What is philosophy?

It's only a matter of perspective: From a subjective point of view free will and inventions do exist, but not from an objective point of view.
 
You type that like Philosophy is a person. So which philosopher has your favorite answer on God?
Myself. of course!


Platonic
--------------
Inventions do not exist.

(What we call an invention, is actually the realization of a possibility that already existed - irrespective of the discovery of it. The invention of the paperclip for instance is, when we look at it closely, the d i s c o v - e r y of the paperclip. Or, to be more precise, the i d e a of the paperclip. The fact that paperclips did not exist before they were invented, does not matter. Similarly, the fact that the atomic bomb did not exist before, does not exclude the p o s s i b i l i t y of its existence - again, irrespective of the fact if someone had the idea to construct it. In other words, the fact that no one had the idea to invent something, has no bearing on the fact that the idea of something already exists. The idea simply has not come into reality yet. Once again: ideas can be as real as what they represent.)
This only is an argument against invention if invention is defined as, "bringing a new idea into existence", and we allow that this Platonic design space exists. However, we could easily tweak the definition of invention to "bringing a new idea into physical reality" (the brain counts as physical reality) and your objection has absolutely no relevance.

One might object to this definition tweaking, but you have to remember that "invention" is actually defined by usage in the English language, and we're just trying to formalize our intuitive notions.
 
This only is an argument against invention if invention is defined as, "bringing a new idea into existence", and we allow that this Platonic design space exists. However, we could easily tweak the definition of invention to "bringing a new idea into physical reality" (the brain counts as physical reality) and your objection has absolutely no relevance.

One might object to this definition tweaking, but you have to remember that "invention" is actually defined by usage in the English language, and we're just trying to formalize our intuitive notions.

It seems you are missing the point; no "Platonic design space" (whatever that is) is asserted, merely that, as you put it, ideas are being realized through invention. I see no need to redefine "invention" here.
 
Following which argument?

Sorry, I'm just messing around. Schopenhauer and all that. It follows, I guess, that free will is overrated, that it's just the freedom to cause suffering to ourselves ;)
 
Dennett puts it like this: What would make a particular decision "more free?" Take out emotional factors that cloud your rationality, perhaps,

Sure, if they really do cloud your rationality. Even then, we need to realize that the person might rationally want to keep the emotion even if it does come at the cost of occasional irrationality.

take out biological factors that predispose you to a certain pattern of behavior, [...]

I don't see why anyone would want that, or think it has any bearing on freedom. For example, biological factors dispose most mammals to turn right rather than left when faced with an otherwise arbitrary choice. Nothing wrong with that.

If we want to have a free will, it can't be separate from all of these things that, at first glance, seem to be out of our control.

As Dennett would say, Freedom Evolves. From out-of-control beginnings flourishes a gradually more self-controlling being. But this does not imply - even contradicts - the assertions
JEELEN said:
To have a free will would be like making a decision purely by chance. Or, if one had a free will, a decision would not be influenced by any factor.
which are the non sequiturs I complained about.
 
To be honest, I consider the free will sort of a trick problem: in theory it exists, in practice a person's will is always influenced by various factors. In a way, that's just one of life's challenges.

which are the non sequiturs I complained about.

I was wondering about that. Care to elaborate?
 
God
-------
God is a m o r a l.

Explanation: if God is perceived as the Supreme Being - which is usual -, consider that most beings, i.e. plants and animals, lack any sense of morality. Most beings are motivated by necessity. (The notion of a Supreme Being may in itself be a psychological necessity.) God is either moral or amoral. If God is almighty the existence of the devil negates God's morality. If no devil exists, God tolerates evil deeds - and again, by extension, evil itself. (The idea of the human free will is as immaterial as it is irrelevant.) Conclusion: God is amoral. QED

(By example: all pre-judaeic gods are amoral, i.e. beyond moral considerations. The Romans knew one particular god related to moral matters: Justitia. The law is amoral. Why ? Because law is the result of a decision making process or, ultimately, the result of a political process. And politics is, by nature, amoral. Why ? Because politics is power play; its decisions are the result of the clash of various interest groups, and interest is not governed by morality, but the wish - or need - to prevail. At best, laws may be the result of compromise.)



Moses
----------
The notion that Moses should come down a mountain and smash the Godgiven Ten Commandments is blasphemic.

