America's First Forgotten War: The Philippine-American War
- Thread starter El Justo
- Start date
El Justo
Deity
The lasting effects that the Philippine-American War has generated are grossly underrated. It represented a huge shift in American foreign policy; and in the process it greatly strengthened the executive branch of the American government. It may even be said that William McKinley and his cabinet members wielded the most executive power since Lincoln.[1] It should be noted however, that while McKinley often surrounded himself with aggressive and hawkish men, the situation in the Philippines literally fell into his lap. War with Spain had been imminent for several years as evidenced by the brutal suppression in Cuba by the Spanish. Americans were outraged at the Spanish atrocities on the island. Newspaper magnates of the time such as William Randolph Hearst capitalized on the human rights violations that were occurring only seventy miles from the United States. A new patriotic fervor was born. Men were asked to heed the call and thousands of state volunteers signed up. War between Spain and the United States was officially declared on 25 April 1898 under the pretense of the alleged Spanish detonation of the American battleship Maine.[2] However, the first shots fired in the war came from Deweys fleet in Manila Bay. Soon thereafter, U.S. troops landed in southern Cuba and dislodged the Spanish from both Cuba and Puerto Rico. Troops were being ferried from the U.S. west coast bound for the Philippine Islands. President McKinley clearly labored long and hard on the Philippine issue. He solicited the advice of numerous politicians, advisors and military men. The press also had a huge impact on the seemingly indecisive McKinley. His motives during this period in which the great debate on the Philippine question raged were substantially grounded in the overall improvement of human rights for the oppressed inhabitants of Spanish colonialism. It was the validation of the people that he sought. Furthermore, McKinley set a precedent for American presidents in that he considered it a moral duty of Americans to carry on the White Mans Burden.[3] There are also several negatives associated with McKinleys handling of the Philippine issue. It appears that he solicited so much advice on the matter that it produced a dead-lock in those months which the Treaty of Paris was being negotiated by his commissioners in Paris. McKinley insisted on terms that were contrary to four out of the five peace commissioners that he personally appointed. Despite these few blemishes, William McKinleys greatest legacy was Americas overseas empire. His next greatest was the quality of men he chose to run it.[4]
Elihu Root is perhaps the most underrated American statesman in the history of the Republic. He entered service as the Secretary of War at a time when his country was undergoing tremendous changes both internally and externally. He was therefore responsible for managing the demanding responsibilities of the U.S. Armys dual-task in the Philippines, to pacify first and then to rebuild. Once the hostilities between the Americans and Filipinos broke out, Root took a clear and decisive approach to the insurgency. He felt that the best way to handle the issue was to squash it completely. He felt that self-government for the Filipinos was a gradual process and he stood by this stance even after receiving a good deal of criticism from his critics. He did, however, see a need for a swift transition from military to civil governance. Roots greatest legacy in the Philippines is most definitely the economic and industrial improvements that he initiated in the U.S. Congress. He saw the need to develop both the Filipino bureaucracy and its industrial and commercial infrastructure and he aggressively pursued congressional legislation to secure it. It should also be noted that Root dealt deftly with the Vatican while he attempted to broker the transfer of the friars lands in the Philippines. This was clearly a hot-button issue for many in the U.S. If there was a negative to Roots handlings during the Philippine War, it was the cover-up of the atrocities being committed by U.S. troops in Samar. It resulted in an embarrassing moment for Root and the Roosevelt administration. Despite this shortcoming, it is clear that the actions of Elihu Root during the Philippine War deserve great attention and detail and that there are many good examples that can be learned from by historians who wish to determine the arduous task of nation building.
Theodore Roosevelt maintained William McKinleys program of benevolent assimilation in the Philippines. Roosevelts best trait during this affair may have been his progressive attitude that he so often professed. He firmly believed in the notion that it was a duty to civilize and he often used words such as patience, strength, and steadfast resolution. His progressiveness is seen is his willingness to grant an experimental native legislature so long as caution and moderation accompanied it. It is interesting to note that Roosevelt continually cautioned that the moral and industrial endeavors of the Filipinos should take precedence over their aspiring self-governing ambitions. Like Root, Roosevelts image was blemished a bit by the cover-up of the atrocities committed by U.S. troops but in the end, his legacy in the Philippine Islands is that of a firm but progressive visionary who affirmed Americas newest international responsibility: to civilize.
