Axemen or Masemen in real world: where they are used FOR REAL?

[pecheneg]

think this accounting for Roman success based on one weapon is likely somewhat reductive. Bret Devereaux' dissertation paper suggests the Romans decisively outweighed Carthage, and by extension their other main rivals in the Mediterranean basin, in terms of the amount of resources (most importantly the weight of worked metal) per man deployed.

It is precisely about the fact that the Romans could massively use very metal-intensive weapons as a "consumable", when for others every dagger could be valuable. At the same time, they did not invent pilum-like darts. The Roman preponderance in metallurgy is obvious and well-known - see, for example, descriptions of the then island of Elba as an "industrial hell". At the same time, their Hellenistic opponents experienced equally obvious problems - the "Greater Middle East" is not rich in either fuel or raw materials.
The question is how exactly they realized this advantage. And no, it wasn't the "countless horde with short swords" option.

 

[pecheneg]

o ascribe military success entirely to some weapons type is the usual mistake of amateurs and civilians. Rome seized and maintained an Empire because she had an army of very well trained, experienced soldiers led by a very well trained and experienced corps of leaders from the decurion leading a 'squad' of 8 men up to the Senior Centurion of the senior Cohort of the Legion.

Not reading anything is the most common mistake of amateurs.
Rome became the superpower of the Mediterranean before its army became professional. At the
same time, 1. it is darts that do not require high professional skills, which made it possible to effectively use the mass of militias and the demographic potential of Italy.
2. Rome was opposed by professional armies - mercenaries of Carthage, mercenaries and cleruhs (military settlers) of the Hellenistic East.
At the same time, the peak of Rome's success is precisely the era of its asymmetric superiority over the "military equipment" of its opponents. Provided with high per capita metal production. It was precisely because of the technical superiority that the antagonists of Rome tried to copy his style.
At the same time, their own "war machine" evolved in the same direction – the role of throwers (peltasts) began to grow even before the Macedonian conquests. By the time of the Roman conquests, the East already had its own type of heavy thrower (torakite), more similar to the classical legionnaire than the then Roman legionnaires themselves. However, the Hellenists simply did not have the Roman opportunity to throw tons of metal to the wind, with all the consequences that follow from this.
Meanwhile, the traditional Hellenistic pikemen-pedzetayr were just very vulnerable to remote attacks, and the "killing power" of a heavy dart is not too different from that of early firearms.

he original Roman military was a Greek-type phalanx

In an era when the Romans did not have such advantages and spearmen fought with spearmen, Rome was one of the many "gamers" of Italy.

The Empire fell because keeping 500,000 or more men

That is, you do not see the connection between the need to crush opponents at the expense of numbers and the loss of technical superiority over them at all?
Meanwhile 1. During the crisis of the 3rd century, the Roman economy suffered greatly and the same pilums became the weapons of the elite 2. Rome had to face heavy cavalry and advanced mounted riflemen on a huge part of its "front" (and it was no longer an extremely decentralized Parthia in a single copy); and the Germans evolved from outright savages into users of normal equipment.

 

[mitsho]

I do agree a lot that 700 years or more is a long long time! One tends to forget these basic numbers and other data when remembering history - at least the amateur kind of.

But that leads me to the question I had in mind for a long time:

How do we - or rather Civilization 7 or Humanind 2 - better frame the early game units than by their weapon? What can we name them instead of spearman/swordman/warrior? Apparently, it‘s more about organisational possibilty and logistics, but that just doesn‘t lend itself to a catchy naming convention. And if we take in ranged and mobile units - does it still make sense to have Archers and Chariots as separate Units?

I long for a better naming - but I fear we are stuck with that anachronistic idea as it‘s so set in our minds - kind of like the scaly dinosaurs (don‘t add me, I know it‘s more complicated than „they all have feathers now“).

 

[pecheneg]

late Empire

It is strange enough to explain the success of the Romans, referring to the period of degradation and collapse. It seemed to be about the era of hegemony

 

[Snowygerry]

I do agree a lot that 700 years or more is a long long time! One tends to forget these basic numbers and other data when remembering history - at least the amateur kind of.

