A question for moral absolutists: impossible sins

[Mise]

That's not the definition of moral relativism, or at least not the definition of moral relativism that I'm using. Following the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, I'm taking moral relativism to be the notion that the truth of moral statements is contingent on the kind of moral agents they're made by and/or about.

Okay, in that case, (p) is true, and that it is not absurd to think that (p) is true in spite of there being species for which (p) is necessarily (or at least, always) followed.

How is it absurd to say that it is wrong to do what can't be done?

 

[Fifty]

I don't know if this is the standard answer, but this is certainly my answer.

Yes, (p) is still true. For the same underlying reason that there exists an answer to the question of the sum of two numbers, neither of which has ever been thought of before or exemplified.

Also, I think VRWC's answer has more philosophical meat to it then it looks at first pass. If a counterfactual of the form "if person P committed action y, then P would be acting wrongly" is true, then we can meaningful make moral prescriptions about y.

It might not be worthwhile for the people in your hypothetical world to internalize (p), but that doesn't mean it isn't true.

I think this is the best solution, and since we don't ordinarily think that thinking in terms of counterfactuals is weird, I don't think my answer is weird either. For instance, the following seem like perfectly valid statement/counterfactual pairs:

(q1) If I could jump 50 feet up in the air, unassisted, on earth, and with normal atmospheric conditions, I'd be an impressively high jumper.
(p1) Jumping 50 feet up in the air, unassisted, on earth, and with normal atmospheric conditions is impressively high jumping.

(q2) If I killed a billion people in a 5 minute rampage with my bare fists, I'd be acting wrongly.
(p2) Killing a billion people in a 5 minute rampage with bare fists is wrong.

Those statment pairs seem perfectly true here in our world, now consider the version for the world of the hypothetical:

(q) If I murdered, I'd be acting wrongly.
(p) Murder is wrong.

 

[The Last Conformist]

@Mise: Could you please clarify your last post? I suspect some words are missing but at any rate I do not understand what you're trying to say.

@Fifty: It's not clear to me that (p1) is literally true. When people say it, don't they actually mean something like (q1)?

 

[Elrohir]

No, this isn't about the Kama Sutra, you gutterminded freak.


Suppose, for the sake of the argument that I claim

(p) Murder is wrong

and that (p) is true.

Now, consider a hypothetical world were living creatures cannot kill or be killed. Is (p) still true in this world? Presumably, a moral absolutist has to say that, yes, it still is, but I have a hard time seeing how that makes any sense. How is it meaningful to say that it's wrong to do what can't be done?

It seems to me that the truth of (p), if true it be, is contingent on us being creatures capable of killing or being killed. But if we admit that the truth of a moral claim is contingent on the kind of being saying it, we've accepted moral relativism.

I suppose there is a standard answer to this, but I've not heard it. Enlighten me.

Why would the likelihood of an action determine its morality? 'Impossible sins' might not be an especially important subject for us to consider, but I don't see why that should mean they couldn't exist. But then, I don't think morality is a man made concept.

 

[Fifty]

@Fifty: It's not clear to me that (p1) is literally true. When people say it, don't they actually mean something like (q1)?

I dunno, it seems to me like they are semantically equivalent with respect to their value claims. I mean, if you imagine a hypothetical conversation in which you asked someone if (q1) is true, and they said yes, and then you said "so, in other words, (p1)", it seems like most competent speakers would say "yes", not "no".

 

[El_Machinae]

I think that 'impossible now' sins should be considered as well. There are things which would be immoral given sufficient (though possible) technological advancement, and so we should consider whether current actions would be immoral if they were part of the future immoral actions.

 

[The Last Conformist]

Why would the likelihood of an action determine its morality?

Morality is usually considered to apply to moral agents. If one lacks agency, as one does with respect to the impossible, how can morality apply to one?

But then, I don't think morality is a man made concept.

I don't see what man-madeness has to do with moral relativism. If God made morality, presumably he could have made one morality for humans and another for martians. If one morality just is, presumably multiple ones can be.

 

[bhsup]

Yes, (p) is still true. For the same underlying reason that there exists an answer to the question of the sum of two numbers, neither of which has ever been thought of before or exemplified.

Thank you, Fifty, but I have to admit I didn't try to apply any deep philosophy to my answer. It just seemed so obviously common sense and apparent, there wasn't much more to say about it.

 

[Elrohir]

Morality is usually considered to apply to moral agents. If one lacks agency, as one does with respect to the impossible, how can morality apply to one?

Except "agency" in this sense usually refers to the use of free will, not the physical ability to carry out that choice. It's wrong for me to shoot my neighbor in the head so I can steal his TV - and it's still wrong to do so even if I don't own a gun. Whether I can do something isn't really a determining factor in deciding whether a certain action is actually moral.

