While We Wait: The Next Generation

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Symph had a thread. Makes no sense bumping it tho. Someone simply start a roll call thread, we can count heads by the end of the week.



Roll call thread. Please go an post, vote in the poll etc so we know who is active currently in NESing
 
@Abaddon - The habited fingers are on this computer; however, the older fingers (The christmas fingers and the vanilla ones) are on another computer. Why?

Please post up the "habited" ? fingers
 
Please post for sanity!
 
Roll call thread. Please go an post, vote in the poll etc so we know who is active currently in NESing
 
certain ecological events inextricably tie colony nations to colonizers, forcing dependence.

It's convenient that this is apparently not the case at all in the specific situation discussed and therefore still irrelevant. :p

'Caucasians' are a group which have generally spread around Europe. :p

Caucasians are those people who live in the Caucasus region and are called "blacks" in Russian slang, causing homeric laughter (both from Russians and from Armenians) whenever Americans call what we call the Europeoid Race "Caucasian".

...Try not to be a smart aleck (especially towards a professor of history at UCLA) unless you can actually do well at it. The Russians had Guns and Steel, and moreover they had Germs as well; a lot of the Altai and especially the Kamchatkans were devastated by disease. In Kamchatka, natives died in nearly as large a proportion as the Americas.

More importantly, we had vodka (and moonshine) which has kept most native populations docile and near-extinct for centuries. There was scarcely any conquering necessary outside of Tatar regions.

Abaddon, I am going to call you Abbadon for an arbitrary period of time starting now because you felt the need to post the exact same thing over and over again in several threads, and twice in this thread on one page. Inexcusable.
 
EQ said it would be a good idea :sad:
 
Is anyone else loving the whole Protestant motif I'm going for?
 
I'm sorry if my point doesn't stand up very well NK, and I am taking it from a book taking an opposing viewpoint to diamond called "War and Peace and War". The example he uses is the Stronganovs hiring of Ermak Timofeev and his band of Cossacks to conquer the Siberian Khanate. The author, Peter Turchin, claims that both sides had been exposed to the same germs and steel for centuries. He then says it was the Siberians fault they didn't have guns, because the Crimean Khanate had been able to get them, so they should have too. Then he claims guns were indecisive anyways, because the "gunpowder revolution" by the 15th and 16th century biggest effect was that these guns could knock down fortifications. Handguns weren't that effective yet.
Are these points incorrect?
 
Please post up the "habited" ? fingers

Here abby :)

habits70x70.png
 
The author, Peter Turchin, claims that both sides had been exposed to the same germs and steel for centuries.

More or less true. Just don't forget that the Sibir Khanate was the last and only serious obstacle during the late 16th/early 17th centuries, and all subsequent enemies were on the southern periphery of Siberia.

He then says it was the Siberians fault they didn't have guns, because the Crimean Khanate had been able to get them, so they should have too.

The Crimean Khanate was a vassal and trading partner of the Ottoman Empire, though. Compare with even the various Turkic states in 15th century Persia, which had no firearms despite a (failed) attempt to buy some cannons from Venice, an option that was not available to the Siberians. The Siberian Khanate was backwards and peripheral to the rest of the Tatar states (themselves peripheral to the Ottoman Empire), after all.

Then he claims guns were indecisive anyways, because the "gunpowder revolution" by the 15th and 16th century biggest effect was that these guns could knock down fortifications.

Certainly, and the real main obstacle to Muscovite eastwards expansion - the Khanate of Kazan' - was brought down when the Muscovites acquired cannons. Everything after that was a walkover. No real technological supremacy was needed; the Cossacks were battle-hardened and had managed to adapt and improve upon steppe cavalry tactics, which was an important edge, but honestly not much was needed to conquer such an unstable and backwater state as the Siberian Khanate, especially when you remember that horizontal expansion is generally much easier than vertical, and that Russians had the ethnocolonial momentum (peasants fleeing from their masters and adapting to a more militarised lifestyle and seizing new lands in the process; in some regards a superior illustration of the Frontier to the classical American version).
 
Question Das: The Cossacks would not have used much in the way of hand-held firearms on their dash horizontally would they and/or would not have relied on them as their principal weapon?
 
They preferred their sabres (see [wiki]shashka[/wiki], which had just become widespread among the Cossacks at the time). Also, long spears. They did have and used firearms, but not in that great an amount even in the late 16th century, and I think they could've done it without them. Bows in trained hands were much more efficient in combat than 16th century firearms anyway.
 
Welcome Andy.

What brings you here? Welcome to NESing!
 
das said:
They preferred their sabres (see shashka, which had just become widespread among the Cossacks at the time). Also, long spears. They did have and used firearms, but not in that great an amount even in the late 16th century, and I think they could've done it without them. Bows in trained hands were much more efficient in combat than 16th century firearms anyway.