But that leads me to the question I had in mind for a long time:

How do we - or rather Civilization 7 or Humanind 2 - better frame the early game units than by their weapon? What can we name them instead of spearman/swordman/warrior? Apparently, it‘s more about organisational possibilty and logistics, but that just doesn‘t lend itself to a catchy naming convention. And if we take in ranged and mobile units - does it still make sense to have Archers and Chariots as separate Units?

I've been playing the RI for CIV mod recently and they do it rather well by giving boni for unit types in a stack - thus an archer + swordman + spear is stronger than a single unit of macemen for example...

Coupled with the basic rock-paper-scissors relation of units already in the game this offers some interesting tactical possibilities - gone are the days of just parking an archer on a hill and forget about it, the AI will sneak up an exact counter and murder him

 

[Sarin]

Indeed, what many people don't understand is how different Roman system was from most of their enemies. What might surprise you that if you'd take an average legionary of late Republic or Empire and put him one on one against a classical hoplite, kleuruch thorakites (that's singular, plural is thorakitai), Celtic swordsman or even Thracian peltast or falx wielder, odds are the legionary would lose.
Most of the nations in Europe and around Mediterranean had some sort of system where a core of infantry would be drawn from a kind of warrior class whose members would be wealthy enough to be well fed, provide their own equipment and spend significant part of their lives training.for combat, but such class would be relatively low in numbers. These would be supported by cavalry, usually drawn from the nobility, and large number of troops drawn from lower class acting as skirmishers or spearmen. During most of the republic era, Rome had similar system, though they tended to let Socii (their Italic allies) handle the support roles. However, the constant wars were a huge drain on their manpower, which forced Rome to repeatedly lower the wealth limit for enlisting into the army, eventually having to supplement the gear that recruits couldn't afford from the treasury, or at times even from consuls' own pockets. Eventually the army was gradually reformed-all citizens could enlist for several years of full time service (as opposed to seasonal campaigning usual for the time period), which by that time encompassed all Italic people, the state provided relatively heavy and good quality equipment and all recruits went through extended training period, IIRC under ideal circumstances it was at least a year of combat drills and forced marching in full gear before a recruit would see combat. That also meant that many recruits were drawn from underfed lower classes and that one year was the only combat training they ever got before being thrown into combat.
As a result, average legionary wouldn't be as capable in single combat as the core troops of other nations, but they were more numerous, and they were better trained and equipped that the supporting troops. Roman tactics, based on missile exchange followed by rather defensive close quarters fighting, put less emphasis on individual combat prowess, and of course the long campaigning served to harden significant amount of troops into capable veterans.

 

[Angst]

To ascribe military success entirely to some weapons type is the usual mistake of amateurs and civilians. Rome seized and maintained an Empire because she had an army of very well trained, experienced soldiers led by a very well trained and experienced corps of leaders from the decurion leading a 'squad' of 8 men up to the Senior Centurion of the senior Cohort of the Legion.

Their weapons, in fact, kept changing. The original Roman military was a Greek-type phalanx 10 ranks deep (we know that because 'decurion' in fact translates as 'leader of 10' - they kept using the title even after the standard Roman rank became 8 men, just like modern armies still use the old French word for 'servant' to mean a Non-Commissioned Officer) armed with Hoplite-like spears. First the leading third, then two thirds, finally all of their heavy infantry were armed with swords, first long then short, then they added spears back (lanciarii), then they changed back to long swords, and finally the last infantry of the Empire carried long swords, a heavy wooden/metal trimmed shield and a long thrusting spear. They changed weapons and sizes of unit organizations to match conditions and enemies, but they were always well-trained and experienced men led by competent tactical leaders.

The Empire fell because keeping 500,000 or more men equipped and paid so that they could train and fight full-time was an enormous financial burden on a very primitive taxation system. Add the consequences of the Antonine and Cyprian Plagues that wiped out up to a third of the population twice within 150 years, and the Empire couldn't afford to pay for its army any more, and the army began to shrink to where it could no longer defend the long borders. Exeunt Alles

Also, logistics. Even with the primitive tax system. I remember someone noting that Rome could afford to lose battles harshly and still muster soldiers, while their opponents couldn't. This is what happened with Hannibal and Boudica. They won a number of victories that would have been crushing if not done against Rome, but when they lost one similarly crushing engagement, it lost the war.

EDIT: Lex said it better.