I don't see what man-madeness has to do with moral relativism. If God made morality, presumably he could have made one morality for humans and another for martians. If one morality just is, presumably multiple ones can be.

I don't think morality works that way. I don't think God made "a morality" for humans; at most He established a moral system based on His own perfect nature. Or He informs us of, and to a certain degree enforces self evident moral truths that He didn't create. I confess that I'm not completely sure about everything - but I'm fairly certain that there aren't conflicting true moralities out there, even if there are other moral agents besides humans out there. That would contradict the idea of morals as absolute.

 

[The Last Conformist]

I dunno, it seems to me like they are semantically equivalent with respect to their value claims. I mean, if you imagine a hypothetical conversation in which you asked someone if (q1) is true, and they said yes, and then you said "so, in other words, (p1)", it seems like most competent speakers would say "yes", not "no".

You might be right. The whole line of fishy nevertheless feels vaguely fishy - I'll have to think more about this.

Except "agency" in this sense usually refers to the use of free will, not the physical ability to carry out that choice. It's wrong for me to shoot my neighbor in the head so I can steal his TV - and it's still wrong to do so even if I don't own a gun. Whether I can do something isn't really a determining factor in deciding whether a certain action is actually moral.

Fine. Assume the inhabitants of our hypothetical world are also incapable of wanting to murder - they have no free will in the matter. Is murder still wrong for them?

I don't think morality works that way. I don't think God made "a morality" for humans; at most He established a moral system based on His own perfect nature. Or He informs us of, and to a certain degree enforces self evident moral truths that He didn't create. I confess that I'm not completely sure about everything - but I'm fairly certain that there aren't conflicting true moralities out there, even if there are other moral agents besides humans out there. That would contradict the idea of morals as absolute.

Well, obviously, but I don't see how the idea of morals as absolute follows from either of your accounts. If God established a system (it's not to me how this differs from Him making one, but whatever), surely he could have established multiple ones? If there are self-evident moral truths (it's not clear to me how this differs from morality just being, but whatever), why can't there be multiple sets of such? Obviously, you don't believe that He did or that there is, but that's not the same as saying He couldn't have or there couldn't be.

 

[Mise]

@Mise: Could you please clarify your last post? I suspect some words are missing but at any rate I do not understand what you're trying to say.

I'm saying that (p) is true, and is true of all moral agents, regardless of whether or not murder is possible for any individual moral agent.

Then I asked why that would be an absurd thing to think. Personally, I'm satisfied with that level of absurdity, given the much greater absurdity of any competing philosophies.

 

[Elrohir]

Fine. Assume the inhabitants of our hypothetical world are also incapable of wanting to murder - they have no free will in the matter. Is murder still wrong for them?

Well, I don't think you can separate free will (Or some form of it) from morality. And murder is immoral (Or illegal) killing. You can be murdered by a human being, because humans have moral agency - you can't be murdered by a rock slide, only killed by one. It's an important distinction, and one that renders your question rather meaningless. Asking if it's wrong for a being that is a non moral agent to murder is like asking if it's wrong for a rock to commit adultery.

At least, that's how I see it. If you can think of a circumstance where that isn't accurate, or a reason why that isn't so, I'd be very interested in hearing it.

Well, obviously, but I don't see how the idea of morals as absolute follows from either of your accounts. If God established a system (it's not to me how this differs from Him making one, but whatever), surely he could have established multiple ones? If there are self-evident moral truths (it's not clear to me how this differs from morality just being, but whatever), why can't there be multiple sets of such? Obviously, you don't believe that He did or that there is, but that's not the same as saying He couldn't have or there couldn't be.

I don't think so, no, not so long as we're talking about the Judeo-Christian God, and not merely some hypothetical divinity. This God is morally perfect and just, and so the idea of such a God establishing multiple conflicting moralities is obviously absurd. Either God established one morality that was in keeping with His nature, or His nature reflects self evident universal truths that are immutable. (These truths would exist in the same way that, say, mathematical truths do. 2+2+4, regardless of where you go or who you are, and isn't dependent upon any physical phenomena. Moral truths could be the same - entirely non-physical, and without distinguishable beginning, but nevertheless absolute and existent. That's one idea, anyway)

 

[Berzerker]

a better approach: alien world where murder and killing (they aint the same, LC) are unknown and they are shocked to learn about life on planet Earth. Are we immoral by their standards?
Yeah, but their standards dont apply here...

moral absolutes are about human behavior, not other life forms. We dont accuse bears of immorality when they eat humans. Btw, that world dont exist... Life has a design and killing to eat is part of it...

 

[Bill3000]

moral absolutes are about human behavior, not other life forms. We dont accuse bears of immorality when they eat humans. Btw, that world dont exist... Life has a design and killing to eat is part of it...

No. Moral absolutes are applied to all moral agents, and that includes other sapient beings.