The roles of the Unites States military in the Philippine War was a difficult, two-pronged responsibility to pacify and then rebuild while maintaining the general peace. Despite underestimating local desires for independence, the U.S. military in the Philippines was a great success. The policy of attraction that the Americans espoused in the Philippines included but was not limited to a concerted commitment to schools, roads, municipal government, health care, and sanitation.[5] The United States military was successful in the Philippines primarily because they adhered to a coherent pacification policy that balanced conciliation with repression. Thus the judicious mixture of carrot and stick was applied.[6] It is what Prof. Linn describes as the most successful counter-insurgency campaign in U.S. history.[7] For that reason, there are many lessons to be learned from this. Despite these impressive final results, the Americans faced a bevy of problems in the Philippines. The considerable difficulties of pacifying and reconstructing demands that experienced and professional soldiers, officers and commanders were of the utmost necessity. Linn notes that even while engaged in combat operations, soldiers built schools and sanitation systems, roads, bridges, and brought to many a village the first law and the first real peace it had known in years.[8] The varying degrees of resistance that the military faced throughout the archipelago demanded an improvisational approach and regional commanders needed to be able to act freely and quickly instead of waiting for orders, submitting to alternative methods, or even doing nothing at all. Most commanders performed brilliantly in this arena. It was also shown how the path of destruction that followed the American troops in the Philippines can have very grave circumstances. Not only was famine, disease, and starvation a real possibility in many parts, the collateral damage and subsequent reconstruction also greatly burdened the workload of the occupying Americans. This, as shown in the Philippines, results in desperation of the enemy which in turn, opens the door for a bitter, partisan, guerrilla war in which reprisals become more and more frequent. However, men such as Galloping Jim Parker showed a keen knack for overcoming the cultural differences that come attached with occupying a foreign land. His methods of carrot and stick included social events such as church masses and bailes in an effort to win the hearts and minds of the Filipino people. The humility and magnanimity that Parker exuded when he dealt with the inhabitants certainly went a long way and it is clear that he put the stereotypical ethnic biases of the era to the side in order to accomplish his goals. In sum, it can be said that the U.S. militarys responsibilities in the Philippines were immense. They accomplished these tasks by being able to adapt to the situations as they developed and by doing so, allowed most of the military commanders the opportunity to showcase the benefits of benevolent assimilation.
The evidence put forth in this thesis suggests that the Filipinos were clearly not ready to govern themselves in an efficient manner during what Achútegui and Bernad consider the great historical event of Filipino history, The Philippine Revolution 1896-1901. However, it is unfortunate that Aguinaldo and his fellow revolutionaries have been judged through the scope of rebellion, war, and insurgency. One must ask whether Aguinaldo and the First Philippine Republic may have flourished or, at the very least, had been able to stabilize the state of affairs that by many accounts was shown to have spiraled out of control. Among the accomplishments of Aguinaldos Republic was a modern constitution, a legislative branch with elected representatives, provincial governments, its own schools, newspapers, post offices and stamps, and most important of all, a national army. It should be noted that Aguinaldos short-lived Philippine Republic was the first ever natively inspired democracy in Asia. Aguinaldo and his men were also the first Asian nation to openly revolt against their European colonizers and in the process, evicted them once and for all; albeit under unusual circumstances. Thus their identity from an historical viewpoint is very unique.
If there was a barometer or a report card of sorts in which Aguinaldo and the men that surrounded him could be calculated or graded on their actual capacities to govern themselves in an efficient and democratic manner, theyd have performed quite poorly. The harsh methods employed by Bonifacio, the violence, and the wedge that he drove between the lower and upper class Filipinos suggests that serious social problems existed in the Philippines at this time. This undoubtedly made Aguinaldos task of governing terribly difficult. It is also unfortunate that he and his men were dealt with in such a duplicitous manner by the Americans. His failure to secure official diplomatic recognition was the first sign that the Republic was doomed. Of course, this was not entirely Aguinaldos fault. The American consuls in Hong Kong were discussing arms deals and independence with the exiled rebels while the military brass and the McKinley administration plotted their imperialistic ambitions in the Islands. The capturing of Manila by the American essentially sealed the fate of the Republic. Had the rebels controlled the old city prior to the American arrival, Aguinaldo and the Army of Liberation could have made matters much more complicated for the Gen. Merritt and the 8th Corps. The most alarming deficiency of Aguinaldos government was most definitely the corrupt and delinquent tax scheme. The irregularities and dishonesty associated with the collection of taxes was devastating for the fledgling republic. While Carlos Quirino may claim that John R.M. Taylors Philippine Insurrection Against the United States is biased, which to some extents it is.[9] However, numbers do not lie. 896,074.58 pesos, or forty-three percent of all tax revenue received by the insurgent government within the critical months of late 1898 and early 1899 was not allocated to what it should have been; namely, the trust fund in the interests of the nation. Where did this money go? Was it applied to the national cause and not reported as such? It is reasonable to assume that much of the money was simply pocketed by those who collected and received it. These tendencies clearly display an inability to properly govern. In conclusion, it can be said that while the Filipinos seemed to lack the ability to properly govern themselves, they certainly possessed a unique identity in that they were indeed the first recipient of this new American export called democracy.