So in effect we can argue that guns were useless until quite recently against steppe nomads (up until say revolvers and repeating rifles came into widespread use) such that bows were more useful. That steel only garnered a slight competitive advantage if any and that it was only after the Cossacks had adopted, co-opted and adapted pre-existing tactics from the steppe nomads that they were fighting, that they had any success. And that diseases had little to no effect unless you count alcohol :p.

The devil is in the detail it seems.
 
Steppe nomads are normally fought with numbers, as agricultural societies can raise far more men than they.

EDIT: plus lines of fortifications, though the Russian ones as I understand them were a lot more flexible than some silly Great Wall.
 
North King said:
Steppe nomads are normally fought with numbers, as agricultural societies can raise far more men than they.

Were talking about taking the fight to them. In that case you fight steppe nomads in the same way they fight or you lose. Manpower becomes useless rapidly if your trying to pursue them.

A soldier requires a minimum of about 3 pounds of rations per day to maintain his strength and health. A soldier can carry about 80 pounds of equipment and supplies for an extended period, so ten days' rations is a reasonable maximum, assuming 50 pounds for arms and armor and other equipment. Infantry in large bodies can march about 12 miles a day, so infantry alone with supply wagons or packhorses might be able to cover 120 miles before running out of supplies.

A stall-fed packhorse might consume 10 pounds of grass and 10 pounds of grain (barley or oats) each day and carry a burden of 250 pounds. A stall-fed warhorse might carry a greater burden but would require a proportionately greater amount of fodder. Assuming that grass is readily available for grazing, a horse might consume as much grain as it can carry in twenty-five days. Of course, if a packhorse consumes its entire load then there is not much point in bringing it along.

A cavalrymen with 50 or 75 pounds of equipment might weigh nearly as much as a horse could reasonably carry. A second horse might carry ten days' food and fodder (250 pounds, with the rider and two horses consuming 23 pounds each day) plus serve as a spare mount in case the first horses was injured. Large bodies of cavalry could travel somewhere between 19 and 30 miles a day, depending on the likelihood of meeting the enemy and the degree of catuion required, or between 180 and 300 miles on ten days' supplies.

So, assuming that grass and water are readily available, an army could carry enough food and fodder for about ten days without much of a supply train at all. This is a rough estimate but a reasonable one... [bit about living of the land in heavily populated agricultural areas].

On the steppe, such an army woulds starve after ten days. It would have to turn back after five.

In the desert, the assumption that grass and water are readily available no longer holds, and the range of such an army drops precipitously. For each day in the desert, an additional 10 pounds of fodder would have to be carried for each horse, plus 80 pounds of water per horse and 5 pounds of water per person. This is why armies could not travel through the desert except along rivers or for very short periods of time. Infantry would have to turn back after just two days in the desert; cavalry, after just a single day.

Supply trains provide no simple solution. The men and horses in the supply train have to eat too. Pack horses consume 10 pounds each day and carry 250 pounds of supplies, or twenty-five their daily consumption. Porters who consume 3 pounds each day and carry 75 pounds of supplies would be equally efficient. Supply wagons are better; the driver and two horses would consume 23 pounds each day but the wagon might hold 1,400 pounds of supplies, or sixty times their daily consumption, depending on the efficiency of the harness and other factors. Supply wagons were restricted to relatively flat terrain, however. Ships and boats were far more efficient than even supply wagons, but they were more restricted in where they could operate.

Imagine a platoon of thirty infantrymen marching out onto the steepe with one large supply wagon. After ten days, they exhaust their rations and turn to the supply wagon for more. They will find that the driver and the horses have consumed 230 pounds of the load, and that another 230 pounds have be set aside for the driver and horses on the return trip. The remaining 940 pounds is just enough for each of the thirty infantrymen to fill his knapsack with the 30 pounds he can carry, and that in turn will last him just long enough to march back to where he started from.

Increasing the number of wagons quickly runs into the law of diminishing returns. One wagon will double the range of infantrymen from 120 miles to 240 miles, or rather 200 miles with one day of rest in six for the horses. (Horses become permanently incapacitated without periodic rest.) To double it again to 400 miles requires not two wagons, but actually six - one wagon for every five infantrymen, already the maximum likely to be found in practice. The number of wagons will reach thirty - one wagon, one driver and two horses for every infantrymen - before the range will double again.

So if there is one wagon for every five infantrymen, and enough grass and water along the march, then infantry can make a 400 mile round trip (i.e 200 miles in each direction). Take away the grass and water, and its range drops to one fifth of that. Natrually, these umbers are only rough estimates but they suggest and order of magnitude. To put them in perspective, Russian armies faced a 600-mile round trip from Kiev to the Crimea and back, and Chinese armies faced a 1,600 mile round trip from Beijing to Outer Mongolia and back.

