Ultimate Warlord Showdown: Chiang Kai-shek vs. Mao Zedong

"vast majority" seems to be a bit of a stretch. The Kantogun Army guarding against the Soviet threat alone was about equal in size to the Chinese Expeditionary Army. Both of them were frequently stripped of men and supplies in order to reinforce other more active theaters. They got away with it because Chiang sat on his ass during most of the war. Yes the, Chinese theater tied down lots of troops and material who had to guard and occupy a huge land area, true. Did they tie up the "vast majority" of Japan's total military resources? I don't know about that.

Someone here posted details on Japanese troop deployments; if I find the link again I'll post it here.

As for the charge against Chiang Kai-shek; it's partly true but you need to keep in mind that the NRA was never in a position to launch a major offensive against the Japanese until 1945. It had enough resources to wage a war of attrition against the Japanese but not enough to actually inflict them a severe defeat (Chiang Kai-shek did sacrificed the best of the NRA in Shanghai back in 1937, but it's doubtful that even if these forces had fared better that the NRA would be victorious in a major offensive against the far more well-armed and well-organised IJA). And as others have already pointed out, Chiang was anxious to conserve his strength for the showdown against Mao Zedong. This contrasts with the US war effort; the Americans had far, far, far more industrial and technological might at their disposal and had no internal enemies.
 
"vast majority" seems to be a bit of a stretch. The Kantogun Army guarding against the Soviet threat alone was about equal in size to the Chinese Expeditionary Army. Both of them were frequently stripped of men and supplies in order to reinforce other more active theaters. They got away with it because Chiang sat on his ass during most of the war. Yes the, Chinese theater tied down lots of troops and material who had to guard and occupy a huge land area, true. Did they tie up the "vast majority" of Japan's total military resources? I don't know about that.

More importantly it didn't tie up the most advanced forces which are really the bulwark of defense and offense for an island nation; The Navy and Air Force.

The simple fact is that the Chinese theatre didn't matter for the purposes of attacking and defeating Japan itself. For all its bluster and political clout the Japanese Army ened up the least relevant of Japan's armed services. Even at the very end when most of China was back in Allied hands most bombers were still hitting Japan from Pacific islands. It didn't destroy or prevent the building of a single aircraft carrier or battleship (though some airforce assets were tied up there). If China fell or was saved, the Pacific war would have still had to be prosecuted exactly the way it was, and it would be that Pacific campaign that eventually defeated Japan, just like in reality.
 
More importantly it didn't tie up the most advanced forces which are really the bulwark of defense and offense for an island nation; The Navy and Air Force.

The simple fact is that the Chinese theatre didn't matter for the purposes of attacking and defeating Japan itself. For all its bluster and political clout the Japanese Army ened up the least relevant of Japan's armed services. Even at the very end when most of China was back in Allied hands most bombers were still hitting Japan from Pacific islands. It didn't destroy or prevent the building of a single aircraft carrier or battleship (though some airforce assets were tied up there). If China fell or was saved, the Pacific war would have still had to be prosecuted exactly the way it was, and it would be that Pacific campaign that eventually defeated Japan, just like in reality.

Others will know more about this than me, but if China had somehow kicked the Japanese out, wouldn't the whole Japanese rationale for the Pacific war have disappeared? The point of Pearl Harbor was to secure the oil, rubber, and other resources necessary to win the Chinese war. China was the aim, the Southern Expedition was merely an objective on the way.
 
Others will know more about this than me, but if China had somehow kicked the Japanese out, wouldn't the whole Japanese rationale for the Pacific war have disappeared? The point of Pearl Harbor was to secure the oil, rubber, and other resources necessary to win the Chinese war. China was the aim, the Southern Expedition was merely an objective on the way.

The point that Pat makes is that the fate of the Japanese Empire (along with it's ambitions in China and elsewhere) was decided in the PTO.
 
Others will know more about this than me, but if China had somehow kicked the Japanese out, wouldn't the whole Japanese rationale for the Pacific war have disappeared? The point of Pearl Harbor was to secure the oil, rubber, and other resources necessary to win the Chinese war. China was the aim, the Southern Expedition was merely an objective on the way.

If China had kicked them out before Pearl Harbor then yes. They didn't, so no.