Considering this, there are many lessons to be learned from the Philippine-American War. For starters, it is obvious that any American president needs to thoroughly think through their course of actions. A clear and concise plan of entrance and exit is needed. Exporting our lofty ideals of democracy abroad to peoples who are not ready to sufficiently operate self-government comes with a very heavy price tag. The costs in blood and treasure are immeasurable. Each and every American death in combat is a serious loss. By seeking the whole and complete validation of the people, William McKinley was chasing after what President George W. Bush sought from the United Nations prior to the Second Gulf War: validation to carry out the administrations ambitions. In a truly eerie similarity, both espoused the virtues and morals of planting democracy in areas of the world which were unfamiliar to it.[10] This, in a nutshell, is potentially very dangerous as well as a bit contradictory. After all, one of the principle pillars in American democracy is the consent of the governed clause which states that no government shall be enacted that is not of the people and for the people. As a result, what arises is the question of imposing our morals and beliefs upon others with out the direct consent of the people. Is it an American duty to see that all of the oppressed and less-fortunate peoples of the world be fitted with the freedoms and the virtuous ideals of democracy? In a post-Cold War era, the United States is clearly the lone super power. However, does this give the United States a license to export democracy? Indeed, these are valid questions to ask. Another set of similarities that exists is the likenesses of the cover-up of the atrocities in Samar by the Roosevelt administration and the abuses doled out by the American soldiers at one of Saddam Husseins most infamous torture chambers, the prison at Abu Ghraib. A closer look at these similarities suggests that in order to be most effective in nation building, a disciplined, professional, and well-trained military is needed in order to carry out this unbelievably difficult task of winning the hearts and minds of many of whom consider the Americans to be invaders. Thus this judicious mixture of carrot and stick needs to be conducted by a military of the utmost professionalism, pro-activism, creativity, and magnanimity. By examining the identities and character of those who are on the receiving end of benevolent assimilation, we can begin to determine the capacities of those who are either just beginning self-government or will eventually be responsible for self-government. An excellent comparison is the situation that the United States faced in the Republic of South Vietnam. The corruption, the harsh methods of repression, the volatile internal power struggles between government leaders, and the hard-line stance taken by South Vietnam presidents in the early years of their existence, primarily before the arrival of American Marines in March 1965, all suggest that the South Vietnamese were clearly not ready for efficient and honest self-government.[11] An alternative analysis would be to compare the occupation and reconstruction of Germany and Japan. It is true that both nations were in hulking ruins after the Second World War. Their economies were shattered and their peoples broken. However, self-government and capitalist principles were certainly not foreign to them. A massive economic reconstruction effort was conducted by the Americans in Germany, Japan and elsewhere in Europe. The results were impressive and it showed that with the proper application, nation building can conclude with desired results. Thus by examining the identities of those who are on the receiving end of nation building, we can truly begin to understand the difficulties that accompany such an arduous task.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[1] Zimmermann, 198-99. The author notes that after Lincoln, the Cleveland administration possessed the most executive power until McKinley arrived in 1897.
[2] Modern theories on the real truth behind the sinking of the Maine has concluded that it was not an act of Spanish sabotage but an explosion caused in the boiler room of the ships bowels.
[3] This was an early twentieth century ideology which was born out of a Rudyard Kipling poem written in 1899. It extolled the virtues of nurturing and civilizing the uncivilized.
[4] Zimmermann, 402.
[5] Linn, The Philippine War, 323.
[6] Linn, The Philippine War, 323.
[7] Linn, The Philippine War, 327.
[8] Linn, The Philippine War, 327.
[9] The general theme of Taylors interpretation of the captured insurgent documents is that he portrays Filipinos as barbaric and wholly inept.
[10] McKinley: as shown, he sought to civilize the Filipinos and introduce them to benefits of democracy. Bush: his goal, as stated to the United Nations
[11] The Republic of South Vietnam: 1954-1975. George C. Herring notes that the South Vietnamese military officials often padded role calls and military benefit disbursements and simply pocketed the money. Ngo Dinh Diem, the Republics first president, enacted harsh measures of repression against minority sects such as the Cao Dai and Buddhists. Diem was ultimately assassinated by members of his own staff in a bloody coup in November 1963. The hard-line stance and reluctance to employ measures to stabilize the situation in South Vietnam by Diem and his immediate successors certainly did not improve the situation for the fledgling government.
Elihu Root is perhaps the most underrated American statesman in the history of the Republic. He entered service as the Secretary of War at a time when his country was undergoing tremendous changes both internally and externally. He was therefore responsible for managing the demanding responsibilities of the U.S. Armys dual-task in the Philippines, to pacify first and then to rebuild. Once the hostilities between the Americans and Filipinos broke out, Root took a clear and decisive approach to the insurgency. He felt that the best way to handle the issue was to squash it completely. He felt that self-government for the Filipinos was a gradual process and he stood by this stance even after receiving a good deal of criticism from his critics. He did, however, see a need for a swift transition from military to civil governance. Roots greatest legacy in the Philippines is most definitely the economic and industrial improvements that he initiated in the U.S. Congress. He saw the need to develop both the Filipino bureaucracy and its industrial and commercial infrastructure and he aggressively pursued congressional legislation to secure it. It should also be noted that Root dealt deftly with the Vatican while he attempted to broker the transfer of the friars lands in the Philippines. This was clearly a hot-button issue for many in the U.S. If there was a negative to Roots handlings during the Philippine War, it was the cover-up of the atrocities being committed by U.S. troops in Samar. It resulted in an embarrassing moment for Root and the Roosevelt administration. Despite this shortcoming, it is clear that the actions of Elihu Root during the Philippine War deserve great attention and detail and that there are many good examples that can be learned from by historians who wish to determine the arduous task of nation building.
