Ask A Red V: The Five-Year Plan

Now that you're really studying it outside of American perspectives, what are some of the theories of when the Soviet Union started to really not make much sense anymore? When did it lose any realistic opportunity at the emancipation it was originally designed to seek?
 
'Bosses', as you call them don't have 'personal profit' (and if they do it's economically speaking irrelevant): profit is where investment comes from. Reducing profit quite literally means investment reduction (again, there may be other causes for this) - unless increased costs are calculated in the price. Obviously, this isn't always possible, since not all products have an elastic demand. (As for labour costs being the main factor in production costs: this applies to developed countries, i.e. countries where wages tend to be relatively high.)

Investment by profit is only one way grow an economy so I'm going to suggest you open a thread on that very topic and we can debate it. But because it's an entirely contestable point that requires a discussion of terminology, it can't fairly be used to force a Marxism or, at the very least, modern Marxianism to respond to justify itself.

This is in part simply because the two don't even contradict even if it true that growth has to be driven by profit. Because profits as revenue above-cost can be invested in a communistic manner, i.e. the communal negotiation of all people (or at least those responsible, someone who knows more fill me in) people for the positive (i.e. create more economic growth) welfare of the people. Additionally endogenous growth theory by Paul Romer does mathematically have a point in which you fully mechanize the work force and switch the remaining productive labor to ideas labor (school and leisure thinking and tinkering for life) economic growth becomes infinite at t-time, showing how in that model as well, you still have a growth feature.

The above does not say that communism would support economic growth, only that there's enough to debate

So if you want to argue outside what's needed to prove Marxianism.

Interestingly, the real argument against the theory of equilibrating, workers-vs-bosses dichotomy is not from appealing to the very classical/neoclassical growth models you were purporting but that Marxism is equipped to handle, but from Maynard Keynes. Cheezy (and your argument too) assumes that there's as much demand as there is maximum or near maximum supply. But there's no inflation inherently at or above everyone's real wages rising. If there was, we couldn't have had either those periods of huge wage growth nor would we have to deal with austerity as a negative.


So I wanted to make that all clear that these things aren't really debated anymore, but if you want to reassert your claims, you've got too much at stake to have such a discussion merely to be a tangent in the Ask A Red thread because your main argument is against Keynes, which is another big topic entirely.
 
Now that you're really studying it outside of American perspectives, what are some of the theories of when the Soviet Union started to really not make much sense anymore? When did it lose any realistic opportunity at the emancipation it was originally designed to seek?

I'm not sure entirely what you mean. Do you mean when was the "point of no return" for failing to build socialism, or to able to continue moving toward communism, or something else? Do you want this answer on the level of theory, or on the level of practicality? Because Marxist-Leninists, aka, official Soviet ideologues, try to combine the two and pretend that the Soviet Union's actions were themselves the embodiment of Marxist-Leninist Theory in action. That's why they're so incredibly defensive: because a fault in Soviet action means a fracture in the coherency of their theory, and if the Soviet Union was the truest embodiment of Marxist theory as inherited by Lenin, then suggesting that it had faults and problems, or that Lenin or Stalin was wrong, is itself an anti-communist statement.
 
I'm not sure entirely what you mean. Do you mean when was the "point of no return" for failing to build socialism, or to able to continue moving toward communism, or something else? Do you want this answer on the level of theory, or on the level of practicality? Because Marxist-Leninists, aka, official Soviet ideologues, try to combine the two and pretend that the Soviet Union's actions were themselves the embodiment of Marxist-Leninist Theory in action. That's why they're so incredibly defensive: because a fault in Soviet action means a fracture in the coherency of their theory, and if the Soviet Union was the truest embodiment of Marxist theory as inherited by Lenin, then suggesting that it had faults and problems, or that Lenin or Stalin was wrong, is itself an anti-communist statement.

Let's divorce the historical unfolding from the potentials of the theory, and say that a universal, communist emancipation of a mechanized, maximal leisure-time system of Marxist communism is a possible outcome of that Marxist-Leninist theory of revolution.

Now, obviously it didn't happen. So if it was possible, there had to have been a turning point, even if it was before the founding of the USSR (like say the point was during the revolution). Given the early history of the USSR, of which I know little, I find it uncompelling that the USSR as a rule couldn't have achieved some realized kind of emancipatory system by 2013 if they had gone the way of more freedom and less violence at some point earlier on, but still within Soviet values.

