Worst mistakes made by otherwise competent generals

[MattII]

Agincourt
The French should have let the English reach open ground before engaging them, and the tactics used were frankly abismal.

 

[CruddyLeper]

Norman Schwartzkopf, for the pathetic peace agreement signed in 1991.

Stormin' Norm himself admitted he was "suckered" into an agreement that let the Saddam Hussein use a steel fist against his own insurgents.

 

[Louis XXIV]

Robert E. Lee--Pickett's Charge. 15,000 men over a mile with no diversionary attack or feint. What did he think he was going to accomplish?

While I'd have to agree, to be fair, he did have one of the largest artillery bombardments before WWI before the charge (although the charge was delayed until after the bombardment had stopped).

 

[Andu Indorin]

Norman Schwartzkopf, for the pathetic peace agreement signed in 1991.

Stormin' Norm himself admitted he was "suckered" into an agreement that let the Saddam Hussein use a steel fist against his own insurgents.

Then again, in fairness to Schwartzkopf, he was against the cease fire but complied with orders from the White House; and was pretty much left to his own devices for the initial negotiations. As good soldiers, both he and Colin Powell "took the fall" for a truly questionable "policy" decision from the White House.

 

[dgfred]

While I'd have to agree, to be fair, he did have one of the largest artillery bombardments before WWI before the charge (although the charge was delayed until after the bombardment had stopped).

Although quite large, quite ineffective also . Most shots sailed over the Union arty positions. As for 'Picketts' Charge, the attack was made
by several different Brigades that were already banged up, many under new
leadership- that hindered the attack greatly. Their orders were not so clear,
and Longstreet for one did not think the attack stood a good chance of
success. All in all a recipe for disaster!

 

[Serutan]

Never heard of it. Tell me more!

Well, the really good description is in John Erickson's
"The Road to Berlin".

What happened is that the Germans had 3 lines in
the Seelow Heights. Zhukov's plan was to blast the
first line (and presumably most of the defenders) into
very small pieces, then smash through into Berlin.
But Henrici withdrew his forces from the 1st to the 2nd
line, and the massive Soviet bombardment merely
churned up the ground (since it had been rainy,
this actually made things worse for the attackers),
rather than doing damage to the defenders. When the
attack got bogged down, Zhukov told everyone to keep
going, without considering a regrouping, or changing the
axis of attack. As I said, he eventually broke through, but
it was by sheer brute force. And I might add, Stalin was
most displeased by this performance.

 

[Andu Indorin]

Serutan, thanks.

Sounds similar to the Nivelle Offensive in World War I. I've heard that Stalin was playing off Zhukov and Konev in the Battle for Berlin, so that might partially explain Zhukov loss of judgment.

 

[dgfred]

Serutan, thanks.

Sounds similar to the Nivelle Offensive in World War I. I've heard that Stalin was playing off Zhukov and Konev in the Battle for Berlin, so that might partially explain Zhukov loss of judgment.

Good point Andu . Bashing a way into Berlin was going to be
costly any way you look at it .

 

[Adler17]

There was only one army defending Berlin. It hold position at the nearest point: Seelow. Instead of avoiding to the North or South the Russians attacked through the German lines. The Russians were lucky that the Germans had no reserve left. When the Russians eventually conquered Berlin over 500.000 soldiers died on the way from Seelow to Berlin. The Red Army now had to regroup and resupply. A single German army would now has been able to smash the Red army and to push them behind the Oder or even further. But there were no reserves due to the senseless Ardennes offensive and the try of recapturing Budapest...

Adler

 

[rilnator]

During the 'Seven days' apparently Jackson had a habit of falling asleep during cruicial times missing several opportunities to deliver big hits on the union forces. Although in the end they pushed the Feds away from Richmond, there was no decisive blows.

 

[privatehudson]

Zukhov's complacency around Berlin owed much to the rather deep rivarly between him and other commanders, Stalin urging him onward and the knowledge that the Germans were done for by then. One could assume they would avoid such idiocy if the Wermacht were still intact, though quite how they'd operate with nearly no supplies and a busted and overflowing rail system is anyone's guess.

 

[Serutan]

Zukhov's complacency around Berlin owed much to the rather deep rivarly between him and other commanders,{snip}.

Which rivalry Stalin made liberal use of once Zhukov
was bogged down. Not only authorizing Koniev to
push to Berlin, but threatening to bring Rokossovsski
down from the North.

 

[dgfred]

During the 'Seven days' apparently Jackson had a habit of falling asleep during cruicial times missing several opportunities to deliver big hits on the union forces. Although in the end they pushed the Feds away from Richmond, there was no decisive blows.

Wasn't he 'under the weather'? The Confederates would afterwards regroup
their forces and 'weed out' the problematic and incompetant officers, which
had made several mistakes during the Battle. One battle where he had a
bout of the 'slows', but some of it could probably be attributed to inaccurate maps and the reluctance to make a major mistake early in the battle/war.

 

[privatehudson]

Which rivalry Stalin made liberal use of once Zhukov
was bogged down. Not only authorizing Koniev to
push to Berlin, but threatening to bring Rokossovsski
down from the North.

Naturally, I'm merely suggesting that it's normal to assume that had the Germans still somehow posessed the ability to counterattack such an offensive in strength, there's a good chance such gambles would have been less likely.

 

[privatehudson]

Wasn't he 'under the weather'? The Confederates would afterwards regroup
their forces and 'weed out' the problematic and incompetant officers, which
had made several mistakes during the Battle. One battle where he had a
bout of the 'slows', but some of it could probably be attributed to inaccurate maps and the reluctance to make a major mistake early in the battle/war.

I think I remember reading something about him being physically exhausted by the rigours of the Valley campaign and unable to continue so quickly in the Seven days. Bit like Napoleon falling asleep from exhaustion during one of his battles and his guard having to form square round him I think.

 

[rilnator]

One battle where he had a bout of the 'slows', but some of it could probably be attributed to inaccurate maps and the reluctance to make a major mistake early in the battle/war.

Well the fighting was around Richmond so I don't think maps were a problem and the man had the guts to go tearing up into the Shenandoah valley a few weeks before.

 

[Andu Indorin]

Well the fighting was around Richmond so I don't think maps were a problem and the man had the guts to go tearing up into the Shenandoah valley a few weeks before.

Actually, I recall reading in a Stonewall biography that faulty maps were a problem in at least one instance early on in the Seven Days ... something about a non-existent bridge over a swollen creek.

 

[Ace]

Faulty maps probably played a large part. Remember, this was a time and place where the average man lived and died without every living more than 20 miles from his birthplace.

 

[Serutan]

Naturally, I'm merely suggesting that it's normal to assume that had the Germans still somehow posessed the ability to counterattack such an offensive in strength, there's a good chance such gambles would have been less likely.

True, but I couldn't resist the opportunity to use that to note how Stalin
used the rivalries to flog Zhukov once he bogged down...

Oh yes, you PM mailbox is full....

 

[privatehudson]

I know, just deleted them all