Theodore Roosevelt maintained William McKinleys program of benevolent assimilation in the Philippines. Roosevelts best trait during this affair may have been his progressive attitude that he so often professed. He firmly believed in the notion that it was a duty to civilize and he often used words such as patience, strength, and steadfast resolution. His progressiveness is seen is his willingness to grant an experimental native legislature so long as caution and moderation accompanied it. It is interesting to note that Roosevelt continually cautioned that the moral and industrial endeavors of the Filipinos should take precedence over their aspiring self-governing ambitions. Like Root, Roosevelts image was blemished a bit by the cover-up of the atrocities committed by U.S. troops but in the end, his legacy in the Philippine Islands is that of a firm but progressive visionary who affirmed Americas newest international responsibility: to civilize.
The roles of the Unites States military in the Philippine War was a difficult, two-pronged responsibility to pacify and then rebuild while maintaining the general peace. Despite underestimating local desires for independence, the U.S. military in the Philippines was a great success. The policy of attraction that the Americans espoused in the Philippines included but was not limited to a concerted commitment to schools, roads, municipal government, health care, and sanitation.[5] The United States military was successful in the Philippines primarily because they adhered to a coherent pacification policy that balanced conciliation with repression. Thus the judicious mixture of carrot and stick was applied.[6] It is what Prof. Linn describes as the most successful counter-insurgency campaign in U.S. history.[7] For that reason, there are many lessons to be learned from this. Despite these impressive final results, the Americans faced a bevy of problems in the Philippines. The considerable difficulties of pacifying and reconstructing demands that experienced and professional soldiers, officers and commanders were of the utmost necessity. Linn notes that even while engaged in combat operations, soldiers built schools and sanitation systems, roads, bridges, and brought to many a village the first law and the first real peace it had known in years.[8] The varying degrees of resistance that the military faced throughout the archipelago demanded an improvisational approach and regional commanders needed to be able to act freely and quickly instead of waiting for orders, submitting to alternative methods, or even doing nothing at all. Most commanders performed brilliantly in this arena. It was also shown how the path of destruction that followed the American troops in the Philippines can have very grave circumstances. Not only was famine, disease, and starvation a real possibility in many parts, the collateral damage and subsequent reconstruction also greatly burdened the workload of the occupying Americans. This, as shown in the Philippines, results in desperation of the enemy which in turn, opens the door for a bitter, partisan, guerrilla war in which reprisals become more and more frequent. However, men such as Galloping Jim Parker showed a keen knack for overcoming the cultural differences that come attached with occupying a foreign land. His methods of carrot and stick included social events such as church masses and bailes in an effort to win the hearts and minds of the Filipino people. The humility and magnanimity that Parker exuded when he dealt with the inhabitants certainly went a long way and it is clear that he put the stereotypical ethnic biases of the era to the side in order to accomplish his goals. In sum, it can be said that the U.S. militarys responsibilities in the Philippines were immense. They accomplished these tasks by being able to adapt to the situations as they developed and by doing so, allowed most of the military commanders the opportunity to showcase the benefits of benevolent assimilation.
The evidence put forth in this thesis suggests that the Filipinos were clearly not ready to govern themselves in an efficient manner during what Achútegui and Bernad consider the great historical event of Filipino history, The Philippine Revolution 1896-1901. However, it is unfortunate that Aguinaldo and his fellow revolutionaries have been judged through the scope of rebellion, war, and insurgency. One must ask whether Aguinaldo and the First Philippine Republic may have flourished or, at the very least, had been able to stabilize the state of affairs that by many accounts was shown to have spiraled out of control. Among the accomplishments of Aguinaldos Republic was a modern constitution, a legislative branch with elected representatives, provincial governments, its own schools, newspapers, post offices and stamps, and most important of all, a national army. It should be noted that Aguinaldos short-lived Philippine Republic was the first ever natively inspired democracy in Asia. Aguinaldo and his men were also the first Asian nation to openly revolt against their European colonizers and in the process, evicted them once and for all; albeit under unusual circumstances. Thus their identity from an historical viewpoint is very unique.