What do you think? And if it was ever possible, when did it stop being possible and why?
 
Let's divorce the historical unfolding from the potentials of the theory, and say that a universal, communist emancipation of a mechanized, maximal leisure-time system of Marxist communism is a possible outcome of that Marxist-Leninist theory of revolution.

Now, obviously it didn't happen. So if it was possible, there had to have been a turning point, even if it was before the founding of the USSR (like say the point was during the revolution). Given the early history of the USSR, of which I know little, I find it uncompelling that the USSR as a rule couldn't have achieved some realized kind of emancipatory system by 2013 if they had gone the way of more freedom and less violence at some point earlier on, but still within Soviet values.

What do you think? And if it was ever possible, when did it stop being possible and why?

The cliched answer is that the Wright Brothers' first flight was 90 seconds long, but that didn't stop air travel from changing the world later. Which is not to say that I think this answer is wrong, though.

I think it's a mistake to look for one single "turning point" or "point of no return," but there are many things which, in retrospect, led to the Soviet collapse, such as korenizatsiya (the nationalities policy).

In my opinion, there were many things which collectively acted to eventually undo, or put in a bad situation, the Soviet Union. You could point to the Ban on Factionalism, which stems from a particularly nasty fight between Trotsky and Lenin in 1920-21 during the Trade Union Debate, and which made sense at the time, but which was clearly only a temporary measure but was kept in place until 1989, effectively ending debate in politics. One candidate per office, and both elected and appointed people were vetted for Party credentials (nomenklatura, when speaking of bureaucratic positions). The general shutting out of the people from everyday decision-making destroyed any capacity for a credible civil society, and that which did form was never Soviet in form because of this. In fact, paired with the nationalities policy, it very often occurred around ethnically national lines, which is what wound up tearing the country apart in the end. The Nagorno-Karabakh and Georgian conflicts with Abkhazia and Ossetia in the late 80s-1990 represent the thorough failure of this policy.

I think, in the end, this was the biggest problem. When the structure began to crumble, there was no one who cared enough to rush to its defense. They were all looking elsewhere, either to the West, or inward to their own nationalities. Most of the revolutions in Central and Eastern Europe weren't even pro-Western ideologically, there were just angrily directed at the present regime. In a way, that made them a blank slate which the West was able to readily impose a complete alternative ideology and programme onto, which is why most non-communist-majority governments in that region started out as negotiated power-sharing arrangements and ended in lustration and economic shock-therapy.

Because there wasn't one single problem, there is also not one single solution. Vaguely, I would say that the Soviet government did not entirely understand, or at times even believe in, the path of its own professed programme. In many ways, this is entirely understandable as these were the first guys to actually be trying this stuff out. It was trial run in so many ways, and nearly all of it was improvised. I think the point that they really started having problems was when they lost sight of this fact, and started behaving as if This Was The Plan All Along. Until somewhere near the death of Stalin, the Soviet Union had a decidedly forward motion. For all the things that happened before 1953, it could still be argued that the USSR was closer to socialism each year than it had been the previous year. And more, the country knew where it was going and what it was doing. It had a mission which people, by and large, did actually believe in, even the non-political types like we have in the US, who repeat the platitudes about "freedom" being something the US is "good at." Yeah, they had that in the USSR as well. It was just a known thing in all of society, that this was the Soviet purpose: to build socialism and freedom for all working people. Things would be better in the future if we worked hard and sacrificed today. But after Stalin's death that became less and less the attitude, both in the leadership and in society. It had a brief but ultimately inept respite with Khrushchev, which was then snuffed out by Brezhnev's incredible talent for unimaginability. It was during this time that the classic tropes of "we pretend to work, and they pretend to pay us" and "we have more money but nothing to buy" came around. It was like Soviet society became a caricature of itself. As I've discussed before, if you give people nothing to care about, why should you be surprised when they stop caring? And the ultimate measure of any government's legitimacy is its capacity to engender in its constituency the attitude that the existing structures are the most appropriate ones for that society.

