Midway is a great example of where luck and carelessness collide to create an unforseen result. The Japanese had not put their submarines in the right places before the battle, were careless and sloppy in their rearming as mentioned above, "accidently" sunk the Yorktown twice (if you read the Japanese combat reports, they send strikes from the Hiryu, I believe, against the Yorktown, count it as sunk, but in fact the Yorktown repairs its boilers, moves, and then the Hiryu launches another strike against the crippled ship...)
And the timing of the American squadrons...the torpedo planes were obliterated, if I recall, and the first two dive bomber squadrons were chewed up. But the Japanese interceptors were just overwhelmed when that third group showed up from a different direction, and then within minutes stuff got a lot uglier for the Japanese.
It's a memorable battle. Made all the more entertaining when you read about the US carrier Midway launched late in the war. The Americans immortalized that battle pretty quickly!
A couple of details off here, though nothing substantive. Perhaps too much is made of the lack of reconnaissance, air or submarine. given the size of the playing field, the Japanese coverage was understandably thin. Given the horrific result, from the Japanese perspective, many fingers have been pointed this direction, with some justification. Perhaps too much. Heavier coverage would have been very difficult to obtain, and the Americans knew enough of the battle plan to make some judgements about how to avoid being seen. Suffice to say that many a winning Admiral has put out less effort to find the enemy.
Also, there were event tending to focus attention elsewhere. The attacks by dive bombers, which were beaten off, came from the island, not from the carriers. In addition torpedo planes and B-15 heavy bombers also attacked the group. Much of this was going on while half the Japanese planes were bombing the island. The succession of Midway based attacks was crucial, in that it convinced the Japanese command to rearm their reserve planes for ground attack. The plan was to rearm the returning wave of planes for ship to ship.
As ambushes go, this was one of the most successful in history. The rearming was well underway when the Japanese finally spotted the American carriers. This put the Japanese in a time bind. They have empty planes returning, and half their attack strength inappropriately armed. The decision to make an emergency reconversion to AP bombs and torpedoes is understandable, given the situation. Obviously, the consequences were grave.
Also, it was not a third group showing up from a new direction. It was two uncoordinated groups, neither arriving from the bearing to the island or to the known carrier group, that is the real stroke of luck. One group was following a destroyer which had been detached to prosecute antisubmarine bombing. The other had no excuse at all for finding the enemy. Indeed, many other planes never did, including all the dive bombers from the Hornet, even though the Hornet's torpedo planes had been a major part of the earlier attack. Add that to the clear airspace at high altitude and the unsecured fuel and munitions, and the improbability reaches staggering proportions.
J