Once the war was joined by all sides victory in ancillary theatre was not the goal, complete defeat of Japan in all theaters was the goal and once it was decided to defeat Japan wholesale the only way to do that was through the Pacific.
 
If China had kicked them out before Pearl Harbor then yes. They didn't, so no.

Once the war was joined by all sides victory in ancillary theatre was not the goal, complete defeat of Japan in all theaters was the goal and once it was decided to defeat Japan wholesale the only way to do that was through the Pacific.
of course, Pat, I don't think anyone was arguing otherwise. The point tk and others were making was simply that, even if the Pacific War hadn't broken out - in fact, even if the oil embargo hadn't taken place - Japan could not defeat China. The Japanese had become bogged down by 1938 at the latest and their defeat in a war of attrition was inevitable. The Chinese certainly couldn't have chased the Japanese all the way back to the Home Islands on their own, but the Japanese economy would have ground to a halt and forced them to, in turn, evacuate China-proper, then Manchuria, then probably even Korea and Formosa, giving them up without a fight. I don't see the Japanese sticking around in Continental Asia after 1955. Probably much sooner.

That's certainly a far worse prognosis than 1945, but the point is that the Japanese were fighting a losing battle, in much the same way I've repeatedly argued on these boards that Germany was beaten before they even declared war on Poland. Japan never had the capacity to defeat their original enemy, China, let alone China and the huge array of forces the Western Allies - and towards the end, the Soviets - were able to bring to bear against them.
 
No, why should Empire of Japan gives up its territory while guerrilla warfare was low in Formosa, Korea and Manchuria? The only thing Japan might give up is China proper, even there they have some pro-Japanese collaborationist forces that act as buffers.
 
No, why should Empire of Japan gives up its territory while guerrilla warfare was low in Formosa, Korea and Manchuria? The only thing Japan might give up is China proper, even there they have some pro-Japanese collaborationist forces that act as buffers.

Because maintaining a colonial empire when you're country is bankrupt and you're having a crisis of government is a little ridiculous? And China never fully relinquished claims of sovereignty over Manchuria, if Japan was to retreat from the mainland a retreat from Manchuria was inevitable as well. A loss of face for the army/navy/hyper jingoist societies probably would've created enough of a backlash to ensure no more Japanese presence and money in mainland Asia.

Honestly, I think Formosa is the only territory they would have had a chance of (initially) hanging onto.
 
Because maintaining a colonial empire when you're country is bankrupt and you're having a crisis of government is a little ridiculous? And China never fully relinquished claims of sovereignty over Manchuria, if Japan was to retreat from the mainland a retreat from Manchuria was inevitable as well. A loss of face for the army/navy/hyper jingoist societies probably would've created enough of a backlash to ensure no more Japanese presence and money in mainland Asia.

Honestly, I think Formosa is the only territory they would have had a chance of (initially) hanging onto.
Agreed entirely. Britain and France both found out the hard way that you can't run an empire when bankrupt.
 
Because maintaining a colonial empire when you're country is bankrupt and you're having a crisis of government is a little ridiculous? And China never fully relinquished claims of sovereignty over Manchuria, if Japan was to retreat from the mainland a retreat from Manchuria was inevitable as well. A loss of face for the army/navy/hyper jingoist societies probably would've created enough of a backlash to ensure no more Japanese presence and money in mainland Asia.

Honestly, I think Formosa is the only territory they would have had a chance of (initially) hanging onto.

Surely the Japanese can hold onto Korea as well. It's Japan's Algeria. Short of full fledged open rebellion by the Koreans, in an alternate timeline where the 2nd Sino-Japanese War does not involve other countries, Korea will be easy and financially/militarily important enough to remain in Japan's Empire.
 
Surely the Japanese can hold onto Korea as well. It's Japan's Algeria. Short of full fledged open rebellion by the Koreans, in an alternate timeline where the 2nd Sino-Japanese War does not involve other countries, Korea will be easy and financially/militarily important enough to remain in Japan's Empire.

Yea, how did that turn out for France :p
 
Eh...the idea that bankruptcy = pulling out of Korea doesn't seem too convincing for me.
Even the ultra-militarists who played up what a disaster admitting defeat in China in 1941 never claimed the situation was that serious.
Korea hadn't been a drain on the Imperial budget at really any point, unless you count the levels of development investment the government made. The population was largely pacified, with resistance being limited pretty much to Kim Il-Sung, and the occasional assassin. I don't see any reason why, unless the Chinese really wanted to push over this, the Japanese would be inclined to leave Korea.
 