So as you said, the ultimate failure of the Soviet experiment to achieve its goals does not represent a failure of the idea, merely of this attempt at its implementation. We will learn from its failings, like the Wright Brothers, and our next aircraft will be much better. But it will still be an airplane, make no mistake.
 
Thank you for that summary. Very illuminating.

Do you think part of the problem was that most of the intellectual leaders have also been violent warriors? As in regardless of the necessity of violence in revolution, could the prominence of violent people whose power came from the highly authoritarian structure of the military, and prestige came from violent success.

Do you feel there's a more suited type of person or class of people who can voice or synthesize or lead etc a revolution than say another Lenin type?
 
I think the point that they really started having problems was when they lost sight of this fact, and started behaving as if This Was The Plan All Along.
In other words,

Originally posted by Rosa Luxemburg
The danger begins only when they make a virtue of necessity and want to freeze into a complete theoretical system all the tactics forced upon them by these fatal circumstances, and want to recommend them to the international proletariat as a model of socialist tactics. When they get in there own light in this way, and hide their genuine, unquestionable historical service under the bushel of false steps forced on them by necessity, they render a poor service to international socialism for the sake of which they have fought and suffered; for they want to place in its storehouse as new discoveries all the distortions prescribed in Russia by necessity and compulsion – in the last analysis only by-products of the bankruptcy of international socialism in the present world war.

?
 
Thank you for that summary. Very illuminating.

Do you think part of the problem was that most of the intellectual leaders have also been violent warriors? As in regardless of the necessity of violence in revolution, could the prominence of violent people whose power came from the highly authoritarian structure of the military, and prestige came from violent success.

No, I don't think that. If there were anything "violent" I would "fault" them on, it would be simply that they were products of a rather rough and unpolished Russian society. Such a society creates such people, no matter who is ruling, I don't think such people are brought to the Revolution. Statements like that risk characterizing communists or revolutionaries as inherently violent or power-seeking people, and I do not think that is true. Revolutions happen when the rulers cannot go on ruling in the old way, and the people cannot go on being ruled in the old way. Anyone can become a revolutionary in the right circumstances.

Do you feel there's a more suited type of person or class of people who can voice or synthesize or lead etc a revolution than say another Lenin type?

We could only hope for another type such as Lenin. The problem today is that everyone thinks they are Lenin.

In other words,



?

I don't read her statement as saying that. I think she is talking about excusing actions as being "necessary," regardless of the consequences or alternatives. The "you gotta do what you gotta do" attitude which refuses to make a moral stand. I don't entirely agree with her, but I understand where she is coming from. There is, perhaps, a moral event horizon, beyond which there is no longer an excuse for opportunism, but I don't think it is where Luxemburg is drawing it. She died well before I have any objections to Bolshevik actions.
 
No, I don't think that. If there were anything "violent" I would "fault" them on, it would be simply that they were products of a rather rough and unpolished Russian society. Such a society creates such people, no matter who is ruling, I don't think such people are brought to the Revolution. Statements like that risk characterizing communists or revolutionaries as inherently violent or power-seeking people, and I do not think that is true. Revolutions happen when the rulers cannot go on ruling in the old way, and the people cannot go on being ruled in the old way. Anyone can become a revolutionary in the right circumstances.



We could only hope for another type such as Lenin. The problem today is that everyone thinks they are Lenin.
Lenin thought he was Lenin, too, or that he was the revolutionary capable. Perhaps that's not actually an impediment but a prerequisite?

I find your answer that they were simply emblematic of the culture of their time and place compelling to suggest that they weren't any less suited necessarily than anyone else, but I don't see how it precludes or crowds out the possibility that because the revolution did happen to come from military leaders it was therefore biased towards oppression. (Or at least more oppression, enough or not to pass any tipping points, for that any specific case of revolution). But thank you for your knowledge.
 
What do you mean by "military leaders"? The leadership of the Russian Revolution didn't come from a military background (the White leadership did, though). Of course, the Civil War meant the militarization of the government, but that's independent of their personal characteristics.
 
What do you mean by "military leaders"? The leadership of the Russian Revolution didn't come from a military background (the White leadership did, though). Of course, the Civil War meant the militarization of the government, but that's independent of their personal characteristics.