(To say the least. It is curious that Moses should escape the wrath of God for such gross misconduct. Ofcourse the smashing of the stone tablets is a very human reaction. A wise reaction would have been to point out that God forbids the making of images of worship. Unfortunately, God had not foreseen that His people would cast an image instead of carving one. Which in itself is curious - were there no cast statues in all of Egypt ? Or had God forgotten this ? Perhaps God has a faulty short term memory ? Etc. The inconsistencies in God's words, revelations and actions are infinite.)



Mosaic
-----------
M o s a i c is a proper adjective with reference to judaism.

(Mosaic, in fact, is a proper adjective with reference to any religion. Religions in general are a patchwork of trials and errors rather than the result of any moral imperative.)

 
Anaximander (Ἀναξίμανδρος, c. 610 BCE–c. 546 BCE) was the author of the first surviving lines of Western philosophy, so it’s fair to say that the history of Greek philosophy in writing starts with this fellow-citizen of Thales. He was also the first to write a treatise in prose. Unfortunately, knowledge of this book is only available through one surviving fragment; nevertheless it is perhaps the most famous and most discussed phrase in the history of philosophy. Of Anaximander himself also little is known; it is probable that he introduced the gnomon to Greece – a perpendicular sun-dial - and erected one in Sparta. Like Thales he seems to have travelled quite a bit.

Anaximander named the ἄπειρον (of which even in ancient times people complained as to Thales’ exact meaning of this term) as the archê of all things. Apeiron can be translated as boundless, unlimited or indefinite and it could be said Anaximander was the first to use philosophical arguments as to why the apeiron should be the principle of all things, and this qualifies him as the first philosopher per se.

"Everything has an origin or is an origin. The Boundless has no origin. For then it would have a limit. Moreover, it is both unborn and immortal, being a kind of origin. For that which has become has also, necessarily, an end, and there is a termination to every process of destruction" (Aristotle, Physics 203b6-10, DK 12A15).

This may strike us as rather curious, using what looks more like a string of associations or even wordplay instead of formal or mathematical logical arguments. Anaximander calls his principle or origin divine, unpersonal, immortal and unborn. Diogenes Laertius reports a possible origin of Anaximander’s use of the divine in an aphorism he ascribes to Thales:

"What is the divine? That which has no origin and no end" (DK 11A1 (36)).

Similar arguments, within different contexts, are used by Melissus (DK 30B2[9]) and Plato (Phaedrus 245d1-6) and Aristotle gives a version of a vice versa argument:

"(The belief that there is something Boundless stems from) the idea that only then genesis and decay will never stop, when that from which is taken what has been generated, is boundless" (Physics 203b18-20, DK 12A15, other versions in DK12A14 and 12A17).

So another attribute of the apeiron is an inexhaustible nature. A third, perhaps somewhat strange, argument might be referred to as the long since argument:

"Some make this (viz. that which is additional to the elements) the Boundless, but not air or water, lest the others should be destroyed by one of them, being boundless; for they are opposite to one another (the air, for instance, is cold, the water wet, and the fire hot). If any of them should be boundless, it would long since have destroyed the others; but now there is, they say, something other from which they are all generated" (Aristotle, Physics 204b25-29, DK 12A16).

This is virtually the same argument as used by Plato in his Phaedo (72a12-b5), but was also used almost 2500 years later by Friedrich Nietzsche in his attempts to prove his thesis of the Eternal Recurrence:

“If the world had a goal, it would have been reached. If there were for it some unintended final state, this also must have been reached. If it were at all capable of a pausing and becoming fixed, if it were capable of 'being', if in the whole course of its becoming it possessed even for a moment this capability of 'being', then again all becoming would long since have come to an end." Nietzsche wrote these words in his notebook in 1885, but already in Die Philosophie im tragischen Zeitalter der Griechen (1873), which was not published during his lifetime, he mentioned the argument and credited Anaximander with it.

As D.L. Couprie mentions: “The suggestion has been raised that Anaximander's formula in the first two lines of the fragment should have been the model for Aristotle’s definition of the 'principle' (Greek: 'archê') of all things in Metaphysics 983b8. There is some sense in this suggestion. For what could be more natural for Aristotle than to borrow his definition of the notion of 'archê', which he uses to indicate the principle of the first presocratic philosophers, from Anaximander, the one who introduced the notion?”

Anaximander also proposed three important astronomical assertions:

1)[FONT=&quot] [/FONT]the celestial bodies make full circles and pass also beneath the earth;
2)[FONT=&quot] [/FONT]the earth floats free and unsupported in space;
3)[FONT=&quot] [/FONT]the celestial bodies lie behind one another.