If there was a barometer or a report card of sorts in which Aguinaldo and the men that surrounded him could be calculated or graded on their actual capacities to govern themselves in an efficient and democratic manner, theyd have performed quite poorly. The harsh methods employed by Bonifacio, the violence, and the wedge that he drove between the lower and upper class Filipinos suggests that serious social problems existed in the Philippines at this time. This undoubtedly made Aguinaldos task of governing terribly difficult. It is also unfortunate that he and his men were dealt with in such a duplicitous manner by the Americans. His failure to secure official diplomatic recognition was the first sign that the Republic was doomed. Of course, this was not entirely Aguinaldos fault. The American consuls in Hong Kong were discussing arms deals and independence with the exiled rebels while the military brass and the McKinley administration plotted their imperialistic ambitions in the Islands. The capturing of Manila by the American essentially sealed the fate of the Republic. Had the rebels controlled the old city prior to the American arrival, Aguinaldo and the Army of Liberation could have made matters much more complicated for the Gen. Merritt and the 8th Corps. The most alarming deficiency of Aguinaldos government was most definitely the corrupt and delinquent tax scheme. The irregularities and dishonesty associated with the collection of taxes was devastating for the fledgling republic. While Carlos Quirino may claim that John R.M. Taylors Philippine Insurrection Against the United States is biased, which to some extents it is.[9] However, numbers do not lie. 896,074.58 pesos, or forty-three percent of all tax revenue received by the insurgent government within the critical months of late 1898 and early 1899 was not allocated to what it should have been; namely, the trust fund in the interests of the nation. Where did this money go? Was it applied to the national cause and not reported as such? It is reasonable to assume that much of the money was simply pocketed by those who collected and received it. These tendencies clearly display an inability to properly govern. In conclusion, it can be said that while the Filipinos seemed to lack the ability to properly govern themselves, they certainly possessed a unique identity in that they were indeed the first recipient of this new American export called democracy.
Considering this, there are many lessons to be learned from the Philippine-American War. For starters, it is obvious that any American president needs to thoroughly think through their course of actions. A clear and concise plan of entrance and exit is needed. Exporting our lofty ideals of democracy abroad to peoples who are not ready to sufficiently operate self-government comes with a very heavy price tag. The costs in blood and treasure are immeasurable. Each and every American death in combat is a serious loss. By seeking the whole and complete validation of the people, William McKinley was chasing after what President George W. Bush sought from the United Nations prior to the Second Gulf War: validation to carry out the administrations ambitions. In a truly eerie similarity, both espoused the virtues and morals of planting democracy in areas of the world which were unfamiliar to it.[10] This, in a nutshell, is potentially very dangerous as well as a bit contradictory. After all, one of the principle pillars in American democracy is the consent of the governed clause which states that no government shall be enacted that is not of the people and for the people. As a result, what arises is the question of imposing our morals and beliefs upon others with out the direct consent of the people. Is it an American duty to see that all of the oppressed and less-fortunate peoples of the world be fitted with the freedoms and the virtuous ideals of democracy? In a post-Cold War era, the United States is clearly the lone super power. However, does this give the United States a license to export democracy? Indeed, these are valid questions to ask. Another set of similarities that exists is the likenesses of the cover-up of the atrocities in Samar by the Roosevelt administration and the abuses doled out by the American soldiers at one of Saddam Husseins most infamous torture chambers, the prison at Abu Ghraib. A closer look at these similarities suggests that in order to be most effective in nation building, a disciplined, professional, and well-trained military is needed in order to carry out this unbelievably difficult task of winning the hearts and minds of many of whom consider the Americans to be invaders. Thus this judicious mixture of carrot and stick needs to be conducted by a military of the utmost professionalism, pro-activism, creativity, and magnanimity. By examining the identities and character of those who are on the receiving end of benevolent assimilation, we can begin to determine the capacities of those who are either just beginning self-government or will eventually be responsible for self-government. An excellent comparison is the situation that the United States faced in the Republic of South Vietnam. The corruption, the harsh methods of repression, the volatile internal power struggles between government leaders, and the hard-line stance taken by South Vietnam presidents in the early years of their existence, primarily before the arrival of American Marines in March 1965, all suggest that the South Vietnamese were clearly not ready for efficient and honest self-government.[11] An alternative analysis would be to compare the occupation and reconstruction of Germany and Japan. It is true that both nations were in hulking ruins after the Second World War. Their economies were shattered and their peoples broken. However, self-government and capitalist principles were certainly not foreign to them. A massive economic reconstruction effort was conducted by the Americans in Germany, Japan and elsewhere in Europe. The results were impressive and it showed that with the proper application, nation building can conclude with desired results. Thus by examining the identities of those who are on the receiving end of nation building, we can truly begin to understand the difficulties that accompany such an arduous task.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[1] Zimmermann, 198-99. The author notes that after Lincoln, the Cleveland administration possessed the most executive power until McKinley arrived in 1897.
[2] Modern theories on the real truth behind the sinking of the Maine has concluded that it was not an act of Spanish sabotage but an explosion caused in the boiler room of the ships bowels.
[3] This was an early twentieth century ideology which was born out of a Rudyard Kipling poem written in 1899. It extolled the virtues of nurturing and civilizing the uncivilized.
[4] Zimmermann, 402.
[5] Linn, The Philippine War, 323.