 

[H4run]

Also, logistics. Even with the primitive tax system. I remember someone noting that Rome could afford to lose battles harshly and still muster soldiers, while their opponents couldn't. This is what happened with Hannibal and Boudica. They won a number of victories that would have been crushing if not done against Rome, but when they lost one similarly crushing engagement, it lost the war.

EDIT: Lex said it better.

Kind a like what Ajid said also, isn't it? their advantage is more about manpower and recruitment pool, play in quantity than the quality, is the conclusion correct?

 

[Lexicus]

Rome became the superpower of the Mediterranean before its army became professional

I've also seen figures, don't remember where, possibly also from Devereaux, suggesting that even during much of the "citizen militia" period, the army was basically as good as professional because the average Roman man would have spent a really staggering amount of time on campaign. So I think there is something to @Boris Gudenuf's claim about the high level of military skill of the core of the Roman army (though I would point out that other powers also generally had some highly skilled professional-ish troops). On the other hand we know there are times when the experienced core of the Roman army was nearly wiped out and the Romans went on fighting, so I don't think the skills of the soldiers are a sufficient explanation.

The question is how exactly they realized this advantage. And no, it wasn't the "countless horde with short swords" option.

In my understanding they realized the advantage in worked metal per capita with heavily-armed and armored soldiers across the board. They had metal-tipped darts, but also mail shirts and short swords for almost every single soldier. Note that Devereaux also mentions equipment not directly connected to combat, such as metal cooking and drinking vessels, and all these tools for use in constructing field works and foraging for supplies:

Josephus reports of the Roman army in 69 CE that the soldiers each carried “a saw, a basket, and a pick-axe, a leather strap, a sickle and a hook with three days’ provisions” in addition to his weapons, an assemblage Josephus clearly intends to impress.47

I'm not aware of any professional historians who ascribe Roman success purely to the pilum*; most explanations that I've seen focus on the Romans' manpower superiority, engendered by their unique (or nearly so) system of allies on the Italian peninsula. Devereaux's dissertation is an update to the demographic argument showing that the Romans not only fielded far more men than their opponents, they lavished more resources on those men than their opponents could generally afford.

To quote from the abstract,

The result of these investigations is to show that Rome’s advantage in this period extended beyond manpower to include a superior ability to mobilize a broad range of economic resources. Finally, this project seeks to investigate the sources for this Roman advantage in resource mobilization. It suggests that the ability of the Roman Republic to marshal such vast reserves was due to the translation of the social institution of clientela into a blueprint for the inter-communal system of alliances in Italy, which in turn enabled Rome to efficiently and extensively harness the economic and demographic power of Italy. Rome’s rivals were not able to extract revenue and manpower from their own holdings as efficiently, leading to a decisive Roman military advantage.

You can see there is no mention here of pila at all; the focus is on the political and social systems on the Italian peninsula.

*this of course could be due to my own ignorance and I would not claim to have investigated these issues exhaustively.

 

[pecheneg]

Eventually the army was gradually reformed-all citizens could enlist for several years of full time service

This is called the reform of Mary. And it was held in 107 BC.
134 years after the victory in the first Punic
94 years after the victory in the Second Punic
90 years after the victory in the Second Macedonian War
82 years after the defeat of the Galatians
81 years after the defeat of the Seleucids in the Antioch War
61 years after the victory in the Third Macedonian War. Аnd the fact that the Seleucid offensive against the Ptolemies was stopped by a single shout from the Romans.
41 years after the final conquest of Greece by the results of three wars since 195 BC.

Indeed, what many people don't understand is how different Roman system was from most of their enemies. What might surprise you that if you'd take an average legionary of late Republic or Empire and put him one on one against a classical hoplite, kleuruch thorakites (that's singular, plural is thorakitai), Celtic swordsman or even Thracian peltast or falx wielder, odds are the legionary would lose.

Tell me, does nothing bother you that the Romans managed to defeat all these terminators before the reform? And with the same Celtic-Galatians, it was more like a one-sided massacre?

Most of the nations in Europe and around Mediterranean had some sort of system where a core of infantry would be drawn from a kind of warrior class whose members would be wealthy enough to be well fed, provide their own equipment and spend significant part of their lives training.for combat, but such class would be relatively low in numbers.

And this system of recruitment by property classes in its purest form lasted longer for the Romans than for all the main rivals. All the others massively used mercenaries and military settlers.