Lenin and Stalin were commanding troops during wartime, both before they could be considered civilian heads of state.
 
Well, when you are faced with an armed enemy, you've got to militarize.
Remind me, BTW, when Lenin was directly involved in commanding troops during the war?
 
Well, when you are faced with an armed enemy, you've got to militarize.

I suppose but that's a different topic. :dunno: My interest is more about those whose success as revolutionaries was judged as a part of their success with violence, and implicitly since violence is the ultimate oppression, be ill-suited for leading liberation, and if Cheezy had explored that in his studies.

What people thought they needed to do to make the best of many goals of fighting Kaisers, Nazis, Tsars, etcm while also building a modern industrial state, a foundation for current and future emancipation, etc. was what they thought they needed to do. Obviously some things those specific folk did worked out (fighting off Hitler) and other things didn't (communism).

So it's not a smug judgment from across time, it's a question about the nature of circumstances and the people in them.
 
I don't think that violence and liberation are opposites. Violence against slave-owners - or a credible threat of it - is necessary to free the slaves, to use a well-worn example. Now, fetishization of violence is opposed to it, and you could make an argument that the Bolsheviks occasionally, in Luxemburg's words, made a virtue out of this necessity.

I don't think that violence fetishism was the chief factor in Russian revolution's degeneration (and I've got no doubt that it indeed degenerated).
 
@Cheezy: the Wright Brothers first flight was 12 seconds. Like me, they were from Dayton, Ohio.

In regards to my opinion on the USSR and its fall, let me repeat: it was a political problem and, as Cheezy said, no one cared enough to save it -- but there is much hope. Belarus is still socialist.
 
You made a factually correct statement, that rising wages can influence inflation. But it has nothing to do with my post at all.

Do you not understand how you just repeated my previous post?


Neither here nor there. This is a question and answer thread, and we will return to that format at this time.

Some of the answers are indeed neither here nor there. I'd like to see the quality upped somewhat.

Remind me, BTW, when Lenin was directly involved in commanding troops during the war?

He wasn't. Stalin and Trotzky were.

In regards to my opinion on the USSR and its fall, let me repeat: it was a political problem and, as Cheezy said, no one cared enough to save it -- but there is much hope. Belarus is still socialist.

The USSR was a political problem; can't argue with that.

But how is Byelarus socialist?
 
Lenin thought he was Lenin, too, or that he was the revolutionary capable. Perhaps that's not actually an impediment but a prerequisite?

No, Lenin specifically did not think he "was Lenin." By all accounts Lenin was a very unassuming and modest man, unconcerned with his image or his posterity. Lenin was exactly the sort of person a communist should be: someone who does their small part in the global proletarian struggle throughout history. Lenin didn't set out to change the world, he just took what came at him using the gifts that he had, and that happened to land him in a position of leadership.

Or in other words, Lenin was not thinking "I am the one who has to do this." When I say that everyone today thinks they are Lenin, it's because they all imagine themselves to be great leaders of unquestionable correctness, and if, like Lenin, they just wait it out, everyone will one day come around to seeing that they are right and their specific tendency will prevail above all others. There's no room for compromise or other opinions, and everyone must be the great leader.

The point isn't not to admire Lenin, or even look to him for an example when appropriate. The point is, though, that each person should just do what they can and not worry about power or fame, or even if their own specific theory is right or not, and just worry about what little things they can do to help educate, agitate, and organize the working class into defending their class interests, thinking collectively, and acting politically based on those two things. The leaders will rise to the top, and it will be the ones we deserve, not the ones who seek it. These emulators of Lenin make the same mistake of the Marxist-Leninist romantics: they imagine that all of history is an inevitability which need merely be emulated in order to be recreated, which is desirable because everything was perfect. The concepts of circumstance, of luck, of improvisation, these are alien to such people. The point isn't to emulate Lenin, the point is to understand what made Lenin be Lenin and not someone else. How he thought, why he chose one action over another, how he addressed certain situations and why. And finally, to understand that Lenin did what he was able to do because of circumstance. You can't transpose him onto any other situation and expect the same results. Put him in the USA today, and he would likely be near-useless, or at the most, nothing more than your average Party member.

I find it very telling that the final two chapters of To The Finland Station are called "Trotsky Identifies History with Himself" and "Lenin Identifies Himself with History." A perfect summary of the attitudes of these two men.