 

[Berzerker]

No. Moral absolutes are applied to all moral agents, and that includes other sapient beings.

Moral agents that evolved in a world where killing is unknown? Or monkeys? We are the only moral agents, for ourselves. If some "superior" race from this non-existent planet where killing is unknown comes along (God?) and explains why we got it wrong, how do they propose we survive without eating other life forms? Morality exists within a context, and that context is nature.

Moral absolutism - is the belief that there are absolute standards against which moral questions can be judged, and that certain actions are right or wrong, devoid of the context of the act. "Absolutism" is often philosophically contrasted with moral relativism, which is a belief that moral truths are relative to social, cultural, historical or personal references, and to situational ethics, which holds that the morality of an act depends on the context of the act.

Moral absolutists believe that morals are inherent in the laws of the universe, the nature of humanity, the will or character of God or gods, or some other fundamental source. They regard actions as inherently moral or immoral. They might, for example, judge slavery, war, dictatorship, the death penalty, or childhood abuse to be absolutely immoral regardless of the beliefs and goals of a culture that engages in these practices.

Modern human rights theory is a form of moral absolutism, usually based on an estimate of the nature of humanity and the essence of human nature. One such theory was constructed by John Rawls in his A Theory of Justice.[ citation needed ]

Moral absolutism and moral objectivism

The difference between these positions is subtle. Absolutism can be seen as a stronger form of objectivism.

* "Moral absolutism: There is at least one principle that ought never to be violated." [1]

* "Moral objectivism: There is a fact of the matter as to whether any given action is morally permissible or impermissible: a fact of the matter that does not depend solely on social custom or individual acceptance (developed from [1] wiki

Throwing virgins into volcanoes for better crops to feed more people is immoral, dont matter if it works or not.

 

[BasketCase]

Now, consider a hypothetical world were living creatures cannot kill or be killed. Is (p) still true in this world? Presumably, a moral absolutist has to say that, yes, it still is, but I have a hard time seeing how that makes any sense. How is it meaningful to say that it's wrong to do what can't be done?

I realize this is kind of a buzzkill, but I'm gonna have to go with the basic "that hypothetical world is impossible" kind of reply.

Life consumes energy (basic law of thermodynamics). Therefore: if it lives, you can kill it by depriving it of energy.

 

[The Last Conformist]

Well, I don't think you can separate free will (Or some form of it) from morality. And murder is immoral (Or illegal) killing. You can be murdered by a human being, because humans have moral agency - you can't be murdered by a rock slide, only killed by one. It's an important distinction, and one that renders your question rather meaningless. Asking if it's wrong for a being that is a non moral agent to murder is like asking if it's wrong for a rock to commit adultery.

At least, that's how I see it. If you can think of a circumstance where that isn't accurate, or a reason why that isn't so, I'd be very interested in hearing it.

I said they lacked free will wrt murder, not that the lacked free will altogether.

I don't think so, no, not so long as we're talking about the Judeo-Christian God, and not merely some hypothetical divinity.

I'm not talking about any specific concept of god, I'm saying that moral relativism doesn't mean morals are (necessarily) man-made. If you accept that some hypothetical deity could have arranged relativistic morality, we agree on the basic point.

 

[The Last Conformist]

a better approach: alien world where murder and killing (they aint the same, LC)

I didn't say they're the same. I do think, however, that the former requires the later, and that therefore a world without killing is necessarily a world without murder.

are unknown and they are shocked to learn about life on planet Earth. Are we immoral by their standards?
Yeah, but their standards dont apply here...

moral absolutes are about human behavior, not other life forms. We dont accuse bears of immorality when they eat humans.

We don't, and the absolutist's usual excuse is that they're not "moral agents". Someday when I feel particularly bored I'll argue that that constitutes relativism wrt moral agenthood ...

But an "absolutism" that applies to humans only doesn't seem interesting to me. Why not just call yourself a moral relativist with respect to species?

 

[potatokiosk]

I don't think the statement "murder is wrong" and the statement "murder is impossible" are mutually exclusive. Possible is not part of the definition of wrong. So it could still be a true statement in a universe where there is no murder. The only difference is nobody in that universe would ever discover that moral principle.

Likewise there may be immoral things that are not possible in this universe. Obviously I can't give any examples.

 

[Elrohir]

I said they lacked free will wrt murder, not that the lacked free will altogether.

But as far as murder is concerned, it's the same thing. Whether they have free will to be charitable, to steal, to commit adultery, or whatever, is absolutely irrelevant towards whether they have free will to commit murder. If they have no free will where murder is concerned, then they cannot murder.

I'm not talking about any specific concept of god, I'm saying that moral relativism doesn't mean morals are (necessarily) man-made. If you accept that some hypothetical deity could have arranged relativistic morality, we agree on the basic point.

I dunno. I guess in general such a thing could be possible, although I don't see your reasoning behind pointing it out.