 

[Boris Gudenuf]

I do agree a lot that 700 years or more is a long long time! One tends to forget these basic numbers and other data when remembering history - at least the amateur kind of.

But that leads me to the question I had in mind for a long time:

How do we - or rather Civilization 7 or Humanind 2 - better frame the early game units than by their weapon? What can we name them instead of spearman/swordman/warrior? Apparently, it‘s more about organisational possibilty and logistics, but that just doesn‘t lend itself to a catchy naming convention. And if we take in ranged and mobile units - does it still make sense to have Archers and Chariots as separate Units?

I long for a better naming - but I fear we are stuck with that anachronistic idea as it‘s so set in our minds - kind of like the scaly dinosaurs (don‘t add me, I know it‘s more complicated than „they all have feathers now“).

I've started posting my ideas for a "New Combat System" trying to thread the gap between Civ VI's 1UPT abomination of bad temporal and geographical scale and Humankind's micromanagement of every sub-unit in a battle, here: Combat System for Civ VII

Basically, there is no reason for the Grand Panjundrum of a Civilization to control anything on a battlefield, unless he/she is personally leading the army. In a 4X game, you should be making Grand Strategic (which weapons do we manufacture, how do we arm the troops, how do we raise, feed, and train the troops?), Strategic (how and where do we want to fight our wars?), and Operational (How do we get the enemy to fight us when and where we want to fight him, and nowhere else?). Tactical decisions about who stands and who charges, who throws spears and who calls down artillery fire are, frankly, None Of Your Business.

So, I would reduce your basic decisions about Units to two parts:
1. What kind of weapons do we arm them with?
- and this includes the very important element of not only how do we get the materials to manufacture the weapons, but how do we afford the time to train the people to use them, because some weapons are just too expensive in time and effort for the average city-dweller to use (case in point: horse archers - no bunch of city dwellers or farmers EVER became horse archers). This means for some Units typed by their weapons, the origins and criteria for forming them will have to be a lot more 'exotic' than we are used to in our current 4X games.

2. Are the troops gong to be Amateurs or Professionals?
Amateurs for most of history (roughly, to the beginning of the Industrial Era) were simply Everybody Who Showed Up, bringing their own weapons and equipment with them, but also expecting to go home after a short time, because they had jobs, shops, farms, pastures and other livelihoods to attend to. Some of them could be extremely proficient Amateurs - most Greek Hoplites were of this category, but it was a Civic Duty to show up fully armored and well-trained in the Gymnasium to defend your city. In other words, and like most Amateurs, there is a Social or Civic component to these Units that is even more important to their formation than the Weapons.

Professionals are those who fight for a Living. They are available all the time, can train all the time, and so can handle effectively some much more complex (and versatile) weapons. They are also, compared to Amateurs, Expensive to keep because they have to be supported - except when they are looting someone else, they aren't doing anything to pay their own way.
Some weapons require the time and effort only available to Professionals: Swords, Cavalry with Bows, Cavalry with Lances, most Siege equipment, etc. Other types of Weapons can be used by either Amateurs or Professionals, but the Professionals will, all things being equal, be better with them: spears, pikes, battle axes, muskets, rifles, crossbows, etc.

Some weapons are 'naturally' available to certain classes of the population. In any pastoral group, virtually all adult males know how to ride and shoot a bow, because that's what they use to defend their herds against predators on 2 to 4 legs. If you want Horse Archers, in other words, Hire Them from the pastorals: there is a reason that both Rome and Byzantium had large numbers of Hun Cavalry as mercenary components of their armies. Shepherds on foot in most societies also became adept with missile weapons -javelins or slings - to protect their flocks so that they are essentially "self trained" as Slingers or Light Infantry (Classical Greek psiloi). Warrior Aristocrats or Noble Warriors train themselves because their self-image is tied to being proficient with weapons - but that group needs some way of supporting themselves or being supported, which will be a Social/Civic System like Comitatus or Feudalism that will have Major Effects on the rest of your Civilization/Faction as well.