[6] Linn, The Philippine War, 323.
[7] Linn, The Philippine War, 327.
[8] Linn, The Philippine War, 327.
[9] The general theme of Taylors interpretation of the captured insurgent documents is that he portrays Filipinos as barbaric and wholly inept.
[10] McKinley: as shown, he sought to civilize the Filipinos and introduce them to benefits of democracy. Bush: his goal, as stated to the United Nations
[11] The Republic of South Vietnam: 1954-1975. George C. Herring notes that the South Vietnamese military officials often padded role calls and military benefit disbursements and simply pocketed the money. Ngo Dinh Diem, the Republics first president, enacted harsh measures of repression against minority sects such as the Cao Dai and Buddhists. Diem was ultimately assassinated by members of his own staff in a bloody coup in November 1963. The hard-line stance and reluctance to employ measures to stabilize the situation in South Vietnam by Diem and his immediate successors certainly did not improve the situation for the fledgling government.
Adler17
Prussian Feldmarschall
Good summary. 
However a word to Bush, although off topic a bit: In this government there is no Elihu Root with enough influence. There is no Jim Parker in the Iraq. In contrast due to the questionable interpretation of the constitution Bush himself is a problem of pacification. In contrast to the atrocities committed then, I do not doubt that most of the crimes made at Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo are ordered from very high above. I would not be surprised if Bush himself had to do with that! Also the situation in Germany and Japan were both also different as here no colonized people were but states which had a functional law system and democracy before the dictatorship of a certain Austrian resp. some officers after the world economy crise. However it is the best example to make a caomparison as all historical comparisons are faulty in some way.
Adler
However a word to Bush, although off topic a bit: In this government there is no Elihu Root with enough influence. There is no Jim Parker in the Iraq. In contrast due to the questionable interpretation of the constitution Bush himself is a problem of pacification. In contrast to the atrocities committed then, I do not doubt that most of the crimes made at Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo are ordered from very high above. I would not be surprised if Bush himself had to do with that! Also the situation in Germany and Japan were both also different as here no colonized people were but states which had a functional law system and democracy before the dictatorship of a certain Austrian resp. some officers after the world economy crise. However it is the best example to make a caomparison as all historical comparisons are faulty in some way.
Adler
El Justo
Deity
thanks mate 
however, i bet there will indeed be a "James Parker of Iraq". we just don't know of him yet. although i agree that no comparison is flawless. it's just that there are similarities that should, at the least, be analyzed.
agreed that there is no Elihu Root in the Bush Admin. his equivelant would be Rummsfeld and i don't think that he can be favorably compared to the former. as a matter of fact, i'm surprised Rummy has even lasted as long as he has.
as for the attrocities...yea...it is very likely that the attrocities committed in the P.I. weren't authorized from high up. however, i have doubts that the Bush Admin orderer the Abu Graib torturing. to be honest, i would think that they were extremely peesed off over it as it did a lot of damage (from a PR angle). Guantanimo is another story althogether i reckon as W seems to have has his finger on the pulse of that hot-button issue.
i agree about your Germany and Japan assessments. however, actual methods of civic reconstruction are transferable i think (from an engineering and man power perspective). the existing infrastructure though definitely sped up the time tables.
however, i bet there will indeed be a "James Parker of Iraq". we just don't know of him yet. although i agree that no comparison is flawless. it's just that there are similarities that should, at the least, be analyzed.
agreed that there is no Elihu Root in the Bush Admin. his equivelant would be Rummsfeld and i don't think that he can be favorably compared to the former. as a matter of fact, i'm surprised Rummy has even lasted as long as he has.
as for the attrocities...yea...it is very likely that the attrocities committed in the P.I. weren't authorized from high up. however, i have doubts that the Bush Admin orderer the Abu Graib torturing. to be honest, i would think that they were extremely peesed off over it as it did a lot of damage (from a PR angle). Guantanimo is another story althogether i reckon as W seems to have has his finger on the pulse of that hot-button issue.
i agree about your Germany and Japan assessments. however, actual methods of civic reconstruction are transferable i think (from an engineering and man power perspective). the existing infrastructure though definitely sped up the time tables.
El Justo
Deity
lastly - here is a link to the civ3conquests scenario for this topic:
http://forums.civfanatics.com/showthread.php?t=131400
it's a pretty neat play and much different (and smaller) than all of my other works.
http://forums.civfanatics.com/showthread.php?t=131400
it's a pretty neat play and much different (and smaller) than all of my other works.
Dann
Green bug
Read the conclusion only today. Thank you El Justo for the excellent series of works.
I found this particularly interesting:
In contrast I think Sun Yat Sen's revolution in China succeeded because he was able to get on good terms with the foreign powers before anything else. He was Christian, he had cut his queue and dressed in suits (remarkable for a Chinese because it was then illegal, nothing much for a Filipino), and he was against monarchic rule and for democracy. To him and his fellow revolutionaries of the time, the Japanese, the Americans and the Europeans were friends, and bailed them out of trouble more than once. His influence was probably what prevented an outright partition of China ala Africa after the fall of the Qing, which could have happened if it were replaced by just another dynasty which the colonial powers would have no need to respect.