Eh...the idea that bankruptcy = pulling out of Korea doesn't seem too convincing for me.
Even the ultra-militarists who played up what a disaster admitting defeat in China in 1941 never claimed the situation was that serious.
Korea hadn't been a drain on the Imperial budget at really any point, unless you count the levels of development investment the government made. The population was largely pacified, with resistance being limited pretty much to Kim Il-Sung, and the occasional assassin. I don't see any reason why, unless the Chinese really wanted to push over this, the Japanese would be inclined to leave Korea.
Korean resistance was steadily growing and if the Japanese showed signs of weakness resistance would increase. I imagine they'd hold on to Korea for a while longer than Manchuria, but eventually keeping that many people - I don't know what Korea's population was in that period, it's 70 million now - pacified would be too expensive for a collapsing empire that was probably going to suffer a few coup attempts and army mutinies at the least over the next decade or so.

They'd try to hold Korea, certainly, but once their country was in dire enough straits I think the Koreans, likely under Kim Il-Sung with Soviet - and probably Chinese - backing, would make Korea too expensive to hold on to. I even envision this going pretty much the same way as the French attempt to keep Algeria: a bloody civil war in Japan over the issue.
 
Korean resistance was steadily growing and if the Japanese showed signs of weakness resistance would increase.
That was really only the result of having Manchurian bases to operate out of. Not even by 1945 did Korea develop a truly indigenous resistance movement.

I don't know what Korea's population was in that period, it's 70 million now - pacified would be too expensive for a collapsing empire that was probably going to suffer a few coup attempts and army mutinies at the least over the next decade or so.
No where near that. Almost all of that is a result of the population boom in the South since the 1960s. Back then it was around 25 million. Not exactly

They'd try to hold Korea, certainly, but once their country was in dire enough straits I think the Koreans, likely under Kim Il-Sung with Soviet - and probably Chinese - backing, would make Korea too expensive to hold on to. I even envision this going pretty much the same way as the French attempt to keep Algeria: a bloody civil war in Japan over the issue.
If we're using Kim Il-Sung as the vanguard of this resistance, the analogy is less Algeria in the 1950s and more Ulster in the 1950s. Even with the IJA distracted by the whole war in China the most he accomplished was occupying a small, undefended village for a few hours.

I just don't see evidence of real Korean resistance forming that would be so financially detrimental to the Empire, especially weighed against the financial loss of giving up Korea.
 
If there wasn't war between the Allies and Japan, would the US/UK have let Manchuria escape from Japan so easily? It was the most (only?) industrialised area of China, and without having to pander to Soviet support for the war against Japan I can't see them letting Manchuria fall into near-definite Communist hands. Sure, direct military intervention wasn't on the cards, but certainly enough economic support to make the continued occupation of the region feasible would have been?
 
If there wasn't war between the Allies and Japan, would the US/UK have let Manchuria escape from Japan so easily? It was the most (only?) industrialised area of China, and without having to pander to Soviet support for the war against Japan I can't see them letting Manchuria fall into near-definite Communist hands. Sure, direct military intervention wasn't on the cards, but certainly enough economic support to make the continued occupation of the region feasible would have been?

Ok I'll address some of this...

1. there are other industrialized areas in China, especially around the Yangtze (and double especially around Wuhan).

2. In this hypothetical, there's not much the US (and especially the UK) can do if the Soviets or CCP want to seize Manchuria. The Kwantung were already less than a match for the Soviets even at their height, and just basic factors like proximity and preponderance of numbers means the US would just have to accept the loss of Manchuria to evil reds like they did Eastern Europe.

Who does the US even economically support in this case? The imperial government? The army? Ishiwara?

Also, even if the US never directly enters the war in this scenario, there is still great public sympathy in the US for China, especially the GMD & Jiang but even the CCP garners some respect (guys like Stilwell saw a success story at Yan'an and didn't even think Chinese communism was possible). I don't think it would be easy politically to prop up another country's (especially one so outwardly rasist and imperialist) colonial enterprise.
 
Cultural speaking, Koreans and Manchurian Chinese are closer to Japan, then say, Algerians to France and Indians to Britain.

Yea, go ahead and tell them that :lol:
 
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