By including the previously-ignored component of Societal Support (Amateur, Professional, Civic/Social requirements) to the simple Weapons we get both a more accurate depiction of armies and units but also (finally!) can show the relationship between the army and the society that produced it. A large professional Roman Army was not possible without also extending the basis for recruitment to virtually all Roman Citizens, while also extending Roman Citizenship far beyond the original inhabitants of the city of Rome. That also turned out to be the basis for maintaining a relatively stable and inclusive Empire for centuries. That started before the Empire: Hannibal and the Carthaginians ultimately failed because they were not fighting the city of Rome only, but Rome controlling most of Italy and able to recruit most of the Italians into effective Roman armies. The exclusive Greek city states with their Social/Civic structure could not have formed an Empire that was other than coercive beyond their original city-state borders, as Athens' attempt to do so demonstrated.

Society = Army in very fundamental ways, and it also affects the rest of the Society.

 

[Sofista]

This is called the reform of Mary. And it was held in 107 BC.

I think you meant to write, [Gaius] Marius.

 

[Sarin]

This is called the reform of Mary. And it was held in 107 BC.
134 years after the victory in the first Punic
94 years after the victory in the Second Punic
90 years after the victory in the Second Macedonian War
82 years after the defeat of the Galatians
81 years after the defeat of the Seleucids in the Antioch War
61 years after the victory in the Third Macedonian War. Аnd the fact that the Seleucid offensive against the Ptolemies was stopped by a single shout from the Romans.
41 years after the final conquest of Greece by the results of three wars since 195 BC.

I think the old Gaius Marius would object to being called "Mary". The Marian reforms were somewhat more gradual that that, 107 BCE just marks the time when property requirements were effectively abolished. Roman military system had been gradually shifting toward this model since Second Punic war, with property requirements being gradually lowered and at times of need temporarily abolished several times before Marius.

Tell me, does nothing bother you that the Romans managed to defeat all these terminators before the reform? And with the same Celtic-Galatians, it was more like a one-sided massacre?

Eh, no. When the reforms were effectively finished, which was after Social War when the Italic allies were granted Roman citizenship, Roman Republic constituted of Italy, southern Gaul, most of the Iberian peninsula, Greece, Illyria, parts of Thrace, Ionian coast and parts of north African coast. Celtic traditions were still alive and kicking throughout Gaul (which was a patchwork of kingdoms, most loosely allied with Rome) and Britain, hellenic traditions were still alive in Pontic, Ptolemaic and vestigial Seleucid empires and the northern Balkan military tradition was kept by what was left of Thracians, Dacians and several other tribes until early 2nd century CE Dacian wars.

And this system of recruitment by property classes in its purest form lasted longer for the Romans than for all the main rivals. All the others massively used mercenaries and military settlers.

Again, it did not. Everyone used mercenaries. Carthage was infamous for relying almost exclusively on mercenaries and allies, but even Roman Republic relied on mercenaries to provide significant part of their cavalry forces throughout most of its history. The Roman property class system started breaking down during Second Punic War, and it only went from bad to worse throughout the second century BCE. Eventually, Gaius Marius did little more than put all the exceptions to the requirements, campaign terms and equipment acquisition on official footing and sorted out logistical problems related to it.

 

[pecheneg]

On the other hand we know there are times when the experienced core of the Roman army was nearly wiped out and the Romans went on fighting, so I don't think the skills of the soldiers are a sufficient explanation.

In addition, to become a professional, the "recruit" had to live up to this. If the only advantage is the number of soldiers and the losses are huge, the core of veterans simply does not have time to form. At the same time, the 2nd century BC is not the twentieth, when contact with the enemy is constant and experience accumulates almost daily.

They had metal-tipped darts, but also mail shirts and short swords for almost every single soldier.

Armor gave the Romans a lot of advantages, but they became the hegemon of the Mediterranean with such equipment
The middle of the II century BC. e. "most Roman soldiers wear a copper plaque in a span of width and length, which is attached to the chest and is called a breastplate (cardiophylax)."

I'm not aware of any professional historians who ascribe Roman success purely to the pilum*;

I remind you that the dispute began with the statement that the Romans were betting on the sword. Naturally, the massive use of metal-intensive projectiles was not the only reason for the success of the Romans. However, without pure military technical superiority, all other options would be largely devalued. As for the demographic and logistical argument, the effectiveness of the militia masses with inadequate armament is elementary to strive for zero. At the same time, it does not matter how successfully you can collect them and how far you can send them.
And military-technical superiority, based on powerful metallurgy, explains why the Romans won relatively easily in field battles against opponents who often had more than impressive contingents of professional troops.
At the same time, I repeat, it was the pilum that turned even a poorly trained recruit into a very dangerous soldier, which made it possible to use the demographic potential. When the technical superiority was lost, the Romans were not helped by the road network, nor by a huge mobilization base.