*

North King said:
EDIT: plus lines of fortifications, though the Russian ones as I understand them were a lot more flexible than some silly Great Wall.

Passive. They would have at all times been linked by flying columns of cavalry to contest any advance.
 
Spoiler :
Steppe nomads are normally fought with numbers, as agricultural societies can raise far more men than they.

A soldier requires a minimum of about 3 pounds of rations per day to maintain his strength and health. A soldier can carry about 80 pounds of equipment and supplies for an extended period, so ten days' rations is a reasonable maximum, assuming 50 pounds for arms and armor and other equipment. Infantry in large bodies can march about 12 miles a day, so infantry alone with supply wagons or packhorses might be able to cover 120 miles before running out of supplies.

A stall-fed packhorse might consume 10 pounds of grass and 10 pounds of grain (barley or oats) each day and carry a burden of 250 pounds. A stall-fed warhorse might carry a greater burden but would require a proportionately greater amount of fodder. Assuming that grass is readily available for grazing, a horse might consume as much grain as it can carry in twenty-five days. Of course, if a packhorse consumes its entire load then there is not much point in bringing it along.

A cavalrymen with 50 or 75 pounds of equipment might weigh nearly as much as a horse could reasonably carry. A second horse might carry ten days' food and fodder (250 pounds, with the rider and two horses consuming 23 pounds each day) plus serve as a spare mount in case the first horses was injured. Large bodies of cavalry could travel somewhere between 19 and 30 miles a day, depending on the likelihood of meeting the enemy and the degree of catuion required, or between 180 and 300 miles on ten days' supplies.

So, assuming that grass and water are readily available, an army could carry enough food and fodder for about ten days without much of a supply train at all. This is a rough estimate but a reasonable one... [bit about living of the land in heavily populated agricultural areas].

On the steppe, such an army woulds starve after ten days. It would have to turn back after five.

In the desert, the assumption that grass and water are readily available no longer holds, and the range of such an army drops precipitously. For each day in the desert, an additional 10 pounds of fodder would have to be carried for each horse, plus 80 pounds of water per horse and 5 pounds of water per person. This is why armies could not travel through the desert except along rivers or for very short periods of time. Infantry would have to turn back after just two days in the desert; cavalry, after just a single day.

Supply trains provide no simple solution. The men and horses in the supply train have to eat too. Pack horses consume 10 pounds each day and carry 250 pounds of supplies, or twenty-five their daily consumption. Porters who consume 3 pounds each day and carry 75 pounds of supplies would be equally efficient. Supply wagons are better; the driver and two horses would consume 23 pounds each day but the wagon might hold 1,400 pounds of supplies, or sixty times their daily consumption, depending on the efficiency of the harness and other factors. Supply wagons were restricted to relatively flat terrain, however. Ships and boats were far more efficient than even supply wagons, but they were more restricted in where they could operate.

Imagine a platoon of thirty infantrymen marching out onto the steepe with one large supply wagon. After ten days, they exhaust their rations and turn to the supply wagon for more. They will find that the driver and the horses have consumed 230 pounds of the load, and that another 230 pounds have be set aside for the driver and horses on the return trip. The remaining 940 pounds is just enough for each of the thirty infantrymen to fill his knapsack with the 30 pounds he can carry, and that in turn will last him just long enough to march back to where he started from.

Increasing the number of wagons quickly runs into the law of diminishing returns. One wagon will double the range of infantrymen from 120 miles to 240 miles, or rather 200 miles with one day of rest in six for the horses. (Horses become permanently incapacitated without periodic rest.) To double it again to 400 miles requires not two wagons, but actually six - one wagon for every five infantrymen, already the maximum likely to be found in practice. The number of wagons will reach thirty - one wagon, one driver and two horses for every infantrymen - before the range will double again.

So if there is one wagon for every five infantrymen, and enough grass and water along the march, then infantry can make a 400 mile round trip (i.e 200 miles in each direction). Take away the grass and water, and its range drops to one fifth of that. Natrually, these umbers are only rough estimates but they suggest and order of magnitude. To put them in perspective, Russian armies faced a 600-mile round trip from Kiev to the Crimea and back, and Chinese armies faced a 1,600 mile round trip from Beijing to Outer Mongolia and back.


That is so interesting! Very useful information :goodjob: SO I copied and pasted it to word for later use/consideration....

Some questions though...
1. Who wrote all that?
2. Why does it take 6 supply wagons to double the marching length instead of just 2?
3. Didn't Russian and Chinese forces have supply stations/forts all along their war routes so they could resupply easily without returning all the way back to base?
 
I wasn't talking individual battles, I was talking long-term (though it was poor wording on my part, to be sure). You fight the steppe by making it disappear.
 
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