I find your answer that they were simply emblematic of the culture of their time and place compelling to suggest that they weren't any less suited necessarily than anyone else, but I don't see how it precludes or crowds out the possibility that because the revolution did happen to come from military leaders it was therefore biased towards oppression. (Or at least more oppression, enough or not to pass any tipping points, for that any specific case of revolution). But thank you for your knowledge.

I don't think any group from that era, even the liberal democratic parties, could have maintained a significantly less oppressive regime during that time. Not because "durr Russians are barbarians" but because of the very severe threats to any established government by other groups who resented that establishment. Communist power came first to Russia because of its unique mix of powerful class interests which collided there: both feudal as well as capitalist class struggles were at work simultaneously. This is why the emblem of the Communist Party there was a hammer and sickle: the party represented the alliance of the workers and peasants against all oppressors: capitalists, barons, and tsars. The same social weakness which allowed Bolshevik power in the first place was also the weakness that any subsequent government would have to face and rectify.

I suppose but that's a different topic. :dunno: My interest is more about those whose success as revolutionaries was judged as a part of their success with violence, and implicitly since violence is the ultimate oppression, be ill-suited for leading liberation, and if Cheezy had explored that in his studies.

Violence is necessary when facing a violent system. Pacifism may sound warm and morally upright, but it only works if your enemy has a conscience.

As I said, by the time Luxemburg died I had no complaints about Bolshevik behavior. Violence was used judiciously, where and when it became appropriate, and never before, but it was used. And I'm okay with that, because allowing the anti-capitalist revolution to fail where one could have prevented that outcome is a worse crime, in my opinion. It is not one arrived at without significant contemplation.

What people thought they needed to do to make the best of many goals of fighting Kaisers, Nazis, Tsars, etc while also building a modern industrial state, a foundation for current and future emancipation, etc. was what they thought they needed to do. Obviously some things those specific folk did worked out (fighting off Hitler) and other things didn't (communism).

So it's not a smug judgment from across time, it's a question about the nature of circumstances and the people in them.

I don't see it as a statement about anything but history itself. They tried and failed, as you said, because of historical circumstances. I would say view it as an experiment, but that would ignore the fact that each historical situation is unique, as will future ones be. You cannot look at an individual, or even a group of examples, and say that this is conclusive proof that something does or does not work, because there are infinite variables in each situation as to make them unreproducible. That is why Marxism ejected utopianism in favor of a coherent and systematic theory: a social science. It allows us to understand things on a theoretical level and reapply lessons to understand new circumstances as well as old ones.
 
Perhaps you are referring to Lukashenkism?

Some tidbits about Belorus's 4 term president:

- Lukashenko campaigned as an independent on a populist platform of "defeat the mafia against the Conspiracy of New World Order and Zionism" for his 1st term as president;

- Lukashenko used his 1st term to promote a referendum, following which the constitution that was amended by Lukashenko was accepted and the one amended by the Supreme Soviet was voided. The new document dramatically increased Lukashenko's power. His decrees now had the force of law, and he also acquired near-total control over government spending. For all intents and purposes, it transformed Lukashenko's presidency into a legal dictatorship;

- Lukashenko then used his 2nd term for a referendum to eliminate presidential term limits. Previously, Lukashenko had been limited to two terms and thus would have been constitutionally required to step down after the presidential elections in 2006;

- by Lukashenko's 3rd term opposition candidacies for parliament were limited to a few, following Lukashenko's personal approval; surprsiringly, they won no seats at all;

- Lukashenko's 4th term was initiated by an election in which two presidential candidates were seriously beaten by police and several were arrested;

- in addtion to being president since 1994, Lukashenko is also president of the Belorus Olympic committee since 1997 (obviously because of his athletic abilities and outstanding career in sports).

But I'm sure by accusing Lukashenko of socialism you are referring to his economic policies.
 
Jeelen: this is Ask a Red. Start a "Where we discuss Lukashenkismo" Thread if you want to trash socialism.

I stand by what I say, regardless of what some bourgeois press apparatus wants to tell me what to believe.

And isn't that a common criticism of socialist governments? Telling people what they believe.

:nono:
 
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