You can see there is no mention here of pila at all; the focus is on the political and social systems on the Italian peninsula.

It seems that purely humanitarian and military historians exist in perpendicular realities.
1. I wonder what deep economic and demographic justification the author found for the victory of the Macedonians over the Persians or the role of the Swedes in the Thirty Years' War.
2. The Romans themselves at the same time perfectly understood the role of even minor improvements

 

[GinandTonic]

The logistical advantage is not the same as a numerical advantage. Being able to get 20k professional troops in place, with sufficient supplies to move rapidly was a huge advantage over an adversary who could field 3k elite troops and 40k militia but without the wherewithal to really supply or move them.

Similar to the British Empire - it's not about having the most troops or the best troops. It's about having enough troops, good enough troops. Having them where and when you need them, ready to do their job.

 

[pecheneg]

Roman military system had been gradually shifting toward this model since Second Punic war

The catch is that the only reliable part of this gradality is 123 BC, Gracchi. Now look at the dates above

, with property requirements being gradually lowered and at times of need temporarily abolished several times before Marius.

I would say a very long time before - during the war with Pyrrhus, for example (281 BC). This is standard Roman procedure in case of an emergency. And here "after the Second Punic?"
At the same time, in the same Greece, еven non-citizens began to be swept into the army and 300+ years earlier.
While the Romans were creaking towards a professional army, all the other civilized Mediterranean people had it for centuries. Even if supplemented by the militia in emergency cases

Celtic traditions were still alive and kicking throughout Gaul (which was a patchwork of kingdoms, most loosely allied with Rome) and Britain, hellenic traditions were still alive in Pontic, Ptolemaic and vestigial Seleucid empires and the northern Balkan military tradition was kept by what was left of Thracians, Dacians and several other tribes until early 2nd century CE Dacian wars.

That is, the fact that these figures have not yet been directly conquered somehow cancels the fact that they have already been repeatedly beaten by the Romans in one gate?

Again, it did not. Everyone used mercenaries. Carthage was infamous for relying almost exclusively on mercenaries and allies, but even Roman Republic relied on mercenaries to provide significant part of their cavalry forces throughout most of its history.

So the auxiliaries and clientella are mercenaries? An original look at Roman history, to put it mildly.

The Roman property class system started breaking down during Second Punic War, and it only went from bad to worse throughout the second century BCE.

In reality, the property qualification has not changed since the beginning of the 2nd Punic at least up to 160 BC. Moreover, the only military reform between 160 BC and 107 - in 123 BC
Worse, even Marius did not finally abolish the qualification, it was simply lowered.

 

[pecheneg]

Also, logistics. Even with the primitive tax system. I remember someone noting that Rome could afford to lose battles harshly and still muster soldiers, while their opponents couldn't.

That is, the inability to mobilize a significant part of their reserves at once - and on their own territory - is a consequence of good logistics?
And if on the contrary and transfer from Athens to Sicily - very bad?
Do you think Chiang Kai-shek had the best logistics in World War II?

This is what happened with Hannibal

What exactly happened to Hannibal? He personally lost two armies - in Italy and at Zama. Two more Carthaginians disappeared in Spain and a fairly large contingent in Sicily.
At the same time, whether Carthage has run out of reserves or not is a question. The Romans simply won at Zama - in the immediate vicinity of Carthage.

Boudica. They won a number of victories

Like this?
"Sent by the procurator Cat Decinius (later replaced by Gaius Julius Alpinus Classicianus) at the request of the besieged troops in the number of two hundred militia were easily defeated."
Rome has shown amazing resilience in this difficult situation, yes.

 

[pecheneg]

Being able to get 20k professional troops

Is the professionalism of the troops and the quality (not quantity) of their weapons and ammunition also logistics? And the favorable location of the stars ?

 

[Sarin]

So you don't know the specific dates? The catch is that the only reliable part of this gradality is 123 BC, Gracchi.

I would say a very long time before - during the war with Pyrrhus, for example (281 BC). This is standard Roman procedure in case of an emergency. And here "after the Second Punic?"

