taillesskangaru said:
Several problems:
- He believed in and at times (Zama) depended on elephants. Never place your hopes and dreams on animals with unpredictable temper.
At Zama, Hannibal was actually hampered by his lack of cavalry, which was actually the decisive arm at several battles: Ticinus, Trebia, and Cannae. After Massinissa switched sides, Hannibal didn't have much chance to win at Zama, but the fact that he came so close is merely a testament to his skill.
taillesskangaru said:
- He depended too much on supply from Carthage, while many of the oligarchs back home doesn't give a #### about him. Capturing and holding Roman ports also proved more difficult than previously thought.
He couldn't depend AT ALL on supply from Carthage. IIRC only two reinforcement parties reached him: that of his brother Mago in Liguria in the later war, and another after he took Tarentum. Supply from Africa would have been the only way for the Punic Army to win the war without, say, Philip V joining in the fight.
taillesskangaru said:
- He delayed in taking Rome after the battle of Cannae. After that sort of defeat he expected Rome would collapse internally and southern Itary would revolt against Roman rule and join him on a final assault on a weakened Rome. This, of course, did not happen. So Hannibal is forced to wait for supply which never came.
He didn't have a choice. Realistically, attacking Rome was virtually impossible with his resources anyway. It was said that Hannibal knew how to gain a victory but not to use it; that's not entirely true. Had he the siege train or support from Carthage - the fact that they didn't come wasn't his but Hanno's fault anyway - he would undoubtedly have marched on Rome and taken the fortifications, which he knew he couldn't crack any other way.
On the subject of Hannibal: He was very tactically able (although he liked to do the same basic tactic of a cavalry envelopment too much) and strategically his only real match of the time was Scipio Africanus. He, unfortunately, had to pit a trading power that relied on mercenaries against a nation with about half a million possible soldiers, a superior basic tactical system, and generals that (generally) were not up to his caliber, but very, very close (like Nero, Marcellus, and Fabius for those almost as good, and Scipio for a general as good as he). Denigrating Hannibal just because he didn't win is silly and a bit pedantic.
taillesskangaru said:
Re: Alexander
He was very lucky to attack the Persians when they were still recovering from internal dynastic strife and provincial revolts. His military successes were result of combination luck/Alexander's personal determination ambition /crappy organisation on part of the Persians. He's a risk taker, and it paid off until he was forced to turn back on the edge of India. He took a risk by crossing the desert back to Susa. This time he weren't so lucky: the ordeal decimated his army, and then he tried unsuccessfully to implement reforms which was to reconcile Macedonians and Persians. Had he not die in Babylon in 323 BC, he would've found it extremely difficult to manage his empire, let alone proceed on further conquests.
Yes, of course he was a risk taker, but you seem to completely leave out his A) superior tactical instrument and B) brilliance in utilizing it and C) skill on the plane of grand strategy. Sure, the Persians had been going through internal unrest. They do that all of the time: in fact, almost every single time their Great King died (Darius I had to deal with it, and Artaxerxes II too. Those are just the most notable examples, of course). It didn't seem to affect Darius' ability to raise armies of 100,000+ troops - at Ipsus and Arbela both.
I'm really tired of everyone denigrating the Achaemenid Army. For their time, they were probably one of the better technical and tactical instruments. Cyrus used it to his benefit against the Lydians at Pteria and Thymbra, and Darius I was able to smash up the Egyptians pretty well. They just have the bad luck to be compared with the Greek hoplites, which were the best in the world. It's like those who compare WWII France to Nazi Germany: they weren't bad at all, but they weren't the best, and they ended up fighting the best. It should also be noted that many Greek mercenary hoplites served in Achaemenid armies, especially at Ipsus (although not so much at Arbela).
Darius III Codomannus wasn't a complete idiot, either. Everyone seems to forget that he was so intelligent as to maneuver onto Alexander's line of communications and supply before Ipsus to force him to fight; it was just his bad luck that Alexander - who, it should be noted, had only had to fight the Persian satraps before this, and fought rather foolhardily there at the Granicus, which possibly caused Darius to underrate his generalship - wanted a battle, and, being one step ahead, had used his line of communications to entice the Persians to battle in such a way that he could clear his rear areas without having a frontal distraction as well. At Arbela in two years, Darius - just like Hannibal! - tried for a cavalry double envelopment, but Alexander, realizing that the enemy's size prevented him from closing the net easily, went and charged for Darius in a lightning strike that decapitated the Persian command by forcing the King to flee, forcing the contracting Persian ring to come apart just as Parmenio was beginning to falter against Bessus' assault. Darius was no fool, but, like Archduke Charles or Leopold von Daun, he wasn't more than a competent general fighting a Great Captain of History, and that spelled his downfall.
Alexander may have been a bit delirious sometimes, relying on his luck a little too much, but every general needs luck, after all. His inability to push on to India was the result of the Argyraspides' unwillingness to keep going - probably caused by his concentration too much on what
he could do as opposed to what
they could do. His much-maligned decision do cross Baluchistan deserves to be just that: much-maligned. There were some pretty good reasons, though. It would be faster than going back north - the main reason he went back at all was because of his men, you know, and he didn't have the fleet capacity to carry all of his men, for example. I agree completely that he would have had problems administering his Empire as soon as it reached a state of peace - and even possibly before. The Lamian War, which started just as soon as he died, was brought on by news of his death; if he'd been on the other side of the world, the Greeks might as well have thought that he could do them just as much harm as if he were dead. His generals, those who would become the
diadochi, would have been trying to get rid of each other, and there are some instances of that happening even before Alexander died. Alexander's death in Babylon would be comparable to that of Napoleon after Tilsit, if it happened.