So, 1934 Germany was in relation to 1934 Italy considerably weaker than 1940 Greece in relation to 1940 Italy?
Yes, actually. While Hitler had unilaterally abrogated the Versailles Treaty (which limited the German army to 100,000 personel, along with restrictions on the weaponry and vehicles they could use, including the air force) the previous year, the German military had not yet rearmed or increased its size to the point where it could pose a legitimate threat to Italy, which was one of the most powerful states in the world. It couldn't have beaten Austria without the assistance of the Austrian Nazi Party, which is why they relied on them pulling off a coup, instead of simply annexing Austria as they did in 1938. In the early-1930s, even small countries like
Lithuania were pushing Germany around.
Don't forget that, in addition to its quantitative and qualitative advantages over Germany in 1934, the morale problems which plagued Italy during WWII wouldn't affect it when it was actually fighting to defend an ally from a foreign invasion. Also, the terrain in Austria, while not good, is better suited to an invasion from Italy than Greece's terrain is to an invasion from Albania. While Italy would by no means march to Berlin, they wouldn't need to do so. Simply kicking the Germans out of Austria would fulfil their goals, and likely lead to Hitler's arrest (and execution) by the
wehrmacht, which would doubtless take over the country at this point.
I am not sure what to say other than "hugh?" I mean I am generally inclined to trust you on your expertise, but still, hugh?
Are you enquiring about the Polish refusal to allow Soviet troops to enter their territory to fight the Germans? Because it's been well-documented that the USSR was fully-prepared to fight off a German invasion of Poland even without the assistance of the Western Allies, if only the Poles would allow them free passage. Stalin made the same offer to the Czechs before the Munich Pact. Neither nation would allow Russian troops on their soil, though they certainly had their reasons.
How important was the Treaty of Locarno? Kissinger spent about a chapter and a half on it which indicates that (to him at least) it was important.
I've read some scenarios that showed Germany would've been barely able to handle Czechoslovakia if it would've come to war over the Sudetenland issue in 1938.
It would have taken Germany about four-to-six weeks to defeat Czechoslovakia in 1938. In that time it would have been completely defenceless against a French attack across the Rhine, which was far more likely in 1938 than 1939. The French grew more hesitant to engage Germany as time went by, though I've never found a satisfactory reason as to why the government's belligerence decreased as Germany's increased.
In addition to gaining an extra year in which to prepare for war, the Munich Pact also gave Germany access to Czechoslovakia's many mines and munitions factories, almost all of which were located in the Sudetenland. To make matters worse, when Bohemia and Moravia fell almost without a fight in March 1939, Germany commandeered as much Czech military equipment as they could. There was very little fighting and the Czech army followed their government's order to surrender rather than destroy their equipment before turning it over. Those who deserted with their equipment only ended up in Slovakia, which was a German puppet-state, so that equpiment all became de-facto German anyway.
Also, Germany was nearly broke before the annexation of Austria (as Nazi Germany was almost constantly broke) and only Austria's rather large currency reserves helped them to sustain their budget any longer.
Not to mention Austria's iron ore, which fueled German armament production.
@LordBaal: That was the kind of answer I was looking for and since other posters seem to testify to your expertise, I will trust the accuracy of your response. I actually find it quite heartening to know that war was not inevitable and that it was just the result of a tragic series of events.
Thank you. Never forget, nothing in history - excepting natural disasters, of course - is inevitable. If Franz Ferdinand doesn't stupidly decide he wants a sandwich in Sarajevo, he doesn't get shot and WWI doesn't happen. If Hitler dies during WWI instead of merely being wounded, then there's no WWII. If JFK doesn't get shot in Dallas, then the moon landings may well have been a joint US-Soviet mission. History is contingent, not inevitable.
The USSR was pretty much shut out of European diplomacy for most of the interwar years. I don't recall how they were brought into the League of Nations, but it wasn't for very long.
I'm pretty sure they joined in 1934 - partly in response to Hitler's rise in Germany, actually - but didn't have much to do with the League.
Wait, wasn't the whole thing staged?
Not on the part of the defending troops. They were completely unaware that they were being attacked by Germans wearing Polish uniforms, who were shooting blanks. It wasn't the same as the "artillery attacks" Stalin used as
casus belli against Finland, which were entirely staged - and didn't hit any troops.
From the document, we can really believe that Hitler was deeply convinced France and Britain would never declare war on Germany as a support of Poland. It's actually rather unbelievable to read how sure he was about it, constantly minimizing the multiple alerts sent by the French ambassador.
Hitler was genuinely surprised that Britain joined the alliance against him, but fully expected France to declare war. In fact, he was so put off by Britain's unexpected last-minute alliance with Poland that he delayed attacking it by two days.
the whole Blitzkrieg tactic was approved because he saw the potencial for "speed war" in it, before blitzkrieg he was presented with a dozen diferent plans that he rejected, Guderian only came to show him the new plans after all the existant ones were dismissed, not because it was innovative, but because he could pin the allies in one place while he was finishing off the other front, and for that, he needed above all, speed.
Hitler had
already agreed to an invasion of France using the original plan presented to him, only to change it a few weeks out when
Manstein came to him with the plan. Hitler was notoriously fickle when it came to his orders to the military. Sometimes he'd change plans at the last minute, he'd remove generals from command only to bring them back a short time later (Guderian was removed from his command on the Russian front, only to be promoted to Chief of Staff a short time later, despite having no experience as a staff officer)
You can read from records that after seeing Blitzkrieg in a training session he stated "This is it! This is what i want! And this is what i will have!", clearly he saw speed of execution possible on one front, and a swift war, while he pinned down an allied invasion against the Siegfried Line in the other.
The so-called
blitzkrieg (Guderian named it
after WWII) tactic of tactical bombing followed closely by fast-moving armoured assaults did not exist in any form until the Manstein Plan was formulated. This was after the invasion of Poland. What the Siegfried line has to do with the Battle for France I don't know.
Rick, I would like you to take a look at this Graph and to tell me where you think you belong.
That graph is hilarious.