Reading over these posts, I'd have to agree that it would have been possible for the western Allies to defeat the USSR in a long drawn-out war - if they had been willing to take horrendous casualties doing so. I just don't see it as politically realistic they would ever have done so. Would the US have been willing to spend hundreds of thousands, maybe millions, of their soldiers to liberate Eastern Europe? At a time when most Americans had been conditionen to see the Russians as their friends? I really don't think so.
I agree, historically the US was appeasing the Soviets until the communist coup in Czechoslovakia in 1948.
Also, granting the Sovs logistical problems, the Allies had their own, as others have said. And comparing the Soviet armies of 1945 with those of the Winter War or 1941 is frivolous.
First, land routes and sea routes are not comparable. Allies had more than enough cargo ships to keep suplying Allied troops in continental Europe, and the Soviets had no means how to hit these sea lanes (unlike Germany, which caused a considerable damage with its U-boots). With sea lanes safe and Benelux/North German ports available, the Allied supply lines in central Europe would be very short, compared to the insanely long land supply routes. (Actually logistics were the cause why it took the Soviets so long to fight their way through Poland to Berlin. It was a nightmare to properly supply the huge armies which were about to enter Germany.)
Second, the Soviets depended on relatively few railroads to transport most of the needed supplies from the industrial regions in Eastern Russia/Siberia, as the roads in USSR were practically unusable for long-distance supply runs. Allies would naturally take advantage of this and hit major railroad hubs, bridges, depots etc. As a result, the Soviet armies fighting in the Central Europe would soon find themselves in an impossible logistical situation. There is no chance in hell they could maintain offensive posture, it's much more likely the Soviets would desperately try to shorten the supply lines by gradual withdrawal to the East Prussia-Bessarabia line (no doubt using scorched earth tactic in Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania and the rest of the Balkans - I am sure we'd all be happy to see that!
).
But see - this would play into the hands of Allies. They'd push the Soviets out of most of Central Europe and that's what this "Patton's plan" really is all about. I doubt that if this had happened, the Allies would have entered the same trap as the Germans and try to occupy the USSR.
I'd also really like to know, Winner, just how the Americans were supposed to 'nuke the Soviet industrial heartlands'? Enough to make a significant difference? Do the math: if they had built 2-3 new bombs a month, that would be at most 36 new bombs in a year, with none at all available to start out with. How many of those bombs would ever have reached a target in the Soviet heartland? Remember, no ICBMs yet. The only way of delivering those bombs at the time was by B29 bomber. How many of those would have reached their targets, do you think, with the Sovs forewarned and going all out to stop those bombers? Flying overland for thousands of miles?
AFAIK no Soviet fighter craft was able to effectively engage B-29s in the high attitudes they operated in. Moreover, the Americans have perfected the use of long-range escort fighters, so for most of their trip, B-29s would be safe. The only real danger they'd face would be during the actual nuclear drop.
As for the range - Japan was being pounded by B-29s taking off from the Mariana Islands (Saipan). The distance to Japan from there is roughly comparable to the distance from Persia/Northern India to the Soviet industrial heartland (after the WW2 transfer of industry). So yes, the Allied bombers could have reached the Soviet industry and they could have destroyed most of it in a prolonged combined nuclear/conventional strategic bombing campaign. Baku oil fields would certainly be wiped out first (the British/French planned to bomb them even in 1939 as a part of proposed intervention on behalf Finland, which of course didn't materialize for obvious reasons).
The initial nuclear strikes would most likely target Moscow + some very important transportation hubs in Belarus/Ukraine or European Russia.
As I said, I don't doubt the Americans could have nuked a few cities, but never enough to destroy the Soviet industrial capacity. Don't forget bombing didn't stop German production, either - and it doesn't really make much difference if you destroy a city in a firestorm by conventional bombing or a nuke.
Germany was defeated because it lacked resources to wage a long war, it was grossly outnumbered by the enemies, it's supply lines were vulnerable and its industrial potential was being kept from expanding by a constant Allied bombing.
Every single factor would be applied to the war with Soviet Russia as well, and it would be made worse due to the use of nuclear weapons. Moreover, let's not forget that even during the WW2, the Russians relied on the Allies to supply them with many necessary things already mentioned in this thread (trucks, locomotives, some vital raw materials etc.). Without these supplies, with its industry being gradually turned to dust, with the supply lines severed and its armies exposed fighting far from the Soviet heartland, the USSR would be in an extremelly difficult position.
Again, nobody is saying the war would be a walk in the park, but if the Allies remained commited to it, the relatively limited aim of pushing the Soviets back to their 1939 borders would have been entirely achievable (IMO
).
I stand by my position that the US was right not to risk a land war - but that they should nonetheless have taken a stronger position against Stalin in the negotiations. I'm sure they could have gotten better conditions for Eastern Europe if they had tried - Stalin wasn't going to risk a land war either, if he could avoid it.
I agree with this. I am moderately convinced that Stalin planned a "red storm" in Western Europe which is why he kept such huge numbers of troops mobilized after the war even though the Western Allies demobilized and were thus extremelly vulnerable. Fortunately, Stalin feared the Allied air superiority and their nuclear arsenal (American ambivalence made them believe they had thousands of bombs, whereas they had only few (dozen) until the mass production in 1950s).
Fortunately, he died before he could initiate WW3 and his successors were not so eager to fight a war once it became clear that the large nuclear arsenals on both sides would make the costs of such a war unbearable. Which of course didn't prevent the Soviets from preparing to this eventuality.
