "help" Belgium against the agressor, just as Bismarck did before. Then moving to Belgium, destroying the French army there and taking Paris. As belgium was attacke, the French could not past as fast while the Germans could now be deployed fast at the border of France, without the problems with the Belgish fortresses. That would have given Germany the time back the French won due to their first shot. And without the German breech of neutrality the British were hardly able to declare war on Germany- or being breaking the neutrality, too.
Here is the fatal error of the plan.
Adler
France would have fastly come back to the discussion table- or again lost against Germany, also disrupted of overseas materials by the Hochseeflotte.
Firstly, I think France defensive line was a much stronger, so definately it cant be fastly come back to the discussion table. Anyways, Britain probably had declared war to Germany - sooner or later.
Firstly, I think France defensive line was a much stronger, so definately it cant be fastly come back to the discussion table. Anyways, Britain probably had declared war to Germany - sooner or later.
Louis XXIV
Le Roi Soleil
I think Britain used Belgium as an excuse to join the war. Britain likes keeping Europe divided to maintain the balance of power. Germany dominating the continent would have been bad, so they backed France.
Verbose
Deity
I still think Schlieffen's idea - less of an actual Plan - was overoptimistic on the logistics side of things. (Where's Yncs on this?)
No matter how many troop the Germans could deploy there was only so much ground they could cover at a certain speed by marching, effectively limiting the plan. The wingmen were keeling over with fatigue in the later stages of the initial push. They wouldn't have been able to go further faster on their own anyway so there wouldn't be a speedier flanking of the French in any case.
Most of the real fighting was done between the Sambre and Meuse, where the French took the bulk of the million casualties in 1914, retreated, but didn't disintegrate. Possibly one might argue that more German troops there could have meant a victory, but there doesn't seem to have been an actual shortage of them in the sector so it might not have mattered at all.
Having more troops isn't a panacea. With enough of them around on both sides you get a stalemate pretty much whatever you do. Soviet military planners did a lot of arithmetic about this stuff post WWII. Generally without mechanisation things will bog down once you deploy enough people in a theatre of operations.
Besides, according the German military planning Paris should have been toast anyway, as the Germans considered it too complicated to transfer and deploy an army to the west of Paris to counter the German move. Only the French didn't know that and did it anyway by implementing the famous "système D" of the French army.
That should perhaps be considered a flaw: The Schlieffen plan somehow seems to have assumed the French to be sitting still. But as von Moltke Sr once observed iirc, no plan survives the initial contact with the enemy.
That experience might have been more radical for the French army in 1914 (nothing going right) than for the German (just enough things going wrong to land the plan in the bin), but it still holds true for both.
No matter how many troop the Germans could deploy there was only so much ground they could cover at a certain speed by marching, effectively limiting the plan. The wingmen were keeling over with fatigue in the later stages of the initial push. They wouldn't have been able to go further faster on their own anyway so there wouldn't be a speedier flanking of the French in any case.
Most of the real fighting was done between the Sambre and Meuse, where the French took the bulk of the million casualties in 1914, retreated, but didn't disintegrate. Possibly one might argue that more German troops there could have meant a victory, but there doesn't seem to have been an actual shortage of them in the sector so it might not have mattered at all.
Having more troops isn't a panacea. With enough of them around on both sides you get a stalemate pretty much whatever you do. Soviet military planners did a lot of arithmetic about this stuff post WWII. Generally without mechanisation things will bog down once you deploy enough people in a theatre of operations.
Besides, according the German military planning Paris should have been toast anyway, as the Germans considered it too complicated to transfer and deploy an army to the west of Paris to counter the German move. Only the French didn't know that and did it anyway by implementing the famous "système D" of the French army.
That should perhaps be considered a flaw: The Schlieffen plan somehow seems to have assumed the French to be sitting still. But as von Moltke Sr once observed iirc, no plan survives the initial contact with the enemy.
That experience might have been more radical for the French army in 1914 (nothing going right) than for the German (just enough things going wrong to land the plan in the bin), but it still holds true for both.
SeleucusNicator
Diadoch
Louis XXIV said:
Exactly. German hegemony over the European Continent was simply not in Britain's best interest, and they would have joined the war eventually anyway. Britain and Germany were doomed to be enemies, and there was little that could be done about that.