This may seem obvious today, but, astronomically speaking, was a great jump forwards and represents the origin of our modern concept of the universe. For instance, that the celestial bodies make full circles is not something he could have observed, but a conclusion he must have drawn – or extrapolated from what he could observe. Again, the idea that the earth floats free in space – a revolution in our understanding of the universe - is not something he could have observed, but rather concluded it following his first assertion. (To be true, he also asserted that the earth is in the centre of the universe, has a cylinder-shape and that we live on top of it.)

So why does the earth not fall? Aristotle delivers Anaximander’s argument as follows:

"There are some who say that it (viz. the earth) stays where it is because of equality, such as among the ancients Anaximander. For that which is situated in the center and at equal distances from the extremes, has no inclination whatsoever to move up rather than down or sideways; and since it is impossible to move in opposite directions at the same time, it necessarily stays where it is." (De caelo 295b10ff., DK 12A26)

This is the first example of argument following the principle of sufficient reason (i.e. for everything that occurs there’s an explicit reason). The very same argument is found in Plato’s Phaedo (108E4 ff.) and with Leibniz:

"And therefore Archimedes (...) in his book De aequilibrio, was obliged to make use of a particular case of the great Principle of a sufficient reason. He takes it for granted that if there be a balance in which everything is alike on both sides, and if equal weights are hung on the two ends of that balance, the whole will stay at rest. This is because there is no reason why one side should weigh down, rather than the other". (Leibniz 2nd letter to Clarke)

For a better argument as to why the earth, floating in space, does not fall, we have to wait for Newton.

When Anaximander looked at the heaven, he imagined, for the first time in history, space. Anaximander's vision implied depth in the universe, that is, the idea that the celestial bodies lie behind one another. Although it sounds simple, this is a remarkable idea, because it cannot be based on direct observation. We do not see depth in the universe. (The more natural and primitive idea is that of the celestial vault, a kind of dome or tent, onto which the celestial bodies are attached, all of them at the same distance, like in a planetarium. One meets this kind of conception in Homer, when he speaks of the brazen or iron heaven, which is apparently conceived of as something solid, being supported by Atlas, or by pillars.)

It is no use trying to unify the information on Anaximander into one all-compassing and consistent whole. His work will always remain truncated, like the mutilated and decapitated statue that has been found at the market-place of Miletus and that bears his name. Nevertheless, by what we know of him, we may say that he was one of the greatest minds that ever lived. By speculating and arguing about the 'Boundless' he was the first metaphysician. By drawing a map of the world he was the first geographer.* But above all, by boldly speculating about the universe he broke with the ancient image of the celestial vault and became the discoverer of the modern view of the universe.


*Both Strabo and Agathemerus (later Greek geographers) claim that, according to the geographer Eratosthenes, Anaximander was the first to publish a map of the world. The map probably inspired the Greek historian Hecataeus of Miletus to draw a more accurate version.Local maps were produced in ancient times, notably in Egypt, Lydia, the Middle East, and Babylon. They indicated roads, towns, borders, and geological features. Anaximander's innovation was to represent the entire inhabited land known to the ancient Greeks.

(Sources: The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, article by Dirk L. Couprie http://www.iep.utm.edu/a/anaximan.htm; J. Mansfeld (ed.), Die Vorsokratiker I, p. 56-81; Wikipedia entry on Anaximander)
 
I was wondering about that. Care to elaborate?

Well my complaint is simply, "huh? Where does the following come from:"
To have a free will would be like making a decision purely by chance. Or, if one had a free will, a decision would not be influenced by any factor.

And before you answer, let me provide my own theory. It comes from bad parents and bad religion, trying to cover up their faults.

Suppose your kid is a monster, completely out of control. How do you explain it? Was it bad genes, or bad parenting? Either way, you come out looking bad. But wait, suppose that the kid's choices are not only the result of the major influences in their life, but also include a random element! Voila, you're off the hook!

But even if we accept the parent's hypothesis, that only implies that free will as it exists in humans happens to include random elements. It doesn't imply that free will has to be random. Where did THAT idea come from?

Enter religion. Religionists have got some really bad parenting, by Our Father Who Art In Heaven, to explain away. And they can't just say that our choices happen to be random. Because God supposedly designed humans, including our wills, and could have given us nonrandom wills that consistently lead to better choices. Could have, and should have - unless you posit (A) that free will has to be random or it's not free will, and also (B) that free will is a very good thing.