The "emergency" was declared many times in Roman history. Way too many. In fact, it became de facto state of Roman army most of the time after Second Punic War.

At the same time, in the same Greece, еven non-citizens began to be swept into the army and 300+ years earlier.
While the Romans were creaking towards a professional army, all the other civilized Mediterranean people had it for centuries

Here, I strongly disagree. Romans were among the first to create true standing army, rather than recruiting main body of soldiers for specific campaigns, as was the usual for other nations. The emergency recruitment of lower classes and at times even non-citizens (if there was such distinction) was an emergency measure used, at times, by many nations, but it was Romans who made it a common practice.

That is, the fact that these figures have not yet been directly conquered somehow cancels the fact that they have already been repeatedly beaten by the Romans in one gate?

They've beaten Romans too. Nothing unusual.

So the auxiliaries and clientella are mercenaries? An original look at Roman history, to put it mildly.

No, I really mean mercenaries. Let me put some examples to this:
Heraclea (280 BCE). While Bruttians were allied with Pyrrhus, some of their mercenaries were among Roman light infantry and cavalry.
Upper Baetis (211 BCE). 20 000 Iberian mercenaries hired by Romans. Infamous for being bribed and deserting.
Cynoscephalae (197 BCE) and Magnesia (190 BCE). Cretan mercenary archers present among Roman light infantry.
Mercenary Germanic cavalry fought on both sides of Caesar's Civil War.

And so on...if you poke around a bit you'll find many more examples.

In reality, the property qualification has not changed since the beginning of the 2nd Punic at least up to 160 BC. Moreover, the only military reform between 160 BC and 107 - in 123 BC
Worse, even Marius did not finally abolish the qualification, it was simply lowered.

Incorrect. While conscription was based on property classes and had strict limits written in Roman law, volunteers had less limits imposed on them, and this was gradually used more often to circumvent the legal limitations. Livy tells about a soldier who volunteered in around 200 BCE despite not meeting the property requirements and subsequently served for 22 years, while conscripts were legally limited to no more than 6 years of continuous service and 16 campaigns in total, barring emergency. After Marius used the precedent from Second Punic War that allowed him to recruit from capite censi, a lowest citizen class that had no registered property, the long period of warfare gave him enough political leverage to legalize the practice as the norm, rather than emergency measure.

 

[pecheneg]

The "emergency" was declared many times in Roman history. Way too many. In fact, it became de facto state of Roman army most of the time after Second Punic War.

For example? What are the states of emergency between the Second Punic and Cimbrian Wars?

Here, I strongly disagree. Romans were among the first to create true standing army, rather than recruiting main body of soldiers for specific campaigns, as was the usual for other nations.

First, we are discussing the professionalism of the armies, not their constancy.

They've beaten Romans too. Nothing unusual.

Seriously? The list of Roman victories of the 3rd century BC is above. These are almost all wars in a row, except "barbaric.

No, I really mean mercenaries. Let me put some examples to this:
Heraclea (280 BCE). While Bruttians were allied with Pyrrhus, some of their mercenaries were among Roman light infantry and cavalry.
Upper Baetis (211 BCE). 20 000 Iberian mercenaries hired by Romans. Infamous for being bribed and deserting.
Cynoscephalae (197 BCE) and Magnesia (190 BCE). Cretan mercenary archers present among Roman light infantry.
Mercenary Germanic cavalry fought on both sides of Caesar's Civil War.

Does nothing bother you about the fact that about 300 years have passed between Heraclea and the Germans?
At the same time, you claimed that

"but even Roman Republic relied on mercenaries to provide significant part of their cavalry forces throughout most of its history".

And the most mysterious - what does the Cretans have to do with it?
At the same time, a cursory check shows that, for example, the Cretan mercenaries of the Romans under the Cynoscephalians are mentioned in the Wiki, but more academic descriptions speak of allied contingents.
At the same time, the battle itself is indicative. The Macedonians have 1/5 of the army of mercenaries and this is not counting the permanent contingents. The Romans either had a handful of Cretan mercenaries, or not.

Livy tells about a soldier who volunteered in around 200 BCE despite not meeting the property requirements and subsequently served for 22 years,

And where does Livy say that Spurius did not pass the censorship?