I found this particularly interesting:
IMO aside from the revolutionaries' own governing deficiencies, another problem was the timing itself. The late 19th century - early 20th century was a world totally different from today. You do not do a regime change without some colonial power hovering nearby waiting to pounce, much moreso if said transfer of power involves kicking out a weakened colonial power. Even prior to the outbreak of the revolution, Rizal and his fellow reformists like Juan Luna, Graciano Lopez Jaina etc. were doing the rounds in Europe for decades, pushing ONLY for reform, not even independence and yet being ignored by everyone. The general thinking then among those with power is: "WTH should anyone care about the desires of some little brown/yellow/black/colored people?"El Justo said:
In contrast I think Sun Yat Sen's revolution in China succeeded because he was able to get on good terms with the foreign powers before anything else. He was Christian, he had cut his queue and dressed in suits (remarkable for a Chinese because it was then illegal, nothing much for a Filipino), and he was against monarchic rule and for democracy. To him and his fellow revolutionaries of the time, the Japanese, the Americans and the Europeans were friends, and bailed them out of trouble more than once. His influence was probably what prevented an outright partition of China ala Africa after the fall of the Qing, which could have happened if it were replaced by just another dynasty which the colonial powers would have no need to respect.
7ronin
海軍少佐
My thanks also, El J (with appreciation to Dann and Adler17 for their insightful comments).
El Justo
Deity
thanks guys 
Dann:
no doubt the Yanks fleeced Aguinaldo and led him to believe (initially at least - the ambassadors and Dewey) that Aguinaldo and the Republic had a future.
i remember reading one passage about the First Battle of Manila against the Spanish hold-outs in May 1898. the Filipinos had already been dug in for some time around the outskirts of the city and when the Americans came in, they wanted to occupy some of these advantageous positions to lauch assaults from. however, since Aguinaldo and his troops occupied these spots, the Americans offered Aguinaldo several pieces of artillery in exchange for abandoning some of these locales. Aguinaldo accepted and vacated these positions. however, the American arty pieces were never sent over in return.
the bottom line is that the US most definitely strung Aguinaldo et als along for the opening rounds of the conflict between Spain and the US.
i am glad to see that Aguinbaldo is remembered well in the P.I. (as he should be imo).
a few other notes on Aguinaldo (to the non-native Filipino
)
he was chastised by many after his alleged cooperation w/ the Japanese occupiers during WW2. it is imo that he was literally held at gunpoint and forced to cooperate. he took a lot of flak for that one though (undeservadly so imo).
i think i noted it in a footnote along the way but Aguinaldo was actually given back the sword that was pictured in some many photos; it was taken from him after he was captured in '01 by Funston and the Macabebes. iirc, there was a ceremony where official US State Dept officials gave the sabre back to Aguinaldo. this was in the early 1960s i reckon...just before his death.
Dann:
one last thing - how are the Macabebes regarded today in connection w/ Philippine history? i'm curious to find out how Filipinos feel about his...
Dann:
no doubt the Yanks fleeced Aguinaldo and led him to believe (initially at least - the ambassadors and Dewey) that Aguinaldo and the Republic had a future.
i remember reading one passage about the First Battle of Manila against the Spanish hold-outs in May 1898. the Filipinos had already been dug in for some time around the outskirts of the city and when the Americans came in, they wanted to occupy some of these advantageous positions to lauch assaults from. however, since Aguinaldo and his troops occupied these spots, the Americans offered Aguinaldo several pieces of artillery in exchange for abandoning some of these locales. Aguinaldo accepted and vacated these positions. however, the American arty pieces were never sent over in return.
the bottom line is that the US most definitely strung Aguinaldo et als along for the opening rounds of the conflict between Spain and the US.
i am glad to see that Aguinbaldo is remembered well in the P.I. (as he should be imo).
a few other notes on Aguinaldo (to the non-native Filipino
)he was chastised by many after his alleged cooperation w/ the Japanese occupiers during WW2. it is imo that he was literally held at gunpoint and forced to cooperate. he took a lot of flak for that one though (undeservadly so imo).
i think i noted it in a footnote along the way but Aguinaldo was actually given back the sword that was pictured in some many photos; it was taken from him after he was captured in '01 by Funston and the Macabebes. iirc, there was a ceremony where official US State Dept officials gave the sabre back to Aguinaldo. this was in the early 1960s i reckon...just before his death.
Dann:
one last thing - how are the Macabebes regarded today in connection w/ Philippine history? i'm curious to find out how Filipinos feel about his...