Now (B) is true and obvious, though it would be neither if (A) were true. (A) is not true, and was never a fruitful or promising hypothesis, but powerful religions needed it and have had plenty of time to sell the idea.
 
The first question obviously must be: What is free will? Is it an urge that must be followed? I think 'free will' is a bit of a conundrum. If we define will as an urge or 'that what we want', obviously there already are factors to be taken into account, which influence the ultimate outcome at any given point. So I considered that removing all factors might result in a free will - but with nothing left to want, as what we want will always be influended or stimulated by certain factors. (So, basically, I was equating 'free will' with a platonian ideal; it can be thought up, but doesn't really exist in daily life, i.e. the real world.) Your example - kids, parents, upbringing, religion - seem to me more to be associated with guilt than free will. But to take your example: no matter what influences may be considered a factor, what happens (what you do) will be considered an expression of your will, i.e. your decision. In this case, if a kid expresses obnoxious behaviour - and we accept the concept of the will -, some blame must fall A) on the kid (for it is his behaviour) and B) on the parents (because they are responsible and acountable for childrens' behaviour up til a certain age). Religion (or social circumstances at large) may come into the picture, but whether this has a positive or negative influence depends very much on the situation at hand.
 
I'm not saying that religion is the explanation of particular behavior, like the obnoxious kid's obnoxiousness. I'm saying that it explains the ideas some people have about free will.

Free will isn't just "that what we want", it's the considered decisions of a rational self-reflective being.
 
That is already an assertion, is it not? I don't think people actuall fall into the category of "a rational self-reflective being". I'm not suggesting people can't be that, but rather that, most (or some) of the time they are not. (That those irrational urges actually make up a - large - part of the will, is what I'm suggesting.)

I departed from the notion of free thought - even if your surroundings influence the way you think, your actual thought can still be free (perhaps that is what rationality is) -, which - to me at least - seems a slightly more workable category than that of 'free will'.

Like with most of discussions of this type one needs first to have a working definition. I hope I have been able to explain the definition I was using. (Even if the definition isn't made explicit, it's still there, so one might as well make it explicit to avoid any confusion or endless debate.)
 
Most urges aren't irrational, though. A rational person learns to accommodate or at least live with many urges. Meanwhile, it's our rational faculties that allow us to imagine various future actions and evaluate them - the process also known as choice. And because we are self-reflective, we also imagine various kinds of person we could be, and make choices about that too.

In my view, a (well-)working definition is about the last thing in a philosophical discussion, after a lot of progress has been made. Most things are like pornography - we can't define them, but we know them when we see them.
 
It seems you are missing the point; no "Platonic design space" (whatever that is) is asserted, merely that, as you put it, ideas are being realized through invention. I see no need to redefine "invention" here.
I thought the point was "Inventions do not exist." which is bogus.
 
Well, some comments posted here are more bogus, I think. Anyway, I appreciated your earlier comment more:

This only is an argument against invention if invention is defined as, "bringing a new idea into existence", and we allow that this Platonic design space exists. However, we could easily tweak the definition of invention to "bringing a new idea into physical reality" (the brain counts as physical reality) and your objection has absolutely no relevance.

One might object to this definition tweaking, but you have to remember that "invention" is actually defined by usage in the English language, and we're just trying to formalize our intuitive notions.

The point is, I'm not arguing against invention, but rather against what might be called a common conception of the word 'invention'. On a very basic level I really think inventions are merely realizations of ideas - the platonic portion being that ideas exist even if noone has thought them yet.

Actually, inventions do not exist is a statement true per se: inventions do not exist - until someone has the idea for it. (And that precise moment is what I am talking about.)
 
Really, I don't think it's that interesting. If we call this platonic idea space as real, we have to tweak common use definitions to fit in the formal structure. These tweaks are semantic quibbles that might be important if a more important argument hinges on them, but not interesting in themselves.
 
Perhaps it is.

Really, I don't think it's that interesting. If we call this platonic idea space as real, we have to tweak common use definitions to fit in the formal structure. These tweaks are semantic quibbles that might be important if a more important argument hinges on them, but not interesting in themselves.

Possibly. But semantics, in itself, is important as well, and in philosophy always has been. (Philosophy apart, if a thread on CFC starts with "What is the best...?" I always feel I can't really answer, as what is the best in any given circumstance will always depend, besides other deciding factors, on perception. To my mind, how you formulate something - anything - is of paramount importance - if only for clarity's sake.)
 
Back
Top Bottom