I take the position that where Germany erred, it was not in violating Belgium, but in not violating the Netherlands also. Things would have gone much easier if they also went through the Netherlands, and once you violate Belgium, violating the Netherlands doesn't really make things worse for you in terms of angering the British or being seen as agressors.
sydhe
King of Kongs
On the other hand, it gave the Kaiser a place to retire to.
BEHIND_THE_MASK
A Liar... A Cheat...
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The Plan was a good one however I think its failure was in the Trenches... No one was expecting Trench Warfare at such violent levels and it messed with most plans...
And about that other thing. Britain and Germany. Britain was gonna declare war on Germany no matter what for several reasons. One may have been that war time industry might help speed up building the british navy which the British relied so much on. If Germanys war industry jumped up their own production of naval power it may have been trouble for the Royal Navy...
Am i right cause I rly dont know. But my studies on the subject seem accurate.
And about that other thing. Britain and Germany. Britain was gonna declare war on Germany no matter what for several reasons. One may have been that war time industry might help speed up building the british navy which the British relied so much on. If Germanys war industry jumped up their own production of naval power it may have been trouble for the Royal Navy...
Am i right cause I rly dont know. But my studies on the subject seem accurate.
Adler17
Prussian Feldmarschall
Indeed Britain and Germany came near to a stabile modus vivendi in 1914. If Germany did not declare the war on France and France invaded, Britain could stay out of the war, or declaring war on Germany (what is more likely). But then they would have been openly supporting a French "agression". They had to live with the fact their side fired here the first shot. Also they needed a good reason to enter the war. Serbia was none, but Belgium. A French invasion of Belgium might have also damaged the hawks in the parliament.
Adler
Adler
SeleucusNicator
Diadoch
Britain was always the enemy of the most powerful country on the European Continent; at various times, this has been France, Russia, or Germany.
That's the case because Britain does not want one single country dominating the entire European continent. Their historic pattern was that when one country on the continent became too powerful, Britain allied with the other ones on the continent to contain it.
Germany and Britain's fate as enemies was sealed in the late 19th century when Germany, due to economic, demographic, and military factors, replaced France as the most powerful country on the European Continent. I can't think of a good agreement that Britain and Germany could have reached with each other without sacrificing their own security. Their interests were completely divergent. One nation wanted to dominate the continent, the other nation wanted nobody to dominate the continent.
That's the case because Britain does not want one single country dominating the entire European continent. Their historic pattern was that when one country on the continent became too powerful, Britain allied with the other ones on the continent to contain it.
Germany and Britain's fate as enemies was sealed in the late 19th century when Germany, due to economic, demographic, and military factors, replaced France as the most powerful country on the European Continent. I can't think of a good agreement that Britain and Germany could have reached with each other without sacrificing their own security. Their interests were completely divergent. One nation wanted to dominate the continent, the other nation wanted nobody to dominate the continent.
TrailblazingScot
I was kittenOFchaos
As soon as the Kaiser built the High Seas Fleet Germany and Britain could not be friends, that fleet had no other purpose than to fight the British.
North King
blech
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A bad idea for political AND military reasons. The Plan simply did not take into account that the rails would become increasingly inadequate the more they were fought over; did not take into account that the army corps of 1914 was far more unwieldly than those of 1870; did not take into account the possibility that Russia might mobilize faster than predicted. It relied too much on clockwork timing, and too much on the enemy making the moves that were choreographed for them.
And of course it was bloody insane to so blantantly entice Britain into the war.
And of course it was bloody insane to so blantantly entice Britain into the war.
EdwardTking
Deity
No it did not.
Wishful thinking. Germany hoping for repetition of Franco-Prussian war result.
But cities are notoriously good places for riflemen to defend and the
technological developments since 1870 favoured the defence.
And even if Paris had fallen, with Britain and Russia about as allies;
the French would not necessarily have surrendered. They were
more motivated to defend their democracy than Napoleon III rule.
That may be true.
And posters here should remember it was not just Britain. Italy, which
was supposed to join the central powers side, joined the allies instead.
Riesstiu IV
Deity
More like the Scheißen plan.
1889
Mayor of H-Marker Lake
I think Schlieffen had a very good idea (although he may have been overly optimistic about the logistical ability of such a large army charging all the way to Paris). The failure of the German invasion can not be a repudiation of his plan because it was never really employed during the August offensive. Such an ambitious and risky plan could not be implemented by Moltke, who was fundamentally more cautious and conventional.
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