Dann
Green bug
The Japanese forced a lot of people to cooperate during WW2. Anyone who refused was shot, including the then Chief Justice Abad Santos. Others like Jose Laurel et al cooperated and served as a buffer between the Japanese overlords and the people, possibly saving quite a lot more necks that would have been lost had the kempeitai been allowed to rule the place directly. People shouldn't blame Aguinaldo for that. Besides, how old was he by then?El Justo said:...a few other notes on Aguinaldo (to the non-native Filipino
he was chastised by many after his alleged cooperation w/ the Japanese occupiers during WW2. it is imo that he was literally held at gunpoint and forced to cooperate. he took a lot of flak for that one though (undeservadly so imo)....
Traitorous scum, of course.El Justo said:
Nah, just kidding. Filipinos are generally uninterested in history. Even their own. 
What captures their attention is MTV, showbiz gossip and the NBA. Ask them about Macabebe and some might be able to reply: "It's a place in Pampanga." 
Really. One of the usual phrases Filipinos use to dismiss anything as passe and antiquated is: "Panahon pa ni Jose Rizal yan." Rough translation: "That already belongs to the dustbins of history. Not of interest to us."
El Justo
Deity
thanks Dann.
i reckon Aguinaldo was in his 70s when the Japanese occupied the Islands.
heh...Filipino 'yoots ain't no different from American ones!
that's an interesting quoute you posted there. thanks for sharing!
i reckon Aguinaldo was in his 70s when the Japanese occupied the Islands.
heh...Filipino 'yoots ain't no different from American ones!
that's an interesting quoute you posted there. thanks for sharing!
Quasar1011
King of Sylvania
Good read, El Justo! 
Including the father of my fiancé. She is Mexican-Filipina.7ronin said:
El Justo
Deity
hey thanksQuasar1011 said:Good read, El Justo!
Including the father of my fiancé. She is Mexican-Filipina.
it's an interesting topic for sure.
7ronin
海軍少佐
El Justo
Deity
that's a sharp looking painting
is that the famous colt .45?
is that the famous colt .45?
7ronin
海軍少佐
You are correct sir! Notice also that some of the Moros are wearing steel armor.
I guess I ought to wake up and do some AoI work.
Notice also that some of the Moros are wearing steel armor.I guess I ought to wake up and do some AoI work.
Troop E, 9th Cavalry at the Presidio in San Francisco before shipping out to the Philippines, 1900. if you close enough, you'll notice that the entire troop is African American (save the officers). these soldiers fought bravely in most instances depsite experiencing tremendous racism from their own commrades. i remember reading some diary entries by on e of the soldiers from Troop E and he wondered why he should try to do the Army's job of providing civic reconstruction to a foreign peoples when African Americans do not recieve it state-side. this is a great point i reckon...
An interesting note in the insurrection is David Fagen, a black infantryman from the 24th infantry division that defected to the Phillipino side, was quickly promoted by the phillipinos, and did quite a bit of damage to the Americans
http://www.blackpast.org/?q=aaw/fagen-david-1875
El Justo
Deity
interesting. thanks for sharing that.
raigainousa
Stelthy Jet
- Joined
- Nov 22, 2007
- Messages
- 99
Spoiler :
Aglipayan Church included as result of spanish mistreatment. Filipino here too.
David Fagen, I presume is the only american who did that.
El Justo
Deity
there were others for sure. however, due to the racial climate in the US at the time, African Americans often felt disenfranchised, especially when carrying out the so-called "white man's burden". so it is not hard to imagine why this occurred.
the americans did do some good in the P.I. with regard to the Church. Taft and Root stripped the friars of their lands and redistributed them to the tenants and others. now, this can be seen as eminent domain gone wild...or as a realistic and somewhat altruistic attempt to award these tenants and peasants a few acres of land for their own. the friars, it should be noted, had an absolute grip on these lands for centuries...and it perpetuated the drastic class divisions on the islands. so this "defrocking" was a good thing that the Spanish certainly would never had done had they not lost them. also, Taft himself went to the Vatican to broker the deal. and this was at the time a dicey political move considering the anti-catholic sentiment in the US at the turn of the 20th century.
the americans did do some good in the P.I. with regard to the Church. Taft and Root stripped the friars of their lands and redistributed them to the tenants and others. now, this can be seen as eminent domain gone wild...or as a realistic and somewhat altruistic attempt to award these tenants and peasants a few acres of land for their own. the friars, it should be noted, had an absolute grip on these lands for centuries...and it perpetuated the drastic class divisions on the islands. so this "defrocking" was a good thing that the Spanish certainly would never had done had they not lost them. also, Taft himself went to the Vatican to broker the deal. and this was at the time a dicey political move considering the anti-catholic sentiment in the US at the turn of the 20th century.
Sharwood
Rich, doctor nephew
Wow, big necro and most everyone is still around.
I studied this recently for an essay on American imperialism around the Spanish-American War. Wish I'd had this to reference then, although my tutor probably wouldn't have been impressed with a video-games forum as a source. Good read.
I studied this recently for an essay on American imperialism around the Spanish-American War. Wish I'd had this to reference then, although my tutor probably wouldn't have been impressed with a video-games forum as a source. Good read.
