A question for moral absolutists: impossible sins

[The Last Conformist]

No, this isn't about the Kama Sutra, you gutterminded freak.


Suppose, for the sake of the argument that I claim

(p) Murder is wrong

and that (p) is true.

Now, consider a hypothetical world were living creatures cannot kill or be killed. Is (p) still true in this world? Presumably, a moral absolutist has to say that, yes, it still is, but I have a hard time seeing how that makes any sense. How is it meaningful to say that it's wrong to do what can't be done?

It seems to me that the truth of (p), if true it be, is contingent on us being creatures capable of killing or being killed. But if we admit that the truth of a moral claim is contingent on the kind of being saying it, we've accepted moral relativism.



I suppose there is a standard answer to this, but I've not heard it. Enlighten me.

 

[bhsup]

Of course (p) would still be true. Just because it would be impossible to carry out does not mean it would be okay if it could be carried out. In other words, I do not accept your premise that the truth of (p) is contingent on the possibility of it being carried out.

 

[The Last Conformist]

Of course (p) would still be true. Just because it would be impossible to carry out does not mean it would be okay if it could be carried out. In other words, I do not accept your premise that the truth of (p) is contingent on the possibility of it being carried out.

This is an assertion, not an argument.

 

[bhsup]

I have no argument to put forward. You didn't say 2+2=5, you simply gave your opinion on the subject without giving an argument to support your case other than you feel truth being contingent on being able to carry out said truth. I gave my opinion that I disagree.

 

[Mise]

I can't time travel, but I think it would be wrong to go back in time and change the future to my advantage, even if all actions I carry out in the past are perfectly moral.

 

[Mise]

I've thought of another one:

I can't metamorphasise into Selma Blair, but it would still be wrong to metamorphasise into Selma Blair, take naked pictures of myself, and sell them on the internet, even though taking naked pictures of myself and selling them on the internet isn't wrong.

 

[The Last Conformist]

I can't time travel, but I think it would be wrong to go back in time and change the future to my advantage, even if all actions I carry out in the past are perfectly moral.

Since changing the future to one's advantage is ordinarily considered legitimate, this appears to put a moral value on time travel in itself. I don't see why that should be?

But a relativist could grant it would be immoral, what he'd deny is that it is wrong despite time travel being (we assume for the sake of the discussion) impossible.

I can't metamorphasise into Selma Blair, but it would still be wrong to metamorphasise into Selma Blair, take naked pictures of myself, and sell them on the internet, even though taking naked pictures of myself and selling them on the internet isn't wrong.

It seems to me that the actual moral infraction here is making people think you're showing them naked pictures of this Selma Blair, which is not impossible to do.

 

[warpus]

Hmm, I betcha that most moral absolutites (absoluters? absolutists?) have a list of things that they believe to be immoral - yet, it would be impossible for them to do these things.

 

[scy12]

(p) Murder is wrong

and that (p) is true.

Now, consider a hypothetical world were living creatures cannot kill or be killed. Is (p) still true in this world? Presumably, a moral absolutist has to say that, yes, it still is, but I have a hard time seeing how that makes any sense. How is it meaningful to say that it's wrong to do what can't be done?

It seems to me that the truth of (p), if true it be, is contingent on us being creatures capable of killing or being killed. But if we admit that the truth of a moral claim is contingent on the kind of being saying it, we've accepted moral relativism.



I suppose there is a standard answer to this, but I've not heard it. Enlighten me.

I am not a moral absolutist but i would answer the question. The sentence "Murder is wrong" is wrong. The sentence Murder and .... and ... is wrong when it happens on this context .... by that person .... on this area ... under those circumstances .... " is correct.

The .... is what are those circumstances.

Your moral propositions must be as complex as possible if they are for every situation possible or they may be shorter if they are only for something that happens on very specific circumstances. Like a Computer program. I think my logic is correct and everyone who disagrees with me is obviously wrong.

Their is only Moral Scyism everything else is BS.

 

[Mise]

Okay, fair enough.

In that case, I propose that (p) is true, if we define murder in such a way that it is only relevant to species that can kill or be killed.

IMO, though, murder is wrong regardless of whether or not a particular species is capable of murder. And there's nothing to say that morality doesn't differ between species -- I don't hold dogs to the same moral standards as humans, for example.

 

[The Last Conformist]

I am not a moral absolutist but i would answer the question. The sentence "Murder is wrong" is wrong.

Your failure to understand hypotheticals makes baby Fifty cry.

 

[scy12]

Your failure to understand hypotheticals makes baby Fifty cry.

My success to understand hypotheticals better than everyone that disagrees with me make me Cry.

If in this instance P = specific circumstances.

The sentence (p) Murder is wrong is usually wrong unless P is so complex that it contains in it or the possible circumstances that may happen. As at this point as i consider that impossible it is only more correct than other propositions. If it is the better proposition we can possibly think at the moment is "Correct","true","Absolute" or "Great" . Until we think a more complex one.

So it is not really true correct or absolute. It is just "The greatest moral proposition thought on this subject yet"

 

[The Last Conformist]

Okay, fair enough.

In that case, I propose that (p) is true, if we define murder in such a way that it is only relevant to species that can kill or be killed.

I don't see how this'd work without granting that some moral statements are true for some species and wrong or null for some. Not saying it can't work, mind, just that I don't see how.

IMO, though, murder is wrong regardless of whether or not a particular species is capable of murder. And there's nothing to say that morality doesn't differ between species -- I don't hold dogs to the same moral standards as humans, for example.

If you consider dogs to be moral agents at all, this sounds like the definition of moral relativism. Am I misunderstanding you?

 

[scy12]

If you consider dogs to be moral agents at all, this sounds like the definition of moral relativism. Am I misunderstanding you?

Am I a moral relativist ? I don't think so and for the same reason i don't think he is either.

 

[The Last Conformist]

Am I a moral relativist ?

I neither know nor care. Since you obviously have no intention of addressing the OP, kindly leave this thread.

 

[scy12]

I neither know nor care. Since you obviously have no intention of addressing the OP, kindly leave this thread.

I did address the OP. Under some(many) circumstances it is wrong.
Now .
I think in your specific example that the proposition "Murder is wrong" is wrong. It is one of the many circumstances where it is wrong. Or better it is irrelevant. The word Murder does not even exist in that world. Using it would be giberrish. It is like we saying " Transforming Humans into Vampires by saying to them Hello , is wrong"

 

[Mise]

I don't see how this'd work without granting that some moral statements are true for some species and wrong or null for some. Not saying it can't work, mind, just that I don't see how.

If you consider dogs to be moral agents at all, this sounds like the definition of moral relativism. Am I misunderstanding you?

In practice, I doubt that people who believe in the objective truth of moral propositions have vastly different moral standards than people who don't believe in objective truth for moral propositions. It shouldn't surprise you that what I find moral is similar to what relativists find moral. The difference between the two POVs is whether or not these moral statements are true objectively, in the same way as "my hair is black" is true objectively.

 

[The Last Conformist]

It shouldn't surprise you that what I find moral is similar to what relativists find moral.

That's not what suprised me. What surprised me was your apparent explicit endorsement of relativism.

 

[Mise]

That's not what suprised me. What surprised me was your apparent explicit endorsement of relativism.

I don't see how I explicitly endorsed the view that moral propositions are not objectively true.

 

[The Last Conformist]

I don't see how I explicitly endorsed the view that moral propositions are not objectively true.

That's not the definition of moral relativism, or at least not the definition of moral relativism that I'm using. Following the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, I'm taking moral relativism to be the notion that the truth of moral statements is contingent on the kind of moral agents they're made by and/or about.